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May this work serve in some small way as a constant candle, honouring people 
in all walks of life who sit together and talk when other paths persist.  
 
A haiku, for my Grandparents 
Generations past, 
did more, for longer, with less. 
To you, gracious thanks. 
 
Lanterns in the dusk 
For those who wait.  
The scarred, of soul and frame. 
All whose homecoming never came.  
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Abstract 
Negotiated agreements are vital policy options for parties in conflict and those 
seeking conflict resolutions, as military action alone can rarely achieve “the political 
resolution of the drivers of conflict” required for lasting stability and reconciliation.1 
21st Century Western-led interventions into conflict areas no longer seek conquest or 
permanent direct rule. Instead, moral, legal and policy imperatives make the “focus on 
supporting the local populace and the host nation government.”2 If international 
militaries (with development and diplomatic activity) “cannot achieve lasting success 
without the HN [Host Nation] government achieving legitimacy”3 then to be useful, 
academic theory and scholarly analysis of negotiated agreements must explain the 
impact of military action on the legitimacy of government as a negotiating partner. 
A central debate in negotiation theory is whether the substance of negotiations 
determines success, or if timing is decisive. William Zartman’s Ripeness theory 
considers timing definitive, but also encompasses issues of substance, combining both 
major arguments.4 It is also the only theory to link the onset of genuine negotiation to 
military power – the most heavily resourced arm of government – closely matching 
real-world strategy and policy options. The thesis makes two important contributions. 
First, it introduces the Sangin Accord as an historical case study, an agreement 
negotiated in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province from 2008-2010 and made public in 
January 2011. This is the first detailed, political history and assessment of the Sangin 
Accord yet published. Second, it explores Ripeness theory as an explanatory tool for a 
negotiated political agreement at the local level – since it was originally derived from 
inter-state case studies in Africa during the Cold War (though more recently it has 
been applied to civil wars). Here “local” means “subprovincial,” and refers “to district- 
                                                     
1 All academic terms used in this abstract are defined when first used in the main text. 
Quote from British Army, Field Manual Vol 1. Part 10 Countering Insurgency (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2009), paragraph 8-6.  
2 US Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2006), 
paragraph 2-2.  
3 Ibid., paragraph 1-120.  
4 Zartman’s initial theory is set out in I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict Resolution in 
Africa, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). It is later updated in I. William Zartman, 
"Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. D. 
Druckman and P. Stern, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000). 
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or village-specific issues.”5 The conclusions offer observations on applying Ripeness 
theory when intervening to seek political reconciliation in a local area removed from 
centralised authority, and without a permanent military advantage – termed here as 
‘fringe areas’. It highlights the impact of history (both received and remembered), and 
traumatic experiences, on memory, perception and rationality; vital factors for 
Ripeness theory. Finally, it explores the paradox between policymakers’ desire to 
negotiate from a position of strength, and Ripeness theory’s contradictory 
requirement for a mutually perceived hurting stalemate – simultaneously alongside a 
























Figure 1: The Times Online reports Helmand Provincial Governor Gulab Mangal’s 
public announcement of the Sangin Accord, 4th January 2011.6 
                                                     
5 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 43. 
6 The image is a screenshot (full article available to subscribers only): The Times, "Afghan Tribal Elders 
Promise to Stop Attacks on Troops in Sangin," 4th January 2011, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/afghanistan/article2861680.ece.  
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
AD – Anno Domini. 
AH – Anno Hijiri, denoting the Islamic calendar. 
ANA – Afghan National Army. 
ANP – Afghan National Police. 
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces. 
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation. 
CIA – United States Central Intelligence Agency. 
COIN – Counterinsurgency. 
DfID – UK Department for International Development. 
DG – (Afghan) District Governor. 
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FOI – (UK) Freedom of Information (Act, 2000). 
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GIRoA – Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.  
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IAC – Internal Armed Conflict. 
IED – Improvised Explosive Device. 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan). 
ISI – (Pakistan’s) Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. 
KCL – King’s College London University. 
                                                                                                                                                           
The text (only) is on the author’s personal website at: Jerome Starkey, "Afghan Tribal Elders Promise to 
Stop Attacks on Troops in Sangin," 2011, http://www.jeromestarkey.com/post/2592771525/afghan-
tribal-elders-promise-to-stop-attacks-on-troops(accessed 12th October 2014 - both sources).  
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KGB – Russian intelligence agency (1954-1991). Literally, the Committee for 
State Security. 
MEO – Mutually Enhancing Opportunity. 
MHS – Mutually Hurting Stalemate. 
MOD – United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
NDS – Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, akin to domestic 
intelligence. 
NWFP – Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province. 
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team. 
QDDR – (The United States’) Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. 
QST – Quetta Shura Taliban. Commonly used to refer to the Taliban leadership. 
RC – Regional Command, a sub-division of ISAF. For example, Regional 
Command (South) becomes RC(S), or RC (South). 
UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
UN – United Nations. 
US – United States of America. 
USMC – United States Marine Corps. 
USV – Upper Sangin Valley. 
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Glossary of Afghan language and cultural terms 
This section includes an explanation of necessary terms used in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan uses two languages, Dari and Pashto. In contemporary use, Dari refers to 
the dialects of modern Persian language spoken in Afghanistan, and known as "Afghan 
Persian" in some Western sources. As defined in the Constitution of Afghanistan, it is 
one of the two official languages of Afghanistan.7 Pashto [alternative: Pushtu] is the 
language of the Pashtun. The Pashtun are the predominant ethnolinguistic element 
within Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, 
constituting a population of between fifty to sixty million.”8 Pashto is a national 
language of Afghanistan, alongside Dari. These languages are sometimes mixed in the 
same sentence in colloquial Afghan dialogue, and Arabic words are at times imported. I 
have not distinguished between them here. Where these terms are first used in the 
text they are shown in italics, and where necessary, a fuller definition has been given. 
Arbakai – an Afghan collective community defence mechanism. 
Fatwa – an Islamic religious pronouncement. 
Jihad – one of the Islamic duties, literally, “the struggle” (though it need not 
signify violence). People engaged in jihad are mujahidin (see below). 
Jerib – Afghan unit of area usually used in agriculture, typically relating to 
around 2km2. 
Jirga – an Afghan decision-making council or assembly. 
Kalay – village. 
Kiriz – an irrigation canal. 
Loya Jirga – a traditional “Grand Assembly” at which national or highly 
significant leaders are chosen. 
Mirab – Afghan community-appointed stewards of the waterways. 
                                                     
7 King's College London, "Modern Language Centre: Languages We Offer - Dari," 2014, 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/artshums/depts/mlc/about/languages/dari.aspx(accessed 6th August 2014).  
8 SOAS, "Languages of the near & Middle East at SOAS: Pashto," 2014, 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/nme/languages/languages-of-the-near-middle-east-at-soas-
pashto.html(accessed 27th July 2014).  
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Mujahidin – Islamic holy warriors (singular: mujahid). 
Mullah – religious leader, akin to a priest. 
Qala – castle or fort. 
Shura – (Pashto) an Afghan community meeting, considered slightly less formal 
than a jirga. Binding decisions are still taken and attendance may be wider. 
Talib – the Arabic word for “student”. In addition to singular and plural, Arabic 
has a dual form of a noun, meaning a pair. The Arabic word for “two students” is 
Taliban, imported into Pashto as the plural meaning “students”. 
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Note on transliteration, naming, and referencing style 
Transliteration and Afghan words 
Afghan terms, words, names, and labels are written in English in the format 
used by the United Kingdom’s civilian or military command chain in Helmand during 
the author’s time there between September 2009 and July 2010. Where possible they 
have been referenced from a declassified document or unclassified source.  
I have attempted to validate and reference the spellings of Afghan words, and 
have used italic emphasis to highlight these words the first time they are used – 
including by adding my own emphasis to quotations. Any errors are my own. I have 
made no changes to foreign language words when quoted directly, and where 
spellings differ from the terms typically used in the thesis I have used square brackets 
to show the correlation, for example, the city of Qandahar [Kandahar]. 
Key terms, dates, places, and names 
Essential terminology, acronyms, abbreviations, and some names, are defined 
and referenced when first mentioned in the text. Terms that name a specific 
organisation (e.g. Afghan Government), job title (Provincial Governor), or 
administrative area (Sangin District) are capitalised. The core components of Ripeness 
theory are capitalised, to make clear that analysis relates specifically to that theory: 
the Way Out; Mutually Hurting Stalemate, Ripe Moment. The terms Ripe and Ripeness, 
where they relate to the theoretical conditions of Ripeness theory are also capitalised. 
Dates are presented in the Western Gregorian calendar, and AD or BC is added 
where clarification is helpful. Selected dates are also given in the Islamic calendar, for 
example, the last Persian Shah was assassinated by his Generals in 1747 AD (1160 AH). 
Referencing and Primary Sources 
A slightly expanded version of Endnote’s Turabian Bibliography format is used.9 
Quotes referenced from the translated primary sources are edited only for 
improvements in English fluency. These changes are shown in [squared brackets].  
                                                     
9 University of Western Australia, "Oxford Referencing Style: A Guide to Using the Oxford Note Citation 
Referencing Style for Footnotes and Reference Lists," 2014, 
http://guides.is.uwa.edu.au/content.php?pid=385139&sid=3156563(accessed 27th July 2014).  
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Timeline 




(Significant Pre-Afghan leader and events). 






Assassinated Persian generals, then declared 
independence; considered the birth of Afghanistan. 
 
Natural death. 
1772-1793 Timur Shah 
Inherited: Eldest son of Durrani. Violently 
suppressed uprising led by his brother. 
 
Natural death. 
1793-1800 Zaman Shah 
No heir named. Overcame six or more rivals, from 
23 sons – in a lengthy dispute. 
 
Himself deposed, blinded. 
1800-1803 Shah Mahmud 
Deposed his brother, Zaman Shah. 
 
Himself deposed, imprisoned. 
1803-1809 Shah Shuja 
Deposed his brother Shah Mahmud. 
 
Also deposed, exiled to India. 
1809-1818 Shah Mahmud 
Restored, deposing his brother Shah Shuja. 
 




Declared himself Amir of Kabul. 
 
Deposed by UK, first Afghan war. 
1839-1842 Shah Shuja 
Restored by the British. 
 




British didn’t oppose his return after Shuja killed. 
 
Died naturally. 
1863-1879 Sher Ali 
3rd son of Dost Mohammad (defeated his brothers’ 










Succession as oldest son of Abdur Rahman. 
 
Assassinated. 
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1919-1929 Ammanullah 
Son of Habibullah, resisted his uncles’ claims. 
 
Exiled (to Italy). 
1929-1933 Nadir Shah 
Descended from Dost Mohammad. Returned from 
France, shot his rivals. 
 
Assassinated. 
1933-1973 Zahir Shah 
Succeeded his father Nadir Shah. 
 




Prime Minister. Overthrew his brother Zahir Shah. 
 
Killed by Communists. 
1978-1979 Nur Taraki 
Installed in coup. 
 
Assassinated. 
1979 Hafizullah Amin 
Promoted after death of Taraki. 
 
KGB assassination. 
1979-1986 Babrak Karmal 
KGB installation. 
 










Political leader for most of the Mujahidin 
Government, after that coalition captured Kabul. 
 
Deposed by Taliban, fled – retained position as 
rival to Taliban Islamic Emirate. 
(Assassinated by Taliban 2011 while Chairman of 





Conquered Kabul (and other parts of the country), 
founding an Islamic Emirate under Taliban rule. 
 
Deposed after the US-backed Northern Alliance 
defeated Taliban in 2001. Confirmed dead in 2015. 
2004-2014 Hamid Karzai 
Interim leader under UN-mandated process. 
Elected President by traditional gathering (2002) 
and formal ballot in 2004. 
 
Stood for two terms, and retired. 
2014-
present 
Dr. Ashraf Ghani 
Elected in 2014. 
 
Still serving. 
Figure 2: Afghanistan’s turbulent leadership changes.10
                                                     
10 Data from Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the 
Failures of Great Powers (PublicAffairs, 2011), pp. 720-3. 
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Figure 3: Afghanistan. Helmand Province is in the south-west, with Sangin located on the upper reaches of the 
Helmand River valley to the east of Musa Qaleh. Image: Crown Copyright, 2013. Used with permission. 
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Figure 4: Helmand Province. Sangin and the Kajaki Dam are marked in the top 
right corner, north-east of the more populous areas of central Helmand, such as 
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Figure 5: Sangin District (marked approximately in green) and the topography of 
the Upper Sangin Valley. The populations covered by the Sangin Accord lived in 
this area, territory dominated by the Helmand River and the connected irrigation 
system and framed by sharp mountain outcrops. Image: Crown Copyright, 2013. 
Used with permission. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Why study the Sangin Accord? 
The Sangin Accord11 of 2011 is one of a very small number of publicised 
political agreements from the recent Afghanistan campaign and it came about, 
somewhat unexpectedly, in one of the country’s most violent districts.12 The 2006 
Musa Qala Accord (alternative spelling, Musa Qaleh) is one of the few other local 
events, occurring in the neighbouring district to Sangin. There was no public national-
level political process between the Afghan Government and the Taliban at that time.13 
A detailed case study of the Sangin Accord is therefore valuable in its own right as an 
historical record, but also for two further reasons. First, it adds new data to the 
ongoing debate about the relative importance of negotiation in any conflict strategy. 
Second, it explores the role of either the stalemate or the position of strength as 
necessary precursors to a negotiated genuine agreement to resolve conflict.  
There is no universal theoretical definition of a negotiated agreement, and so 
when used here it should be considered as a statement of shared intent reached by 
communication between conflict parties and agreed and formalised by their 
representatives, with or without mediators. It usually addresses some or all of the 
drivers of the conflict, or interim steps towards them, and is usually recorded in writing 
or other locally appropriate indicators of commitment. Finally, the case study 
illustrates Ripeness theory’s relative value as an explanatory tool for negotiations at 
the local level. The local is an important level of analysis (best considered alongside 
assessments of wider geographical areas), especially in areas where authority is 
disputed and centralised political engagement struggles to address local grievances 
and historical conflict drivers. Specifically, William Zartman’s Ripeness theory is used, 
                                                     
11 The capitalised term ‘Accord’ is used only to name this agreement and confers no academic 
characteristics on the nature of the agreement itself, or on the process by which it was reached. Some 
US sources prefer ‘Sangin Security Agreement’ rather than Accord. For example, American Commanding 
General Richard Mills: “Local elders from the Sangin area approached Gov. Mangal and myself to discuss 
what I would term an important security agreement.” See Afghanistan ISAF Joint Command, "Afghan, 
Coalition Leaders Broker Peace Deal in Sangin," ISAF Joint Command, Afghanistan, 2011, 
http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-coalition-leaders-broker-peace-deal-in-
sangin.html(accessed 11th January 2015).  
12 The term Sangin is given to both a town and an administrative district in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan. This is shown on maps in the Reference Maps section of the Front Matter. 
13 For more on the Musa Qala case study see for example Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009). 
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which is “intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are 
susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution 
through negotiation.”14 Ripeness theory is very specific, aiming only to describe the 
conditions present at the opening of genuine negotiations focused on conflict 
resolution. Here, conflict resolution means “the elimination of the causes of the 
underlying conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties” – a process which is 
“rarely achieved by direct action and is more frequently achieved only over long 
periods of time.”15 As Zartman says,  
“It is difficult at the outset to determine whether negotiations are indeed 
serious or sincere, and indeed “true” and “false” motives may be indistinguishably 
mixed in the minds of the actors themselves at the beginning. Yet it is the onset of 
negotiations that are the subject of the theory.”16  
Zartman’s writing is influential within scholarship about negotiations, 
significantly developing the field.17 This credibility, alongside two further reasons, 
                                                     
14 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 228. 
15 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 8. 
16 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 227. 
17 For a full list of Zartman’s influential works and academic achievements see Johns Hopkins University, 
"I. William Zartman Biography," 2016, https://www.sais-jhu.edu/i-william-zartman(accessed 16th 
January 2016).  
Core references for Ripeness theory include: I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and 
Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford, 1985); Zartman, 1989, op. cit; Zartman, 2000, op. cit; I. William 
Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics vol. 1, no. 1 (2001); I. William Zartman, Power and Negotiation, ed. I. William Zartman and 
Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002). 
Zartman’s work has catalysed significant scholarship. Detailed literature reviews setting Ripeness theory 
within the field of negotiation theory and its evolutions can be found in Dean G. Pruitt, Whither Ripeness 
Theory? Working Paper No. 25 (George Mason University: Institute for Conflict Management and 
Resolution, 2005); Peter T. Coleman et al., "Reconstructing Ripeness I: A Study of Constructive 
Engagement in Protracted Social Conflicts," Conflict Resolution Quarterly vol. 26, no. 1 (2008); Peter T. 
Coleman et al., "Reconstructing Ripeness II: Models and Methods for Fostering Constructive Stakeholder 
Engagement across Protracted Divides," Conflict Resolution Quarterly vol. 26, no. 1 (2008). 
Scholars have also sought to apply Ripeness to specific conflict types and case studies: I. William 
Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1995); Daniel Lieberfeld, "Conflict “Ripeness” Revisited: The South African and 
Israeli/Palestinian Cases," Negotiation Journal vol. 15, no. 1 (1999); Philip A. Schrodt, Ömür Yilmaz, and 
Deborah J. Gerner, "Evaluating “Ripeness” and “Hurting Stalemate” in Mediated International Conflicts: 
An Event Data Study of the Middle East, Balkans, and West Africa," University of Kansas, 2003, 
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/papers.dir/Schrodt.etal.ISA03.pdf(accessed 22nd June 2013). The 
impact of policy choices on Ripeness is an emerging area, such as I.W. Zartman and G.O. Faure, 
Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011); L. 
Podszun, Does Development Aid Affect Conflict Ripeness?: The Theory of Ripeness and Its Applicability in 
the Context of Development Aid (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011).  
In addition to theory, Zartman is also widely published on the practice of negotiation, including I. 
William Zartman, "The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation," Integrating Internal Displacement into 
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justify the selection of Ripeness theory (defined and explained in detail later in this 
chapter) as the explanatory framework assessed by the Sangin case study: first, it 
incorporates elements of the other approaches within negotiation theory; second, it is 
the only theory to account for the impact of military action on genuine negotiation. If, 
during conflict, theory could define operational methods to illustrate relative progress 
towards a negotiating opportunity in near-real time, it would be truly useful in deeply 
violent areas like Sangin. The core question considered by this thesis is therefore, 
“What does the Sangin Accord case study illustrate about the explanatory value of 
Ripeness theory for negotiated agreements at the local level?” 
Why focus on negotiation and on Ripeness, given the range of alternative 
theories of conflict termination and resolution? The primary reason is that policy 
makers continue to expect negotiated agreements to be possible, describe them using 
the language of Ripeness theory, and in prominent cases actively seek them as conflict 
outcomes.18 In 2011, US State Department Assistant Secretary Rose Goetmoeller 
(Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance) referred to a sense within the 
international community that the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty was “Ripe for 
negotiation.”19 In 2002, Rosemary Hollis (a former director of Chatham House), 
presenting evidence to the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee, suggested that the peace camps within the Israel-Palestinian conflict 
“need a signal that the international community has not abandoned all hope and can 
envisage a peaceful resolution of the conflict even if the time is not yet Ripe for 
                                                                                                                                                           
Peace Processes and Agreements: resource kit to accompany Guide for mediators (1997). 
http://id.cdint.org/content/documents/The_Structuralist_Dilemma_in_Negotiation.pdf (accessed 21st 
January 2012); I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982); I William Zartman, "Negotiating with Terrorists," International Negotiation vol. 
8, no. 3 (2003); I William Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays on Theory and Practice 
(Routledge, 2007). 
18 See for example Council of the European Union, "Presidency Conclusions," 2007, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/eu_kosovo/european_council_conclusions_14_
dec_2007_en.pdf(accessed 22nd March 2011).  Also Delegation of the European Union to the 
Philippines, "EU Expands Its Support to the Peace Process in Mindanao," 2012, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/documents/press_corner/20120720.pdf(accessed 26th 
August 2012).  Or European Union, "EU Statement in Response to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine, H.E. Kostyantyn Gryshchenko," 2012, http://www.osce.org/pc/71115?download=true(accessed 
29th August 2012).  
19 Rose Goettemoeller, "Progress on Commencing Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Negotiations," 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/179167.htm(accessed 10th October 2012).  
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reaching a peace agreement.”20 This element of the rationale for focusing on 
negotiated agreement, and Ripeness theory, is expanded later in this chapter. 
Significant disagreement remains over how conflicts actually end. There are 
roughly three lines of analysis: first, whether war is linear or dynamic; the second 
assesses the relative significance of conflict drivers; the third considers how 
judgements about conflict termination choices are made. The first focus considers 
negotiation as a conflict outcome, or a phase in a conflict spectrum. For example in 
studies of war termination – negotiation is considered “the last stage in a war once 
basic political objectives of the war are within reach,” signifying “the transition from 
war to peace.”21 In such analyses it is possible to consider negotiation as simply a 
mechanism for validating the successful application of other approaches – a victor’s 
peace.22 The concept of the Liberal Peace also attempts to define a standard process 
to conflict termination: it is an outcome that is universal, attainable, and achieving it is 
dependent upon a specific methodology.23  
Attempts to define conflict phases lend themselves to models of conflict 
termination that also favour binary choices, applied at specific recognisable times. 
Zartman summarises conflict theorists, observing that “negotiation is only one of a 
family of approaches to the settlement of conflict; the others are domination, 
capitulation, inaction, withdrawal, and the intervention of third parties.”24 In this 
analysis, the type of war becomes significant for theory, since distinctions in 
observable conflict characteristics suggest different approaches are required to end 
                                                     
20 Rosemary Hollis, "Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence," (2002). 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/384/2022602.htm (accessed 
29th May 2012). 
21 Oliver P Richmond, "Patterns of Peace," Global Society 20, no. 4 (2006); Rose M. Kadende-Kaiser and 
Paul J. Kaiser, "Phases of Conflict in Africa," Journal of Asian and African Studies vol. 38, no. 2-3 (2003); 
Linda Legier-Topp, War Termination: Setting Conditions for Peace (DTIC Document, 2009). 
22 Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela, "Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention after a Victor's Peace in 
Sri Lanka," Contemporary Social Science vol. 6, no. 1 (2011). 
23 Richmond, 2006, op. cit., p. 367. On the general theory see John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: 
American Politics and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2000); Michael W. Doyle, "Three 
Pillars of the Liberal Peace," American Political Science Review vol. 99, no. 3 (2005). For a  specific case 
study see Kristian Stokke, "Crafting Liberal Peace? International Peace Promotion and the Contextual 
Politics of Peace in Sri Lanka," Annals of the Association of American Geographers vol. 99, no. 5 (2009). 
24 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Dean Pruitt, S.H. Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. 
(New York McGraw-Hill, 1994). Quoted in Zartman, 1997, op. cit. For related analysis on specific 
approaches to conflict termination see: on “strategic coping” Christopher Tuck, Confrontation, Strategy 
and War Termination: Britain's Conflict with Indonesia (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). On  
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them.25 This thesis argues that these approaches have weaknesses that justify 
discarding them as explanatory tools for the case study, particularly that the 
delineation of the strategies imply that they are pursued separately from each other, 
and the impact of multiple simultaneous strategies on each other, or on the 
negotiating process, is poorly defined. These points are troublesome for those conflicts 
– as appeared to be the case in Sangin – where negotiations take place while other 
conflict strategies continue in parallel, or where multiple conflict strategies interact to 
bring about desired negotiations. These, and other concerns, contributed to the rise in 
theory considering conflict termination to be less about the competent application of 
rational scientific methods, and rooted instead in influencing subjective psychological 
responses to drivers of conflict – some of which are specifically local, cultural or 
historical – within unpredictable, dynamic hostilities.26 
The psychology around the value actors place on a negotiated end to conflict is 
an important factor. Research by the Rand Corporation describes a negotiated 
agreement as a “Mixed Outcome” – it is unclear whether this is considered positive.27 
This line of thinking risks placing negotiation in opposition to outcomes that are more 
directly the product of the successful application of military force; it is implicit that 
(military) domination, and other more recognisable indicators of victory, have failed if 
a negotiated outcome is prioritised. An increased focus on psychology and subjectivity 
extends the more objective, rational approaches beyond assessments of what military 
commanders will do with their resources (generally personnel and materiel) in 
response to their opponent’s military strategy. It also allows non-military motivations 
to play an increased role in conflict termination methodologies, such as the desire for 
                                                     
25 Whether a conflict is interstate, a civil war, an insurgency, or fits some other categorisation, can be 
considered an important variable in theories of conflict termination. For examples, see P. Terrence 
Hopmann, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts (University of South 
Carolina Press, 1996); Zartman, 1989, op. cit; Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "Interstate and 
Intrastate Negotiations in Angola," in Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. , ed. I. William 
Zartman, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1995); T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil 
Wars End a Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 40, no. 4 (1996). 
26 On the dynamism of conflict see Karen A. Jehn and Elizabeth A. Mannix, "The Dynamic Nature of 
Conflict: A Longitudinal Study of Intragroup Conflict and Group Performance," Academy of management 
journal vol. 44, no. 2 (2001); Louis Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," Grasping 
the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict, (2005). For evolutions to Ripeness theory in response 
to the dynamic nature of conflict intractability see the series of two articles by Coleman et al., 2008, op. 
cit; Coleman et al., 2008, op. cit. 
27  See for example Martin C. Libicki and Ben Connable, "How Insurgencies End," (2010). 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html (accessed 3rd July 2012), pp. 14-17, 168-171. 
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legitimacy, economics (including illicit activity), or the impact of humanitarian aid.28 
Paul Collier’s work, notably on greed and grievance, outlines a range of non-military 
motivations for conflict rooted in the same negative psychology as Ripeness theory, in 
which it may be economically rational to perpetuate war.29 This suggests greed is a 
motivation that needs to be considered as part of explanations for conflict 
termination, including through negotiation.  
Collier highlights an important issue that helps to explain the absence of greed 
narratives from the primary source material, and therefore from the detailed case 
study analysis: narratives of grievance play much better with the international 
community than ones of greed, and so greed is rarely admitted to interlocutors.30 This 
is a weakness that could only be mitigated effectively with alternative sources of 
economic data, not available for north Helmand at this time. Collier’s conclusions also 
highlight the importance of two other factors pertinent to the case study and the 
approach taken in this thesis, both of which fall outside Ripeness theory. His research 
“found that geography matters,” as conflict risks are increased by population 
dispersion and possibly by mountainous terrain – both conditions present in 
Afghanistan.31 History was also shown to be important, for in areas that “experienced 
                                                     
28 Economic motivations are covered in Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann, Ending Wars, Consolidating 
Peace: Economic Perspectives (Routledge, 2013). For the interaction between narcotics actors and state 
finance and taxation see Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian P. Kühn, "Rents, Taxes, and Perpetual 
Dependency," Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding, (2013), p. 266. On humanitarian aid, 
see Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis, "State Building in a Rentier State: How Development 
Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan," Development and Change vol. 44, no. 3 (2013); 
Jonathan Goodhand, "Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid in Afghanistan," 
Third World Quarterly vol. 23, no. 5 (2002); Florian P. Kühn, "Aid, Opium, and the State of Rents in 
Afghanistan: Competition, Cooperation, or Cohabitation?," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding vol. 
2, no. 3 (2008); Stuart Gordon, "The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact 
on Humanitarian Actors," Disasters vol. 34, no. s3 (2010). Specifically on the link between development 
policy and civil war, see Paul Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy 
(World Bank, 2003). 
29 See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War " Oxford Economic Papers No. 
56., (2002). For an assessment of the economic rationality of continuing conflict see Paul Collier, "Doing 
Well out of War: An Economic Perspective," in Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic 
Perspectives, ed. Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann, (Boulder, London: Lynne Reinner, 2000). 
Grievance as a conflict driver is covered in L.E. Cederman, K.S. Gleditsch, and H. Buhaug, Inequality, 
Grievances, and Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2013). The field is extended in Karen Ballentine 
and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
30 Collier, 2000, op. cit., p. 92. 
31 Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, op. cit., p. 35. 
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a conflict recently the risk of recurrent conflict is high.”32 It is therefore significant that 
Afghanistan has a long history of turbulent changeovers of power (as shown in Figure 
2), and that it had been a near-perpetual conflict since 1979. These are important 
narratives, expanded further in the case study, with strong antecedents in 
Afghanistan’s history.  
The role of international subsidy, and Afghanistan’s capacity to be sustained by 
domestic revenue, is a recurring theme from the 18th Century onwards. This highlights 
the importance of Rubin and others’ work on the rentier state, where the state itself, 
and its economy, rely disproportionately on external income – at times to the 
exclusion of promoting domestic productivity.33 The case study at the centre of this 
thesis occurs in the post 1991-era but some perceptions, influential on actors 
negotiating the Sangin Accord, derive from experience and historical memory from 
1978 and before. This places the analysis astride the fault line in different approaches 
taken by international actors towards Afghanistan as a rentier state, described by 
Barnett Rubin: 
Whereas before 1978 foreign powers competed for influence within the common 
framework of the Afghan state, through 1991 they pursued their goals by funding 
antagonistic organisations, of which the state was only the best armed (and the only 
one capable of printing currency).34 
The relative weakness of centralised reforms is also important. The historical 
antecedents to the Sangin Accord recall repeated instances of elites (often sponsored 
by outsiders) “building an overdeveloped but under-achieving state that shuts itself off 
from the population.”35 For Gilles Dorronsoro, the international community added 
fresh impetus to the re-establishment of a centralised political system, but “the drive 
to reconstruct the state has clashed with the efforts of regional powers to remain 
                                                     
32 Ibid. 
33 Distinct from rentier capitalism (where currency is exported), the modern use of the term comes from 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (Routledge, 2015). The definition is summarised 
very effectively in Giacomo Luciani, The Arab State (Univ of California Press, 1990), pp. 87-88. 
Implementation challenges in this context are described in Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013, op. cit; 
Barnett R. Rubin, "Political Elites in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 24, no. 01 (1992). 
34 Rubin, 1992, op. cit., p. 98. 
35 de Guevara and Kühn, 2013, op. cit., p. 226. 
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autonomous.”36 From this perspective the Sangin Accord case study could be 
considered a microcosm of this struggle between community desires for security and 
autonomy. Dorronsoro reviews the history of Afghanistan from 1979 to 2005, 
considering whether the course of the country’s modern history represents continuity 
with older history, or a marked change from what went before.37 These themes are 
useful lens for the historical analysis, and have been applied to elements of the case 
study. There is therefore a considerable range of theories, models of analysis, and 
thematic approaches that could be applied to the case study. However, given the 
centrality of the negotiated agreement itself to the case study, the thesis focuses on 
the application of negotiation theory and related work on reconciliation theory. 
Negotiation theory divides broadly into two schools of thought. “One, of the 
longest standing, holds that the key to a successful resolution of conflict lies in the 
substance of the proposals for a solution” while “the other holds that the key to 
successful conflict resolution lies in the timing of efforts for resolution.”38 There is a 
third smaller school that “focuses on relationships between the parties rather than 
either the substance or the procedure of the issues in conflict.”39 Reconciliation theory 
addresses the final line of argument; this body of research holds that some of the core 
motivators for conflict resolution are contact and communication between the conflict 
parties; problem-solving workshops and other forms of interactive conflict resolution; 
or intervention by mediators.40 Since these activities need not depend on negotiation, 
or involve it at all, it is considered less useful here. Those that prioritise the substance 
school argue that, “parties resolve their conflict by finding an acceptable agreement – 
more or less at a mid-point – between their positions, either along a flat front through 
compromise or through the search for positive sum solutions or encompassing 
                                                     
36 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2005), p. 338. 
37 For example, in ibid. he describes the continuous nature of the strengthening central state relative to 
the traditional regional leadership (p. 120), the cyclical nature of state reliance on foreign subsidy (p. 
335), while the Taliban’s co-option of religious leaders into the state apparatus is considered a new 
phenomenon (pp. 273-4). 
38 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 225. Emphasis added. 
39 Ibid. 
40 For a review of this line, see Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 38. For more on reconciliation theory, see for 
example Yehudith Auerbach, "The Reconciliation Pyramid—a Narrative-Based Framework for Analyzing 
Identity Conflicts," Political Psychology 30, no. 2 (2009); Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Reconciliation, Justice, 
and Coexistence: Theory and Practice (Lexington Books, 2001), especially chapters 2 and 6. 
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formulas.”41 The substance and relationship schools of negotiation theory therefore 
align with the separate but related reconciliation theory, in prioritising the social 
interactions between conflict parties, and the mechanisms that facilitate them. To 
select one of these approaches would make exploring the interaction between military 
power and negotiations less direct than allowed by Ripeness theory, and so they have 
been discarded. 
The timing school is dominated by Zartman’s Ripeness theory, and offers 
important critical advantages over reconciliation theory, and over the substance and 
relationships schools within negotiation theory. A theoretical framework built around 
Ripeness theory allows coverage of both those main arms of negotiation theory, as 
Ripeness theory is not intended to be a direct foil to the substance debate, but 
incorporates key elements of it. Zartman is clear that Ripeness “does not obviate the 
analysis of substance,”42 as propositions of worthy substance are a key part of 
formulating the conditions that Ripeness theory states are pre-requisites for successful 
negotiation. There are two further strengths. First, the concept of Ripeness remains 
central in the academic literature on negotiation and conflict resolution, and – 
importantly – also in public statements about current conflicts, as shown earlier. 
Secondly, unlike other elements of negotiation theory, Ripeness directly addresses the 
impact of the armed forces – the most heavily resourced government policy lever – on 
the negotiating process, incorporating substance, timing, relationships, and military 
action into one theoretical framework. This more closely mirrors the real-world policy 
options facing international actors seeking to deploy government resources to bring 
about political progress through genuine political agreement.  
Ripeness has a further useful strength (albeit not unique to Zartman’s work), in 
that the theory – especially later additions to it – allow for many of the wider factors 
                                                     
41 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 225. Work aligned with the substance debate is discussed later in the thesis, 
and includes important assessments on the relationship between the terms of agreement and their 
resilience. See for example Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to 
Intrastate Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 43, no. 1 (1999); K. Derouen, J. Lea, and P. 
Wallensteen, "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements," Conflict Management and Peace Science 
vol. 26, no. 4 (2009); M. Hoddie and C. Hartzell, "Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of 
Military Power-Sharing Arrangements," Journal of Peace Research vol. 40, no. 3 (2003); Caroline A. 
Hartzell, "Settling Civil Wars: Armed Opponents' Fates and the Duration of the Peace," Conflict 
Management and Peace Science vol. 26, no. 4 (2009). 
42 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., pp. 225-6. 
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discussed above to be factored in to the calculation, providing they can be shown to 
affect the conditions that determine when genuine negotiations begin. Theoretical 
distinctions between the type of war, or the military approach used, become 
secondary to their impact on the mindsets of negotiating parties. The impact of history 
may also be considered, alongside non-military motivations and actions such as 
perceptions of outsiders and their actions, the impact of international development 
spending, and cultural or locally-determined factors such as tribe or perceived 
legitimacy). Alongside these strengths, Ripeness theory has been selected because of a 
desire to explore the policy makers’ aspirations for international action – especially 
military power – to generate negotiated agreement. Since this was so central to the 
stated aims of the later years of the Afghanistan campaign, Ripeness forms the basis of 
the explanatory method applied to that case study. The Sangin Accord also occurred in 
an area of the country renowned for intense fighting, offering an opportunity to 
consider the importance of high levels of violent conflict on negotiation – a core tenet 
of Zartman’s theory. 
Former American Defense Secretary Robert Gates described Sangin District, in 
Helmand Province, as “the most dangerous not only in Afghanistan but maybe the 
whole world.”43 The United Kingdom (UK) “suffered its heaviest losses in Sangin.”44 On 
20th September 2010, as responsibility for Sangin passed from the United Kingdom to 
the United States (US), the BBC reported that “of the 337 UK deaths [in Afghanistan] 
since 2001, a third have happened there.”45 As British forces did not deploy to Sangin 
permanently until 21st June 2006,46 this number – and the many wounded – testify to 
the intense combat and complex threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
faced by British, American and Afghan National Security Forces, and the civilian 
government and local population they were there to support. On 4th January 2011, 
Gulab Mangal, Helmand’s Provincial Governor, revealed that his government had 
negotiated an agreement with the principal local political grouping in Sangin District’s 
                                                     
43 Robert Gates, quoted in Euan MacAskill, "US Claims to Have Driven Taliban out of Sangin," 8th March 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/08/us-afghanistan-sangin-taliban-claim(accessed 
4th May 2011).  
44 Quote from Ian Pannell, 20th September 2010. "UK Troops Leave Helmand's Sangin," BBC News, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11367931 (accessed 10th July 2014). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Patrick Bishop, 3 Para (London: Harper Press, 2007), p. 107. 
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rural areas, where the Taliban asserted control.47 This appears consistent with 
important changes to the grand strategy. The Afghan Government held a peace jirga48 
(a decision-making council) on 4th June 2010,49 announcing in public that a national 
reconciliation50 program was now underway, also offering top-level support for the 
ongoing reintegration efforts aimed at low-level fighters. Separately, in scholarship, 
reconciliation theory is distinct from both the ISAF policy of political outreach to the 
Taliban and different from the process specified in Ripeness theory as it removes the 
pain caused by military activity as a motivating element, and arguing instead that 
conflict moves towards resolution because of conciliatory motivations and activities.51 
Complementing the reconciliation policy used in the later phases of the recent Afghan 
conflict, reintegration referred to both policy and practical activity aimed at the 
tactical and operational levels to persuade low-level fighters, commanders, and 
[Taliban] shadow governors to lay down their arms and to assimilate peacefully into 
Afghan society.52 
By the time the US took over in Sangin in autumn 2010, it appeared that 
greater military resources and a national-level policy mechanism for reconciliation had 
delivered a local political negotiated agreement there. The military and policy changes 
were significant points, but they do not tell the whole story. Outreach efforts began 
through the Afghan District Governor (DG)’s office in 2008.53 Sangin’s DG changed to a 
more respected, educated man on 1st March 2010. The new appointee, Mohammad 
Sharif Khan, received a written offer of peace on 29th May 2010 (which formed the 
basis of the 4th January 2011 Sangin Accord), apparently from leaders of the same 
                                                     
47 The Telegraph, "Afghanistan: Sangin Insurgents Agree to Stand up to Taliban," 4th January 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.UK/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8238031/Afghanistan-Sangin-
insurgents-agree-to-stand-up-to-Taliban.html(accessed 27th July 2014).  
48 See the Afghan Glossary for more on jirgas. 
49 BBC, "Afghan Peace Jirga Backs Karzai Taliban Talks Proposal," 4th June 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.UK/news/10234823(accessed 26th November 2013).  
50 Official documents capitalised the word reconciliation, naming the policy of negotiating with Taliban 
senior leaders used within the Afghanistan campaign, but lower case is used in this thesis for 
consistency. See for example NATO, "Backgrounder: ISAF Support to Reintegration and Reconciliation," 
2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_12/20110310_091203-media-
backgrounder-support-to-reintegration.pdf(accessed 27th July 2014).  
51 For a brief review of this line see Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 38 and chapters 4-7 of this thesis. 
52 NATO, 2011, op. cit., http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_12/20110310_091203-
media-backgrounder-support-to-reintegration.pdf.  
53 Author’s personal communication with civilian reconstruction official, 6th November 2012. 
  Page 32 of 334 
 
political grouping who would also make that later agreement.54 This offer preceded 
the peace jirga, the military surge into north Helmand, and the handover from the UK 
to US forces. Negotiations that led to the Sangin Accord therefore opened and evolved 
into a proposed agreement at a time when NATO’s55 International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF)56 and Afghan Government national security forces (ANSF)57 were under 
considerable pressure in that district and arguably in a stalemate – despite the arrival 
of US Marine Corps (USMC) units from 2009 onwards, mostly into southern Helmand. 
However, the agreement was activated publicly in 2011 after the US completed that 
surge of additional personnel into the country. Most of them “were concentrated 
overwhelmingly on two volatile areas of southern Afghanistan: Helmand and Kandahar 
Provinces,” with the later formations reaching north Helmand in 2010,58 bringing ISAF 
towards a force numbering 100,000.59 Explaining the role played by military action is 
most important since – in the early stages at least – it is at best unclear when and how 
it correlates directly with negotiated agreement, despite the presence of apparently 
overwhelming force. This suggests that the Sangin case study could highlight areas 
where, alongside wider research, it may inform new thinking on counterinsurgency. 
                                                     
54 Phil Weatherill, "Note from the Field: Targeting the Centre of Gravity - Adapting Stabilisation in 
Sangin," The RUSI Journal vol. 156, no. 4 (2011), endnote 24, p. 98. 
http://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A4E3684F6260B4 
55 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An international organisation consisting of 28 member 
countries from Europe and North America, safeguarding the freedom and security of its members 
through political and military means. See NATO, "What Is NATO?," 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf(accessed 22nd April 2012). P. 5. 
In this thesis, the term ‘International Organisation’ means those formal organisations with international 
reach which have operated, or are operating in Afghanistan. This includes both those constructed from 
coalitions, such as NATO or the United Nations, and those from a single state. 
56 ISAF: the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force deployed to conduct 
military “operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the 
growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate 
improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure 
environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.” See ISAF, "Afghanistan 
International Security Assistance Force: Mission," ISAF, 2014, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html(accessed 8th February 2013).  
57 ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces, a NATO term for the combined Afghan National Army (ANA) 
and Afghan National Police (ANP). 
58 Barak Obama acknowledged the need for more troops as early as 2008, during the election campaign. 
On this, and related themes see Theo Farrell, Unwinnable (Bodley Head, forthcoming), chapter 8. Also 
Spencer Ackerman, "What Surge? Afghanistan’s Most Violent Places Stay Bad, Despite Extra Troops," 
2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/afghanistan-violence-helmand/.  
59 As of 19th February 2013, ISAF contained 102,052 deployed personnel from 50 countries, including 
68,000 from the United States (the largest contributor) and 9,500 from the UK (the second largest 
contributor), see ISAF, "ISAF-ANA Troops Placemat Dated Feb 19 2013," 2013, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/ISAF-ANA%20Troops%20Placemat-
Feb19%202013.pdf(accessed 26th July 2014).  
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British doctrine, developed jointly with the United States, says clearly that security 
makes progress towards reconciliation and accommodation possible.60 Yet as will be 
shown in later chapters, the Sangin Accord came about while the population covered 
by the Accord were not secure, and without “a strong forward presence among that 
part of the population which insurgents seek to control” – considered by doctrine and 
experience to be a “vital step in neutralising insurgents.”61 Nevertheless, in order to 
have developed the Accord, it must have been possible in some degree “to address the 
legitimate grievances used to generate popular support for armed resistance” – on the 
assumption that the negotiations were genuine.62 The problems of assessing 
motivation and intent among negotiators are vital to any assessment, and are explored 
in detail in later chapters, notably chapter seven which attempts to use Ripeness 
theory to explain the Sangin Accord. The central question highlighted by the case study 
remains relevant for policy in current and future conflicts, and for theorists: is a 
stalemate required for genuine negotiations focused on conflict resolution to start, or 
for one side to be in a clear position of strength? 
 
Why seek a local negotiated agreement? 
There are three reasons to question which matters more, stalemate or 
strength. Firstly, governments continue to seek negotiated agreements during conflicts 
and as mechanisms to end them. Negotiated agreements are a key policy option for 
those seeking conflict resolutions, for, as the British Army recognises, military action 
alone can rarely achieve “the political resolution of the drivers of conflict” required for 
lasting stability and reconciliation.63 Successive United Kingdom governments continue 
to express the importance of securing a negotiated end to disagreements and conflicts 
around the world. On Iran, and its nuclear activities, the UK’s Foreign Secretary said on 
13th April 2012 “what we want is a peaceful and negotiated solution.”64 On Israel and 
                                                     
60 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 3-19. 
61 Ibid., paragraph 3-22. 
62 Based closely on US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-51. 
63 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 8-6.  
64 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012. "Iran Talks: Seeking a Peaceful and Negotiated 
Solution," www.fco.gov.uk, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=752666682 
(accessed 13th April 2013). 
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the Occupied Territories, the UK felt (in 2011) that “a negotiated end to the occupation 
is the best way to allow Palestinian aspirations to be met in reality and on the 
ground.”65 While these public communications can only verify the importance of 
negotiated agreements to a limited extent, as many of these pronouncements may be 
pure rhetoric, this is a rhetoric nonetheless that sustains the importance of negotiated 
agreement within public discourse on foreign policy and defence matters. It is also 
shared by our closest allies. 
The United Kingdom rarely, if ever, operates alone in foreign policy terms. 
Traditionally, its closest working partners in conflict areas are the United States and 
also Canada, Australia and New Zealand – the so-called Five Eyes community formed 
from close working, especially on intelligence matters, during the Second World War.66 
More recently, the European Union (notably Denmark), and some Baltic states, have 
come to the fore. References to negotiations and political settlements vary in official 
documents from these sources. The United States’ first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (QDDR), subtitled Leading Through Civilian Power was released 
in 2010. Its stated aim is to provide “a blueprint for elevating American "civilian 
power" to better advance our national interests and to be a better partner to the US 
military” specifically by “directing and coordinating the resources of all America's 
civilian agencies to prevent and resolve conflicts; help countries lift themselves out of 
poverty into prosperous, stable, and democratic states; and build global coalitions to 
address global problems.”67 That document makes many implicit and indirect 
references to negotiated agreements, but refers to them directly only as part of 
“classic diplomacy,” and usually in the context of multi-lateral agreements between 
states.68 Yet, recognising the role that negotiations can play in ending dispute abroad, 
                                                     
65 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011. "Foreign Secretary Updates Parliament on Middle East 
and North Africa," www.fco.gov.uk, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=PressS&id=689368882 (accessed 9th November 2013). 
66 See for example Privacy International, "The Five Eyes," 2015, 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/?q=node/51(accessed 10th February 2015).  For the core UK-USA 
Agreement see The National Archives, "Newly Released GCHQ Files: UKUSA Agreement," 2010, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukusa/.  
67 United States Government Department of State, "The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review," 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm(accessed 29th August 2012).  
68 United States Government Department of State, "The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review: Leading through Civilian Power," www.state.gov (2010). 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153108.pdf, p. 25. 
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the US State Department also commits to creating “a new cadre of senior diplomats 
who have advanced training and experience in the area of conflict resolution and 
mediation and who could be deployed to critical conflict zones and at-risk weak 
states.”69 A review process began in April 2014, but no updated document has yet 
been published.70 Crucially, neither the QDDR nor any other prominent public 
statements or policy documents make clear the relationship between military power, 
and achieving negotiated conflict management or conflict resolution objectives. Here, 
conflict management refers to more immediate timeframes and solutions, and is 
defined as “the elimination, neutralization, or control of the means of pursuing either 
the conflict or the crisis” in contrast to the deeper and more sustained approach taken 
in conflict resolution, defined earlier.71 The nature of that relationship between 
military action and negotiation is unclear and disputed. The evidence supports this 
continuing lack of certainty over the best approach, with “nearly 30 percent of all 
conflicts that ended in negotiated settlement resuming again within five years,” 
according to the New Zealand Government in a 2009 statement to the United Nations 
Security Council.72 
Secondly, governments continue to attempt to use large-scale military 
deployments to secure negotiated agreements as part of efforts to deliver peace and 
security, most recently in Afghanistan from 2001, and so it is valuable to assess the 
impact of their actions on negotiated agreement in that campaign.73 For centuries, 
Afghanistan has triggered fear and fascination, and debate among outsiders, over 
strategies for securing political influence. The British transplanted approaches trialled 
in Sindh and Baluchistan in the 1870s. Some, such as British Victorian colonial official 
General William Merewether, thought that the wild landscape created an uncultured 
                                                     
69 Ibid., p. 136. 
70 US State Department, "Secretary of State John Kerry to Launch the 2014 Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review (QDDR)," 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225009.htm(accessed 
10th February 2015).  
71 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 8.  
72 H.E. Jim McLay, 2009. "United Nations Security Council: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," 
www.mfat.govt.nz, http://mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2009/0-22-
July-2009.php (accessed 22nd July 2011). I have not been able to find a direct reference or the 
underlying data for this quoted statement. 
73 This thesis uses the end of UK combat operations in 2014 as the end of the campaign, though an 
evolved military relationship continues: BBC, "UK Ends Afghan Combat Operations," 26th October 2014, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29776544(accessed 16th January 2016).  
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society controllable only by force.74 Others like his rival Robert Groves Sandeman 
recognised the need for foreigners to work with the strength found there, in fertile 
farmland protected by tribes and families with particular cultural and social 
characteristics, bound by a fierce loyalty.75 The NATO campaign of 2001-2014 saw the 
United Kingdom’s armed forces engaged in Afghanistan for the fourth time in the last 
200 years, following the First (1838-42), Second (1878-80) and Third (1919) Anglo-
Afghan Wars.76 However, unlike the first three engagements, modern Western-led 
interventions no longer tend to seek military conquest alone, or permanent direct 
political rule. Instead, moral, legal and policy imperatives make the “focus on 
supporting the local populace and Host Nation government.”77 The NATO-led 
campaign in Afghanistan therefore makes a suitable case study; there was in the later 
years the intent for military dominance to lead to a negotiated political settlement. It 
has also been selected because Afghanistan is the most recent long running conflict in 
which more than 15,000 international military personnel were mandated to act in an 
active combat role for a sustained period of time – though the peak figure was many 
times greater. This figure represents roughly a large Army brigade deployment, 
separating the larger military commitments from smaller scale training and mentoring 
missions, and other types of small deployment. The active combat role is also 
important, because – as outlined later in this chapter – Zartman’s Ripeness theory 
features military escalation, and requires military force to provide the coercive pain 
necessary, alongside a political Way Out, for genuine negotiations to open.78 This 
discounts case studies involving peace-keeping missions with mandates limiting active 
military operations with conflict parties. 
It is widely accepted that most protagonists fight for a political purpose. In 
conventional war, earlier thinking held that politics as an instrument of that war 
                                                     
74 These debates and distinctions are outlined in chapter 2. General William Merewether was initially 
British Resident at Aden (1863 to 1867) and Commissioner in Sind, 1867 to 1877. 
75 Robert Groves Sandeman held a number of colonial administrative positions, largely in Baluchistan 
and latterly modern day Afghanistan, between 1866 and his death in 1892. 
76 Chapter 2 outlines these events in more detail. 
77 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 2-2. 
78 While the active combat role has ended before publication of this thesis, it was very much in effect 
during the dates bounding the case study. 
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emerges when the military achieves its objectives and the fighting ends.79 This evolves 
when addressing an insurgency, since the military objective is in fact simultaneously a 
political one: “the battle for the population.”80 The term insurgency refers to an 
organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 
the use of subversion and armed conflict; participants in an insurgency are called 
insurgents.81 The military response, known as counterinsurgency (also COIN) includes 
“those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken 
by a government to defeat an insurgency.”82 This is illustrated by the oft-quoted 
maxim that counterinsurgency “is 20 percent military action and 80 percent 
political,”83 first advanced in Maoist China.84 The implications are profound, since 
“once we acknowledge that the people’s political views matter to our own definition 
of success or failure, an exclusively military definition of success or failure relative to 
the enemy in battle is insufficient.”85 For example, the UK’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Business Plan 2012-15 lists one of the top objectives for that 
government as supporting “international efforts towards agreeing long term 
commitments to Afghanistan, and Afghan efforts towards an inclusive political 
Settlement [sic].”86 The document does not define “political Settlement” nor specify 
whether it is to be negotiated (or, for example, imposed), yet it is implicit that the 
international military, development, and diplomatic action impact on the political 
objectives underpinning this strategy. Here, the three terms refer to the actions of the 
government departments of state responsible for Defence, Development Aid, and 
Diplomacy – in the UK, the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Department for 
International Development (DfID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
                                                     
79 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2006), pp. 4-5. 
80 Ibid. 
81 US Army, 2006, op. cit., p. 385. 
82 Ibid., p. 383. 
83 Galula, 2006, op. cit., p. 63. For an excellent overview of counterinsurgency and evolutions to the 
theory and conduct over time, see Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern 
Warfare (Osprey Publishing, 2008). 
84 General Ting-Chen Chang quoted in US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-123. 
85 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2012), p. 23. 
86 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012. "Business Plan 2012-2015," www.fco.gov.uk, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publications/annual-reports/business-plan-12 (accessed 16th 
May 2012). 
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This definition aligns with UK and NATO policymakers’ intention for the actions of 
individual government departments to contribute together as a “Comprehensive 
Approach” where strategy and action synchronises a campaign of military, 
development, and diplomatic practitioners’ chosen policies and behaviours aligned 
towards a common aim.87  
In 1965, Bernard Fall concluded that a government losing to an insurgency isn’t 
being outfought its being out-administered, out-governed.88 Thus, a weakness in 
governance – perhaps caused by deficient legitimacy relative to opponents or other 
standards – becomes a factor in the success of the military campaign. American 
military doctrine in place during the later stages of the Afghan campaign states that 
the mission “cannot achieve lasting success without the HN [Host Nation] government 
achieving legitimacy.”89 The Host Nation is one “that receives the forces and/or 
supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located 
on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.”90 Legitimacy is a more 
complicated concept, being a subjective characteristic referring to the level of 
acceptance afforded to an individual, group, or structure by its constituents or other 
assessors – relative to rivals or alternatives. This thesis follows Thomas Ohlson’s 
categorisations. “Vertical legitimacy is about responsible authority and voluntary 
subordination, horizontal legitimacy is about mutual acceptance and tolerance at elite 
and mass levels.”91 For theory to be truly useful therefore, it must account for the 
relationship between government levers (like military power, diplomacy, 
development, and stabilisation activity) and the legitimacy – and capacity – of the 
supported government to bring about a political settlement with its opponents. This 
                                                     
87 On the Comprehensive Approach, see for example NATO, "A ''Comprehensive Approach'' to Crises," 
2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm(accessed 10th February 2015). ; UK 
House of Commons Defence Committee, The Comprehensive Approach: The Point of War Is Not Just to 
Win but to Make a Better Peace (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2010). Also Wilton Park, 
"Conference WP1092: Operationalising the Comprehensive Approach," 2012, 
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/conference/wp1092/(accessed 10th February 2015).  
88 After Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," Naval War 
College Review, (1965), p. 55. 
89 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-120. 
90 Ibid., p. 384. 
91 Thomas Ohlson, "Understanding Causes of War and Peace," European Journal of International 
Relations vol. 14, no. 1 (2008), p. 137. 
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thesis considers the ability of Ripeness theory to do this as part of explaining what 
happened in one particular local negotiated agreement – the Sangin Accord of 2011.  
The status of dialogue involving the Taliban senior leadership has evolved over 
time, though there has been no public announcement of a negotiated agreement 
ending the conflict. In 2010, a source close to alleged talks between the Taliban and 
President Karzai’s government indicated they were “very, very serious about finding a 
way out”92 and that “Taliban representatives are fully authorised to speak for the 
Quetta Shura and its leader, Mohammad Omar.”93 National-level progress remained 
elusive, and the process was further complicated by the announcement of Mullah 
Omar’s death in 2015.94 Without publicly acknowledged developments at senior levels 
it is unsurprising that there have only been a small number of negotiated agreements 
in Afghanistan publicised during the 2001-14 conflict, and these are local in scope. 
Perhaps the most prominent is the Musa Qala Accord of September 2006.95 Michael 
Semple’s account illuminates the complexity of strengthening central government by 
co-opting local governance structures, such as tribal jirgas. Local (Afghan) sponsors are 
often “expected to use their influence to advocate compliance” which requires them 
to “deliver tangible benefits in the district center [sic] to acquire and use some power 
of patronage.”96 For some this same local patronage is considered corruption.97 For all 
these reasons, within the most recent campaign in Afghanistan the Accord struck in 
                                                     
92 Karen DeYoung, "U.S Attempts to Restart Peace Talks with the Taliban," The Washington Post, 3rd 
February 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-03/world/36728713_1_taliban-
negotiators-taliban-office-taliban-leaders(accessed 12th May 2014).  
93 Pajhwok Report, "Time Not Ripe for Peace Talks: Pentagon," October 6th 2010, 
http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/10/06/time-not-ripe-peace-talks-pentagon-0.  
94 See for example Theo Farrell and Michael Semple, "Making Peace with the Taliban," Survival 57, no. 6 
(2015), notably p. 88 onwards; Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 
Update," Brookings Institute, 26th May 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-
isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown(accessed 16th January 2016). Also Antonio Giustozzi and Silab 
Mangal, "The Taliban in Pieces: The Internal Struggle Behind the Announcement of Mullah Omar's 
Death," Foreign Affairs, 3rd August 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2015-08-
03/taliban-pieces(accessed 16th January 2016).   
95 See Semple, 2009, op. cit., chapter 8. 
96 Ibid., p. 85. 
97 For example, The Asia Foundation, "Occasional Paper No, 15: The Growing Challenge of Corruption in 
Afghanistan," 2012, 
https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/FNLcorruptionchapterOccasionalPaperJuly30.pdf.  
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Sangin District is therefore rare and worthy of further analysis – not least as it appears 
to have held for at least 6 months and perhaps a year or longer.98 
Figure 6: The Sangin Valley, looking northwards, date unknown. The Kajaki Road 
(Route 611) is visible to the right. The population lived mostly in the thin, fertile strip 
between the road and the Helmand River. The western tip of the larger, prominent 
range of hills marks the northernmost point of the District, and the site of the 
important shrine at Garm Ab. Photo: © Crown copyright. 
Thirdly, despite the huge scale of the NATO deployment to Afghanistan, and 
efforts to centralise government, local factors – for good or ill – remained strong 
motivators for conflict, and this introduces a new level of analysis for those seeking to 
use historical case studies to illustrate the relative value of theory as an explanatory 
tool. Why does the local level of analysis matter? Here, “local” follows the definition 
given by Séverine Autesserre meaning “subprovincial,” and refers “to district- or 
village-specific issues.”99 (The term ‘Local’ does not refer to national-level 
characteristics of the country, and should not be considered as the opposite of 
‘international’). For the military, the term local correlates with the tactical level, “at 
which engagements are fought and direct contact is made with an enemy or 
                                                     
98 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 11121/11, "Afghanistan/Helmand: Sangin Peace Accord 
Six Months On," 20th June 2011. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 
2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-19. See Annex A. Also Primary Source PS-1, 
between 30-39 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Noorzai tribe. Local to Sangin? Not Local. Self-
identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, from pre-4th Jan 2011. This 
source is anonymised, and given the label PS-1. 
99 Autesserre, 2010, op. cit., p. 43. 
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opponent.”100 This makes the tactical level likely to encompass the smaller and more 
locally-focused military deployments that affect the local politics and negotiation 
pertinent to this case study. The decisions taken, usually by young officers, Non-
Commissioned Officers and soldiers under their command, affect perceptions of a 
conflict profoundly. Their actions, and reactions, can have local, but also very far-
reaching social, political, and military consequences in the eyes of the enemy, the local 
population, allies and for our domestic and international audiences. Just as the tactical 
level determines some higher-level military decisions, local considerations also affect 
wider political and social dynamics.  
Categorising conflicts within state borders is complicated. Perhaps the most 
useful definition is Internal Armed Conflict (IAC) – a more general term than ‘civil war’ 
or ‘ethnic conflict’ but better suited to the most complex cases. The term IAC describes 
conflicts that are predominantly intrastate in focus, but recognizes the “international, 
regional and cross-border dimensions of IACs.”101 Nevertheless, other terms are 
common, but the theoretical gap remains important: researchers have applied 
negotiation theory to intrastate and civil wars (in which both refer to the struggle for 
control of the state fought within its borders), but never at the local level. A civil war 
“suddenly splits a nation into two or more groups which find themselves in control of 
part of both the territory and the existing armed forces” and violence ensues.102 
Importantly, under this definition, a nation’s current enlisted armed forces would need 
to split in two and be in conflict with each other to constitute a civil war. Were they 
fighting as one organisation against other combatants, this would imply an 
insurgency.103 Caroline Hartzell considers “the stability of negotiated settlements in 
intrastate wars,” though the term intrastate is not defined other than to imply it is 
contained with a state’s borders.104 She concluded that “negotiated settlements that 
                                                     
100 UK Ministry of Defence, "Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 British Defence Doctrine," (2011). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33697/20111130jdp0
01_bdd_Ed4.pdf (accessed 12th September 2014), p. 2-9. 
101 Theo Farrell and Olivier Schmitt, The Causes, Character and Conduct of Armed Conflict, and the Effect 
on Civilian Populations, 1990-2010 (Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2012), p. 2. 
102 Galula, 2006, op. cit., p. 3. 
103 For more, see for example Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.16-20. Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical 
Complexities of an Operational Definition," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004), p. 829.  
104 Hartzell, 1999, op. cit., pp. 3-22. 
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are most extensively institutionalized – that is, that provide institutional guarantees for 
the security threats antagonists face as they move towards a situation of centralized 
state power – are the ones most likely to prove stable.”105 Derouen, Lea, and 
Wallensteen analyse the duration of civil war peace agreements, and test 140 
agreements for their durability in relation to the provisions included within the terms 
of the negotiated outcome.106 Hartzell has shown that while “destroying opposing 
groups’ organizations has little effect on the duration of the peace, an agreement 
among rivals to share power can help prolong the peace.”107 The Sangin Accord case 
study adds new data for future studies exploring whether their conclusions also apply 
at the local level. 
There are two more reasons to analyse the relationship between military 
action and political objectives at the local level, though always alongside higher-level 
strategy and planning. These are important research priorities, since as Autesserre 
notes, “local agendas – at the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the 
municipality, the community, the district or the ethnic group – at least partly drive the 
continuation of violence.”108 This is especially likely where centralised governance 
structures are weak or disputed, since engagement with apparently key leaders at the 
top or centre of the society does not necessarily ensure local issues are addressed. 
First, engagement with central authorities in weakened states provides a poor route 
for addressing local conflict drivers. Intervening forces typically organise for top-down, 
centralised political engagement. Political deals with well-placed, accessible power 
brokers can offer a degree of centralisation and coordination without extensive 
military action. However, where the coercive impact of force is required (or perceived 
as important) the military remains the most heavily resourced arm of national 
policy.109 Many interventions now occur in areas where central authority and political 
                                                     
105 Ibid., p. 3. 
106 Derouen et al., 2009, op. cit., pp. 367-387. 
107 Hartzell, 2009, op. cit., p. 347. 
108 Autesserre, 2010, op. cit., p. 6. 
109 See for example the United Kingdom’s 2011-12 budget, in which in general terms, Defence received 
£37.3Bn, the Foreign Office £2.2Bn and International Development £7.Bn.  
Simon Rogers and Garry Blight, "Public Spending by UK Government Department 2011-12: An 
Interactive Guide," The Guardian, 4th December 2012, 
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interactive(accessed 1st February 2013).  
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mechanisms are disputed, and traditional categorisation (between say civil war and 
insurgency) is imperfect. This makes the definition of the parties to a dispute 
extremely challenging. Here the term “party” (sometimes conflict party) refers to “a 
person or group involved in an enterprise; a participant or an accessory”110 – in this 
case, to a conflict. The nature and boundaries of a conflict party are subjective and not 
defined in theoretical research, and so the term is clarified further where appropriate. 
Second, resource or policy constraints can diminish the impact of a theatre-
wide military advantage on local dynamics. The total number of armed personnel 
available to one conflict party may far outweigh the other. However, decisions or 
constraints over where to deploy them, or the logistical challenge in massing forces 
decisively in the right place at the right time, mean that the overall advantage is not 
always held simultaneously in all local scenarios. In such situations, political progress is 
still important, and must be delivered in other ways – or parties must act to ensure a 
national-level reconciliation program has local reach and influence. For example, 
Afghanistan is dominated by rural areas with low population density. Capacity for 
brigade and division-level operations, the principal methods for NATO to mass military 
force at levels far exceeding the Taliban’s strength in the same area, was finite – 
typically one or two per year in each priority province, focusing on one or two 
districts.111 This means that the vast majority of Afghan or international military 
leaders responsible for Afghanistan’s districts – some 400 of them – faced the same 
challenge present in Sangin between 2006 and autumn 2010: how to help Afghan 
civilian officials generate and sustain political progress without first requiring a 
temporary, heavily resourced NATO surge of military effort.  
Since under the military doctrine driving the Afghan campaign at that time 
improving the situation for the population was “the reason we are going in,” it follows 
that areas of low population density were more likely to be allocated low military force 
                                                     
110 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, "Search Term: Party," Farlex, 2000, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/party(accessed 10th February 2013).  
111 For a structured, chronological overview of each brigade’s major actions, see Leigh Neville and Peter 
Dennis, The British Army in Afghanistan 2006–14: Task Force Helmand (Osprey Publishing Limited, 
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levels.112 I define these low population locations containing lower military force levels 
as “fringe areas” – typically removed from centralised authority – in which military 
resource levels, doctrine, campaign planning or other factors result in no permanent, 
definitive military dominance, and no imminent prospect of one without a change in 
either the overall number of military forces available, or to another factor that 
currently restricts reinforcement. For example, according to US Army doctrine, 
“twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop 
density required for effective counter-insurgency operations,” though “as with any 
fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.”113 This 
equates to a ratio of 50:1. Comparing this to an established peacekeeping mission, 
typically in smaller regions, highlights the scale of the challenge both then and for the 
future: Kosovo, 48:1; East Timor 86:1; Cambodia 727:1; Rwanda 3,350:1.114 Here, a 
population’s perception of their own insecurity can play a part in generating political 
progress.115 As negotiation with local armed actors is always going to be necessary to 
reach a sustainable end to conflict, it is therefore especially important in these fringe 
areas to consider whether military dominance is a necessary condition in delivering 
negotiations.  
The principal architect of Ripeness theory, William Zartman, in Elusive Peace: 
Negotiating and end to Civil Wars, looks at “different forms of internal conflict in which 
attempts have been made to achieve solutions through negotiations, but without 
complete success.”116 He sees the central question to be whether: 
“Asymmetry [can] be overcome to catch the elusive peace.”117  
                                                     
112 This concept is drawn from (among others) David Galula, who calls this the battle for the population 
(see Galula, 2006, op. cit., p. 4.), and variants are used by commanders. See for example Gen. Larry 
Nicholson, in Dexter Filkins, "Afghan Offensive Is New War Model," 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/world/asia/13kabul.html?_r=0(accessed 1st February 2014).  
113 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-67.  
114 Care International, "Care International in Afghanistan Policy Brief January 2003," 2003, 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/AfghanistanPolicyBrief_Jan03.pdf(accessed 22nd 
May 2015).  ibid. 
115 See ontological insecurity: where the inability to plan ahead due to radically changing policies is so 
destructive. After Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(University of California Press, 1984), pp. 62-3. 
116 Zartman, 1995, op. cit., p. 24. 
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This is a critical rejection of the position of strength as a precursor to 
negotiations for peace.118 As deployed force levels are lower, when conflict in these 
fringe areas is analysed locally there is an increased chance that a stalemate is present, 
even though at higher levels (e.g. nationally) international forces may have a clear 
position of strength. For some, this local impasse precludes political progress. 
However, within Ripeness theory, stalemate is one definitive condition for genuine 
negotiation to begin, alongside a shared perception of a political way out (the theory is 
defined in detail in the next section). This frames a vital question for chapter seven, in 
which Ripeness theory’s capacity to explain the Sangin Accord is assessed: whether a 
large intervening military force – such as ISAF in Afghanistan – must always be 
stalemated for genuine negotiations to begin, particularly in fringe areas where the 
conditions to activate political progress may be developed without local military 
dominance. Alternatively, is there support for negotiating from a position of strength, 
or evolving negotiation theory to conceptualise a stalemate more broadly, where a 
military advantage might be offset by shortfalls in other factors? Addressing these 
questions requires a review of William Zartman’s Ripeness theory. 
 
Explaining negotiated agreements in theory and doctrine 
Military forces remain the most heavily resourced, most numerous and most 
widely deployable agent through which a government influences conflicts; they are 
also the biggest factor affecting progress towards a negotiated end. It is therefore vital 
to review the way theory explains negotiations and negotiated ends to conflict, 
alongside those espoused in military doctrine, training, and strategy. A combined 
approach matters, since theory seeks to explain why events occur, allowing a strategy 
to be developed, while doctrine suggests how to conduct the actions required to make 
strategy a reality. The UK Ministry of Defence defines strategy as “concerned with the 
political consequences and advantages of the threat and use of force; it gives meaning 
                                                     
118 This is expanded in considerable detail in Zartman, 2002, op. cit. This book includes a number of 
scenarios, exploring the relative power of actors of different sizes, and with different numbers of 
requirements, engaged in negotiations. 
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and context to all operational and tactical actions.”119 Whereas the purpose of Defence 
Doctrine is to set out the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their 
actions, drawing on the lessons of history, on original thinking and on experiences 
gained from training and operations.120 Negotiation theory is concerned with 
identifying the conditions required for successful negotiations: for this body of 
scholarship, the type of war is less relevant – except where it affects the conditions 
that theory identifies as necessary to achieve the objective of a negotiated outcome. 
This suggests negotiation theory is applicable for analyses of many different levels and 
categories of conflict, such as sub-state scenarios, or coalition or superpower 
interventions – as long as a negotiated end is the focus of analysis. 
Introducing Ripeness theory 
The term Ripeness has become connected directly with Zartman, as the theory 
is so dominant within negotiation theory (for the reasons set out earlier). However, 
the language of Ripeness was influential before Zartman developed his theory in the 
1980s. The terms “Ripe” and “Ripeness” are also used to describe when the conditions 
described by the theory are present and the time to negotiate is reached, for example 
“the moment was Ripe” or “analysts perceived a sense of Ripeness.” Full theoretical 
definitions are provided later in this chapter. Ripeness theory, or core Ripeness theory, 
refers to this theoretical concept defined solely by Zartman, with other related work 
referred to as ‘additions to Ripeness theory’ here. This is my collective term for later 
contributions to the body of theory, principally by psychologists. A unifying feature of 
these additions to Ripeness theory is that parties to conflict may construct the 
required conditions incrementally, aggregating the impact of their own different 
psychologies and motivations, rather than considering them as – as Zartman does – to 
be binary elements, either absent or present at the same time for the same reasons. 
Importantly, these writers aim to extend Zartman’s theory to include “the successful 
                                                     
119 UK Ministry of Defence, 2011, op. cit., p. 1-5. For an excellent overview of strategy throughout 
history, see Edward Mead Earle, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: 
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton University Press, 1944). 
120 Closely based on the Chief of the Defence Staff’s words, in UK Ministry of Defence, 2011, op. cit., p. 
iii. For additional doctrine on campaign planning for complex operations, see UK Ministry of Defence, 
"Campaign Planning: Joint Doctrine Publication 5-00," www.mod.uk (2011). 
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/56AAAE6B-0728-4D10-A6AB-
DBBE30B957B8/0/JDP5002ndEdCh1web.pdf (accessed 11th February 2012). 
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conclusion of negotiations once opened” (more on these elements later in this 
section).121 Zartman’s key article on Ripeness quotes John Campbell’s conclusion from 
the 1954 Trieste treaty negotiations, that “Ripeness of time is one of the absolute 
essences of diplomacy” and Henry Kissinger, who recognised that “stalemate is the 
most propitious condition for settlement.”122 The formulation and academic 
significance of Ripeness theory has extended the influence of the associated terms and 
language (defined in full forthwith): Ripeness; the Ripe Moment; Hurt; the Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate; the Trusted Spokesman; the Way Out. This perceived link between 
the timing of negotiations and military action in conflict – and the fact that no 
definitive alternative has been offered – ensures Ripeness theory remains important 
and relevant today. 
Zartman published Ripe for resolution: Conflict resolution in Africa in 1985, 
introducing “the concept of there being a set of appropriate conditions for the 
successful launching of peace initiatives in otherwise protracted and intractable 
conflicts.”123 The theory asserts that the simultaneous perception of these conditions – 
the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and the Way Out – by all conflict parties is 
required. As these terms do not have simple definitions, they are analysed in detail 
later in this section. A second edition followed in 1989, and the theory was further 
updated in 2000 when Zartman published “Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and 
beyond,” as a chapter within Druckman and Stern’s edited volume, Conflict resolution 
after the Cold War.124 It is important to reiterate a point made right at the start, that 
Zartman’s Ripeness theory is concerned specifically with the conditions that exist at 
the start of genuine negotiations for conflict resolution:  
“It is difficult at the outset to determine whether negotiations are indeed 
serious or sincere, and indeed ‘true’ and ‘false’ motives may be indistinguishably 
mixed in the minds of the actors themselves at the beginning. Yet it is the outset 
which is the subject of the theory.”125  
                                                     
121 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 241.  
122 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 8. 
123 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. v. For the first edition see Zartman, 1985, op. cit. This was updated in a 
second edition four years later: Zartman, 1989, op. cit. 
124 Zartman, 2000, op. cit. 
125 Ibid., p. 227. 
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Ripeness leaves unanswered questions about ensuring the success of 
negotiations, the conclusion of an agreement, or its implementation. It does not 
therefore address how the psychology and perceptions of the conflict parties evolve 
away from the negative motivators, held as negotiations open, and move towards 
collaboration. There are further critiques to this theory, for example, it relies on 
negative psychology and military escalation. All the same, it serves as a useful start 
point when designing strategies in military operations for making an agreement and 
then implementing a plan to ensure it survives (often with new personnel, with new 
perceptions). As shown previously, there is no prominent alternative, if the focus of 
research is exploring the relationship between military power and negotiation. 
Zartman’s initial writing on the theory lacks the clarity of later publications, and 
specifies that Ripe Moments should be “viewed in relation to escalation of, or critical 
shifts in, the intensity of a crisis.”126 He goes on to set out three types of crisis, the 
“consummated crisis,”127 the “escalating crisis,”128 and “the grinding crisis.”129 He 
specifies characteristics of the violence in each, usually involving military forces, but 
certainly involving open, violent hostility. These distinctions between the different 
types of escalation are not carried through into later works, and so they remain 
sideshows for Ripeness theory and are not used as a basis for explaining the Sangin 
Accord. Zartman then specifies three overlapping ways to recognise Ripe Moments, 
though the link between them and the specific type of crisis is undefined: 
1. “as mutual, painful stalemates, marked by a recent or impending catastrophe” (this 
is the early definition of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate);130 
2. “as a time when both parties’ efforts at unilateral solutions or “tracks” are blocked 
and bilateral solutions or “tracks” are conceivable” (this is the early definition of 
the Way Out);131 
                                                     
126 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 10. 
127 In which there is a “sudden flare-up of military hostilities followed by a return to the status quo.” 
Ibid., p. 263. 
128  Defined by “a series of successive hostile outbreaks that follow each other closely with increasing 
intensity.” Ibid., p. 264. 
129 Which “begins with a flare-up of hostilities that attracts international attention but does not return 
to the status quo rather, it moves into stalemate on the basis of a different relationship between the 
forces in which a new and unstable status quo is created.” Ibid., p. 265. 
130 Ibid., p. 10. 
  Page 49 of 334 
 
3. “as a place on a long slope where the “ins” start to slip and the “outs” start to 
surge” (this element is dropped from the later theory, as set out below).132 
In point three Zartman is trying to encapsulate a changing momentum within a 
stalemated position, though the “ins” and “outs” are not defined and the entire 
element is dropped as a central requirement from later formulations. The descriptions 
of the categories of crises, and their more detailed supporting case studies, illustrate 
the central role that military activity plays in establishing the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate component of the core theory. Military action is defined only once in all of 
Zartman’s writings as the mechanism through which conflict parties apply ‘Hurt’ to 
each other (the term is used in capitalised form when relating directly to this 
subjective pain conceptualised by Ripeness theory). Hurt is never defined separately 
from the MHS, in which it is considered to be: 
“Subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of 
future escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate,” such as “data on 
number and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such evidence.”133 
Parties apply Hurt intending first to achieve victory, but it also contributes to 
the motivation to negotiate if this does not work. Analysts must note also that 
stalemates are possible at other times, but they are not Mutually Hurting Stalemates 
unless perceived simultaneously by all conflict parties and accompanied by the 
definitive and fundamentally important (yet hard to define) perceptual indicator: 
A shared “inability to bear the costs of further escalation.”134  
Here escalation is considered to refer to military escalation, but again this is not 
clearly defined by Zartman, just implied. This is challenged in later additions to 
Ripeness theory. It is essential to recall that an MHS is one of two necessary 
components of Ripeness, and must be accompanied by a Way Out for Ripeness, or a 
Ripe Moment, to exist.  
                                                                                                                                                           
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 I. William Zartman, Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. D. Druckman and P. Stern (National 
Academy Press: Washington, DC, 2000), pp. 231-2. 
134 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., pp. 231-2.  
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The Way Out is also subjective and ill-defined, despite being a necessary 
component of Ripeness theory. This is perhaps made harder due to the less distinct 
nature of the mechanisms for bringing it about; compared to the military element of 
the MHS. It remains vital, however, for “without a sense of a Way Out, the push 
associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to go.”135 For a Way 
Out to exist, “parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense 
that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares 
that sense and the willingness to search too.”136 Since “the core of the negotiation 
process is the transformation of zero-sum attitudes and approaches into positive sum 
situations and approaches,”137 one of the main perceptual narratives underpinning the 
Way Out is “the sense that concessions will be reciprocated, not just banked.”138 
(Here, zero-sum refers to a perception that power within relations is finite, and 
therefore any advantage gained must trigger a compensating reduction for others).139 
These mutually perceived conditions provide the push into genuine negotiations. 
These theoretical concepts sourced from Zartman’s central works (as set out above) 
constitute core Ripeness theory, or simply Ripeness theory, in this thesis. 
The following diagram shows how negotiation, politics, and military action 
interact to create the components of Ripeness theory – the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate and the Way Out – that together constitute a Ripe Moment when genuine 
negotiations may begin: 
                                                     
135 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 9. 
136 Ibid. 
137 I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982), p. 12. 
138 Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives’, p. 9. 
139 ‘Zero-sum’ is both a mathematical term and a concept central to certain schools of International 
Relations and world politics. See for example David A Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New 
Trends Versus Old Tendencies," World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979). Also Yair Caro, "Zero-Sum Problems—a 
Survey," Discrete Mathematics 152, no. 1 (1996); Philip D Straffin, "Game Theory and Strategy," 
Washington DC, (1993). 
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Figure 7: The core elements of Zartman’s Ripeness theory linked to later additions.140 
There are difficulties with the theory and the later additions shown on the 
diagram. It does not represent the different conflict parties, or any precursors to a 
Way Out. It implies there is no interaction between the desire and intent for a political 
Way Out – or the actions that construct it – and perceptions of the factors that 
establish a MHS (notably the acceptance on all sides that further military escalation is 
too painful). Nevertheless, the diagram captures Zartman’s later formulation that:  
“Negotiations completed under the shadow – or the push – of an MHS 
alone are likely to be unstable and unlikely to lead to a more enduring settlement. A 
negative shadow can begin the process but cannot provide for the change of 
mentalities to reconciliation.”141  
Additions to Ripeness theory by Zartman himself introduce the Mutually 
Enhancing Opportunity (MEO) to satisfy this need for positive psychological horizons. 
The MEO – which may exist, or be created – has a decisive impact on the psychologies 
of the conflict parties, yet the nature of an MEO is not discussed or defined. Perhaps 
international investment into government services, or other support focused on 
fostering stability, could provide the Mutually Enhancing Opportunity (MEO) required 
to catalyse this necessary “change of mentalities,” balancing the coercion of a 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Further research is important, in addition to the case 
                                                     
140 The diagram combines two of Zartman’s, presented separately in Zartman, 2000, op. cit., pp. 230, 
242.  
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study that follows, since “when an MEO is not developed in the negotiations, the 
negotiations remain truncated and unstable, even if a conflict management agreement 
to suspend violence is reached.”142 These questions are explored in later chapters. 
There are also some problems and critiques with the loose terminology 
employed by Zartman in Ripeness theory. For him the definitive factors are the 
subjective perceptions of the MHS and the Way Out, not the characteristics of the 
conflict that bring them about in the minds of the conflict parties. Ripeness is intended 
to be just as applicable to civil wars as to state-state conflicts. As a result, he 
frequently interchanges the terms civil war, insurgency, insurgents, rebels, and 
opposition, as (for him) “ambiguity exists concerning an appropriate name for the 
parties to a conflict.”143 Though it is clear that Zartman’s focus is on “negotiations 
between government and an opposition that contests the government’s legitimate 
monopoly on violence and uses violent means to press its demands and to contest 
government authority” his varied terminology may alienate other theorists for whom 
those categorisations are fundamental to validating the efficacy of any conclusions 
drawn from the model.144 This thesis follows Zartman in focusing on the negotiated 
agreement at the heart of the case study. I have therefore considered history, the 
characteristics of conflict, and the option of other modes of conflict termination, only 
in terms of how they affect the MHS and Way Out required by Ripeness theory. 
When formulating Ripeness theory, Zartman focused initially on case studies 
typically from the 1960s-1980s involving state-state conflict and negotiations, no 
doubt influenced by the policy priorities of the ongoing Cold War (and often in 
partnership with other writers) – notably, Morocco-Algeria;145 Somalia-Ethiopia-
Kenya;146 Angola-Zaire,147 and; Namibia-South Africa.148 This – and the status of related 
work on psychology and decision making at the time – affected his core concepts in 
ways that have since drawn critique. For example: 1) Ripeness is based on 
economically rational cost-benefit assumptions, which does not account for other 
                                                     
142 Ibid., pp. 242-3. 
143 Zartman, 1995, op. cit., p. 5. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., pp. 19-81. . 
146 Ibid., pp. 82-133. 
147 Ibid., pp. 134-169. 
148 Ibid., pp. 170-254. 
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types of decisions (such as social, emotional, and legal decisions) relevant to conflict 
and peace. 2) Zartman presents Ripeness as a dichotomous state—as Ripe or unripe, 
and assumes that there is no gradual path to the state of Ripeness. When Ripeness 
occurs, all conflict parties switch state from unripe, and simultaneously perceive it. 3) 
It is limited to the individual level of decision (typically concerning the military leader 
alone), in top-down models of decision-making.149 There are similar areas of 
uncertainty within military doctrine, adding to the challenge of using theory for 
explanatory purposes, and for practitioners applying scholarly research to evolving 
active scenarios in near-real time. 
Negotiated agreements in military doctrine  
Many types of war and approaches to warfare exist, and most major militaries 
are careful not to optimise doctrine and training permanently for any one strategy or 
conflict type. In addition, the tenets put forward in doctrine are disputed within the 
military and more widely. Debate focuses on the relative balance between hard 
combat power and its application, with more socially focused military approaches.150 It 
is a debate with long historical roots, as set out later chapters. While British Defence 
Doctrine describes the point when momentum towards the key objective is achieved 
as the “Campaign Fulcrum,” there is no clear statement on the relationship between 
military action and achieving and consolidating this fulcrum when the objective is a 
negotiated end to conflict.151 While it is accepted that a negotiated end to conflict can 
be a stated aim, (as revisited in later chapters) policy aspiration anticipates that 
                                                     
149 Coleman et al., 2008, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
150 The more nuanced approaches are discussed in the case study later, and are epitomised by the most 
recent doctrine on Counterinsurgency: US Army, 2006, op. cit. See also chapter 2 in David Kilcullen, The 
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Hurst and Company, 2009). 
Supporters of more traditional combat power include Bing West and Gian Gentile. See for example Bing 
West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way out of Afghanistan (Random House Incorporated, 
2012). Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (Random House Trade 
Paperbacks, 2009). Also Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (The 
New Press,, 2013). Gian Gentile, "The Selective Use of History in the Development of American 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine," Army History 72, (2009). 
151 UK Ministry of Defence, 2011, op. cit., p. 2-20. 
Participant observation by the author in Helmand Province between August 2009 and April 2010 
confirms that elements within the Afghanistan campaign planning staffs informally adopted Malcolm 
Gladwell’s description, the “tipping point,” as a label for the moment when activity across stabilisation 
strands yields significant political progress. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can 
Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown, 2000). 
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negotiations should open from a position of strength.152 Doctrine cannot therefore 
offer any universal methodology through which military force supports negotiations, 
nor upon the optimum way to apply military force to help secure a political agreement. 
The importance of politics in counterinsurgency theory has been translated into 
practical guidance for the US and UK militaries and published as doctrine in the US 
Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (2007)153 and the British 
Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency (2009).154 Personnel from 
the US and UK were on the writing team for both documents, and so the core message 
for both nations’ armed forces is consistent: political purpose has primacy.155 The US 
Army manual makes clear that the “long-term objective for both sides remains 
acceptance by the people of the legitimacy of one side’s claim to political power.”156 
Many conventional military tasks support this objective. However, the additional need 
to foster the legitimacy of another government (or, in some cases, a different or less 
formal governance mechanism), alters the relationship between military and other 
actors’ activities and political objectives. Conceptualisation of the Afghanistan 
campaign as a counterinsurgency in which military action leads to an explicitly political 
end enhances the validity of the case study selection and use of Ripeness theory as an 
explanatory tool. 
For the armed forces deployed to the NATO campaign in Afghanistan, and to 
the local area covered by the case study, doctrine directed that “long-term success in 
COIN [counterinsurgency] depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs 
and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the 
government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible,”157 many of 
which are social or political. However, there is no overt recognition that these political 
elements need involve or end with negotiation, and – if they do – the doctrinal 
                                                     
152 For example, a Pentagon spokesman was reported as saying in 2010 that “reconciliation can only be 
achieved from a position of strength, when the enemy is on the run.” Pajhwok Report, October 6th 
2010, op. cit., http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/10/06/time-not-ripe-peace-talks-pentagon-0.  
153 US Army, 2006, op. cit.  
154 British Army, 2009, op. cit. 
155 This point was confirmed at Oxford University’s Changing Character of War program seminar on 26th 
May 2011 under the Chatham House Rule. 
156 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-7. 
157 Ibid., paragraph 1-4. 
  Page 55 of 334 
 
language appears based on achieving advantage and then opening negotiations from a 
position of strength. Thus British Army doctrine notes “[o]nce the population is secure 
the political and development processes can resume and progress towards 
reconciliation and accommodation is possible.”158 It would seem appropriate to 
conclude that the term ‘accommodation’ in this context refers to a negotiated 
agreement. This doctrine therefore leads the military towards the provision of 
security, apparently founded on a military advantage, to set the conditions for 
negotiated political agreement – if one is sought. 
However, if Zartman’s conception of negotiation theory is correct, a military 
stalemate is actually the foundation for the type of sustainable agreement upon which 
the reconciliation and accommodation envisaged by British doctrine rest. This presents 
an irrational impasse, with huge implications for the tactics and level of kinetic force 
chosen by military commanders seeking to bring about what Zartman calls “serious” or 
“sincere” negotiations.159 How, and why, would commanders seek the stalemate 
required by Ripeness theory? This is all the more unlikely given the overwhelming 
technological advantage enjoyed by NATO in Afghanistan. Such an approach also risks 
immense damage to the reputation and future deterrent value of the organisation 
itself, and the Allied troop-contributing nations (especially the American superpower), 
if commanders aimed for stalemate when directed to achieve a negotiated outcome. 
This is the very heart of the challenge for those attempting to apply Ripeness theory to 
live operational scenarios. 
Despite these theoretical and doctrinal drawbacks, the language of Ripeness 
peppers commentary about the relationship between the military campaign and 
political progress in Afghanistan. In 2010, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee discussed Zartman’s concepts, considering whether “negotiations are more 
likely when you have a stalemate.”160 It was considered time for “that first step 
towards negotiation trying to build trust between the parties,”161 although “both sides 
                                                     
158 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 3-19.  
159 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 9. 
160 UK Parliament, Corrected Transcript of Oral Evidence to the United Kingdom House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee Hc 514-I: The UK's Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan (London: 
The Stationary Office Limited, 2010), p. 216. 
161 Ibid. 
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believe that they can reach a position of greater strength or victory.”162 (These 
anticipated advantages would indicate the moment was not Ripe for negotiation 
according to Zartman’s theory; these mutual aspirations for a future unilateral military 
victory demonstrate the absence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate). This also exposes 
the potential for differences in perception between field commanders and domestic 
politicians, meaning that a Ripe Moment might exist, but depend on which leaders’ 
opinions were analysed. Nevertheless, that Ripeness is referenced in elected debate 
suggests that Zartman’s hypothesis has not been categorically disproven or 
conclusively overtaken by another theory explaining when and why genuine 
negotiation towards sustainable political agreement begins in the minds of politicians, 
their advisors, and critics. The concepts of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate, the Way 
Out, and other additions therefore remain important frameworks for understanding 
when genuine negotiation towards sustainable political agreement begins. 
 
Identifying and collecting data on indicators of Ripeness 
For Ripeness theory to be applied as explanatory tool, it is necessary to set out 
the data – both objective and subjective – that correlates with the key elements of the 
theory, notably the Mutually Hurting Stalemate, and the Way Out. The theory is clear 
that these two elements are each “necessary, but not sufficient” in their own right, 
only constituting a Ripe Moment when perceived simultaneously by conflict parties.163 
Some important other contributions either suggest changes to the way these core 
elements are described, or offer additions to the list of correlates asserted to be 
necessary, or related but not essential. To explain this further, I shall extend Figure 7, 
annotated to show the key components of a Ripe Moment and the negotiating process 
that may follow, labelled R1-R8 in Figure 8, below (where “R” is descriptive only, and 
refers to Ripeness). Core Ripeness theory’s requirements are outlined with solid lines, 
while optional elements of the theory, or additions to the theory, are shown with 
dotted lines.  
                                                     
162 Ibid. 
163 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 227. 
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Figure 8: The key elements of a Ripe Moment (circled) labelled for explanation.164 
The concepts in this diagram are analysed in the case study and conclusions, to 
explore the significance and construction of each element and their interactions and 
relationships in detail. Each element from R1-R8 is explained below, showing the 
specific characteristics assigned to it within Ripeness theory, and its additions. 
R1: Objective elements of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
Zartman only refers to “data on numbers and nature of casualties and material 
costs” as objective evidence, but (as shown in the earlier indented quote) accepts that 
other evidence may exist – there is therefore no definitive list of data categories.165 
Other research focused on the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict (1990-95) correlates 
negotiation with a sudden rise in casualties.166 Pruitt asserts that objective evidence 
“be defined as circumstances under which a well-informed, dispassionate, and rational 
decision maker would conclude that negotiation is appropriate.”167 This leaves the 
analyst free to update the categories to be considered objective evidence of Hurt, 
                                                     
164 The diagram is an extended representation based on a combination of two of Zartman’s, presented 
separately in ibid., pp. 230, 242.  
165 Zartman, 2001, op. cit. 
166 See for example Moorad Moorodian and Daniel Druckman, "Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The 
Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95," Journal of Peace Research vol. 36, no. 6 (1999), especially 
pp. 724-726.  
They conceptualised Ripeness as number of casualties in the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, showing that a sudden dramatic rise in casualties was followed by successful cease-fire 
negotiations. 
167 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 2. 
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accounting for the nature of conflict in each case study. These objective elements are 
not a required element of Ripeness theory, since it is possible for conflict parties to 
perceive themselves as in a MHS without any objective evidence at all.168 In Ripeness 
theory though, this could represent an irrational subjective response. And as will be 
shown, additions to the theory suggest a wider definition of objective evidence to 
include non-military factors. Cultural differences of perception over the severity of 
evidence of Hurt also challenge a universal definition to rationality. Finally, because of 
the tendency to associate intense military action, Hurt, and Ripeness, it is important to 
stress that, “nothing in the definition of an MHS requires it to take place at the height 
of the conflict or at a high level of violence.”169 Analysts must therefore also be 
watchful for Ripe Moments at points of low intensity in conflict. 
R2: Subjective elements of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
This is a required element of Ripeness theory since “Ripeness is necessarily a 
perceptual event.”170 For the analyst, accurate, regularly validated insight into the 
mindset of conflict parties is therefore a key technique for applying the theory as an 
explanatory tool. Implicit in Zartman’s conceptualization is the definition of conflict 
parties as single entities reflecting and responding completely to a single individual. 
“The theory is almost entirely focused on leader decision making,” so there is little 
requirement to account for the varied polities of individual mindsets, or the 
perceptions of subordinates – this also risks discounting the impact of perceptions held 
by the civilian population an intervening force aims to support.171 Criticisms and 
responses to this point are set out in later chapters. 
R3: A Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
The MHS is a core, required element of Ripeness theory, whether perceived in 
response to the objective elements (R1), or in their absence. Objective evidence need 
not be accepted, and indeed may be resisted, downplayed or ignored. “If the parties 
do not recognize ‘clear evidence’ (in someone else's view) that they are in an impasse, 
                                                     
168 Zartman cites the case of South Africa 1990-94 as a striking case of negotiations opened because of 
an MHS perceived on the basis of an impending catastrophe, not of present casualties. Zartman, 2000, 
op. cit., p. 230. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 9. 
171 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 22. 
  Page 59 of 334 
 
a Mutually Hurting Stalemate has not (yet) occurred, and if they do perceive 
themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the ‘evidence’, the MHS is 
present.”172 The definitive characteristic of an MHS is the “inability to bear the costs of 
further escalation,” strongly implied but not conclusively defined within the theory as 
military escalation.173 An MHS alone is not a sufficient indicator of a negotiating 
opportunity, since Ripeness requires it to be perceived alongside a Way Out – 
recognizing these and synchronizing them perfectly is a challenge for practitioners and 
analysts. In Ripeness theory there is no conceptual capacity for a partial MHS. The MHS 
has a binary state – either perceived, or not. (This is challenged by additions to 
Ripeness theory). 
R4: A Way Out 
A Way Out is a necessary component of Ripeness, and must be perceived by all 
conflict parties mutually and simultaneously, alongside the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate. The Way Out is also subjective: for a Way Out to exist, “parties do not have 
to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is 
possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the 
willingness to search too.”174 Zartman gives no description of the mechanisms, 
processes, or techniques that construct a Way Out. It is implicitly acknowledged that it 
may be helpful if proposed solutions are already in circulation when the MHS arrives 
since at that point parties “grab on to proposals that have usually been in the air for a 
long time and that only now appear attractive.”175 Again, there is no capacity in 
Zartman’s original theory for a partial Way Out: it has a binary state – either perceived, 
or not. (This is challenged by additions to Ripeness theory). 
R5: A Ripe Moment 
A Ripe Moment is the stated outcome and goal for Zartman’s Ripeness theory, 
and exists when all conflict parties simultaneously perceive both an MHS and a Way 
Out. Since not all negotiations occur at a Ripe Moment, and are therefore destined for 
outcomes other than genuine negotiated resolutions, a Ripe Moment requires a 
                                                     
172 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 9. 
173 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 231.  
174 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 9. 
175 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 225. 
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modifier such as “serious” or “sincere” because Ripeness alone indicates a sincere 
search for a joint outcome.176 A Ripe Moment indicates the point at which genuine 
negotiations for conflict resolution may be opened. If policy makers or practitioners 
decide to seize a Ripe Moment, then they move beyond the boundaries of Zartman’s 
theory and into deal making and implementation. These points are partially addressed 
by additions to Ripeness theory. 
R6: Point at which genuine negotiations open 
This is the decision point resulting from Ripeness theory. Note this element, R6, 
is this beyond the point where Zartman’s original conception ends, as it is not relevant 
to the theoretical definition of whether the parties open negotiations or not. The 
theory does not describe this point as a separate event to the Ripe Moment, since 
there is no provision within the core theory to explain how to ensure negotiations are 
successful. Zartman and other theorists do comment upon these later stages, but not 
within the core propositions, as Ripeness theory applies specifically to the 
characteristics that define only the onset of genuine negotiations. This is one of the 
major criticisms of the theory. I have added this point to the diagram to connect the 
core theory to the stages of the negotiating process that follow in real-world scenarios 
and are important to policymakers. The significance of this and later stages are 
explored in the case study. 
R7: Mutually Enhancing Opportunity (MEO) 
Additions to Ripeness theory, notably by Zartman himself, consider the 
Mutually Enhancing Opportunity (MEO) to be an essential requirement for 
negotiations to move from opening towards a successful outcome.177 The MEO – 
which may exist independently from the conflict parties, or be created by one or more 
of them – has a decisive impact on the psychologies of the conflict parties. 
“Negotiations completed under the shadow – or the push – of an MHS alone are likely 
                                                     
176 Ibid., p. 227. 
177 See for example the section entitled ‘Problems: Compelling Opportunities’ in ibid., pp. 241-3. This 
requirement for positive options relates to prospect theory, in which “decision making under risk can be 
viewed as a choice between prospects and gambles,” see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 
vol. 47, no. 2 (1979), p. 263; ibid. Prospect theory has experienced the same evolutions as Ripeness, 
towards cumulative generation of the perceptive elements. See for example Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty vol. 5, no. 4 (1992). 
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to be unstable and unlikely to lead to a more enduring settlement. A negative shadow 
can begin the process but cannot provide for the change of mentalities to 
reconciliation.”178 Despite its apparent importance, the nature of an MEO is not 
discussed or defined. 
R8: Genuine outcome from negotiations 
Zartman’s implication – based on his descriptions of preceding elements – is 
that a genuine outcome represents a negotiated reconciliation, rooted in collaborative 
mindsets and commitments, and perceived mutually as genuine or sincere. As with 
other elements from R6 onwards, a genuine outcome is beyond scope of Ripeness 
theory and is considered merely one possible result from negotiations opened at a 
Ripe Moment. For Zartman, genuine negotiated outcomes must come from a Ripe 
Moment, but the presence of a Ripe Moment at the start does not ensure a genuine 
outcome. This requires analysts to monitor mindsets on all sides as the negotiation 
progresses, as any later move away from a simultaneous MHS and Way Out in the 
minds of one or more conflict parties is likely to undermine successful outcomes. 
Renewed belief in escalation is also an indicator that Ripe Moment is passing. 
Zartman and other theorists introduce four second-order factors to consider 
alongside the core elements of Ripeness set out above: the valid or trusted 
spokesman; the impending (or recent) catastrophe; the shock; and the new leader. 
Zartman’s original theory placed the Valid Spokesman as a further essential element of 
Ripeness. This was later downgraded to secondary importance and separated from the 
route to the Ripe Moment. Yet it remains important to explanations of Ripeness within 
the whole negotiating process, and so it is considered an indicator here. “The presence 
of strong leadership recognized as representative of each party and that can deliver 
that party’s compliance to the agreement is a necessary (while alone insufficient) 
condition for productive negotiations to begin, or indeed to end successfully.”179 The 
leader is central to perceptions (or not) of the MHS and Way Out, since Ripeness is 
underpinned by cost-benefit analysis, and these risk and opportunity-driven 
                                                     
178 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 242. 
179 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., pp. 10-11. For more see Lieberfeld, 1999, op. cit., especially pp. 71-72, pp. 77-
78. Also the article expanded as a book in Daniel Lieberfeld, Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation and 
Threat Perception in South Africa and Israel/Palestine (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999). 
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calculations are central to a leader’s role. Changes in leadership perceptions, including 
changes in personnel, are therefore important events because of their possible impact 
on an organisation’s approach towards escalation or negotiation. Zartman also 
suggests that an MHS is “optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently 
avoided catastrophe” – though the catastrophe is not a necessary indicator for 
Ripeness, it is therefore significant and included here.180  
Two additional theories also relate to leadership perceptions, and are included 
here because they add context to Ripeness theory’s explanatory value in its original 
format. New Leader theory “suggests that a change in leadership is often needed to 
pull away from failed policies.”181 Shock theory, states that “there will be a return to 
rationality when a sudden striking event—a “shock”—jolts the mind and stimulates 
rethinking.”182 The data and indicators relating to these second order elements, core 
Ripeness theory, and selected additions that do not challenge the core 
conceptualization and construction of Ripeness, are summarized in the table below:  
                                                     
180 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 228. 
181 See Tom Woodhouse and Christopher Mitchell, "Gestures of Conciliation; Factors Contributing to 
Successful Olive Branches," Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 12, no. 1 (2006). Also 
Stephen S. Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," in Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, 
ed. P. Stern and D. Druckman, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000). For leadership and 
strategy within organisational theory, Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and 
Beyond (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), chapter 2 and 3. 
182 Jacob Bercovitch, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz, "The Management and Termination of Protracted 
Interstate Conflicts: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations," Millennium vol. 26, no. 3 (1997). 
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Summary of data collection requirements relating to Ripeness theory 




Related to elements of 
Ripeness theory 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
Numbers and nature of 
casualties and material costs 
Objective Defined R1: optional for R3 - MHS 
‘Other evidence’ of stalemate 
or MHS 
Objective Undefined R1: optional for R3 - MHS 
Perception of MHS, with or 
without objective evidence 
Subjective Defined 
R2: essential for R3 – 
MHS, and therefore also 
R5 – Ripe Moment 
Way Out 
A sense shared with the 
other party that a negotiated 
solution is possible and a 
willingness to search exists 
Subjective Defined 
Essential for R4, and 
therefore also R5 – Ripe 
Moment 
Ripe Moment 
Exists when a Way Out and 
MHS exist simultaneously. 
 
Note: may exist whether or 
not negotiations begin. 
Subjective Defined 
R5: created by the 
simultaneous existence 
of R3 and R4 
Optional second-order factors 
Proposals in circulation? Objective 
Optional, 
Defined 
Supporting R4: the Way 
Out, increasing chances 
of its simultaneity with 
R3, the MHS. 
Trusted spokesman Subjective 
Optional, 
Defined 
Supporting R4: the Way 
Out, increasing chances 
of its simultaneity with 




Supporting R3, the MHS. 





May affect perceptions 
vital to all elements. 
New Leader Objective 
Addition, 
Defined. 
May affect perceptions 
vital to all elements. 
Figure 9: Summary of data collection requirements relating to Ripeness theory. 
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Additions to Ripeness theory: moving towards incorporating legitimacy 
Other more substantial evolutions to Zartman’s work are termed “additions to 
Ripeness theory” in this thesis. These are pertinent given the requirement in military 
doctrine and the case study to account for the impact of military action upon 
legitimacy, including of the Host Nation’s credibility as a negotiating partner. These 
additions increase the theory’s usefulness for complex military operations in two ways:  
1) By allowing each conflict party to aggregate a variety of subjective responses, 
motivations, and triggers together to create Ripeness incrementally, and for 
bespoke reasons;  
2) By applying Ripeness theory to the context of low-resource, local, military 
deployments. 
The first addition to theory is very significant. Here, scholars add to Zartman’s 
concept of Ripeness, in which conflict parties must reach the same perceptive states 
(i.e. of the MHS, and the Way Out), at the same time, for the same reason – and both 
feel the inability to escalate militarily. These theorists introduce a variable model in 
which differences in legitimacy, and other non-violent, positive concepts and actions 
(such as quality of governance and public service delivery) – optionally, alongside 
military actions – may bring about both an MHS and contribute to a Mutually Enticing 
Opportunity.183 Pruitt proposes readiness theory, in which “readiness is the extent to 
which an individual disputant is interested in negotiation.”184 Importantly, while this 
follows Ripeness theory’s requirement for parties to have both motivation to end 
conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation, readiness and other additions 
allow more of one variable to substitute (that is, compensate) for less of another.185 
Pruitt explains this in practical language: 
“Readiness theory allows some parties to be motivated mainly by a belief 
that they cannot win, others mainly by the cost of the conflict, and still others 
mainly by the risk of a future catastrophe or pressure from a powerful third party. 
                                                     
183 Daniel Druckman and Justin Green, "Playing Two Games: Internal Negotiations in the Philippines," in 
Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman, (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 299-231, especially pp. 305-311. 
184 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 6. 
185 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Such a model fits reality better than Ripeness theory, which requires a uniform 
hurting stalemate for all cases.”186 
The second addition to Ripeness theory makes it more useful for practitioners 
in the context of both fringe areas and other scenarios. Here, imbalances in a military 
position may be offset by financial or reconstruction (dis-)advantages, or legitimacy 
differences, allowing a stalemate constructed from the aggregate of a range of factors. 
This is a more accurate representation of the interplay between military, development, 
and diplomatic strategies. Similarly, the impact of national-level military dominance 
might be brought towards stalemate by shortening time before withdrawal or 
domestic political pressures to see quick results. This allows the doctrinal requirement 
for a military advantage before negotiation to fit within theoretical models based 
around stalemate.  
Such a model also goes further than core Ripeness in addressing the realities of 
deployments to fringe areas, where political progress is required although central 
government is weak or disputed and only a small military force is available. This links 
to the evolving thinking in the United States towards “minimalist stabilization” 
deployments.187 The 2012 US Defense Strategic Guidance states that “US forces will be 
ready to conduct limited counter-insurgency and other stability operations if required, 
[but] US forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability 
operations.”188 This term groups a variety of related proposals under the concept of 
minimalist stabilization, defined as “small-scale, lowcost operations combining military 
and civilian activities to influence the political authority structure of a state in or 
recovering from violent conflict.”189 Critics of smaller military deployments argue that 
“a light footprint makes the success of an operation more than usually dependent on 
the political dynamic of local actors. Since the malevolence or collapse of that political 
dynamic is precisely the reason that power is arrogated to an international presence, 
                                                     
186 Ibid. 
187 Stephen Watts et al., The Uses and Limitations of Small-Scale Military Interventions (RAND, 2012), p. 
1. 
188 US Department of Defense quoted in ibid., p. 6. 
189 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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the light footprint is unsustainable as a model for general application.”190 As explored 
in the case study, additions to Ripeness theory can explain how a smaller military force 
might foster the motivation to negotiate using the capacity for some population 
security and carefully targeted coercion (but without full military dominance), when 
supported by non-military activities designed to improve governance and legitimacy. 
(These might include dialogue and confidence-building, public service and 
infrastructure delivery. 
The case study also suggests the need to develop Ripeness theory further in 
two areas; a task made more feasible by the greater flexibility offered by additions to 
Ripeness theory: 
1) In cases that involve multiple conflict parties, especially those where multiple 
identities are used as hedging strategies;  
2) Where improvement to legitimacy is an important outcome desired from the 
conduct and onset of genuine negotiation.  
The first area for development applies to both core Ripeness and additions to it 
since both Zartman’s theory and evolutions, such as readiness theory, share a crucial 
limitation: they focus “on two-party conflicts despite the increasing prevalence of 
conflicts involving multiple players.”191 The Sangin case study, developed in due 
course, involved groups subject to different leadership and control, and different 
motivations for conflict. This could merit defining them as separate conflict parties. 
The list of active parties includes: international military forces; Afghan Government 
forces; Taliban from outside Helmand, or Afghanistan itself; local Taliban; narcotics 
smugglers; local criminal elements. It could be argued that the groups mentioned 
above, and the military coalition, were also internally multi-polar. For example, ISAF 
included different nationalities (the US, UK and others); different levels of command 
with different priorities (e.g. Battlegroup, National Task Force, and Regional 
Command); and different leadership arrangements (ISAF, and the separate counter-
terrorism Operation Enduring Freedom mission). By extension, it could also be argued 
                                                     
190 Simon Chesterman, "Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations," in Making 
States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Government, ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and 
Ramesh Thakur., (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), p. 344. 
191 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 31. 
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that the presence of civilian reconstruction and diplomatic elements added to this 
multipolarity. This is especially pertinent once we move beyond the military-focused 
Ripeness theory and into the additions where non-military activities contribute to 
feelings of Hurt, or to awareness of a Mutually Enticing Opportunity. The Sangin 
Accord also represents a multi-polar negotiation (with local and national government, 
NATO, neighbouring non-government power brokers and the Taliban all involved to a 
degree). This complexity requires Ripeness theory to be developed if it is to be useful, 
especially for cases where doctrine and policy aspires for negotiated agreements 
constructed within states to strengthen the centralised state itself. 
The second area for development stems from the focus in case study on 
fostering local political legitimacy through the Sangin Accord, and other military and 
non-military activities. It also adds the impact of the Afghan Government, which was 
supposed to be the ultimate leader of political progress, into the challenges for 
modelling the conflict parties. A focus on legitimacy brings more detail on a crucial 
overlap between theory and policy aspiration: the desire for external action to 
strengthen the bond between central authority and the population, so that host nation 
government officials become central to the Way Out and – if a sustainable agreement 
is needed – the Mutually Enticing Opportunity that Ripeness theory suggests. In the 
longer term, this legitimacy should be a factor in the fate of any supported 
government after the withdrawal of external military and civilian personnel. Assessing 
the Way Out in more detail is an important element of the case study, as – in the 
Sangin case – the construction of this perception appears to have taken over a year; 
significantly longer than well-resourced military strategies required to change the 
security dynamics. In particular, this allows an analysis of the important pre-
negotiation stages, following the definition provided by Harold H. Saunders, meaning 
“those parts of the negotiating process which take place before around-the-table 
negotiation begins.”192 This considers “why parties to a conflict will not negotiate, and 
what changes in the situation might enable them to do so” and is effectively addressed 
through two sub-questions also provided by Saunders:  
                                                     
192 Harold H. Saunders, "We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of Pre-Negotiating 
Phases," Negotiation Journal, vol. 1, (1985), pp. 249-262. 
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(1) Can the parties organize themselves to make the decisions necessary for 
negotiation?  
(2) What in their analysis of the situation stands against a decision to 
negotiate?193  
In conflict zones where face-to-face meetings are very rare, the pre-negotiation 
phase, and actions taken within it are critical to influencing parties to perceive the Way 
Out. These activities may also include other confidence-building projects and 
mechanisms, and – in conflict where the purpose is to boost the local government – 
the act of governing more effectively. This highlights the importance of linking 
Ripeness to the stated objectives of modern counterinsurgency doctrine – the 
improved legitimacy of the government, in general terms and as a negotiating partner. 
It is significant that additions to Ripeness theory allow longer-term factors to be 
accounted for in an MHS and a Way Out, since legitimacy is linked in part to the 
“cultural, political and historical contexts” which Stern and Druckman argue “affects 
the parties, their motives, and susceptibility to influence.”194 
Why history? 
History is important for any assessment of a contemporary conflict because 
individual and collective beliefs, and memories about historical events, give subjective 
context to “objective” facts about past events. This recall is not perfect, sometimes 
deliberately so; history can for example be remembered, invented, or recovered, and 
personal bias can affect perceptions of accuracy for conflict parties and researchers 
alike.195 In turn, these subjective calibrations affect the type and quality of evidence 
that is considered convincing, including in the conduct of negotiation. For example, the 
acts of negotiators or soldiers, dealing with leaders from another conflict party who 
have been let down by predecessors from the same group in the past, may increase 
                                                     
193 Ibid., (the pagination is unmarked within the source so the full page range is given). 
194 Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, "Evaluation Interventions in History: The Case of International 
Conflict Resolution," in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel 
Druckman, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000), p. 39. 
195 Mark Damen, "USU 1320: History and Civilization; Section 1 - History and What Really Happened," 
Utah State University, 2015, 
http://www.usu.edu/markdamen/1320hist&Civ/chapters/01HIST.htm(accessed 21st May 2015). There 
are also inadvertent failures of recall, see Kim J. Vicente and Adriaan D. De Groot, "The Memory Recall 
Paradigm: Straightening out the Historical Record," American Psychologist 45, no. 2 (1990). Notably 
recall bias, where desired outcomes affect what is remembered: Karen Raphael, "Recall Bias: A Proposal 
for Assessment and Control," International Journal of Epidemiology vol. 16, no. 2 (1987). 
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the threshold at which the new generation of representatives is considered legitimate. 
History helps determine whether conflict that is considered unbearably intense by one 
party, is perceived similarly, or felt to be less severe than other disputes from within 
the living memory of participants. For example, previous experience in Iraq, or in war 
against the Soviets, may alter the perceptual threshold required for an MHS. Trauma is 
also a factor affecting rational assessment of Hurt, and the cost of escalation.196 This is 
covered in later chapters in more detail. 
Historical record also calibrates perceptions of legitimacy, for example, 
memories of a central government’s past record of service delivery affects modern 
thresholds. Here, the experience and historical memory held by different generations 
is important. For example, in Sangin, individuals around 70 years of age recalled the 
pre-Soviet liberal lifestyle; 40 year olds had their formative years in the Mujahidin 
resistance to Communist forces and their reforms; younger people were educated and 
lived only under Taliban rule. What happened, and how stories passed between 
generations are judged, affected later approaches to the Sangin Accord – as set out in 
later chapters. This matters in two ways. Firstly, within an intervention, perceptions of 
the legitimacy of government and its international backers, in relation to alternatives, 
influence progress towards the ultimate political objective: sufficient stability (in both 
security and governance) to allow the transition of all functions from the international 
presence to the national government alone. Secondly, legitimacy is both the objective 
for military doctrine in counterinsurgency, and a factor that will be shown to affect 
perceptions – and therefore the presence – of key components of Ripeness theory. 
Threatened “state legitimacy matters because it undermines the processes of state-
society bargaining that are central to building state capacity.”197 In particular, 
assessments of legitimacy affect the likelihood that the Way Out, required for 
collaborative approaches to non-violent solutions, and the Mutually Enticing 
Opportunity (needed to turn genuine negotiations into a successful agreement) are 
perceived. Defining legitimacy is therefore necessary. 
                                                     
196 Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, eds., Memory and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, 
Cases and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
197 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "The State's Legitimacy in Fragile 
Situations: Unpacking Complexity," OECD Publishing, 2010, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/the-state-s-legitimacy-in-fragile-situations_9789264083882-en(accessed 14th 
February 2015).  
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Judgements about legitimacy are “based on indicators of a group’s structure 
(its age and constitutional legality), whether its leadership is charismatic or not, 
endorsements from leaders of other countries, and the group’s performance as 
evaluated in relation to the expectations and standards of other groups.”198 An 
opponent’s assessment of the host nation government as a partner in negotiations 
may be affected by subjective judgements about legitimacy, especially where policy 
defines “political progress” to include a form of reconciliation between different 
conflict parties within a nation. What can Ripeness offer the analyst or practitioner 
aiming to promote both legitimacy and negotiated reconciliation, monitor progress in 
real time, or explain past events? Druckman and Green’s analysis matrix on the 
following page provides a useful starting point:199 
  
                                                     
198 Druckman and Green, 1995, op. cit., p. 305. 
199 Ibid., p. 307. 
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Relative Power and Legitimacy conditions under which Insurgents and Regimes 
would consider entering into negotiations 
Insurgents’ relative 
Legitimacy 
Relative Power (insurgents versus regime) 
Decreasing Constant Increasing 
Decreasing 1A – Negotiate 
2A – Do not 
negotiate 
3A – Do not 
negotiate 
Constant 
4A – Do not 
negotiate 
5A – Do not 
negotiate 
6A – Negotiate 
Increasing 
7A – Do not 
negotiate 




Relative Power (regime versus insurgents) 
Increasing Constant Decreasing 
Increasing 1B – Negotiate 2B – Negotiate 3B – Negotiate 
Constant 4B – Negotiate 5B – Negotiate 6B – Negotiate 
Decreasing 
7B – Do not 
negotiate 
8B – Do not 
negotiate 
9B – Negotiate 
 
Ripe Moments when both sides seek genuine negotiated reconciliation = 
1A+1B together, 6A+6B together, 9A+9B together. 
Figure 10: Relative Power and Legitimacy conditions under which Insurgents and 
Regimes would consider entering into negotiations. 
Here, “the particular intersection of relative power and legitimacy defined in 
cells 6A and 6B (as well as those defined in cells 1A, 1B, 9A, and 9B) is a definition of a 
Ripe Moment,” at which genuine negotiations could begin – if desired by all parties.200 
This offers a set of conditions for analysts to look for in case studies and consider in 
real-time. What can a negotiated agreement brokered at the local level such as the 
Sangin Accord tell us about the applicability of theory, developed initially from state-
state conflict scenarios? Was there evidence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate and a 
Way Out as the negotiations that led to the agreement began, including the inability to 
escalate the conflict? Did zero-sum attitudes evolve towards shared goals? Were the 
negotiations focused on genuine conflict resolution, or something else? If comparative 
differences in legitimacy can be shown to contribute to the Way Out or the Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate then it may be possible to suggest developments to theory that – 
                                                     
200 Ibid., p. 311. 
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reversing Clausewitz’s dictum – allow “politics to become the continuation of warfare 
by other means.”201 These questions are addressed in later chapters. The impact of 
long-term conflict drivers, geographic, demographic, and historical factors also have a 
significant influence on events in the case study – and upon political legitimacy – and 
so this thesis continues in chapter two with a detailed review of the history of Sangin 
District, Helmand, and Afghanistan itself showing how this affects the Sangin Accord. 
The later history is then given nuance and context by data from existing and new 
sources (both primary and secondary) in the case study analysis, as explained below. 
 
Defining the research task and scholarly context 
Of all the published works on Sangin, this thesis is unique in placing the local 
political dynamics at the heart of an academic study analysing the course of the 
conflict in Sangin District between 2006 and 2011. These dates are designed to bracket 
international efforts to bring about political progress in Sangin at the local level, and 
correspond to the arrival of UK forces there in 2006 and the public announcement of 
the Sangin Accord in January 2011. It presents for the first time an unclassified 
historical narrative outlining the lineage of the Sangin Accord, describing the ancient 
historical antecedents and the contemporary conflict dynamics, and assessing their 
relative impacts – alongside external and foreign influences – on the political situation 
in north Helmand that led to the negotiated agreement in 2011. The primary value of 
this research is therefore as a unique contribution to historical knowledge about 
Sangin and Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While the fate of the Accord in the years 
that followed is considered, the thesis focuses on the events leading to the onset of 
negotiations rather than its implementation as this is both the focus of Ripeness 
theory, and the period covered by the new primary data from Afghan sources.  
Alongside augmenting the new historical case study, the thesis makes a second 
contribution to scholarship. This is methodological – assessing the applicability of 
Ripeness theory and its evolutions, and developments are suggested addressing why 
                                                     
201 Former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband quoted in British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 3-3. 
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and when parties to an IAC at a local level negotiate an end to the conflict.202 By 
considering the local level (as earlier defined), it takes a new approach to the study of 
negotiated agreements in conflict. This moves beyond negotiated agreements in state-
to-state conflict, and later, intrastate or civil wars at the national level: the traditional 
frames of theoretical analysis used in core Ripeness theory. 
This thesis applies a single case study approach to the Sangin Accord. This 
method is distinct from the historian’s case study method because “case study 
researchers in political science are interested in the theory-based explanation of 
individual cases for the purposes of generalizing to other cases, while for historians the 
explanation of individual cases is a primary goal in itself.”203 The analysis begins with 
the narrative surrounding the political situation in Sangin set out in the historical case 
study, from the longer-term drivers to the specifics of the period leading up the Sangin 
Accord in January 2011. The explanatory method will consider whether the available 
primary and secondary source material correlates with the elements considered 
critical for genuine negotiations in Ripeness theory, and additions to it – or other 
explanations. This includes the construction of a Way Out, and the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate, using objective quantitative measures (for example on casualty statistics), 
and subjective assessments of them made by local leaders and higher placed staff.  
An alternative method would have been to compare the Sangin Accord with 
other negotiated agreements, and to ground the historical narrative and the suggested 
areas for further theoretical within a larger set of case studies. This would have 
undoubtedly offered greater value if the focus of this research had been to test 
Ripeness theory, and to prove the basis for further iterations. Negotiated agreements 
in Northern Ireland, and in Columbia, would have been strong candidates for inclusion 
with a larger dataset. However, there are a number of drawbacks that meant this 
                                                     
202 An effective explanation for the value of historical case study research as the basis for theoretical 
evolution is set out by Georgetown University’s Professor Andrew Bennett in Andrew Bennett, "Case 
Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages," in Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods 
for Studying International Relations, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2004), especially pp. 29-30. The use of history for theoretical evolution is 
covered on pp. 37-38. Also Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005). Important contributions from single cases include 
Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Anna 
Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton University Press, 2005). 
203 Bennett, 2004, op. cit., p. 38. 
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approach was discarded in favour of the one outlined above. First, covering a number 
of case studies would prevent the Sangin Accord being outlined in detail, reducing the 
unique and untold historical narrative to a far shorter outline. Given that there are no 
other significant scholarly works on the Sangin Accord, this would have undermined 
the theoretical value of comparing this reduced summary to other cases, which are 
supported by extensive bodies of research. Second, there are already a number of 
works applying Ripeness theory – or additions to it – to Northern Ireland204 and the 
agreements with FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia),205 and also to other case studies.206 Adding 
these cases to the methodology only allow this thesis to make a unique contribution to 
scholarship if they have sufficient parallels to create multiple data points in support of 
conclusions that modifies theory. Variations in combat intensity, local focus, 
stabilisation spending, and governance mechanisms suggest that these cases may be 
too divergent to enable effective comparison with the Sangin Accord. The most 
significant is the presence of international forces. The significant NATO presence in 
Afghanistan intended to use outsiders to support another national government in its 
negotiation. In both Northern Ireland and Columbia, the negotiations occurred 
between central authorities of a state, and those that resist it, with military action 
coming directly from the state party to the negotiations. This makes the Sangin case 
markedly different, and so a single case study approach has been chosen. 
                                                     
204 Dean G Pruitt, "Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict," American Behavioral Scientist 
vol. 50, no. 11 (2007); Eileen Connolly and John Doyle, "Ripe Moments for Exiting Political Violence: An 
Analysis of the Northern Ireland Case," Irish Studies in International Affairs vol. 26, (2015); John Doyle, 
"Re-Examining the Northern Ireland Conflict," The politics of conflict: A survey, (2007); Joseph E. 
Thompson, "Northern Ireland: How Ripe for Peace?," World Affairs vol. 3, (1996). Ripeness is also 
rejected as significant for those who favour reconciliatory motives and actions – see for example 
Jonathan Tonge, Peter Shirlow, and James McAuley, "So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent? How Interplay, 
Not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process," Irish Political Studies vol. 26, no. 1 (2011). 
205 Colin Walch, "Rethinking Ripeness Theory: Explaining Progress and Failure in Civil War Negotiations in 
the Philippines and Colombia," International Negotiation vol. 21, no. 1 (2016); Aldo Civico, "Eluding 
Peace?," in Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy, ed. I William Zartman and G.O. 
Faure, (2011); Nazih Richani, "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The 
Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002," Journal of Conflict Studies vol. 25, no. 2 (2005); Todd 
Eisenstadt and Daniel García Peña, "Colombia: Negotiations in a Shifting Pattern of Insurgency," in 
Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, ed. I. William Zartman, (1995). 
206 See for example Richard N Haass, "Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes," Survival 
vol. 30, no. 3 (1988); Dean G Pruitt, "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks," International Negotiation vol. 
2, no. 2 (1997); Lieberfeld, 1999, op. cit; Schrodt et al., 2003, op. cit., 
http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/papers.dir/Schrodt.etal.ISA03.pdf. ; I William Zartman, 
"Mediation: Ripeness and Its Challenges in the Middle East," International Negotiation vol. 20, no. 3 
(2015). 
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Academic research and writing on the Sangin Accord has been limited, for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was, and remains, a very dangerous place and not for fit for 
independent travellers. Aside from Afghan nationals, only people associated with 
international military forces are likely to spend a significant amount of time there, 
although some very brave journalists and researchers have made their own visits to 
north Helmand and the Sangin area. Official data is also tightly controlled, as the 
campaign continued for most of the research period. The author’s Freedom of 
Information (FOI) request of 8th May 2014 is believed to be the first extensive release 
of government data on this case study.207 The UK’s Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) was a vital conduit for collecting and disseminating this and other data about 
Helmand, initially for official use only. Nations approached the PRT construct 
differently, but for the UK, it was a combined civilian-military, often multinational, 
organisation with a variety of functions depending on location, personnel, and other 
factors. Unless stated specifically, (and since there were others across the country), 
the term refers only to the UK’s PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. The PRT there 
“supported the Afghan Government in delivering governance and improved 
development across the province” through the delivery of a single Helmand Plan 
agreed between the Government of Afghanistan and its international partners. The 
plan coordinates 9 themes: Governance and Politics; Rule of Law; Counter-Narcotics; 
Population Engagement; Health; Education; Agriculture; Infrastructure and Private 
Sector Development.”208 
While many sources mention Sangin in some form, the restrictions upon data 
collection explained above account for the presence of only 19 known public sources 
that address Sangin District in any detail. They fall into two categories: sources dealing 
predominantly with the tactical military experience, usually in a narrative format, and; 
sources analysing the situation in Sangin, from either a military or wider political and 
stabilisation perspective. Mike Martin (then of the British Army Counterinsurgency 
Centre) wrote an unclassified History of Helmand, first published in August 2011, 
                                                     
207 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Freedom of Information Request Reference 0494-14 Dated 
8th May 2014. This data is analysed in detail in chapters 4-7, alongside Afghan primary sources. 
208 Helmand PRT, "About the Helmand Reconstruction Team," 2012, 
http://www.helmandprt.com/about-the-prt/(accessed 5th January 2013).  
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initially for internal use by the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD).209 Martin subsequently 
published in 2014 a fuller study, An Intimate War, providing a history of the Helmand 
conflict based primarily on oral history sources.210 This was a first: there was therefore 
no scholarly modern history of Helmand available to civilian or military personnel until 
after the Sangin Accord was already in place. These important themes are again 
explored in the film Bitter Lake (2015).211 
A further ten sources address the military experience in Sangin as their main 
priority, combining narrative and analysis in varying degrees. The most widely known 
in the UK are perhaps 3 Para by Patrick Bishop, and Danger Close by Colonel Stuart 
Tootal (which tell the story of the initial break-in battle in Helmand in 2006).212 The US 
experience (largely after the period covered by this thesis) is described by Ben 
Anderson in No Worse Enemy and One Million Steps, by Bing West.213 Sangin – a 
glance through Afghan eyes by Toby Woodbridge is a short, self-published memoir by 
a British military officer who served in Sangin in early 2009.214 This is interesting 
context and has some relevant specifics about some key personalities, but it remains a 
tactical military narrative for the most part. An effective chronological overview and 
overall context is given on a private website produced by retired US Air Force 
Lieutenant Colonel Ed Marek. His lengthy research, entitled ‘Afghanistan’s hell, the 
Sangin Valley: Why Sangin?’ is a very useful timeline upon which to frame a more 
detailed and politically focused narrative. While it appears largely based on access to 
sources with knowledge of the campaign, or documents from it, the referencing is 
insufficient to rely upon it here.215 Mark Moyar, in The Third Way of COIN: defeating 
the Taliban in Sangin (2010) writes a detailed account, largely based on a comparison 
                                                     
209 Mike Martin, A Brief History of Helmand (Warminster: British Army Afghan COIN Centre, 2011). 
210 Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict (Hurst and Co., 2014), quoted 
on the dust jacket. Carter Malkasian produced in 2013 an excellent study of one of Helmand’s key 
districts, but this contains just a few – admittedly important – points on Sangin and so is not considered 
one of the key sources. See Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the 
Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst, 2013). 
211 Adam Curtis, "Bitter Lake," (25th January 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRbq63r7rys. 
212 Bishop, 2007, op. cit. Colonel Stuart Tootal, Danger Close (London: John Murray, 2009). 
213 Ben Anderson, No Worse Enemy: The inside Story of the Chaotic Struggle for Afghanistan (Oneworld 
Publications, 2012). Bing West, One Million Steps, a Marine Platoon at War (New York: Random House, 
2014). 
214 Toby Woodbridge, "Sangin - a Glance through Afghan Eyes," (Google Books: MY Books, 2011). 
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=zjpD8BUMpyUC. 
215 Edward Marek, "Afghanistan’s Hell, the Sangin Valley: Why Sangin?," 2010-2014, 
http://www.talkingproud.us/Military/SanginValley/SanginIntro.html.  
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between British and US Marine Corps tactics, and advances so-called “leader-centric” 
counterinsurgency.216 While he makes some valid conclusions, his desire to compare 
military tactics without linking military action to the political objectives so central to 
counterinsurgency diminishes the value. His analysis starts from the premise that “the 
same social and political conditions” existed throughout the British and US 
deployments to Sangin between 2006 and 2011, therefore allowing a direct 
comparison of the tactics used by the various commanders.217 This assessment is 
incorrect, as this case study and other more recent sources show, which limits the 
strength of his argument. He also makes little reference to other variations in the 
wider campaign – mostly outside the control of local commanders of either nation – 
that affected operations in Sangin, such as policy or campaign directives from the most 
senior leadership, fluctuations in Afghan National Security Force numbers, or changes 
in the personnel and legitimacy within the local Afghan Government. Two books 
address the military experiences of commanding a company of soldiers responsible for 
key parts of Sangin District: Major Russell Lewis’ Company Commander and Major 
Richard Streatfeild’s Honourable Warriors.218 The realities of deployment in Sangin 
District are covered in two visceral television documentaries, BBC1’s Our War and 
BBC2’s The Lion’s Final Roar.219 
Six sources cover Afghan political or social issues in more detail, or deal with 
the wider stabilisation and political context. The first is Making Peace in War: stories 
from civilians on Helmund’s front line, a collection of accounts published as an e-book 
in 2014, describing the experiences of civilian reconstruction staff working at District 
and Provincial level alongside military forces (including in Sangin).220 The second is a 
brief but vital mention in Tom Coghlan’s chapter ‘The Taliban in Helmand: an oral 
                                                     
216 Mark Moyar, "The Third Way of Coin: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin," Small Wars Journal, (2011). 
217 Ibid., p. 7. 
218 See: Russell Lewis, Company Commander (Ebury Publishing, 2012). And: Richard Streatfeild, 
Honourable Warriors: Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2014).  
219 Bruce Goodison, Television broadcast, "The Invisible Enemy," Series 1, Episode 2, in Our War (BBC1: 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b011x1hl. Richard Sanders, Television broadcast, 
"Afghanistan, the Lion's Last Roar?," Episodes 1-2, (BBC2: 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04nd3rq. 
220 Iain and Lou Perrotta (eds.) King, "Making Peace in War: Stories from Civilians on Helmund's Front 
Line," (Amazon.co.uk: Isaac Perrotta-Hays, 2014). http://www.amazon.co.uk/Making-Peace-War-
Civilians-Helmunds-ebook/dp/B00LMTLVOW/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1413390516&sr=8-1. 
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history’ in Antonio Giustozzi’s Decoding the new Taliban.221 This gives a particularly 
strong overview of the deeply complex interplay between long standing tribal, social, 
commercial, other disputes, and their relationship with the much more recent conflict 
involving the Taliban, the government and NATO forces.222 The Sangin Accord case 
study was first sketched out in a Royal United Services Institute (in as much detail as 
then possible since the campaign remained underway), by former Sangin Stabilisation 
Advisor Phil Weatherill. This is an important source, from someone with deep 
knowledge of the case study. In Note from the Field: Targeting the Centre of Gravity – 
Adapting Stabilisation in Sangin, he sets out how “an alliance between the UK district 
stabilisation team, UK battle groups, and the Afghan District Governor helped to build 
stability from the district centre out. By focusing on locally owned and implemented 
service delivery, the District Governor’s office gained legitimacy and effectiveness – 
and an offer of peace from groups aligned to the Taliban.”223 Julius Cavendish, writing 
in summer 2014 also after pertinent field experience, has conducted the fullest 
research account yet published on the specifics and personalities behind the Sangin 
Accord, for the Afghanistan Analysts Network.224 Finally, a reduced version of my 
thesis was published by Oxford University Press in December 2014, as part of the 
edited volume, At the end of Military Intervention.225 
Many of these sources contain little analysis of Afghan and foreign actions in 
the context of their impact on local politics, or progress towards the social outcomes 
that lie at the heart of counterinsurgency and political reconciliation. The primary 
focus remains on the (usually tactical) actions and experiences of international military 
forces. This is somewhat ironic given the clear acknowledgement in British and US 
military doctrine of the primacy of political purpose in the counterinsurgency theory 
and doctrine driving the campaign. Therefore this thesis offers a new and important 
                                                     
221 Tom Coghlan, "The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History," in Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio 
Giustozzi, (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 119-153. 
222 See the Glossary for more on NATO. 
223 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 90.  
224 Julius Cavendish, "Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory: How ISAF Infighting Helped Doom 
Sangin to Its Ongoing Violence," 2014, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-
victory-how-isaf-infighting-helped-doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence(accessed 29th October 2014).  
225 Mark Beautement, "Negotiated Agreements in Tactical Transitions: The Sangin Accord 2011," in At 
the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover 
and Withdrawal, ed. Timothy Clack and Robert Johnson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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contribution to the history of the Helmand conflict as well as contributing to the 
methodological application of Ripeness theory to the analysis of conflict termination. 
Case study data sources and research ethics 
The data available for the Sangin Accord case study falls into three categories, 
two secondary and one primary. Firstly, there is the published literature referred to 
previously. Secondly, this is supplemented by existing data sourced under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000, directly from UK Government Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office archives. Thirdly, I draw upon new data from 35 primary source interviews, 
conducted in Kabul and Helmand Province, and kindly provided by Professors Theo 
Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi at King’s College London (KCL).226 This dataset constitutes 
original interview transcripts with Afghan sources, including self-identified Taliban 
commanders. Fifteen of these come from Farrell’s research conducted under the 
Economic and Social Research Council programme “Organisations, Innovation and 
Security in the Twenty-First Century” (1st April 2009 – 31st July 2012).227 Other data 
comes from Giustozzi, a world expert on the Taliban with over 10 years of experience 
on this type of field research. Elements of this data set have been referenced in an 
article published by Farrell and Giustozzi.228 The interviews were conducted in Pashto 
or Dari by Afghan researchers, journalists by profession, supervised by Giustozzi, using 
a standard questionnaire, and then translated into English. 
An overview of the new primary sources is provided in Annex A. Each source 
has been given an anonymised in-text reference code to protect the identity of the 
individual. Additional information that is not deemed to add risk to the individual is 
provided in the table. If it was provided, the subject’s exact age has been protected 
but the decade within which it falls has been indicated. This allows an analysis of the 
factors that may have affected the subject’s experience and attitude, especially the 
                                                     
226 For biographies of both Professors, see: King's College London, "Professor Theo Farrell Biography," 
2014, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/farrell.aspx(accessed 
19th October 2014).  King's College London, "Professor Antonio Giustozzi Biography," 2014, 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/visiting/giustozzi.aspx(accessed 16th 
October 2014).  
227 For details of this research project, see: Economic and Social Research Council, "Organisations, 
Innovation and Security in the Twenty-First Century," 2014, http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-
071-27-0069/read(accessed 11th October 2014).  
228 See Theo and Antonio Giustozzi Farrell, "The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency 2004-
2012," International Affairs vol. 89, no. 4 (2013), pp. 845-871. 
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political and education system in place at definitive periods, without providing specific 
identifying characteristics. This allows the sources to be assessed according to their 
generation where that proves useful for explaining the range of approaches taken by 
groups to the Sangin Accord. Of note, the category relating to knowledge of the Sangin 
Accord captures only the descriptor most directly confirmed by the interview 
transcript. It does not confirm or rule out multiple characteristics (a source might in 
reality have been involved but not shown this in their interview responses, for 
example). As far as possible, multiple confirmations across the primary and secondary 
dataset are used, to counter potential weaknesses such as confirmation bias, a small 
data pool, translation inaccuracies, and the author’s personal connection to the 
subject. No conclusions have been drawn from evidence provided by only one source 
except where noted in the footnotes, and only where the credibility and accuracy is 
verified by the author’s participant observation. These instances have been avoided as 
far as possible. Except where noted, the characteristics presented in the table reflect 
the chosen labels and testimonial data provided by the subjects themselves during 
interview. Afghan sources have been translated by near-bilingual native speakers, and 
in a small number of cases have been edited only for clarity of structure, not for 
meaning, and to remove names or data that increases the risk of identification. This 
Afghan-focused data is then fused with the secondary sources in English. The outcome 
brings into circulation a new historical and political case study, based on some 
completely new data, and some existing data unused in this context. Both King’s 
College London University and UK Ministry of Defence Ethics Committees have 
approved the project.229 
 
Thesis overview 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two presents the longer-term conflict 
drivers, setting the historical context, and establishes the narratives and themes 
present up to Afghanistan’s independence and the years immediately after it. These 
                                                     
229 For university approval, see: Mark Beautement, King's College London Research Ethics Protocol 
SSHL/12/13-48 Approved 28th May 20132013. For UK Ministry of Defence approval see: Mark 
Beautement, UK Ministry of Defence Research Protocol 415/MODREC/13 Approved 25th October 2013 
(2013). 
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relate specifically to water and land disputes, interactions with foreigners, challenges 
between central government and outlying areas, and the problems with reforms and 
modernisation in Afghanistan. These older narratives matter because perceptions of 
them vary between generations, for those involved in the case study. 
Covering the period from 1933 to 1994, chapter three sets the scene for the 
US-led intervention in 2001 with a review of the reforms under Zahir Shah, and then 
the subsequent Soviet experience from 1979-1989. The significance of the rise of a 
functioning narcotics industry in response to the Russian invasion is introduced. It then 
describes the significance of the civil war that followed – mixed with the preceding 
narratives – for the rise of the Taliban. This period of history relates closely to the 
oldest generation alive during the Sangin Accord, and their children.  
Chapter four briefly covers the rise of the Taliban and its relationship with al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The impact of the attacks on 11th September 2001, the 
rise of President Karzai, and NATO’s intervention are then outlined. The chapter 
finishes with the NATO expansion into the south of Afghanistan, and Helmand 
Province, in 2006; this is where the modern precursors to the Sangin Accord begin. 
This timeframe covers the experiences of the younger generations involved in the case 
study. 
Chapter five reviews the political developments in Helmand in 2006-2007, 
including the onset and ending of the Musa Qala Accord (2006). A near-simultaneous 
offer in Sangin that same year is also assessed, and its relationship on a failed uprising 
in 2007 that affected mindsets in the run up to the Sangin Accord. NATO’s policies of 
reconciliation and reintegration are reviewed, alongside Afghan approaches to 
negotiation and communication with opponents. 
Chapter six offers a detailed chronology and narrative modern history of Sangin 
District from 2006, and describes political progress towards the Accord in 2011. The 
narrative uses Afghan primary sources set against secondary source Western literature 
and public records sourced under the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000. Secondary 
sources frame this history, adding additional corroboration, and further context and 
specific details not covered by field research and official documents.  
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Chapter seven uses Ripeness theory and additions – alongside military doctrine 
– to explain the Sangin Accord. The analysis considers whether a military Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate, alongside a Way Out, is sufficient. Further work incorporates 
government capacity, reconstruction spending, community motivations and political 
legitimacy. The results are set within a wider policy context, considering how to 
promote political outcomes using military, development, and diplomatic resources.  
Chapter eight offers conclusions on the importance of historical antecedents in 
the explanation for the Sangin Accord, and the relative merits of Ripeness theory and 
its additions as explanatory tools. These conclusions aim to ensure that – combined 
with the high level of detail provided in the historical narrative – this case study is 
useful for future analysis work, as part of a larger group of case studies.230 This is 
intended to ensure the conclusions make a new and credible contribution to 
understanding about the relationship between the applications of military force, 
alongside diplomatic and development activity, and the onset of genuine negotiations 
at the local level – addressing the practitioners’ tension between Ripeness theory’s 
requirement for military stalemate and the policy makers’ desire to negotiate from a 
position of military advantage. 
                                                     
230 This might be achieved for example by keeping certain variables constant: the local level, plus either 
features of the conflict that are similar to Sangin (e.g. intensity, rural, number and type of conflict 
parties), plus the presence of a negotiated agreement). 
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CHAPTER 2: AN EARLY HISTORY OF SANGIN DISTRICT 
Afghan Government efforts to bring about the Sangin Accord of 2011 aligned 
Kabul’s priorities with those of the international community and many local actors: 
communities, their elders, the disaffected, government officials and elements 
aligned to the Taliban. This proved to be central pillar of the strategy, correlating in 
the case study with Ripeness’ theoretical need for the creation of a possible Way 
Out. Geographic and political landscapes, notably involving land and water 
ownership and access, strongly influenced the foundations for negotiation and 
created deep conflict drivers. While there were distinctly near-term facets to this 
complex and dynamic political environment, as will be shown in chapters four and 
five, there were also ancient roots stretching back centuries.  
The history of the Sangin area, and its wider environs, is therefore critical for a 
case study of the Sangin Accord itself, for two reasons. First, conflict drivers 
affecting the negotiating parties, and their perceptions of each other, had historical 
antecedents stretching back over 200 years. These included: a long history of 
interaction between locals, and foreigners perceived as partisan in disputes – 
revisited in 19th Century wars with Britain, covered in chapter three; significant 
unresolved disagreements over land and water rights, at the local level but also 
across national borders into contemporary Pakistan and Iran; and local groups 
seeking to preserve degrees of political autonomy within the context of wider 
conflict or power struggles, often perpetuated by larger regional rivalries. Second, 
the case study suggests that these factors affected the perceptions required for the 
creation of the constituent parts of a Ripe Moment. This contrasts with core 
Ripeness theory, that considers military Hurt in the current conflict to be the 
dominant motivating force for negotiation.  
These important historical themes are reviewed in the following chapters. 
Much of it falls outside the immediate memory of those involved in the Sangin 
Accord, but – as is shown in the case study analysis – the varied experiences of the 
different generations involved in that negotiated agreement leads to important 
differences in perception towards these older narratives. 
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Introducing Sangin: Sarwan Qala, the place of the caravans 
The Sangin area has affected politics and society in southern Afghanistan – and 
beyond – for hundreds of years. Its geography and human activity greatly influence the 
movement of people and goods, nearby security, and the extension of government.  
Figure 11: Approximate location of Sangin District (in white) and town (the red star) 
within Helmand Province, Afghanistan.231  
It is fertile land, ideally situated on the upper reaches of the Helmand River. 
Ancient trade and transit routes run through the area from the west, through Herat, to 
Kandahar in the east, and this axis remains influential today. This perhaps explains the 
local name Sarawan Qala, identified by locals to mean “place of the caravans.”232 Kalā 
(لاق) or qala means fort or castle. Distinct from other common names, locals never used 
(Sarawan) kalaey (  َيلک), [anglicised as Kalay], meaning village.
233 
                                                     
231 Adapted from BBC, "NATO Forces in Afghanistan to Launch Helmand Operation," 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8478220.stm(accessed 23rd June 2014).  
232 Participant observation from 2009-10 showed variations in pronunciation (and therefore anglicised 
spelling) from Sarawan, Sarwan, to Saravan and Sarvan. Related terms include Sapwan Qala used 
generally used to designate a specific village or sub-zone within a wider area known as Sarawan Qala. 
On trade caravans in the Islamic world, including Afghanistan, see T. Matthew. Ciolek, "A Catalogue of 
Georeferenced Caravanserais/Khans. Old World Trade Routes (OWTRAD) Project," Asia Pacific Research 
Online., 2004-present., www.ciolek.com/OWTRAD/caravanserais-catalogue-00.html(accessed 15th July 
2014).  
233 Henry George Raverty, "A Dictionary of the Puk'hto, Pus'hto, or Language of the Afghans: With 
Remarks on the Originality of the Language, and Its Affinity to Other Oriental Tongues," Williams and 
Norgate, 1867, Published online by the University of Chicago and Digital Dictionaries of South Asia, at 
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Figure 12: A high-prestige qala.234 
Names and labels in northern Helmand Province have fluid definitions and 
relate to human groupings as much as physical geography. Sarawan Qala had at times 
one, or multiple connotations simultaneously, though always referring to land north-
east of Sangin town itself, and never spanning the Helmand River. Meanings included a 
small collection of dwellings; a specific village; the lower part of the Sangin Valley for 
just a few kilometres north of the town; the entire Upper Sangin Valley (USV), which is 
approximately 30km long (from the town centre to the formal northern edge of the 
administrative district); traditionally Alikozai tribal lands; or the area’s people and 
community.235 This may be as much to do with varying levels of education and 
experience as the fact that “people’s identities are constructed in relationship to 
changing hierarchies of status, sect, and ethnicity.”236 At times therefore, the 
importance of formal maps was heavily diminished, since “the world constructed by 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/raverty/.  Consider for example the difference between the 
spellings, and therefore meanings, for the population centres of Musa Qala and Shin Kalay in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan. 
234 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: An Atlas of Indigenous Domestic Architecture (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1991), p. 188. 
235 Participant observation from 2009-10 confirmed in multiple interviews during the author’s time in 
Sangin. This posed significant problems for accuracy during discussions about the location of different 
social, political or geographic features. 
236 Magnus and Benjamin D. Hopkins Marsden, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2012), p. 177. 
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local inhabitants stands in stark contrast to that conceived for them by external state 
authorities,” both from Kabul and by outsiders.237 This varied approach posed 
challenges for conflict parties involved in the Sangin Accord, in defining and agreeing 
the geographical, social and political boundaries bound by the agreement. 
Situating Sangin and Helmand 
Great Britain has a long history with Afghanistan, and Helmand Province in 
particular. Sangin is a mere 30 miles westwards over the Ghorak Pass from the 
battleground at Maiwand. In July 1880, an Afghan army under Governor Ayyub 
encountered at Maiwand a smaller British force, but armed with modern weaponry. 
“The Afghans were able to close their formation by taking large numbers of casualties 
and annihilated the enemy in fierce combat.”238 The site holds a central place in 
Afghan lore about the British, and the foreigner.  
Maiwand is also where Sherlock Holmes’ companion and Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
fictitious narrator, Dr. Watson, was wounded; Conan Doyle himself served at 
Maiwand. The name Sangin is, however, almost entirely absent from English-speaking 
historical records pre-dating 21st Century military activity there. Captain W.A. 
Broome’s journals from the Second Afghan War offer one of the very few references. 
Writing in the 1880s following military service in the area he describes Sangin as “a 
village in Kala Gaz, on the left bank of the Helmand, 24 miles above Grishk [Gereshk] 
and about 7 miles south east of Shahban. There are only 5 houses.”239 The name 
Sangin (نیګنس in Pushto) meant ‘made of stone’, weighty, or solid according to 19th 
Century researcher Major Henry Raverty.240 One hundred and twenty-six years after 
Captain Broome passed through, those five houses had become a small town, and 
                                                     
237 Ibid. 
238 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), p. 144. For a detailed account from a British military perspective, see Leigh Maxwell, My 
God - Maiwand! Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force (1878-80). (London: Leo Cooper, 1979), 
especially, pp. 126-167. 
239 Captain W.A. Broome, Second Afghan War, quoted in the UK India Office papers published as L.W. 
Adamec, Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan (Akadem. Druck-u. Verlagsanst., 1985), Vol. 2, 
p. 254. 
240 Raverty, 1867, op. cit., Published online by the University of Chicago and Digital Dictionaries of South 
Asia, at http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/raverty/.  Search term: Sangin. 
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Sangin a name synonymous with intense combat.241 The names Sangin and Helmand 
as references to areas of territory stem from comparatively recent administrative 
changes, introduced alongside the new constitution in 1964.242 These changing and 
multi-layered meanings illustrate important subtleties, since sub-regional boundaries 
are “the products of successive Kabul regimes seeking to increase the power of their 
centralized governments by diminishing their regional rivals through ever-greater 
division. Afghans themselves recognize this by their persistent use of older names.”243 
For the Accord in 2011, this manifested itself in a sense of tribal entitlement to specific 
territory in and around Sangin, defined and described in terms pre-dating the 20th 
Century administrative measures. 
While Helmand has existed as an administrative province for some 50 years, 
the eponymous river is many thousands of years old and scholars must be careful to 
distinguish the terms, and qualifications of influence – both within Afghanistan, and 
beyond. “The great Helmand River and its tributaries end up in the desert marshes of 
Seistan [now Sistan] on the Iranian border, squeezed between Registan (“Land of 
Sand”) on one side and the Dasht-i-Margo (“Desert of Death”) on the other.”244 The 
Helmand had less impact on human interaction than rivers in Europe or Africa, for 
example, because none of Afghanistan’s rivers reach the ocean. “Rivers in Afghanistan 
therefore do not connect the country to the outside world or facilitate trade.”245 The 
flow also varies enormously, from fast-paced and deep torrents in flood season to 
barely a trickle in the dry months. The Helmand River has few all-year fording points, 
as its width and depth make it largely impassable to the movement of supplies or 
groups of people when in spate. A technical hydrological and geological survey 
conducted in 2006 for the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) describes how “annual discharge has varied by a factor of five over 28 years of 
                                                     
241 See for example Mark Urban, "The Ingredients Making Sangin So Lethal," 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/03/the_ingredients_making_sangin.html.  
Missy Ryan, "US Seeks Surge Success from Lethal Afghan Outpost," (9th March 2011). 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/09/us-afghanistan-sangin-
idUSTRE72809M20110309?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews (accessed 15th July 2014). 
242 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Taurus, 2012), p. 
146, and pp. 142-154. 
243 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 341. As a counter, it is also worth considering if the smaller units of 
organisation helped administration become more effective, given the distances from Kabul. 
244 Ibid., p. 47. 
245 Ibid. 
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continuous record on the Helmand” (between 1947-1975).246 This has two significant 
consequences, locally and regionally. First, “the erratic behavior of the Helmand and 
the Arghandab is a characteristic of these streams; droughts and floods are not rare 
events in the lower Helmand Basin.”247 Second “the unpredictability of streamflow 
from year to year has a marked effect on the inhabitants of Sistan,”248 across the 
border in Iran’s turbulent Baluch-dominated province.249 The United Nations 
Environment Program concluded in 2006:  
“The annual precipitation in the lower Sistan basin is about 50 mm. Under 
such conditions, life is only possible if an ‘external’ water source is also available to 
nourish the region. The Helmand River plays that major role in the Sistan area, by 
draining the snowmelt waters from the mountains of the southern Hindu Kush.”250 
This relationship between Helmand’s water flow and Iranian communities is 
also long-standing, for “in ancient and medieval times, Seistan, [sic] at the end of the 
Helmand’s drainage, rivalled Qandahar in importance, but then declined when its 
irrigation system failed.”251 These long-term and significant variations in river levels 
may well explain the limits of Arab conquest in the area. Arab expansion in the 9th 
Century AD “was never much further advanced that Herat and Bust [Bost, near 
modern-day Lashkar Gah] and even there was confined to the main lines of 
communication, tenuous and often intermittent … East of the Helmand there was no 
                                                     
246 John W. Whitney, Geology, Water, and Wind in the Lower Helmand Basin, Southern Afghanistan 
Scientific Investigations Report 2006–5182 (Reston, Virginia: US Geological Survey, 2006), p. 24. 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH905.pdf 
247 Ibid. For some specifics, see for example data on Sangin and 49 other streams in: Tara Williams-
Sether, Streamflow Characteristics of Streams in the Helmand Basin, Afghanistan (Reston, Virginia: US 
Geological Survey, 2008), p. 249-254.  
Data collected between 1953 and 1960 on the Sangin Wash (Seraj Canal) “100 m upstream from office 
of the Governor of Sangin District in village of Sangin … 35 km northeast of Girishk, and about 40 km 
downstream from Kajaki Dam” (ibid. pp. 249-254), showed a variation in the mean discharge (cubic 
metres per second) between a minimum of 0.3 in February 1957 and 13.5 in April 1955 – a maximum 
flow 45 times larger than the recorded minimum.  
248 Whitney, 2006, op. cit. 
249 For coverage of potential links between drought and instability, see for example: Amir Hossein 
Asayesh, "Poverty and Blind Violence in Baluchestan," 2008, http://mianeh.net/article/poverty-and-
blind-violence-baluchestan(accessed 19th July 2014).  Zia Ur Rehman, The Baluch Insurgency: Linking 
Iran to Pakistan (www.peacebuilding.no/, 2014). Chris Zambelis, The Evolution of the Ethnic Baluch 
Insurgency in Iran (CTC Sentinel: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 2014). 
250 United Nations Environment Programme, History of Environmental Change in the Sistan Basin Based 
on Satellite Image Analysis: 1976 – 2005 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, 2006), p. 5. 
251 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 50. Also Alessandro Bausani, The Persians (London: HarperCollins, 1971), p. 
125. “The ruins of Sistan, which lie in land which was once fertile but that is now uninhabitable because 
the canals from the river Helmand were destroyed, bear eloquent witness to the passage of Tamerlane.”  
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occupation.”252 For many centuries, Helmand was therefore significant only for the 
division the great river created between rival groups, and the impact it had on 
movement to and from the east and west, and on the fertility of neighbouring lands – 
especially around its lower reaches in modern-day Iran. The relationship between 
activities in Helmand and Iranian water security would also be a factor in the 2011 
Sangin Accord. 
Figure 13: The route of the Helmand River from Afghanistan’s central mountainous 






                                                     
252 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, (17th reprint, 2009) ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 100. 
253 Kmusser, "Helmand River Map (Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Via 
Wikimedia Commons)," 2010, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Helmandrivermap.png#mediaviewer/File:Helmandrivermap.pn
g(accessed 28th July 2014).  
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The Afghans and the struggle between Persia and India 
Within the borders of modern Afghanistan, the Helmand River sat within the 
sphere of influence of the city of Kandahar, to its east. National borders were set over 
centuries, often through the independence and self-determination of neighbours, as 
well as disputes between bordering territories and Afghanistan herself after 
independence from the British in 1919.254 It is therefore more accurate to talk of 
regions or spheres of influence, especially when analysing older eras.  
Figure 14: Afghanistan’s regions – a layer of analysis between nation and province.255 
From around the 5th century AD Persian, Arab and Indian leaders vied for 
control in the area.256 Bost, just outside modern-day Lashkar Gah (and now the site of 
                                                     
254 The government in Kabul continues to reject any formalisation of the existing Durand Line separating 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and debate continues: Tayyab Mahmud, "Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial 
Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Frontier," Brook. J. International Law. 36, (2010). This remains the most contentious border: outgoing 
President Hamid Karzai is alleged to have called it "a line of hatred that raised a wall between the two 
brothers,” see: Selig S. Harrison, "The Fault Line between Pashtuns and Punjabis in Pakistan," 
Washington Post, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/10/AR2009051001959.html(accessed 19th July 2014).  
255 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 43. 
256 For an accessible overview see: Homa Katazian, The Persians: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Iran 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), chapters 1 and 2. For a detailed study (from an outsider’s pro-
Imperial perspective), by a Briton with service in both areas: Lt. Colonel Sir Wolseley Haig, ed. The 
Cambridge History of India, 6 vols., vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), especially 
chapter 2. For a concise summary of the 10th-16th Centuries: Stephen F. Dale, The Muslim Empires of the 
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the city’s airport) was the winter capital of the Persian Ghaznavid Empire for 
approximately two centuries, from 976, until its destruction in 1150 AD began 
contemporary Kandahar’s rise to importance.257 Kandahar city was a key trading 
centre, and a constant bone of contention between empires based in Iran and India – 
illustrated by frequent switches in political allegiance.258 Persians saw it as a prize for 
expelling Indian influence, seeking plunder and the destruction of Hindu temples.259 
Later, Babur – in the 16th Century – considered Kandahar an essential stepping stone 
for his contemplated invasion of India, eventually capturing it in 1522.260 Kandahar also 
gives its name to a broad swathe of territory constituting most of contemporary 
southern Afghanistan – both a culturally defined region, and a formal state province. 
Looking west from the Helmand River, the lands that border modern-day Iran would 
become known as Farah, occupying the traditional route to the trading city of Herat. 
Travellers wishing to move on an east-west axis had two choices: scale the 
mountainous highlands of Afghanistan’s centre or cross the river Helmand – see Figure 
13, previously.  
Aspiring empires used a variety of strategies, including tribute, conquest, 
vassalage and alliance to secure their interests. The Safavid Persians, for example, 
“capitalised on venomous Pashtun tribal rivalries to divide and conquer the Afghans 
sowing animosity between the two largest Pashtun confederations.”261 Larger 
aggregated groups of tribes are commonly called ‘federations’ in the Afghan context: 
as set out in Annex C, within the Pashtun tribes, the first distinction is between the two 
most numerous groups, the Durrani federation (roughly south-western) and the Ghilzai 
(south-eastern). Within the Durrani federation, the Zirak branch – including the 
Barakzai, Alikozai, Popalzai tribes – is historically the more favoured and prestigious, 
and the Kings of Afghanistan have come from these tribes. The Panjpai (literally, five 
                                                                                                                                                           
Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 10-47, especially 
pp. 17-22. 
257 Caroe, 1958, op. cit., p. 171. 
258 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., pp. 50-51. The history of the city since around 1278 AD “is one of continual 
sieges and changes of government”: S. W. Helms, "Kandahar of the Arab Conquest," World Archaeology 
14, no. 3 (1983), pp. 344-5. 
259 History Today, "Historical Dictionary: Mahmud of Ghazni," 2012, 
http://www.historytoday.com/historical-dictionary/m/mahmud-ghazni(accessed 19th July 2014).  
260 Caroe, 1958, op. cit., p. 172. 
261 Tomsen, 2011, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
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fingers), and containing the Ishaqzai, Noorzai, Alizai tribes – is perceived to be the 
lesser branch, and central authority tends to exclude these. It is little surprise that the 
Taliban have heavy support within these tribes. Their populations had as yet no clear 
unified national or political identity. Nor were they always tied to specific pieces of 
land, for communities were typically the subjects of others, whether they lived a 
nomadic or sedentary existence – defined by Thomas Barfield as “the elusive” and the 
“the fixed.”262 A stronger bond between identity and land would be forged in some 
specific cases, including Sangin, based on 18th Century events that remain influential 
today. 
By the 16th Century AD, “local populations took such foreign rulership as part of 
the inevitable ebb and flow of the region’s political dynamics, and they did not resist 
it.”263 Deal making (and re-negotiating), as well as political brinkmanship involving 
foreign influencers was and remains a central part of the social fabric in Helmand. 
Throughout the region, before the arrival of European concepts of statehood (which 
rested on the control of territory and its delineation),264 residents, and rulers stressed, 
“a relational rather than territorial focus which existed in Islamic legal principles as 
well as in tribal concepts of use rather than land value.”265 The disposition of those 
who controlled the rare but vital all-year crossing points was therefore highly 
significant, politically and logistically. The fort at Gereshk (alternatively Grishk) was one 
of these, watching over “a strategic crossing point on the major fluvial barrier between 
Herat and Kandahar.”266 Gereshk would later become the family bastion for the 
second dynasty of the Afghan Durrani leaders, from the Barakzai tribe (and 
Mohammadzai sub-tribe).267 Sangin, the town in Sarwan Qala, and the main political 
group based there from the Alikozai tribe, would increase in importance largely 
because of the impact that this more mountainous region had on the security of the 
lowland river crossing and the seat of the Afghan kings at Gereshk.  Capacity to enforce 
Royal control over all territory and communities was limited, as was the will to do so: 
                                                     
262 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 68. 
263 Ibid., p. 93. 
264 Marsden, 2012, op. cit., p. 25. 
265 Ibid., p. 28. 
266 Martin, 2014, op. cit., p. 20. 
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“The ploy was to assert nominal sovereignty over people in marginal areas 
without bothering them much. They need not be ruled directly or subject to the 
same style of government as were the people of the irrigated plains and valleys.”268 
By the mid-18th Century AD, Persian leaders asserted dominance in the south 
and west of modern Afghanistan, but “fortuitous geostrategic circumstances opened a 
window for Afghans to throw off Mughal and Safavid control, establish an independent 
Afghan state, and briefly create an empire for themselves.”269 If assessed along tribal 
lines, this episode mirrors rivalries between the Durrani (broadly, based in south-west 
Afghanistan) and Ghilzai (south-eastern) sub-sections of the Pashtun ethnicity still 
observed today, with Kandahar city in the south-east a prize treasured by both groups. 
In 1709 Mirwais Hotek, the head of the Ghilzai Hotek tribe (also the tribe of 
Mullah Mohammad Omar, Taliban leader from 1994 until his death in 2013) declared 
Kandahar independent after massacring the Persian establishment at a banquet. His 
brother succeeded him, and invaded Persia in 1722, capturing the capital Isfahan and 
ruling for 16 years.270 The Persian leader Nadir Quli (“Slave of the Wonderful,” who 
would rename himself Nadir Shah) sought revenge, and defeated Afghan 
Abdali/Durrani fighters at Herat in 1731.271 Shah incorporated these vanquished 
warriors into his army, liberating Isfahan in 1738 and, exploiting the long-standing 
Pashtun rivalry, then overturning the self-declared Ghilzai kingdom of Kandahar two 
years later.272 Shah would go on to grant the Abdali/Durrani land titles in Helmand and 
Kandahar in reward for their military service against the Mughals.273 The size, location, 
population, and richness of these land grants form an important part of the relative 
power balance both between the Abdali and Ghilzai, and also within the Durrani 
federation that was to emerge from Abdali roots in 1747 – widely considered as the 
birth of the Afghan nation. These same land titles formed the foundations of the 
                                                     
268 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 68. This policy interplay between incentive and coercion – discussed later – 
gave rise to significant debate about methods of frontier management, typified by the contrasting 
systems of the 19th Century British frontier officers Robert Sandeman and William Merewether. See 
also: Marsden, 2012, op. cit., chapter 2. 
269 Tomsen, 2011, op. cit., p. 29. 
270 Ibid., p. 30. 
271 Martin, 2014, op. cit., p. 18. 
272 Tomsen, 2011, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
273 Ibid., p. 31. 
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Alikozai tribe’s perceived entitlement to Sangin, and were therefore a motivating 
factor during the Accord, over 250 years later.  
 
Afghans and outsiders: patronage, autonomy and land rights 
Narratives collected between 2008-2010 claimed that the Alikozai tribe 
received land rights to the Sangin Valley for supporting Persian campaigns against the 
Mughal emperors of India.274 Historical research, notably by Thomas Barfield and Mike 
Martin shows that this is possible. Persian and Indian leaders (and culture) had been 
competing in Afghanistan directly, and using local groups (now considered Afghans) as 
proxies, since at least 500 BC. For example, Hinduism was widespread in Afghanistan 
until Arab and later Persian expansion between the 7th and 11th Centuries AD brought 
Islam to the area.  
The use of the term ‘Mughal’ in field experience and interviews likely places the 
land transfer after 1526 AD, the commonly held date for the start of the Mughal rule in 
India.275  The last Persian Shah was assassinated by his generals in 1747 AD (1160 AH in 
the Hijri Islamic calendar), ending formal Persian control in the area. Ahmad Shah 
Durrani was confirmed by loya jirga (a traditional ‘Grand Assembly’ at which national 
or highly significant leaders are chosen) as the new, and first dominant Afghan leader 
in southern Afghanistan.276 Following defeat to Persian forces in 1731, Nadir Shah 
elevated Ahmad Khan (an earlier name for Ahmad Shah Durrani) to be commander of 
his largest army’s largest cavalry contingent.277 His principal rivals, the Ghilzai, had 
been diminished by Nadir Shah, who expelled most of them from Kandahar in 1738 
and transferred confiscated lands to the Durrani, in retribution for Ghilzai 
                                                     
274 Author’s interview with Provincial Reconstruction Team official, 11th December 2012. Additional 
confirmation through participant observation 2009-10 during the author’s time in Sangin. 
275 John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, vol. 5 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 6-7. For a 
chronology of the Mughal Emperors, their Mongol roots and relationship with Persian/Iran history, see 
Francis Robinson, "The Mughal Emperors and the Islamic Dynasties of India," Iran, and Central Asia, 
London, (2007), especially p. 112 and pp. 113-179. For an excellent look at the end of the Mughal 
Empire, at the hands of foreign forces, see William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal: The Fall of Delhi, 1857 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009). 
276 See for example: Ganda Singh, Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan (Gosha-e-Adab, 
1977). Barnett R. Rubin, "Lineages of the State in Afghanistan," Asian Survey 28, no. 11 (1988), pp. 1191-
2. 
277 Tomsen, 2011, op. cit., p. 31. 
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depredations in Persia just a few decades before.278 It is inconceivable that Ahmad 
Shah Durrani, for Afghans (and especially Pashtuns) the undisputed founder of modern 
Afghanistan, would be considered Persian by today’s northern Helmandis. Therefore, 
we can conclude with a degree of certainty that Sangin was given to the Alikozai clans 
before 1747 and likely after 1731. The Persians sacked Delhi in 1739, a decisive event 
within this timeframe that may have triggered the reward.279 Power remained 
disputed in many areas that now fall within Afghanistan’s modern borders, but Ahmad 
Shah Durrani’s ascension certainly established him as the principal political broker and 
patron in what was then the declining eastern fringe of the Persian control, and is now 
Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. This also illustrates the astute and divisive manner in 
which foreign aspirations interacted with local Afghan politics, and the challenge of 
aligning local and international interests constructively. This theme recurs frequently 
throughout the modern history of Afghanistan, and features strongly in the dynamics 
surrounding the Sangin Accord. 
The Durrani period introduces two key characteristics into Afghan society: 
locally nuanced features of lineage and power transfer, and, frequently renegotiated 
relationships between authorities claiming leadership and local social groups. The 
transfer of official power within the Durrani tribal federation began largely by 
bloodline and lineage – a rutbavi system.280 This is at odds with the selection of leaders 
for their quality and credibility in other areas, normally less isolated and less 
dominated by the Durrani federation; the quami model preferred by the Ghilzai.281 
Other characteristics of lineage and descent are also significant, such as Sayyids [alt. 
Sayed, Sayid], “to whom there still attaches a reputation for past or present sanctity or 
piety.”282  
                                                     
278 Ibid. Caroe, 1958, op. cit., chapter 16, especially pp. 252-256. 
279 See Muzaffar Alam, "The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-1748,"  
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), chapter 1, especially pp. 50-51. Legend recounts that the 
Persian Nadir Shah was invited to take Delhi by an old Punjabi commander, who had been offended by 
the conduct of his replacement – see M. Longworth Dames, "Balochi Tales [Concluded]," Folklore 8, no. 
1 (1897), pp. 77-78. 
280 For an example of the family lineages, see: Caroe, 1958, op. cit., p. 277. 
281 The difference is explained in detail in the meticulous anthropological study of a single village near 
Kabul, in: Noah Coburn, Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford 
University Press, 2011), notably chapter 5 "Leadership, Descent and Marriage" (pp. 76-105). 
282 Caroe, 1958, op. cit., p. 101. 
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“Even today their prestige is a living thing, and people will reverently kiss a 
Sayyid’s hand.” Whether or not they are descended from the Prophet (by the union 
of his daughter Fatima, with Ali) they are certainly the descendants of Arab 
colonists or missionaries who came to these parts in the early Islamic centuries, 
partly to propagate the Faith and partly to assist in the onward march of 
conquest.283 
Since the centralised state has struggled to establish universal control over the 
land for centuries, authorities have sought to extend their influence through 
relationships with periphery groups based on military service, or financial interactions 
(such as tax or subsidy). Power and perceptions of security link strongly to the size of a 
group’s land holdings and the number of men they can provide for military service284 
(including community defence, but also to support allies): offering “a horseman for 
every plough” also brought an exemption from taxation.285 These factors remained 
influential beyond the 18th Century – and have a degree of importance today, 
especially when the tribal hierarchy is strong, despite the effects of education, 
technology, modern communications, and urbanisation. Understanding the terms 
under which local armed groups would resist, or be co-opted into, formal state 
security forces (or work with their international backers) was a central theme for the 
2011 case study. 
 
From separatists to an independent Afghanistan  
The early years of the newly independent Afghans were characterised by the 
hunt for recognition, conquest, and plunder in foreign lands. Almost the first act of 
Ahmad Shah Durrani after the death of Nadir Shah was to plunder a caravan full of his 
                                                     
283 Ibid., p. 102. 
284 Martin, 2014, op. cit., p. 19. This raises the interesting possibility that some conservative, traditional 
areas of Afghanistan may judge the relative strength and importance of the contemporary government 
according to the size of the state land holdings (and also budget, staff levels) – known collectively as the 
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285 Ibid. Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 113. By extension, the application of tax may be seen as a slight, or a 
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explain why there are problems with a universal tax system mandated from Kabul, as exemption from 
tax – or the selected application of tax burdens onto rivals, or opponents – is a key tool of power. It also 
shows why some may find the option of a private revenue stream (perhaps from private licit or illicit 
interests) highly attractive as a key tool of patronage, and counter-intuitively, as a stability measure (in 
that outlying areas profit from the arrangement too, and are less inclined to violently resist central 
taxation by the state). 
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treasure, the fruit of Indian conquests.286 This tale, and his confirmation as leader by 
his peers in a loya jirga, is typically romanticised and Ahmad – a mere 24 years old – is 
described as a humble, quiet young man.287 But the Durranis knew that only by rallying 
around the man who had run off with the bulk of Nadir’s available treasure, and had 
elite cavalry contingents under his personal command could they hope to permanently 
displace their Ghilzai rivals in Kandahar, recover Herat, and expand beyond the 
Pashtun heartland.288 The challenge for Durrani was how to manage “independent 
groups who did not want to be part of a state” and the solution was a system financed 
by plunder gained during foreign military service.289 “In his reign of twenty-six years 
(1747-73) Ahmad Shah swept eight times across the Indus, and ravaged the Punjab as 
far as Delhi,” capturing Peshawar, all of West Punjab, and Kashmir.290 There was 
wealth and glory for all, allowing the leader scope to avoid applying burdensome taxes 
– “he indulged the Durrani to almost a prodigal extent.”291 Ahmad Shah’s personal 
qualities were also significant: he wrote poetry in Pashtu (not Persian), and “was adept 
in the difficult management of men and tribes and disposed to policies of conciliation, 
where the way lay open.”292 Nevertheless, his structural changes were immensely far-
reaching; his land grants and policy on military service in return for tax exemption 
enhanced Durrani tribal structures in a hierarchical kinship relationship containing 
hereditary positions.293 “In this way the Barakzai, as the most powerful tribe, secured 
the understanding that they would always be ministers to the Popalzai crown, as well 
as possessors of the best land in Helmand.”294 Ahmad Shah’s death in 1772 brought 
about great upheaval, and further disunity. 
His successors would face three problems: First, a diminishing number of 
external areas available to conquer, increasing the need to secure finance from their 
own people. Second, Ahmad’s own policies towards administration and tax bred future 
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instability. Third, their weaker personal qualities made internal management more 
difficult and challenges to leadership more common. Ahmad Shah’s favouritism 
towards his own people had less impact on internal stability because of conquest 
opportunities but, once these reduced, his policy of “governing the tribes lightly while 
levying heavy taxes on the non-tribal parts of the empire” would become more and 
more inflammatory.295 He had also “conquered territories that had yet to be 
incorporated administratively” Into a more centralised, or state, system.296 Future 
attempts to do so, especially in Peshawar, were perceived as undue encroachment; a 
mindset that remains prevalent in fringe areas today. Durrani’s death triggered 
infighting, and his son and heir designate, Timur Shah, took over after crushing a rival 
claim headed by his brother. While Timur’s reign was well handled, the manner of his 
accession – and the struggle after his demise – were just the start of “successional 
struggles, which eventually allowed a Barakzai dynasty, led by Dost Mohammad, to 
usurp the Popalzai throne in 1826.”297 This political situation was complicated further 
by the Russian-British rivalry playing out across the Eastern hemisphere, dubbed “The 
Great Game.”  
It is worth reviewing this 19th Century history in a little more detail, as the same 
themes influenced attitudes towards international forces (and the political intentions 
behind their presence), and perceptions of Afghanistan’s neighbours described in the 
case study. Russian relationships with leaders around Herat (on Afghanistan’s western 
border with modern Iran) and Moscow’s perceived influence with Dost Mohammad 
were partly to blame for Britain’s intervention in 1839 that attempted to place Shah 
Shuja (one of Timur’s sons) as a puppet ruler.298 British efforts to oust Dost 
Mohammad led to the deposition of his two brothers, who controlled Kandahar (the 
old capital) and Gereshk (the principal river crossing in Helmand Province). Harsh tax 
collection (enforced by the British, and conducted by the Barakzai authorities) 
triggered an Alizai-led tribal uprising in north Helmand in the Alizai heartland of 
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Zamindawar. This led eventually to a British retreat from Helmand in spring 1841, 
preceding the nation-wide turmoil later that year in the wake of British envoy 
Alexander Burnes’ violent murder in Kabul and the humiliating annihilation of General 
Elphinstone’s retreat from Kabul in January 1842. Traditionally the name for much of 
the south of the country, Zamindawar is now a smaller area between modern-day 
Musa Qala, Sangin, and Kajaki (in old Persian: “the land of the justice giver”).299 Actors 
in the Sangin Accord would seek align themselves with these older narratives, as 
important sources of credibility and legitimacy. 
Timur Shah had established his winter palace in Peshawar (contributing to the 
sense that Pashtun identity spans the Durand line), later established between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. He also moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul in the 
1770s “in an attempt to reduce the influence of the Pashtun tribes permanently.”300 
The British 19th Century experiences, as with the Persians and Mughals before them, 
showed that local rivalries and subtleties between the tribes remained significant 
factors in the success of policies aimed at the state as a whole, or targeted at the 
capital. The fear of Russian encroachment towards India accelerated British 
involvement in southern Afghanistan.301 Afghan central authorities also faced 
continued financial problems, and 1856-7 saw a vital change in policy: the British 
subsidised Afghan local groups to fight Russian influence in Herat, sometimes directly, 
or through the state. This had a fundamental impact on the relationship between 
Afghan ruler and tribes enshrined by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The ruler no longer had to 
rely on the tribes for revenue or military service (since he could purchase arms using 
foreign funds), and the tribes knew that they would be able to gain resources from the 
state in return for stability, or threatening instability. This theme returns in the Sangin 
Accord, which involved bargaining over (de-)stabilising behaviour and international 
funding between local groups in fringe areas, and the state itself. 
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British actions in 1840 also fundamentally changed the role of religion in 
Afghan internal politics (which had usually involved Muslims disputing with each 
other). Their “occupation of Afghanistan in support of Shah Shuja raised the question 
of whether the regime had lost the authority normally inherent to a Muslim ruler:  
If Shuja’s government was just a cloak for the rule of foreign infidels, then 
rebellion against it would be justified … leaping to the defense of Islam to justify 
resisting a regime in Kabul or its policies would henceforth become a sword that 
was rarely sheathed in Afghan politics, regardless of whether foreigners were 
actually present on Afghan soil.”302 
The British backed Shuja to repel an invasion of economically bounteous India 
by France and the Russians (who backed Dost Mohammad), and spent much of the 
19th Century competing with Great Britain in Europe and for imperial expansion. 
Though victorious, Shuja was assassinated in 1842, and Dost Mohammad returned for 
his second term as ruler. Although the British ended the permanent official subsidy 
payments in September 1858, outside financial aid remained a tactic of influence.303  
Russia and Britain were both able to offer larger sums – sourced from outside 
Afghanistan – than Afghan rulers in Kabul could (who also had reduced incomes from 
their much diminished foreign actions, and relied increasingly on divisive internal 
revenue collection). These drivers return in the 21st Century context, in debates over 
Afghanistan as a rentier state (set out in chapter one), and the role of international aid 
and reconstruction spending as a factor in negotiation covered in the case study. 
Dost Mohammad’s succession was tumultuous and – following rivalry between 
his sons – in November 1878, British forces again invaded Afghanistan over fears of 
Russian influence, starting what is now known as the Second Afghan War. Kandahar 
was occupied, and attempting to defend it from perceived threats from Dost 
Mohammad’s grandson Ayub in Herat, the British sent a Barakzai force, commanded 
by Kandahar’s Governor, to occupy Gereshk as a forward defence. The Gereshk force 
was reinforced with a detachment under General Burrows304 but in 1880 the 
Governor’s Barakzai troops mutinied, switching allegiance to Ayub and the 
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Zamindawaris he had enlisted from north Helmand.305 The British withdrew and the 
tribesmen followed, crossing at Haiderabad, and defeated the British at Maiwand, near 
present day Sangin on 27th July 1880. The victors were slow to press their advantage 
and returned to Zamindawar, allowing the British to defeat Ayub at Kandahar later 
that year.306 The Alizai tribesmen from Zamindawar were decisive in the wider conflict 
between Russian-backed Heratis and Kandaharis supported by the British, and in doing 
so, had helped defeat a western army in the field. The British withdrew, leaving a 
fractured Afghanistan and paying further subsidies to a disputed Barakzai king – Abdur 
Rahman – who ruled little more than Kabul.307 If the Battle of Maiwand in 1880 and 
the Afghan defeat at Kandahar later that year, left scars “etched in the [Afghan] 
national psyche, particularly in the northern reaches of Helmand,”308 do they really 
motivate modern actions? Perhaps, though likely only as a supporting narrative: 
Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Haleem Haleem (quoted in 2008) stated, “British 
soldiers, they think they are there to settle the scores of their great-grandparents who 
came to occupy Afghanistan but were killed and are buried in Helmand.”309 
Interpretations of foreign intentions, then and now, relate closely to the 
policies driving interactions with local people – and the manner in which they are 
implemented. Differences in British Imperial frontier management policies across the 
area are reflected in the systems devised by British colonial officers Major General 
William Merewether and Sir Robert Sandeman in Sindh and Baluchistan in the 1870s: 
“The Sandeman policy … consists of an active participation in the life and 
interests of the people beyond our administrative border, but with the least possible 
dislocation of the tribal systems.” 310 
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Whereas Merewether advocated a: 
“Close[d] border system whereby the tribes beyond the administrative 
frontier were left to work out their own salvation subject to the limitation that 
offences against the inhabitants of areas within our administrative border are 
punished by reprisals across the border, and that subsidies are paid to the tribes to 
keep the peace, particularly on main trade routes through or bordering on their 
territory.”311 
Afghan leaders in Kabul, often lacking the military or administrative strength to 
assert dominance, had to choose between Sandeman’s policy of dealing “with the 
hearts and minds of the people and not only with their fears,” and Merewether’s 
blend of uncompromising militarism and social non-intervention.312 These approaches 
left perceptions that would be passed between generations and would influence 
views, and the hostility of responses to future interventions in Afghanistan, including 
the most recent ISAF campaign. 
The early history of Sangin, Helmand, and Afghanistan, offers five important 
long-term conflict drivers which must be considered in the assessment of the Sangin 
Accord and the applicability of Ripeness theory to it, which follows in chapter seven. 
Clear delineations between conflict parties, as Zartman’s theory imagines, is shown to 
be hugely challenging: here multipolar traditional social and political systems interact 
with outside concepts of power, respect, and organisation, adopting elements and 
resisting others. The genuine, or sincere, motivations required for a true Ripe Moment 
are likely to prove very hard to spot, since local groups sought to preserve degrees of 
political autonomy within the context of wider conflict or power struggles, often 
perpetuated by larger regional rivalries. A long history of interaction between locals, 
and foreigners perceived as partisan in disputes (revisited in 19th Century wars with 
Britain and covered in chapter three) suggests that the trust required for a Way Out 
would be hard to come by. The formation of a Way Out is further challenged by 
significant unresolved disagreements over land and water rights, at the local level but 
also across national borders into contemporary Pakistan and Iran. The actions of a 
disputed centralising government, whose offices were used to favour or disenfranchise 
Afghans often based on tribe (as part of strategies to balance power between the 
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centre and periphery) – are viewed with suspicion in fringe areas. This undermines 
both a Way Out, and in additions to Ripeness theory, contributes to a Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate – when one contains the impact of differences in legitimacy. Since the 18th 
Century the Alikozai tribe is likely to have used (and been subject to) these factors 
while seeking to preserve control over their prime ancestral territorial holding in the 
Sangin Valley. Later chapters demonstrate clearly that negotiating tactics around the 
Sangin Accord draw upon these historical themes, and that they impact upon 
explanations grounded in Ripeness theory.313  
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CHAPTER 3: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERVENTION  
The contrast between Abdur Rahman’s rule, his conservative son Habibullah, 
and his modernist reform-minded grandson Ammanullah, foreshadow the tensions 
within modern Afghanistan between establishing the structures and institutions of a 
state with an outward an international vision, while also paying attention to its people 
and their relative desire to be ruled by Kabul. This correlates with one of Rubin’s 
observations about Afghanistan as a rentier state, since foreign aid frequently backed 
reform programs allowing “state leadership to expand the apparatus under its control 
without bargaining with or being accountable to its citizens.”314 Crucially, this external 
funding drops significantly after 1919 with consequences for state stability, as 
discussed later in the chapter. This period of history directly affected the oldest 
generation alive during the Sangin Accord, or people with whom they had a direct 
relationship while young. In this sense, it represents a more direct body of experience 
influencing perceptions of those involved in the 2011 negotiation than the older 
themes covered previously. It adds some new evolutions with great significance for the 
case study, notably: 1) the great influence – both positive and negative – of major 
infrastructure projects, and their potential to be fulcrums for social and political 
change, and 2) the challenge high value illicit income (in this case, from opium) poses 
to central governments used to a near-monopoly over access to finance. The 20th 
Century also reiterates some longer-term themes, including tensions between rural 
populations and reforming central governments backed by foreign support. 
Abdur Rahman (died 1901) favoured strong internal controls and, with a 
judicious use of British subsidy, made great strides towards the creation of a modern 
centralised state.315 His policies were continued by his conservative son Habibullah, 
after a smooth transition – incredibly, “for the first time in Afghan history there was no 
war of succession.”316 Policy centred upon weakening his rivals alongside a degree of 
“non-interference in tribes’ internal affairs – provided they pay their dues.317 This 
internal policy of neutrality would be affected by the First World War (1914-18). There 
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was some domestic support for the Ottoman Turks’ call for action to defend the 
Muslim Caliphate, but Afghanistan remained out of the war. Nevertheless, the Afghans 
would be in conflict just months after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The Third 
Anglo-Afghan War began when Afghan forces seized a number of border posts and 
towns along the north-west frontier, in May 1919. Afghan agitation for full 
independence was stirred up by the German-Turkish delegation in Kabul during World 
War One, but the immediate cause was a power struggle in Kabul following the 
assassination in 1919 of the Amir, Habibullah Khan. The British were taken by surprise, 
but this was always going to be a one-sided fight.318 As one historian notes, “British 
forces in India were depleted and unprepared yet they remained inherently superior 
to those of Afghanistan in training and equipment, and given that there was not the 
slightest possibility that His Majesty’s Government would stand by while the borders 
of British India were altered by force, the course of the subsequent fighting was a 
foregone conclusion.”319  
This conflict featured the first aerial bombardment in history, conducted by the 
Royal Air Force (which was formally established after the First World War). By August 
the parties reached an equitable agreement; the British recognised Afghanistan as 
having full sovereign rights, and the Afghans recognised the (till then disputed) Durand 
Line as the border between Afghanistan and British India.320 Despite military successes, 
(the Afghan regular army was defeated three times), war-weary Great Britain signed 
the Treaty of Rawalpindi confirming these points just a few months later in December 
1919. The new Afghan leader, Ammanullah, advanced an extensive program of 
reforms popular among outsiders hoping for a modern nation on India’s border. 
However, these had controversial social and political consequences, especially in 
Helmand, where weak government control and a growing refugee and settlement 
program inflamed disputes over land and water access and ownership. These issues 
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would be influential again during the Soviet post-invasion reforms of the 1980s, and 
again during the Sangin Accord. 
 
1920-1933: Consolidating independence  
Ammanullah’s reform program was ambitious. Structural changes to the state 
were much needed, but the pace of regulation was blistering: 
The constitution of 1923 laid out the structure of government, established 
executive and legal authority for the Amir, established a Council of Ministers and a 
State Council to advise it. A new tax law was introduced, and the legal system 
unified.321 
Social reforms were also introduced. Some, such as the abolition of slavery, or 
the expansion of education, brought Afghanistan into line with other international 
modernising agendas. Others were much more contentious for the Afghans, including: 
the imposition of conscription, and attempts to curtail to Pashtun customs relating to 
the treatment of women. While the need for a standing army was clear, the means to 
pay for it was absent. Though conscription was rational, it was also fiercely resisted – 
there were rebellions in both Zamindawar in 1923 and the eastern province of Khost 
the following year. While “public objections to the reforms would be grounded in 
religious terms (that they were in violation of orthodox Islamic practices), the real 
problem lay in Ammanullah’s attempt to extend central government power in 
provincial areas in a way that affected people’s lives directly.”322 There would continue 
to be a correlation in the future between the unpalatable speed of reforms and low 
perceptions of government legitimacy – and violent responses to them – as there had 
been in previous centuries.  
Rulers had used resettlement, and land redistribution, to coerce or encourage 
policies before – usually in rural areas. For example, the government response to the 
Alizai rebellion of 1923 was to deport groups of Zamindawaris to Turkistan 
(corresponding roughly to northern Afghan areas bordering modern-day 
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Turkmenistan).323 Earlier, Amir Abdur Rahman had employed a combination of positive 
inducements and force, to move Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribesmen from the southern 
lands granted by Nadir Shah to the north-west of Afghanistan to populate a border 
region.324 It was a disaster and many returned, only able to retrieve scattered land 
holdings in Helmand, on poorer territory. That exodus and return is the foundation of 
the Ishaqzai tribe’s disenfranchisement from government that has continued right up 
to the present day – they saw it as a fall from their position under Ahmad Shah. 
Discussions in 2009-10 with Ishaqzai figures frequently recalled their fall from grace: 
from feared cavalry units in the 18th Century, to farmers mocked as ‘cabbage-eaters’ in 
the 21st.325 These perceptions played a central role in delaying Ishaqzai communities’ 
engagement with the Afghan District Governor’s political discussions in the run up to 
the Sangin Accord.  
In Helmand, attempts to improve the irrigation and river network would have 
far-reaching consequences. “The development of Helmand had begun with the 
reconstruction of the Saraj canal (the Nahr-e-Saraj, ‘waterway of Saraj’) in 1910.326 
What was previously desert was populated with non-Helmandi ethnic and tribal 
groups, including refugees who had recently fled the Soviet revolutions in Central 
Asia.”327 Human activity that altered the flow of the Helmand River had been the 
subject of close Persian scrutiny since far earlier times, because of the river’s critical 
impact on the viability of agriculture in Persian territory downstream. In late 1865 the 
Persian Army marched farther into the Sistan region, and occupied vital land astride 
the river, just across the border from Helmand, but the British Government stuck to its 
laissez-faire policy. This apparent indifference to local disputes was soon abandoned 
when, in 1870, “the ruler of Afghanistan threatened to go to war with Iran over 
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Sistan.”328 This was wrapped up with the contested and undefined Irano-Afghan 
border, upon which the British were requested to mediate and did so through the 
Goldsmid Mission of 1870-2.329 The issue remained unresolved: there were further 
assessments, such as the Commission on the Sistan Water Question, in 1903. The 
related frontier problem continued, and – amid memories of British-Russian intrigues 
fifty years previously – was re-submitted to Turkey, as a “neutral power, ” for 
arbitration in 1934.330 The Helmand remains officially an International River, not 
owned by either party (though the law is immature).331 After a turbulent post-
independence period, and a further civil war in 1929 (fomented by reforms and 
resistance to them), King Zahir Shah came to the throne in 1933. “Profiting by the 
experience of earlier rulers, who attempted bold changes too quickly, the new king 
began a program of reform on a modest scale” – agricultural improvements were of 
prime importance, notably in Helmand.332 It was into this longer-term historical 
context that the province’s major reconstruction project began in the mid-20th 
Century.  
Costing $130 million between 1946 and 1970: the Helmand-Arghandab Valley 
Authority (HAVA) was a “massive modernization program that dammed the Helmand 
River far to the north of Kajaki and dug new irrigation systems along both it and the 
Arghendab [sic] River in Kandahar.”333 These projects required the massive movement 
and resettlement of people to prepare the space, and implement the acquisition and 
redistribution of land from private ownership to government for state-owned 
construction. Improvements to agriculture, land management, and market access to 
make the best of the crops were also important objectives. Between 1953 and 1978, 
just fewer than 10,000 families were settled in the canal zones. Using an average 
family size for the Province of 9.4, we can estimate that close to 100,000 people 
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arrived by re-settlement over the 35 year period prior to the Soviet invasion.334 To 
allow access for the major construction works, the government moved communities 
from their ancestral land-holdings, only to move them back later with less land, and 
now in competition with the new settlers.335 Farming was also beset with problems, 
some human, and some geographic or technical: HAVA failed to anticipate that raising 
the water table would cause excessive water logging; there was inadequate drainage, 
and farmers did not follow cultivation advice.336  Previous efforts to expand the road 
and rail networks had limited impact in Helmand. So, the HAVA project’s massive-scale 
infrastructure improvements represented a new chapter in the history of the province, 
because for the first time social and political relationships between fringe communities 
and the state became intimately bound up with the calibre of implementation on 
highly visible government projects designed to improve the lives of huge numbers of 
people dependent on agriculture. 
 
1933-1979: Water rights, reforms, and refugees 
Demonstrating improvements for local people was vital, given the scale of 
funds committed. In the early years of Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-73), rebuffed by the 
Americans, “he sought help from Japanese, German, and Italian advisers” since the 
country had few roads, only six miles of rail, and few internal telegraph or phone 
lines.337 Works on the Nahr-e-Bugra canal just north Gereshk got underway in 1936, 
but with the outbreak of World War Two technicians from these Axis nations were 
withdrawn. Important irrigation and other infrastructure projects stalled. After the 
war, the US Government was again asked for aid, but its lack of urgency led the Afghan 
Government to contract privately with the American firm Morrison Knudsen in 1946. 
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The link between the Helmand River and Iranian human security was again 
demonstrated in the 1940s when “a critical drought in the summer of 1947 and the 
initiation of upstream developments precipitated the question anew.”338 As in the 
modern area, pay for foreign workers (as a proportion of the aid received) was 
considerable: “the salaries of Morrison Knudsen advisers and technicians absorbed an 
amount equivalent to Afghanistan’s total exports.”339 Despite high expenditure, 
technical problems remained, compounded by cultural ones: 
“To save money, the Afghan Government had agreed to do administrative 
and drainage work that they were not technically competent to do [while] the 
Americans had trouble recruiting employees who understood the language and 
culture of Helmand.”340  
The foundations for modern mistrust in foreign assistance were laid here, and 
resurfaced during the Sangin Accord – undermining the formation of a Way Out. 
By the early 1960s, the US Government became more directly involved. By 
1964, the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority program posed significant 
administrative challenges due its scale, and its impact on the national economy was 
profound. “The monarchy poured money into the project; a fifth of the central 
government’s total expenditures went into HAVA in the 1950s and early 1960s.”341 It 
was clear that structural changes were required to develop the Afghan state’s capacity 
to administer the HAVA developments; some social and political alterations were also 
proposed, as with both past and future reform and modernisation attempts.342 What 
followed was a series of rapid alterations to the internal characteristics of the state. In 
traditional Afghan lore, the south of Afghanistan remained Zamindawar:  the name 
preceded Ahmad Shah Durrani’s break from Persian overlordship in 1747. In 1960, the 
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new province of Gereshk was created; just the latest recognition of the importance of 
that vital ground astride the Helmand River crossing, which stretched back 
centuries.343 Four years later, in 1964, and under US encouragement, the capital 
moved to Lashkar Gah to co-locate the political centre with the HAVA project 
administration there. Helmand replaced Gereshk as the provincial name, adopting a 
political significance nationally for the first time.344 By the 1970s, this fusion would be 
complete: the president of HAVA was also the Helmand Provincial Governor345 
operating from the new site built on the Lashkari Bazaar.346 This returned the centre of 
power in the area almost exactly to Qala-i-Bost (now, just Bost), established by the 
Persian Ghaznavids as their winter capital in 976 AD, 988 years earlier. These changes 
also had political and social implications for local communities that would affect 
conflict dynamics in the case study. 
Figure 15: The Helmand Valley as an economic buffer zone (Reprinted from Report 
on Development of Helmand Valley, Afghanistan, 1956).347 
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“Stretching across the southern half of Afghanistan, the Helmand Valley 
development was designed by the US Government to act as an economic buffer, 
shielding the US ‘northern tier’ allies Pakistan and Iran from Soviet influence.”348  
While “Britain’s solution to Afghanistan’s tribal wars had been to script 
feuds of blood, honor, and faith within the linear logic of boundary commissions 
the United States replotted tribal enmities on hydrological charts. Resolution 
became a matter of apportioning cubic yards of water and kilowatt-hours of 
energy.”349 
Then, as now, it was perhaps unrealistic to consider the security and 
effectiveness of infrastructure and water initiatives as distinct from the social and 
political situation in Helmand. In Garmser District: “the great canal project brought 
jobs, a new district center, a new bazaar, and the promise of thousands of hectares of 
irrigable land. The government set up eleven schools and staffed them with educated 
teachers. Net farm income per person rose from $126 per year in 1963 to $1,280 in 
1973.”350 There were however consequences for social cohesion. “Each extension of 
the project required more land acquisition and displaced more people. To remain 
flexible, the royal government and Morrison Knudsen kept the question of who 
actually owned the land in abeyance.”351 The quantities of land requisitioned, 
combined with forced settlement of communities from outside Helmand, altered the 
tribal tapestry and social hierarchy laid down centuries before through land grants 
made in the 18th Century, and given great resonance by their perceived association 
with the father of the nation, Ahmad Shah Durrani. There were further re-allocations, 
but the creation of the HAVA in 1952 alone required the removal of some 1,800 square 
miles of territory from local control.352 The resettlement program attempted, by 
stealth, to “disempower tribal groups that had caused problems in the past.”353 The 
case study suggests this narrative remained prevalent 60 years later, with future 
infrastructure works resisted violently by some communities. 
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The 1964 Constitution also perpetuated the long-standing policy by Kabul of 
diminishing regional power bases through sub-division: administrative alterations 
fragmented Helmand from four districts (bounding roughly balancing local power 
blocs), to thirteen. Each was given an ‘order,’ meaning status, which dictated the level 
of staff, budget, and services they could draw from central government.354 The 
historically powerful region of Zamindawar, for example, was fractured into the low 
order (and therefore lowly resourced) districts of Kajaki, Musa Qala, and Bagran. These 
developments may have been conscious efforts to “transition from a political universe 
based on indigenous and Islamic norms of order to one increasingly defined by 
European norms of statehood.”355 They also inflamed residual narratives about the 
perfidy of central government that resonated with tales of previous predatory, un-
Islamic, or incompetent rulers. Combined with the lack of irrigation improvements 
north of Gereshk, these government-driven changes established new grievances (or 
inflamed old ones), over land, water, and social reform, and undermined the 
government’s capacity to act – if it chose to do so – as an honest broker of solutions, 
especially in rural areas.356 The motivations behind foreign aid, given the HAVA 
project’s implementation problems, remained questioned. Within Helmand, successive 
programs of government-sponsored changes were undermined by their social 
consequences. For example, by creating an educated cadre to run the canal project 
from within Helmandi society, the conservative-reformist divide first crafted in the 
1920s was exacerbated.357 Reaction to these factors would feature heavily in the 
fighting against the Soviet invasion and contribute to the fragmentation of the state in 
the civil war that followed. Later, in the Sangin Accord, these Soviet-trained 
administrators would feature heavily, both as government officials, and as their 
Taliban negotiating partners identified for political co-option. 
The conduct of the Communist government, and the Soviet forces that 
followed, would test 19th Century British envoy Alexander Burnes’ conclusion that for 
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the Afghans “to be happy under government they must either be ruled by a vigorous 
despot, or formed into many small republics.”358 There would be one critical difference 
– in the past, once sources of foreign plunder dried up, factions looked to central 
government or outsiders for funding incentives or subsidies. In the coming wars, a new 
source of revenue would fundamentally alter Afghanistan’s political landscape: the 
opium poppy. This represented a major change for the generation who came to 
maturity in this time, who for the first time had a lucrative domestic revenue source as 
an alternative to foreign funding, or cross-border plundering. 
 
The legacy of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
The Communist governments of Nur Taraki (1978-9), Hafizullah Amin (1979) 
and Babrak Karmal (1979-86) arose from left wing political groups started some twenty 
years earlier. King Zahir Shah’s increasingly open stance on democratic participation 
eventually opened the door for a Communist alliance to win election in the 1960s.359 
For a while, a constitutional monarchy prevailed, but Mohammad Daoud deposed his 
cousin the King in 1973 (who was in Europe for an eye operation), declaring himself 
the first President of Afghanistan.360 President Daoud “defiantly rejected any imported 
ideology [i.e. Communism]” which posed a problem for the left-wing political 
groups.361 Climate was again a contributing factor in political unrest: Zahir Shah failed 
to act decisively after a devastating drought scorched the countryside from 1969-72, 
further undermined by declining US and Soviet economic aid.362 Drought, and then 
floods, would also be precursors to the Sangin Accord in 2011 and factors in the 
decision to negotiate and the enhanced value of additions to Ripeness theory for 
explaining the case study. 
Afghan communism had two principal wings: the Khalq faction (named after 
the original PDPA’s newspaper styled on Communist Russia’s Pravda) and Parcham 
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[meaning Flag, or Banner].363 Broadly, Khalq drew their support from the countryside 
and the Pushtun tribes, while Parcham represented the urban intellectuals.364 Once in 
power, the Communists adopted programs of rapid socialist reform, modelled on the 
Soviet experience. They included land redistribution, secularisation, and other changes 
that, as “an attempt to modernize and bring under firm state control the disparate 
ethnic and tribal groupings, ran counter to everything the traditional and independent 
Islamic Afghan village stood for.”365 The reforms were broad, and immediate. For 
example, Decree 6 (August 1978) did away with the mortgage system, and money-
lending – all debts over five years old were cancelled – while Decree 8 confiscated all 
land holdings greater than 30 jeribs.366 This liquidated the redistributions enforced 
during the HAVA project, adding an additional layer of grievance against foreign-
backed government reform programs. 
The Communist reforms inflamed a number of unstable dynamics, 
simultaneously. The traditional way of life was challenged by modernisation. The 
urban was favoured over the rural, and the secular promoted above the religious. 
There was an almost instantaneous response: “A resistance movement started within 
a month of the coup. It was backed by most of the country’s 320,000 mullahs.”367 
Daoud’s administration also had to contend with the Islamic [alternatively labelled 
Islamist] political factions. They “had sought in religion both a barrier and an answer to 
alien [Communist, foreign] thoughts” and he considered them the main threat to his 
modernisation program.368 Alongside internal power struggles, Afghanistan’s foreign 
policy balanced the demands of her immediate neighbours and those of external 
powers such as the United States, Germany, and Great Britain.369 The United States 
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had for example decided to arm Pakistan, as anti-Communist ally, since the 1950s, 
forcing Afghanistan to divert trade northwards through Russia. Tensions were already 
high over suspicions that Kabul’s sought to unite Pashtun communities spanning the 
Afghan-Pakistan border, referred to as Pushtunistan.370 Within Afghanistan, some 
tentatively welcomed the arrival of some 5,000 Soviet soldiers when the invasion 
began in 1979, but a prescient Soviet Embassy contact was reported to have said, “We 
are glad to see you. But you will be very well advised to leave again as soon as you 
can.”371 The Soviets had no intention of leaving. A military relationship stretching back 
over twenty years underpinned the coup, based on the 1956 agreement that “began 
the orientation of the Afghan army and air force to Soviet ways. Their technical 
language became Russian.”372 Continuing a long-standing theme in Afghan history, the 
Soviets backed a political regime they favoured, and then sent in military forces to 
support it, as the British had done before and NATO would do afterwards. Local 
community stances to the foreigners would form a fundamental influence on identity 
and engagement with government, with legacies for the Sangin Accord. 
The Soviet forces faced a considerable challenge. “To win the xenophobic 
hearts and Moslem minds of these thin, tattered people was the precondition of quick 
success. Neither the ideologue Karmal [President 1979-86] nor the Red army came 
close to it.”373 Resistance tactics developed in the face of overwhelming Soviet air 
power, and were re-learnt after NATO’s intervention. Drainage ditches, high walled 
compounds, and “scores of escape tunnels built in the 1980s” offered protection from 
air bombardment and reconnaissance.374 The Soviets committed significant forces to 
the effort: over the course of the campaign, over 525,500 officers, sergeants, soldiers, 
workers, and support staff served there – one in 12 would be killed, wounded or 
missing in action.375 The Soviet bombing campaigns triggered mass movements of 
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people to safer areas, some into Iran, and others southwards into Pakistan where 
displaced people lived in camps in the northern territories. By 15th February 1989, the 
number of displaced had risen to a staggering 6.2 million, split almost equally between 
the two countries.376 These encampments would become the political base and centre 
of military recruitment for the mujahidin, formed around the seven resistance 
parties.377 Helmand Province had links to these political movements – there were at 
least 80 active movement corridors back in to Afghanistan – and so it is possible to 
place the resistance in the south, and in specific districts such as Sangin and Garmser, 
into a wider social, political and geographical context. Features of this conflict 
persisted in later interventions, notably the importance of cross-border political and 
logistical links.378 
Helmand was not a priority for the Soviets. Troop deployments were low; there 
was only one brigade (with four battalions) – roughly 2,500 to 3,000 soldiers – for all of 
Helmand and neighbouring Farah provinces.379 Given the peak annual troop level 
nationally was around 130,000 (in 1985-6), and there are 34 provinces, using today’s 
population and area data this equates roughly to 2% of the deployed Soviet force to 
cover Helmand, which consisted of 7.9% of the people and 16.5% of the national 
territory.380 During participant observation by the author in 2009, residents of the 
Helmand Valley south of Sangin, predominantly Ishaqzai tribesfolk, were labelled 
collaborators since the Soviets are alleged to have conquered and held that territory 
and enlisted (or conscripted) locals into security forces and the political administration. 
Conversely, fighting in north Helmand was particularly tough. Soviet soldiers carried up 
to 6 days supplies (often 40kg or more per man), staying in the field with one litre of 
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water per man per day.381 Sangin town contains the wreckage of Soviet tanks where 
largely Alikozai tribal resistance fighters apparently stopped ground forces. Years later, 
these same men recounted proudly that no Soviet force ever held the Upper Sangin 
Valley, resorting instead to strafing villages with helicopters.382 Those who resisted 
drew great acclaim, perceiving this as a “battle for national dignity and national 
liberation in which they were prepared – literally – to fight to the death.”383 This 
prestige would provide a legitimacy narrative present and influential during the Sangin 
Accord negotiations. 
In north Helmand, rival groups struggled for financial, military, and political 
autonomy, often using changes of allegiance to maximise access to the money flowing 
through the seven resistance parties in Pakistan. The strong association between 
opium poppy cultivation, resistance, and religion stems from this period; Mullah Nasim 
Akhundzada (uncle to the future Provincial Governor of Helmand, Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada) issued a religious fatwa [a considered religious opinion, often believed a 
command] in 1981 demanding, opium “poppy must cultivated in order to finance the 
jihad against the Soviets and the Kabuli lackeys.”384 It was also sensible economics in 
an area without banks, for leaders seeking self-reliance. Opium is a hardy crop, with a 
relatively stable value: the dried pods can be stored for years without significant loss 
of quality, and a significant profit can be made between the farmers’ crop and the 
refined product. For the farmer, let alone the trafficker (whose incomes are 
significantly higher), “it plays a multi-functional role in the livelihood strategies of the 
poor, providing access to land, credit, and an important off-farm income.”385  
The year 1985 saw a change of leadership in the Soviet Union, and Mikhail 
Gorbachev took power as General Secretary of the Communist Party. The Soviet 
military – then at its highest troop concentration – was given one year to ‘solve’ the 
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war.386 In Helmand, Soviet and Afghan forces conducted a massive offensive, 
supported by softer actions such as political work, and religious, female, and medical 
engagement.387 It was not enough, and in May 1986, Karmal was ousted and replaced 
as Afghan President by Major General Mohammad Najibullah – a former director of 
the KHAD secret police – an organisation in which widespread and systematic torture 
were commonplace.”388 Soviet efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and their forces 
withdrew on 15th February 1989, in line with an agreement struck in Geneva. Average 
losses were 126 killed and 4,240 sick and wounded per month, peaking at 144 killed 
per month for the 62 months in Stage II of the war (March 1980-April 1985).389 This 
indicates intense combat, but disease had a far bigger impact. Official figures report 
that “irrecoverable personnel (killed, died of wounds or disease, and in accidents or 
other incidents) came to 14,453” while “53,753 were wounded or injured, and 415,932 
fell sick.”390  
Amidst debate about the use of military tactics, the correct approach to 
working alongside Afghan forces, or equipment suitability, two points remain as 
relevant today as they were for the Soviets, and their antecedents: the terrain, and the 
unity that many – in Afghanistan, and elsewhere – find only in the face of an external 
threat. “When in early 1980 the Soviet deputy foreign minister pointed out to his boss, 
Andrei Gromyko, that three previous invasions by the British had failed, Gromyko 
asked sternly: “Are you comparing our internationalist forces to those of the British 
imperialists?” “No, sir, of course not,” answered his deputy. “But the mountains are 
the same.”391 To many outside observers, notably the USA, the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union itself, and then the end of the Communist government in 1992, signalled 
the effective end of the Cold War. It was exactly the wrong moment for the world to 
take its collective eyes away from events in Afghanistan. 
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Dr. Najibullah’s ascension to leadership after the Soviet departure heralded a 
dramatic shift in aspiration for reform, and a switch to a more collaborative approach 
between urban and rural populations, and conservative and progressive elements. The 
Soviet leadership told him to “forget Communism, abandon socialism, embrace Islam, 
and work with the tribes.”392 For a while, the approach appeared successful. Afghan 
Government professional military forces were considerable, augmented by auxiliaries 
paid for by Najibullah’s former department; the KHAD secret service had financed the 
creation of militias drawn from the former mujahidin – up to 300,000 personnel were 
available to the government in 1988, including up to 100,000 militia.393This strategy 
also had similarities with Persian, India and British approaches in previous centuries, 
and would be evolved by NATO at times during its campaign. 
Najibullah’s administration was contested, however, by a coalition of 
ethnicities (see Annex E). Ethnicity in Afghanistan had importance correlations for the 
power balance, and it affected the geography of political alliances, and had 
implications for the route any aspirant took to reach the national capital. Led 
principally by Ahmad Shad Masood,394 a Tajik mujahidin leader, and Abdul Rashid 
Dostum, the Uzbek leader, the Northern Alliance formed in early 1992 to overturn 
Afghanistan’s post-Soviet Communist government.395 Of particular note, Masood was 
perceived as the only resistance leader who never left the country to live abroad; he 
was widely read, and his army fought back nine major offensives by the Soviet army in 
the Panjshir Valley.396 He was admired by the Soviets – who were unable to inflict a 
decisive defeat upon him – and he showed the ability to master Western-style 
conventional logistics, intelligence gathering, and command and control of at least 
20,000 soldiers.397 Dostum (today Vice-President, under President Ashraf Ghani) was 
originally a General in the Communist government’s army, but left after the Soviet 
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withdrawal.398 His 20,000 Uzbek militiamen had been vital to Najibullah’s government, 
and his departure played a critical role in its fall.399 
Najibullah’s strategy had depended on the redistribution of Soviet aid, but this 
declined significantly after the attempted coup against Soviet President Gorbachev in 
August 1991, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December that year.400 The 
consequences were disastrous: no government in Kabul in the last 250 years had 
survived without massive external subsidy, and Najibullah’s was no different.401 He 
was unable to pay his civil and military supporters, and the country lacked enough 
food and fuel for the harsh winter.402 Since the 14th April 1988, the United Nations had 
formally been the umbrella for joint US-Russian-Pakistan discussions with Kabul’s 
leaders about ‘the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan’, but this played 
out largely in the wider context and ideology of the Cold War rather than addressing 
issues inside the country – the mujahidin were absent from the discussions, for 
example.403 The Communist government effectively collapsed, and in spring 1992, 
Najibullah was detained by the mujahidin leadership who rushed to occupy the capital, 
and fill the power vacuum – led by the ethnic Tajik Mullah Burhanuddin Rabbani (the 
future leader of the President Karzai’s High Peace Council, who himself would be killed 
by the Taliban in 2011).404 
The collapse of the Communist government triggered a race to the capital, with 
Masood arriving just one day before Hekmatyar. The capital was then under near 
constant bombardment. In the first 24 hours, 3,000 civilians died in the first 24-hours, 
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and 700,000 were displaced.405 Rocket and artillery exchanges continued for 46 of the 
following 58 months, as the factions fought for control. While he has Prime Minister, 
Hekmatyar fought openly with Masood, the Defence Minister. Dostum, a hard-drinking 
Soviet-trained general, swapped sides repeatedly in unlikely alliances of convenience 
with staunch Islamist conservatives.406 This pattern continued as the Taliban, backed 
by direct military aid, and advisors from Pakistan took control in Kandahar in 1994 and 
over the next two years consolidated, and advanced upon Kabul; they fired 287 
rockets into the city in January 1996 alone.407 A unified response to this new threat 
might have been decisive, but the success of any one region’s leader against Omar’s 
Taliban forces – such as Masood’s ally Ismael Khan in the western city of Herat – 
“generated more jealousy than support from rivals elsewhere.”408 By then “Kabul had 
been without electricity for three years and its 1.2 million residents fed only because 
of United Nations World Food Programme convoys and an emergency Red Cross 
airlift.”409 The UN Security Council condemned the situation, on 15th February 1996, 
but Afghans – especially in the Pashtun south – would increasingly look to the Taliban 
for change.410 
The early decades of an independent Afghanistan were typified by turbulence, 
within the national borders and the wider region. Efforts to establish a national 
identity – either by Afghans or sponsored by foreign interveners – evolved the legacy 
of older history, leaving a range of motivations and perceptions important for the 
Sangin Accord. First, few reforms had universal appeal, and most would be resisted by 
certain sections of the population – especially those perceived to strike at the 
traditional rural lifestyle. Reforms sponsored by foreign ideologies or interveners 
rarely stuck (though the money that often accompanied them was accepted). 
Resistance to outside influence was a unifying force, and increasingly framed as an 
                                                     
405 Shah M. Tarzi, "Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature," Asian Survey vol. 33, no. 2 (1993), 
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Islamic duty. These narratives are retained from previous centuries, and indicate a 
continuity of approach which undermines explanations of a Way Out and (under 
additions to Ripeness) generates Hurt on the level of government capacity and 
legitimacy. Major infrastructure projects were seen to fracture the power balance, 
disenfranchising and enriching specific groups well before the long-term benefits to 
quality of life were realised. The partially finished HAVA project in Helmand 
exemplifies these mixed outcomes, and would remain a stark reminder of the risks and 
benefits for rural communities associated with promises of foreign aid – and of 
engagement with the central authorities in Kabul. The case study suggests a recent 
catastrophe (a failed uprising in 2007) and a shock (from significant flooding) played a 
role in overcoming these entrenched attitudes, allowing infrastructure improvements 
to feature in the Sangin Accord. Both are supporting, but not essential, elements 
related to Ripeness theory. 
The two most significant legacies of the 20th Century for the Sangin Accord and 
other local negotiations were: the rise of the opium industry and; the volume of 
evidence showing that power brokers associated with Kabul cared more for their 
rivalries than the welfare of their population. The legacy of history played a part in the 
latter case; in 1776 AD Timur Shah had deliberately moved the capital from Kandahar 
in the Pashtun lands to its present site specifically so it sat astride the fault lines 
between Afghanistan’s ancient ethnic groups, rather than wholly within one of them. 
Events immediately preceding the Taliban Government of the 1990s deeply affected 
perceptions of government legitimacy henceforth: “opportunism could always be 
counted on to undermine any other “–ism” (Islamism, nationalism, socialism, etc.).411 
The conduct and failings of the Mujahidin government were directly responsible for 
the Taliban’s increasing legitimacy and their unwillingness to enter a power-sharing 
arrangement in the 1990s. The rise of a functioning narcotics industry, initially in 
response to the Soviet invasion, created a rival income source to outside aid. This is 
specific to this period of history. Alongside increasingly partisan divisions (adding 
religious fundamentalism and Communist ideological labels to older tribal and ethnic 
ones) perpetuated the bypassing of central authorities. External backers would now 
deal directly with competing groups to foster their particular agendas. The review of 
                                                     
411 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 253. 
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history here, and its impact on the case study, supports Rubin’s categorisation of this 
as “rentier-state wrecking” which “blocked the people of Afghanistan from choosing 
among the competing political elites and rebuilding their country.”412 This could be 
expressed as a stalemated political position. While the views of ordinary people are 
excluded from Zartman’s original theory, the case study shows the importance of 
community pressure – and aspiration – especially on the Taliban’s decision to 
negotiate in Sangin, explained more effectively by additions to Ripeness.  
                                                     
412 Rubin, 1992, op. cit. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODERN PRECURSORS TO THE SANGIN ACCORD 
1994-2001: The rise of the Taliban 
The Taliban’s roots trace back at least as far as 1981, under Mullah Mansur, 
whose objective was “to initiate a political-jihad movement especially for Afghan 
Shariat (Islamic Law) students”413 – and credible research suggests there were Taliban 
fronts during the war with the Soviets.414 Earlier, in spring 1994, future President 
Hamid Karzai himself urged the US consul general in Peshawar to support the Taliban, 
who were “going to bring peace and security to the country” and at that stage were 
operating around Kandahar (Karzai’s family home city) “cleaning up all the roadblocks” 
so renowned for widespread theft, violence, and rape.415 Positive perceptions of the 
group’s intent created a foundation for fostering legitimacy in the eyes of some 
communities, even if their methods were rooted in strict interpretations of Islam. 
Explanations of the Sangin Accord grounded in Ripeness theory suggest this favourable 
comparison with the weak performance of the state central government would 
undermine any Way Out, until significant improvements in capacity and conduct were 
observed.  Inside Afghanistan the emergence of the Taliban movement was viewed 
with little concern – it was just the latest in a long line of mujahidin organisations 
formed across the border in Pakistan’s refugee-clogged border areas. Akin with 
Hekmatyar’s own beginnings, it was also a smaller-scale grouping with no geographical 
base inside Afghanistan. These disparate linkages, spanning district, province and 
national boundaries, provide further evidence that analysis of the conflict parties in 
the Sangin Accord is problematic. Approaches that assume all political actors involved 
in perceiving Ripeness were based locally are also unrealistic. 
Initially at least, Omar’s band also compared poorly in strength and reach with 
all the factions he was to vie with, and oust. Hekmatyar had failed to wrest any 
                                                     
413 Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (C. Hurst, Publishers, Limited, 
2014), p. 46; the full story is superbly explained between pp. 46-63. For more on the evolving definition 
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2012). 
415 Gutman, 2008, op. cit., pp. 63-4. 
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meaningful control with far greater support and resources at his disposal than Mullah 
Omar, the Taliban leader, had at his in 1994. The more established factions misjudged 
the population’s weariness with the fight for Kabul, the strength Omar would gain 
from limited yet decisive action, and the power of Islamist religious fervour. 
Nevertheless, by the time the Taliban leadership crossed the border from Pakistan in 
spring 1994, with genuine intent to stake a claim in first Kandahar, then for all of 
Afghanistan, Rabbani’s government and most of the country’s elites had one glaring 
shortfall compared to Omar: perceived legitimacy, especially among the southern 
population. Omar was admired by the Taliban’s supporters for three reasons: his 
religious piety, his reputation for incorruptibility, and his bravery in the jihad.416 
Masood, Rabbani and other notables had varying levels of credibility themselves, as 
mujahidin and as long-standing adherents to Islamic practice in the face of Communist 
secularism. Masood’s record against the Soviets in particular, was virtually 
unimpeachable. However, their administration, and the conduct of the elites they 
were generically (or directly) associated with, had – for close to a decade – displayed 
enormous shortcoming. Even accounting for the unique challenges triggered by the 
near-collapse of the state after the Soviets withdrew aid, previously “corruption was so 
rampant that the government bureaucracy absorbed 85 to 90 percent of Soviet aid 
intended for the whole population,” and much of this was diverted to fund factional 
struggles for power.417  
In September 1996 the Taliban, who shared deeper bonds of ethnicity and 
outlook among their fellow Pashtuns, advanced on Kabul in strength. The wily Masood 
withdrew in good order from the capital to his Panjshir valley bastion, inflicting heavy 
casualties upon his Taliban pursuers during a slick but punishing fighting retreat.418 
Deposed leader President Najibullah refused to leave, confident he was under United 
Nations protection and safe because (by his reading of the CIA’s mujahidin support 
                                                     
416  Renowned US negotiator Richard Holbrooke called Omar “a driving, inspirational force” – see Steve 
Coll, "Looking for Mullah Omar," 23rd January 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/23/looking-for-mullah-omar(accessed 12th February 
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417 Barfield, 2010, op. cit., p. 248. 
418 New York Times, "Islamic Rebels Pursue Retreating Afghan Army," 29th September 1996, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/29/world/islamic-rebels-pursue-retreating-afghan-
army.html(accessed 14th February 2015).  Braithwaite, 2012, op. cit., p. 303. Also Gutman, 2008, op. 
cit., pp. 78-9. 
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activities) the Taliban were backed by the United States and so would not harm him. 
Taliban forces moved into Kabul unopposed on 27th September 1996, and Najibullah’s 
body was discovered hanging from a lamppost, mouth stuffed with banknotes, that 
morning.419 Mullah Omar was now the de facto head of government in Kabul. His 
challenge would be to extend control into the north – bastions of other ethnicities, 
protected by Masood and his veterans of the anti-Soviet campaign – and extend 
influence from the Taliban’s foothold in Kandahar across the Pashtun south. To do this 
he needed funds, and he would rely heavily upon faith and fear. A man, who had 
arrived five months earlier, virtually unnoticed amid the utter turmoil, would bolster 
all three. In May 1996, Osama bin Laden arrived with 90 friends and family seeking 
permanent sanctuary after his expulsion from Sudan; that government declared him 
no longer welcome as a direct result of the threat al-Qaeda posed to American 
Embassy staff in Khartoum.420 The threat bin Laden posed in Afghanistan’s Tora Bora 
mountains, alongside Mullah Omar and the Taliban, would be far more significant. 
Osama bin Laden’s arrival in Afghanistan in 1996 was the direct result of 
American and Saudi Arabian pressure on the government in Sudan, designed to keep 
him on the run, rather than capture him.421 It appears that the US authorities accepted 
that Afghanistan was the most likely destination but did not consider his co-location 
with Mullah Omar and the Taliban a significant risk; they were concerned only that he 
did not go to Somalia.422 Initially, bin Laden set up operations in the eastern city of 
Jalalabad, assessed by the US 9/11 Commission to be “because it was in an area 
controlled by a provincial council of Islamic leaders who were not major contenders for 
national power,” perhaps indicating that he sought independence of action. Rather 
than being solely associated with the Taliban, he hedged his bets, also striking up an 
early relationship with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a staunch opponent of the Taliban 
                                                     
419 Terence White, "Flashback: When the Taleban Took Kabul," 15th October 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1600136.stm(accessed 14th February 2015).  Also 
Braithwaite, 2012, op. cit., p. 303. 
420 US Council on Foreign Relations, "Backgrounder - Profile: Osama Bin Laden," 1st September 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-osama-bin-laden/p9951(accessed 15th February 2015). . 
Gutman, 2008, op. cit., pp. 91-2. Also  
421 US Council on Foreign Relations, 1st September 2007, op. cit., http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-
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422 This was the conclusion of meetings between the US Ambassador and the Sudanese Foreign Minister 
in February and then bilateral talks in March 2006. Gutman, 2008, op. cit., p. 90. 
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movement), and maintaining links with the powerful Haqqani family.423 The area was 
well-chosen, being a short distance from the border with Pakistan, and near the route 
from the Khyber Pass to Kabul. It was also a safe haven, and it was here that bin Laden 
built his austere, fortified mountain bunker in the hinterlands at Tora Bora.424  
Bin Laden’s independence was soon compromised, by the Taliban’s successful 
operations to capture Jalalabad and overturn Hekmatyar en route to taking Kabul, in 
September 1996.  From here on, al-Qaeda and the Taliban would have a closer 
relationship, though there were power struggles between them: Omar is said to have 
“invited” bin Laden to relocate to Kandahar in 1997 “ostensibly in the interests of Bin 
Ladin’s [sic] own security but more likely to situate him where he might be easier to 
control” after his inflammatory interview with CNN breached their agreement on a low 
media profile.425 Despite this, the US still saw the Taliban as a group to be engaged 
with. In 1997 (when Mullah Omar controlled 90% of Afghanistan) senior members of 
the Taliban visited George W. Bush in 1997, when he was Governor of Texas, to discuss 
co-operation over oil pipeline routes that avoided Russia or Iran,426 also visiting 
Houston Zoo and the NASA space centre.427 Regional neighbours maintained varying 
degrees of influence with the movement, but Pakistan maintained the closest 
sponsorship, funding, and mentoring Taliban activities (as well as other groups inside 
Afghanistan) long after the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ceased its covert 
support to the mujahidin under Operation Cyclone.428 These links became increasingly 
                                                     
423 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, "9/11 Commission Report," 2004, 
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The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History 
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bound up with Osama bin Laden. For bin Laden, once aligned with the Taliban, his 
safety and security depended on helping them to neutralise the threat from the one 
remaining credible military commander: Ahmad Shah Masood.  
Masood was a credible military opponent for the Taliban, but he also posed an 
intellectual and ideological challenge. By 2001, after years of failing to defeat him, and 
seeing him receive increased foreign support, the Taliban attempted to co-opt him: 
“Keep your weapons with yourselves, we’ll keep ours. You can retain your 
territory. But there is one condition: just accept the Emirate of Afghanistan and its 
principles, and you can have the second most important post in the government, 
the post of the prime minister.”429 
Masood rejected this offer, considering an accommodation of this sort 
impossible in the long-term, though he did entertain “the possibility of sharing a 
coalition government with the Taliban for a transformation period, at the end of which 
we should go to democratic elections.”430 Masood addressed the European Parliament 
on 5th April 2001, attended by US President George Bush, and offered a stark warning.  
“My message to Bush is the following: If peace is not restored in 
Afghanistan, and if he does not help the Afghan people, it is certain that the 
problem of Afghanistan will also affect the United States and many other 
countries.”431 
 
2001-2005: The roots of the NATO intervention 
Two days before the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, Masood 
was assassinated by bin Laden’s al-Qaeda suicide bombers, using stolen EU passports 
to pose as Belgian journalists representing a fictional Arab television station based in 
                                                                                                                                                           
2, and on the total cost, p. 68. For Pakistan’s direct involvement in Taliban activities in the 1990s, Ahmed 
Rashid, Taliban: The Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 
183-195. 
429 Piotr Balcerowicz, "The Last Interview with Ahmad Shah Masood," August 2001, 
http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm(accessed 21st May 
2015).  
430 Ibid. 
431 Panjsheriboy, Uploaded 1st March 2009. "Ahmad Shah Massoud Warns US President Bush in Paris - 
France," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gM6IY9uoZc0 (accessed 21st May 2015).  
Note, the speech actually took place in Strasbourg, not Paris as listed above. European Parliament 
Audiovisual Services for Media, "50th Anniversary of the European Parliament: Key Dates," 11th 
November 2013, http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Page.aspx?id=751(accessed 21st May 2015).  
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London.432 The one Afghan man capable of organising and leading a genuine large-
scale military operation within Afghan borders – in credible partnership with Western 
forces – was dead. Terrorism experts believe Masood’s assassination was the price the 
Taliban demanded for offering Osama bin Laden sanctuary after the 9/11 attacks.433 
Eight years later, the feeling remained that “he was a charming killer; he would have 
found bin Laden.”434 The two organisations were notionally separate, but the 
international effort to tackle al-Qaeda increasingly linked it to the Taliban. UN Security 
Council resolution 1267 required states under Chapter VII to take specific steps to 
restrict al-Qaeda if the Taliban did not hand over bin Laden by 14th November 1999. 
They did not, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) – launched by President Bush on 
7th October 2001 – continued apace, supporting the post-Masood Northern Alliance to 
retake Kabul and then pursuing the senior Taliban leadership and bin Laden deep into 
the south.435 During a muddled attempt to capture or kill bin Laden in his Tora Bora 
stronghold, the British Special Boat Service are alleged to have had him located, but 
senior approval to act was slow in coming and the world’s most wanted man slipped 
away on a donkey into Pakistan.436 The first major chance for a quick end to the 
military intervention was missed here. As time went on, and now that the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda were effectively synonymous in many eyes, achieving this mission – initially 
designed to meet limited, specific counter-terrorism goals under Operation Enduring 
Freedom – required a sustained and expanded campaign, geographically and in 
mission scope. The UK offered to organise and command the first iteration of this 
expanded ground deployment, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
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duly came into being on 20th December 2001 under UN Security Council Resolution 
1386.437 
ISAF “originally deployed to provide security in and around the capital Kabul” 
which had been wracked by factional fighting, with a terrible impact on civilian lives 
and the reputation of central government, since the 1990s.438 In military terms, ISAF’s 
deployment could be considered the start of the sustained campaign to establish and 
then enlist a post-Taliban Afghan government, and the population. Delivering their 
mandate was immensely difficult; to prevent the “use of Afghan territory, especially 
areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and 
planning of terrorist acts,” as UN Security Resolution 1267 required.439 However, the 
political landscape into which that military campaign operated – one that would 
ultimately require a national reconciliation to nourish a stable future – had already 
been scarred with one central feature determined at the Bonn Conference: there 
would be no Taliban present in the negotiations on the nature of the new Afghanistan. 
The Bonn Conference of December 2001 was “was a victor’s peace attended by 
Washington's Afghan allies, who carved up the post-war status quo between them. 
The Taliban, and many of the Pashtun tribes associated with them, were not invited 
and have been excluded from power ever since.”440 On the face of it, this is 
unsurprising: the Taliban had lost control of the capital Kabul, and Kandahar (their 
spiritual and material base) by December 2001. They were in breach of multiple UN 
Security Council resolutions relating to collusion with international terrorism, and 
remained openly aligned with al-Qaeda and bin Laden, though he was across the 
border in Pakistan by then. They sought an Islamic legal basis for society in Afghanistan 
that was more extreme than the model (based on the 1964 Constitution and legal 
code) deemed acceptable by other Afghan delegates at Bonn. 
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The negotiating strategy in 2001 was based on the complete exclusion and 
destruction of the Taliban, as both a military and a political movement. The structure 
of the Bonn conference was designed to reform the new boundaries of the Afghan 
state, and to place both the political legitimacy and the monopoly of force in the hands 
of leaders who aligned themselves with Western or American interests, or, at least 
could be co-opted to support the international counter-terrorism objectives. The talks 
confirmed US-backed Hamid Karzai as the Chairman of the Interim Administration, 
aided by the absence of existing President Rabbani, who “was insistent that any talks 
on the future of Afghanistan should take place inside the country” (Karzai himself was 
absent from Bonn, but the US arranged for him to address the opening of the meeting 
by satellite phone).441 There were other political options, including (until his death in 
October 2001) those based around Abdul Haq, but Karzai had “long been on the CIA’s 
radar as a future national leader.”442 Karzai had been the Taliban’s international 
representative and then changed sides (possibly after the Taliban murdered his 
father); he also represented at least some degree of traditional lineage. As a Popalzai 
tribal leader (admittedly after his father took the position by force) his candidacy 
returned the national leadership to the tribe which had first held the monarchy in the 
18th Century.443 This demonstrated a clear and deliberate use of historical and cultural 
factors as part of the negotiation within the loya jirga to generate legitimacy for the 
post-Bonn administration. However, since this excluded the Taliban, and therefore the 
chief opponents, it is unlikely that this negotiation corresponds to the construct 
envisaged by Ripeness theory. 
The US-led coalition and the new Afghan Interim Administration moved to 
transfer the administrative structures created in Bonn into political realities, but the 
military elements of the plan to support the extension of political power beyond Kabul 
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http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/withus/cbonn.html(accessed 22nd May 
2015).  For the United Nations transcript, see United Nations, "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements 
in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," www.un.org, 
2001, http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
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could not be achieved within the original mission definition or force levels. Initially 
these totalled no more than around 5,000 personnel (up to 5,000 more American 
forces continued the OEF counter terrorism mission under separate command).444  In 
August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF forces and a period of expansion 
began, first into the north. Fighting continued during and after the Afghan Presidential 
elections in 2004, leading to a westward expansion in 2005. The following year saw 
deployment into the south (with NATO assuming control of US-forces already there in 
July), and then finally into the sensitive border regions to the east by December 
2006.445 There would be a corresponding increase in troop numbers, and an increasing 
awareness that the parameters of the mission were expanding.446 It was contact 
between the conflict parties enabled by this expansion that made the Sangin Accord 
possible – but the attempt to expand government influence backed by international 
forces was also the reason the agreement was needed at all. 
The United Kingdom assumed responsibility for Helmand Province as part of 
NATO’s Phase 3 expansion into the south, with Canada securing the opportunity to 
effect change in the critical province of Kandahar “for agreeing to deploy south.”447 
British forces arriving in Helmand  took over from a small US force (of perhaps 130 
men) conducting counter-terrorism operations under the OEF mission, alongside their 
Provincial Reconstruction Team and the Afghan authorities based in the capital, 
Lashkar Gah.448 Britain had lobbied as part of the pre-deployment negotiations that 
                                                     
444 Assessing the exact number of personnel on the ground, and whether they fell into the US-led OEF 
counter-terrorism mission or the UN/NATO-led ISAF stability mission is complex. For the United States’ 
best effort covering 2002-9 see US Government, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-
FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues," Congressional Research Service, 2009, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf(accessed 22nd May 2015). p. 9. 
This report gives a figure of 5,200 US personnel deployed in 2002, on p. 9. 
445 For a useful summary of the expansion see NATO, 13th January 2015, op. cit., 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.  
446 For specific details on troop numbers and contributing nations (snapshots every 1-2 months since 
2007) see the NATO placemat archive at NATO, "NATO and Afghanistan ISAF Placemats Archive," 
www.nato.int, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/107995.htm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
447 Farrell, forthcoming, op. cit., chapter 4, pp. 30-31 within that chapter, in the pre-publication version 
of Unwinnable seen by the author of this thesis. Also Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, Afghanistan: How the 
West Lost Its Way (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 158. 
448 Anecdotally, these missions were predominantly US Special Operations Forces, some similar in 
format to the tribal engagement community-level tactics outlined in  Major Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a 
Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan," 2009, 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5042~v~One_Tribe_at_a_Time___A_Strategy_for_S
uccess_in_Afghanistan.pdf(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
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President Karzai replaced the Provincial Governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (SMA) 
– relative of the same Mullah Nasim Akhundzada who had issued a religious edict 
requiring opium poppy production to fund resistance against the Soviets 30 years 
earlier. London sought to replace a man who in June 2005 had been rumbled with nine 
metric tonnes of opium in his personal living compound. Sher Mohammad coolly 
replied that he had “confiscated it from drug traffickers and was only storing it until he 
could dispose of it properly.”449 His removal was an important signal of intent to move 
away from the warlords of old in the context of NATO’s support for improving 
governance. The UK had taken on responsibility for countering narcotics, and Karzai’s 
action to sack Akhundzada was intended to send a clear message to the opium traders. 
There would be costs for these principled stances: once he could no longer pay them 
from government funds, it would later be discovered that Akhundzada turned 3,000 of 
his own supporters over to the Taliban.450 US Special Operations Forces had likely been 
conducting missions in partnership with specific (often tribal) groupings, to achieve 
defined and very local objectives. Individuals linked to the Taliban network– in 
strategic policy and assessments – continued to be counter-terrorism targets, due to 
the senior leadership’s association with al-Qaeda.451 As Major Jim Gant, one of the 
most renowned writers on these tactical tribal engagement operations asserted: 
“The fragmented nature of the tribal system, the absence of a major rift 
between tribes and the insurgents, and the feuding of Pashtunwali demand patience 
and forethought in the planning and execution of tribal engagement efforts. Small-
scale community successes are more likely than large-scale province-wide 
successes.”452 
The initial British deployment consisted of 3,300 mostly engineering and 
logistics personnel focused on building vital infrastructure while around 600 elite 
                                                     
449 Joel Hafvenstein, Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 312-
3. 
450 Damien McElroy, "Afghan Governor Turned 3,000 Men over to Taliban," www.bbc.co.uk, 20th 
November 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6615329/Afghan-
governor-turned-3000-men-over-to-Taliban.html(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
451 Information on the exact nature of US Special Operations Forces missions and strategies is 
understandably and rightly absent from unclassified sources, so this is an assertion based purely on the 
publication of Major Jim Gant’s work and an assumption that it broadly represents actions taken around 
this time. This should not be quoted as an authoritative statement without further referencing. 
452 Gant, 2009, op. cit., 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5042~v~One_Tribe_at_a_Time___A_Strategy_for_S
uccess_in_Afghanistan.pdf. p. 43. Author’s emphasis. 
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Paratroopers were fighting forces required to conduct offensive operations.453 The 
British Helmand Task Force faced a tough beginning – later described as poking a very 
large hornets’ nest with a very short stick.454 If a true negotiated reconciliation was 
required – to Zartman’s definition – their task also included moving beyond narrow 
political relationships, for largely military ends, to expand political peace to include all 
tribes, province-wide. This required non-partisan actions to generate legitimacy in the 
eyes of all; history showed the actions of international forces and the governments 
they supported weren’t commonly interpreted in this way. 
 
2006: Britain heads to Sangin 
On 26th January 2006 Defence Secretary John Reid unleased a storm of 
controversy – British forces were already deployed in large numbers in Iraq – by 
announcing to the House of Commons that further personnel would be sent to 
Helmand Province that spring.455 Yet since 2003, there were calls from the 
humanitarian community to expand the mission. In that year Care International, 
Oxfam, Action Aid, Save the Children, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group 
and 72 other organisations called upon: 
“The international community to accord NATO a robust stabilization 
mandate in Afghanistan. This mandate should include the expansion of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to key locations and major transport 
                                                     
453 Gordon Rayner, "British Armed Forces in Helmand Province: Timeline," 2nd April 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10737441/British-Armed-Forces-in-Helmand-
Province-timeline.html(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
For the balance within the UK’s initial deployed forces, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Tootal, Commanding 
Officer, was clear that the 550 or so soldiers from 3 PARA “were the main infantry element of the 
soldiers deploying to Afghanistan” in spring 2006. UK Ministry of Defence, "3 Para Soldiers on Their Way 
to Afghanistan," www.mod.uk (now archived), 3rd May 2006, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060503225247/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/Mil
itaryOperations/3ParaSoldiersOnTheirWayToAfghanistan.htm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
454 Bird and Marshall, 2011, op. cit., p. 159. 
455 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., p. 21. For the original announcement, see UK Parliament, "Statement About 
the Deployment of Our Armed Forces to Afghanistan," Hansard, 26 Jan 2006 : Column 1529, 2006, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060126/debtext/60126-
10.htm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
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routes outside of Kabul … Current efforts to train representative, professional 
Afghan national security forces must be accelerated.”456 
Armed attacks outside Kabul were the root cause of this call, affecting the 
population and reducing the provision of vital services by Kabul’s fledgling ministries, 
NGOs and others. By summer 2003, the ratio of armed attacks outside Kabul to those 
inside the city had risen threefold, to 7:1.457 Yet the original purpose – to protect the 
capital and prevent factional fighting there – had been achieved, with Kabul an “island 
of relative tranquillity due to the presence of 4,800 peacekeepers.”458 Across the 
country though, there was one solider for every 100,000 Afghans outside Kabul, each 
alone responsible for over 100Km2.459 Meeting David Kilcullen’s recommendations for 
a counterinsurgency campaign, of 50:1 would require a force of some 516,000 in 
Afghanistan.460 At the height of the US surge in June 2011 – though the mission cannot 
be compared directly with peacekeeping – ISAF forces numbered 132,000 (including 
90,000 from the United States, 10,000 from the UK), supplemented by Afghan Army 
and Police units and further US personnel on the OEF counter-terrorism mission.461 
Sangin was less than 100km from the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, and home to a 
population of some 50,000 people – suggesting around 1,000 troops were required. 
This is roughly the number deployed into Sangin by both the UK and US in later years. 
That said, Kilcullen’s ratio does not reflect the significant additional challenges posed 
by the facts that the population were widely dispersed, there were major temporary 
movements of people through the district (including hostile elements), and that Sangin 
                                                     
456 Care International, "Afghanistan:  A Call for Security," www.care.ca, 2003, 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/030617AfghanistanACallforSecurity_e.pdf(accessed 
23rd May 2015).  
457 Care International, "Afghanistan Policy Brief, September 15 2003," www.care.ca, 2003, 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/AfghanistanPolicyBrief_Sept03E.pdf(accessed 23rd 
May 2015). P. 3. 
458 Care International, 2003, op. cit., 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/AfghanistanPolicyBrief_Jan03.pdf.  
459 Care International, 2003, op. cit., 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/AfghanistanPolicyBrief_Sept03E.pdf.  
460 This estimate uses figures given on page 4 in Care International, 2003, op. cit., 
http://care.ca/sites/default/files/files/publications/AfghanistanPolicyBrief_Jan03.pdf. 4,800 
peacekeepers at a ratio of 5,380:1 with the population gives an estimated population in 2003 of 25, 
824,000. Divided by Kilcullen’s 50:1 ratio (“twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 population”) gives a 
required force of 516,480. 
461 NATO, "ISAF Placemat 6th June 2011," 2011, 
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/15%20NOV.Placemat%20page1-3.pdf(accessed 
22nd May 2015).  
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is the access point to the Kajaki Dam – the primary sustainable source of power for 
southern Afghanistan.462 
The mission to Helmand Province was initially limited in scope; when the UK’s 
16 Air Assault Brigade deployed in April 2006, its aim was simply to support and 
protect the Afghan Government as it conducted reconstruction and development in 
the Lashkar Gah triangle.463 This area contained the more populous river valley 
communities, and much of the so-called Green Zone. For Afghanistan analysts, “the 
Green Zone is an area of densely irrigated land, supporting almost 90 per cent of the 
local population. Depending on the season, crops of poppy, marijuana and maize 
reduce visibility to 10 metres and sometimes less.”464 Outside this central zone, of 
more urban communities living on the flood plain (at the time called “a lozenge of 
security”), trouble was brewing in Helmand’s mountainous, isolated and rural northern 
districts.465 Long before politics, religion or ideology are considered as primary 
motivators, there were significant geographical factors at work, accentuating local 
human security tensions over water, food and land access to extraordinary levels. UN 
environmental scientists reported that the period 1998-2005 had seen the worst 
drought in the Helmand basin since records began in 1830, with 4,000km2 of water 
table running completely dry and famine affecting up to 6 million people in the centre 
and south of Afghanistan.466 This correlation between climate shock and political 
instability mirrors earlier historical events, such as the King’s removal in the 1930s. 
                                                     
462 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 3535/10, "Afghanistan/Helmand: Making Progress in 
Sangin," 22nd March 2010. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd 
October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-11. See Annex A. 
463 Anthony King, "Understanding the Helmand Campaign: British Military Operations in Afghanistan," 
International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010), pp. 311-32. 
464 Col. Richard Kemp and Chris Hughes, Attack State Red (Penguin UK, 2009), pp. 40-1. 
465 UK Parliament, "Defence Committee - Fourth Report: Operations in Afghanistan," 17th July 2011, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm(accessed 
22nd May 2015).  See paragraph 29. 
466 United Nations Environment Programme, 2006, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
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 Figure 16: Key features of Helmand Province. Note Sangin’s strategic position on the 
upper reaches of the Helmand River as the last urban area before the Kajaki Dam.467 
Sangin District is detached politically and socially from the flood plain 
communities in central Helmand and the provincial capital in Lashkar Gah (though 
recent upheaval, migration, education, urbanisation and increasingly credible political 
outreach have moderated this, to a degree).468 An Afghan Government official 
assessed that the “inhabitants of districts in north of Helmand are very warlike, 
illiterate people, while in the south of Helmand Province they are very open minded” 
meaning these areas “including Sangin District are very important for Taliban as they 
can hire or recruit people very easily.”469 In past times this fierceness was beneficial, 
                                                     
467 Kemp and Hughes, 2009, op. cit., cropped version of the map given on p. x. 
468 This is explained earlier in chapters 2 and 3. 
469 Afghan sources have been translated by bilingual native speakers, and in some cases minimal edits 
have been applied to improve sentence structure or clarity of English, but never for meaning. 
The quote is from perhaps the most significant of the new sources: Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified 
role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 
2013. 
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for “during the Russian time, Sangin Mujahidin fought very well and lots of Russian 
soldiers were killed in Sangin District.”470 Narratives questioning the intentions of 
other Afghans, Afghanistan’s neighbours, and foreigners in general, remain resonant. 
Primary sources indicate that Sangin’s combination of isolated location and excellent 
connections make it very important; it connects north and south Helmand, 471 and 
gives access to the nearby Kajaki Dam, which “has a very significant economic role in 
Helmand Province and in Afghanistan.”472   
Sangin’s location at the upper reaches of the Helmand River gives it great 
influence over local land fertility. Access to water and electricity creates considerable 
friction. Control of the network of sluice gates, irrigation canals and flood run-off 
channels present in the Upper Sangin Valley affects water availability (and therefore 
crop production, both legal and illicit) downstream.473 This is felt most keenly by those 
to the immediate south in the Upper Gereshk Valley (UGV) – largely populated by long-
time rivals of the Alikozai tribe, the Ishaqzai. Sangin has also impacted on the lands to 
the south politically, providing a relatively safe haven for political and military actors, 
while sustaining them with rich food and narcotics crops. There are also significant 
structural factors relating to land and demographics: “the average farm size is the 
smallest for the province (3.22 hectares)” while “household size (10.1 persons) is 
larger than the provincial average, which compounds the economic pressures on the 
land.”474  
                                                     
470 Primary Source PS-2, between 50-59 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alizai tribe. Local to 
Sangin? Local – Province. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Direct. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-2. With thanks and 
acknowledgement to Theo Farrell who provided this data from field research conducted in 2012. 
Further details are set out in Annex A. 
Of note, I can find no direct reference to Sangin in texts about the Soviet experience, perhaps because 
they tend to take a national focus: even Helmand Province is only mentioned twice in Grau and Gress, 
2002, op. cit. 
471 Primary Source PS-10, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Undeclared. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: 
Pre 4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-10. 
472 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
PS-2 also confirms the importance of Sangin for the Kajaki Dam, while the location more generally is 
addressed by PS-2, PS-3, PS-10, PS-12, and PS-14. 
473 See for example Map 3 (p. 15), or for a detailed description, see United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2006, op. cit; Scott, 1980, op. cit. 
474 Scott, 1980, op. cit., p. 6. 
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All this means that: 
“In the process of maximizing income off the smallest amount of land, 
Sangin has been the center of opium poppy cultivation in this part of the 
country.”475 
Locals confirm the link between Sangin’s desirable location and narcotics 
traders, one claiming that Sangin was where the opium poppy was first grown.476 
Others emphasise the district’s “very secret sub-roads that the Afghan Government 
does not have control over,” connecting the area to Herat, Kandahar and the infamous 
narcotics trading market of Baram Cha near the southern border.477 These factors 
provide the basis for a degree of economic independence, and allow the dominant 
group in Sangin to bargain with power brokers (including their own government). This 
is especially useful given the weakness of the formal taxation system, and the 
traditional expectation that patrons offer a degree of tax exemption to their allies.478 
For historical reasons outlined previously, the Alikozai tribe is dominant, and they have 
sought alliances with outsiders (both Afghans and foreigners), and regularly re-
negotiated them as the power balance shifts, seeking political semi-autonomy and 
security guarantees in return for stability, and perhaps a share of the wealth.479 In 
times of real upheaval, commentators noted that the “cultivation of opium on such an 
extensive scale is something new and is directly tied to the war effort,” though 
foreigners travelling in the country as long as 150 years ago wrote of seeing the crop 
harvested.480 The rationale is clear, since – for one Sangin farmer in the 1980s at least 
– poppy yielded up to “up to 100 times more than [he] could get from another crop on 
                                                     
475 Ibid. 
476 Primary Source PS-14, between 30-39 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Tribe Undeclared tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Not Local. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-14. 
477 Primary Source PS-13, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-13. 
Also confirmed by sources PS-1, PS-10. 
478 See chapter 2 for more detail on the traditional taxation system and relationship between rural 
communities and central authority. 
479 See chapter 2 for research on the Alikozai tribal positon in relation to Sangin. For wider work on the 
tribe, mostly relating to their power base in Kandahar, see Tribal Analysis Center, "Alikozai Tribal 
Dynamics: A Very Unusual Durrani Tribe," 2009, http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Alikozai%20Tribal%20Dynamics.pdf(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
480 Arthur Bonner, "Afghan Rebel's Victory Garden: Opium," www.nytimes.com, 18th June 1986, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/18/world/afghan-rebel-s-victory-garden-opium.html(accessed 23rd 
May 2015).  
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the same land” because of its hardiness and particular planting cycle, it gives work 
when labour is not required for other farm operations, such as wheat cultivation.481  
Finally, Sangin is said to have a deeper, spiritual importance. The shrine and hot 
water spring at Garm Ab (which literally means ‘hot water’) at the northern edge of 
Sangin District is believed by Pashtuns to be a “God miracle,” and bathing in the waters 
will cure all illnesses and absolve you of all crimes.482 It is also the home of an 
important family of religious men from the Sayid tribe – the only one in the area – 
respected by all Afghans and considered to be the “grandsons of the Prophet 
Mohammad.”483 It is the site of a prominent religious school owned by Mullah Osmani, 
the former deputy leader of the whole Taliban movement, as explained below. The 
Quetta Shura Taliban senior leadership (empowered by their resources, exploitation of 
traditional social structures and narratives, and their political reach) are simply 
another faction in this largely local dispute, though the linkages with narcotics 
smuggling and foreign financial and religious patronage joins this corner of north 
Helmand to these national, regional and global challenges. 
Before and after his election as President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai sought 
support from four key power brokers in Helmand. One was “Dad Mohammad Khan 
(DMK), known locally as ‘Amir Dado’, the most prominent figure in the Sangin area. 
‘Amir Dado’ was the tribal leader of the Alakozai tribe484  in Helmand, an Afghan MP 
and the Helmand Intelligence Chief in the years between 2001 and 2005.”485 The 
decision to send ISAF forces to Sangin was in large part triggered by the killing of up to 
40 of this man’s family and friends in June 2006 by long-standing local rivals for land, 
prestige, and position in the drugs trade. One of the dead men was his brother, a 
                                                     
481 Ibid. 
482 Primary Source PS-4, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. Local 
to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-4. 
Garm Ab was also mentioned as important by PS-2 and PS-3. 
483 Primary Source PS-16, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Undeclared tribe. Local to 
Sangin? Undeclared. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. This source is 
anonymised, and given the label PS-16; Also, Primary Source PS-17, between Undeclared years old. 
Ethnicity and tribe: Undeclared tribe. Local to Sangin? Undeclared. Self-identified role: Other. 
Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-17. 
See also the earlier description of the Sayids in chapter 2. 
484 Spelt as ‘Alikozai’ throughout the rest of the thesis for consistency, except where quoted. 
485 Coghlan, 2009, op. cit., p. 119-120. On DMK’s history, see BBC, "Bomb Explosion “Kills Afghan MP”," 
19th March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7952333.stm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
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former District Governor of Sangin named Juma Gul.486 As with the British Empire and 
later the Soviets, ISAF’s military deployment interacted with these disputes in and 
around Sangin. A helicopter pilot recalled “trips to Sangin in early 2006 in which we 
would park the helicopter and get out and take tea,”487 yet a few months later “it was 
open war in the streets of the town between the Alikozai and Ishaqzai tribes.”488 This 
vignette illustrates the challenge of seeking to influence evolving local calculations 
about the legitimacy of the Afghan Government, and the risks to outsiders’ legitimacy 
when supporting a government against its opponents. 
DMK’s local rivals – largely from the Ishaqzai tribe to the south of Sangin – had 
a long history of marginalisation and repression at the hands of the people Karzai had 
now chosen as his government representatives, both before and after the Taliban and 
Karzai himself came to prominence. It is perhaps unsurprising that there were: 
“Ishaqzai figures in the highest echelons of the Taliban leadership. Maulawi 
Aktar Mohammad Osmani, second only to Mullah Omar in the entire Taliban 
leadership, was an Ishaqzai from the village of Josh Ali, near Sangin, [author’s note 
– written as Jushalay in 2009-10] where he ran a madrasa. So when the attack on 
Dad Mohammad’s clan came in June 2006 it was, in one sense, a Taliban attack on 
the Afghan Government. However, it was also, to a greater or lesser degree, an 
Ishaqzai tribal vendetta, a drugs war hit, and a popular uprising against a local 
potentate.”489  
This episode demonstrates the way in which the Taliban insurgency in Helmand 
sits within and overlaps with other tensions and drivers for instability within the 
province and in the south of Afghanistan as a whole.490 (This series of vendettas would 
also lead to DMK’s eventual assassination in 2009).491 
                                                     
486 See Elizabeth Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban," New York Times online, 22nd October 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0(18th June 
2015). . Also Coghlan, 2009, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 
Attacks on Afghan intelligence personnel allied to Amir Dado, (now called the National Directorate of 
Security, NDS), had occurred before – a car load were slaughtered in March 2005 by men in police 
uniforms, for example. See Hafvenstein, 2007, op. cit., p. 227.  Also slide 5 in: Tribal Analysis Center, 
2009, op. cit., http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Alikozai%20Tribal%20Dynamics.pdf.  
487 Author’s conversation with ISAF helicopter pilot, 11th December 2011. 
488 Sangin elder, quoted in author’s conversation with civilian PRT official, 22nd November 2011. 
489 Coghlan, 2009, op. cit., p. 120. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Ibid. On DMK’s death see BBC, 19th March 2009, op. cit., 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7952333.stm.  
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The Afghan Government presence in northern towns began to come under 
threat in spring 2006. Helmand’s northernmost district, Bagran, was under Taliban 
control, Musa Qala was attacked in May, Now Zad in June. So, when on 21st June, 
British Paratroopers were sent to Sangin for an operation that was supposed to last a 
few hours, or at the most a few days – sources say up to 72 hours – it was a decision 
taken against a backdrop of Taliban encroachment southwards towards the more 
populous cities of Helmand.492 That mission, later described as “charging up the valley” 
has been assessed widely.493 The early stages of the Sangin mission did have specific, 
local, tactical military and political objectives – to preserve the Afghan Government 
presence in Sangin and aid the President’s supporters and officials. But who was that 
government, and what were the implications of supporting them? In addition to 
addressing the threat to President Karzai’s ally, DMK, Helmand’s Provincial Governor 
Mohammad Daoud demanded international forces be seen to support the local 
administration. This included the local police chief – DMK’s associate and one of the 
few representatives of the national government – who had abused his powerful 
position and “was in danger of being lynched after being accused of raping a little 
girl.”494 Daoud had the ear of President Karzai, and was a hard man to deny; he would 
say “if you don’t do this then there is absolutely no point in you being here because if 
the black flag of Mullah Omar flies in any of these places, then we’ve lost Helmand and 
we might as well all go home.”495 (Interestingly, during 2009-10, locals in Sangin 
considered the white flag to be the sign of Taliban allegiance).496 President Karzai 
himself is alleged to have said “lose in Sangin and you lose in Afghanistan.”497 
The history leading up to Britain’s military deployment to Sangin introduced a 
number of new elements into the longer-term narratives of Afghanistan’s past. The 
involvement of international organisations, notably NATO and the United Nations, in 
                                                     
492 On the planned duration of the mission see Jerome Starkey and James Harding, "British Troops Set to 
Hand Frontline Afghanistan Role to US," www.commondreams.org, 9th January 2010, 
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2010/01/09/british-troops-set-hand-frontline-afghanistan-role-
us(accessed 22nd May 2015).  Also, Bishop, 2007, op. cit., p. 107. Also related, 11-14 minutes in  
493 For example Michael Clarke, The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005–06 
(Routledge, 2012), notably chapter 2, Valentina Soria, ‘A Tale of Flawed “Comprehensiveness”: The Joint 
Plan for Helmand’.  
494 See Tootal, 2009, op. cit., p. 84.. Also Bishop, 2007, op. cit., pp. 107-108. 
495 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., p. 111. 
496 Participant observation by the author while in Sangin, August 2009-July 2010. 
497 Kemp and Hughes, 2009, op. cit., p. 131. 
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decisions to send military forces to the country represented an additional evolution 
from previous international military interventions from the 19th Century and before. 
The presence of international terrorism, and the global resonance of al-Qaeda’s 
actions planned from its Afghan base, introduces a new dimension to existing trends of 
foreign sponsorship of proxy groups operating there. After briefly banning opium 
production, the Taliban continued the economic reliance on narcotics initiated by the 
Mujahidin in the war against the Soviets. This was a key factor, increasing the group’s 
capacity to fund, and tolerate, Hurt inflicted upon them by others – including 
international forces. Revenue from opium and other illicit activities provided the 
financial resilience required to challenge central government and their foreign backers 
over a longer period of time to be considered the legitimate political authorities in 
Afghanistan. 
The exclusion of the Taliban from the Bonn Conference discussions and the 
complete rejection of accommodation on any level with the principal opposing group 
appear to be more extreme than previous conflict termination political processes. 10 
years later, when the American Government confirmed that direct talks were 
underway between the US and the Taliban, the exclusion of a beaten but not 
exhausted enemy in 2001 was “seen by many as the root cause of the current 
Afghanistan conflict.”498 For those who grew up aware of this only policy (likely those 
who were around 18-21 years old by the time of the Sangin Accord), it would have 
affected perceptions of the Afghan Government as a negotiating partner so vital to the 
creation of a Way Out. The link between al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura leadership 
also ensured a policy focused wholeheartedly on the total defeat of the Taliban. For 
Ripeness theory, this would radically diminish the chances of military leaders 
recognising a perception of Mutually Hurting Stalemate, or seeking a Way Out, and 
resulted in an increased willingness to escalate. These factors reduced the possibility 
of a Ripe Moment considerably, especially at the national level. This policy context, 
and the resulting mindset so important for explanations based on Ripeness theory, 
also influenced local perceptions of negotiating opportunities that arose in north 
Helmand, in both Musa Qala and Sangin. Importantly, this recent history was 
                                                     
498 Borger, 20th June 2011, op. cit., http://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global-security-
blog/2011/jun/20/afghanistan-taliban-talks-bonn.  
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experienced by those involved in the case study, but differences in interpretation 
between younger and older men would play a part in fostering a struggle for influence 
over the Sangin Accord that appeared to divide generations.  
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CHAPTER 5: ON NEGOTIATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE 
Negotiating opportunities arise in north Helmand 
The genesis of the Sangin Accord began with the arrival of British forces in 
2006, and continued as efforts to foster a legitimate Afghan Government – supported 
by international military forces – advanced, influencing the lives of local people and 
competing with the Taliban offer to those communities. The presence of increasing 
concentrations of military forces from this point allows the explanatory value of the 
Ripeness theory to be explored, in specific relation to the case study, because of the 
centrality of military-inflicted Hurt for Ripeness theory. Prior to the Sangin Accord, two 
apparent negotiating opportunities arose, offering the chance to explore the impact 
military action had on the psychology of the conflict parties. 
After the British arrived, “soldiers became magnets for attacks from Taliban, 
drug gangs and locals – just angry at the presence of foreigners. Many Afghans were 
killed, some by air strikes called in by troops to defend themselves stuck in their fixed 
positions.”499 During the first two years of the British deployment to Sangin, but 
especially during the first six months, extensive damage to the town centre was caused 
in the fighting both between rival Afghan groups and in the fight with NATO forces.500 
Self-defence imperatives meant it was necessary to improve the soldiers’ visibility, and 
many trees, buildings and other obstructions to line of sight were removed, some 
using heavy ordnance. It was considered necessary to conduct “a massive bombing 
campaign driving the Taliban back, to save the men’s lives, but the bombing also 
destroyed the homes and lives of the local people of Helmand.”501 There were valid 
military reasons for these decisions, yet the impact on the town was significant. 
Anecdotal reporting and the written records held by Sangin's mayor in 2010 show that 
at its peak the bazaar [marketplace] contained around 3,000 trading shops of various 
sizes, yet by 2008 this number was around 300.502 There can be no doubt that the 
                                                     
499 John Ware, "UK's Original Helmand Deployment Plan Examined," BBC News Online, 22nd June 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804(accessed 10th February 2012).  
500 “On average, 30 rounds of artillery were fired in the defense of Sangin each night and this inevitably 
resulted in some civilian casualties.” Warren Chin, "British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan," Defense 
& Security Analysis vol. 23, no. 2 (2007), p. 221. 
501 Quotes between 11min and 14:30mins in Goodison, op. cit., in Our War  
502 Written records held by the mayor of Sangin, seen by the author and other PRT staff in May 2010. 
The market place was divided up into tribally-affiliated zones, though it took years of confidence-
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fighting either with, or because of, NATO’s presence played a part in reducing the 
commercial capacity of the bazaar in the town centre, and that this affected the 
perceived legitimacy of the government and international forces. This presents the 
opportunity to consider the validity of local civilian perceptions and motivations for 
the parties who would later negotiate the Sangin Accord. 
The damage to communities and personal property, caused in part by the hunt 
for those irreconcilable Taliban who had to be isolated and tackled, risked alienating 
the population that international forces were trying to help. A longer-term politically 
motivated campaign, focused on wider stability and eventual transition, could only 
become a priority when the immediate town, and the government and foreign 
personnel based in it, were secure. Ideally, logistics would have benefitted from a 
secure road connection to central Helmand. These objectives were to prove harder 
than anticipated. Alongside the conflict, the political situation was complex and 
evolving rapidly, largely hidden from the soldiers and the local population – partly 
because it often took place away from Sangin itself. By September 2006, all sides 
involved in the fighting, and the local residents, were under extreme pressure. This 
pressure (or Hurt, in Ripeness theory) was applied to materiel as well as men. Senior 
Taliban “had identified the platoon houses’ reliance on helicopter support as a critical 
vulnerability” and the risk of losing one with twenty men on board (an event that was 
perceived at the time to represent a strategic impact) was a factor in negotiations in 
Musa Qala (see the following section).503 On helicopter numbers, six or “seven were 
assigned to the task force, of which five were serviceable at any one time”504 (by 2008 
this number was eight, while the number of British troops relying on them had 
doubled – helicopter numbers would later increase).505 
Political representatives were active, both in the district itself and in other 
population centres such as the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. Mid-September 2006 
saw 13 Afghan representatives purporting to represent a Sangin shura [decision-
                                                                                                                                                           
building and research to find the exact specifics from local people. Yet only then could reconstruction be 
shared fairly – something some local power brokers worked hard to avoid, to preserve their own 
advantage. 
See also Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 97, footnote 8. 
503 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., pp. 254-5. 
504 Ibid., p. 59. 
505 Patrick Bishop, Ground Truth (Soundings, 2009), p. 95. 
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making body] put forward a document containing far-reaching political demands, and 
claiming a 14 point plan had been agreed already by President Karzai, Governor Daud 
and [NATO’s overall commander in Kabul] General Richards.506 “At the Governor’s 
request, UK representatives met the Sangin shura on 14th September in Lashkar Gah. 
There were 13 representatives, most of whom had met us previously in Sangin. They 
focused on one issue: ISAF withdrawal from the district centre.”507 Commanders at the 
time faced a potential negotiating scenario fraught with the underlying problems 
described by Zartman’s Ripeness theory. What were the motivations of the opposite 
parties? Was genuine conflict resolution the aim, or a tactical advantage, or another 
conflict strategy? Was the proposal actually a demand, not open for discussion? 
Making an assessment requires the 2006 offer to be considered alongside wider 
political events in Helmand, notably in neighbouring Musa Qala – where an accord had 
been agreed on 12th September, just two days earlier.508 
Musa Qala 2006-2007 
After Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’s connections with the narcotics trade led 
to his removal in 2005, President Karzai turned to Mohammad Daoud as his 
replacement in December of that year.509 The new governor was often styled as 
Engineer Daoud, having graduated from Kabul University as a specialist in irrigation 
engineering.510 This was a shrewd appointment from a technical point of view, given 
the centrality of Helmand’s river and canal network to long-term recovery. However, 
politically Daoud suffered, partly because Karzai’s response after sacking his 
                                                     
506 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 40720/06, "Afghanistan: The Sangin Shura," 18th 
September 2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 
2014, and allocated source reference FOI-1. See Annex A. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., p. 257. The specifics of this accord are discussed in the following section, 
including discussion of the varied timeline for apparent agreement by different elements on both sides. 
509 UK Parliament, "Defence Committee - Fourth Report: Timeline for UK Operations in Helmand 2006," 
2011, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55404.pdf(accessed 
22nd May 2015).  Also Afghan Bios, "Who Is Who in Afghanistan? Daoud, Muhammad Eng.," 2012, 
http://www.afghan-
bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=2572&task=view&total=3131&start=669&Itemid=2(ac
cessed 22nd May 2015).  
510 Revolvy.com, "List of Governors of Helmand: Mohammad Daoud," 
http://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=List%20of%20governors%20of%20Helmand(accessed 22nd 
May 2015).  Some content imported from Wikipedia on this page. Also Afghan Bios, 2012, op. cit., 
http://www.afghan-
bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=2572&task=view&total=3131&start=669&Itemid=2.  
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predecessor was to appoint SMA to Afghanistan’s national Upper House and appoint 
his brother as Daoud’s deputy.511 Daoud’s achievements would be forever linked to 
the 2006 Musa Qala Accord, in which he was closely involved – Musa Qala was the 
principal town in north Helmand’s Alizai tribal lands, to which the Akhundzada family 
had long staked a prominent claim (and where the deposed governor’s uncle Mullah 
Nasim had pronounced on the importance of growing opium poppy to fund resistance 
against Soviet outsiders).512 These were the successors of the prestigious ancient lands 
of Zamindawar, prominent in the Victorian era. 
The accord’s 14 points described a demilitarised 5km space encompassing the 
town, agreed between the government and a 15-man elders shura, who would 
conduct their own interactions with local Taliban to ensure that the shura members 
were free to “support a local administration that would fly the Afghan flag,” while 
“guaranteeing that the district would not be used for [Taliban] military operations 
against other areas.”513 To explain the Musa Qala Accord in retrospect, using Ripeness 
theory, would require clear evidence that: a) the nature of the conflict parties was 
understood; and b) that their military leaders simultaneously perceived a Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate (based largely on military concepts of Hurt), and also a political Way 
Out.514 Data on these elements is patchy, but a political account exists, written by 
Michael Semple who was closely involved from his position as an EU political officer. 
Semple’s account is nuanced, and worthy of additional credibility due to his long 
service in the region and deep fluency in its languages. For him, the Musa Qala Accord 
“rose as a response to military exigency and became a vehicle for the provincial 
administration to reengage politically with beleaguered and estranged tribes.”515 If 
accurate, it would not confirm to Zartman’s definition of a genuine agreement arising 
from a Ripe Moment unless the military motivation constituted an MHS felt on both 
side, and the political vehicle it created was mutually perceived as a Way Out. 
                                                     
511 Afghan Bios, 2012, op. cit., http://www.afghan-
bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=2572&task=view&total=3131&start=669&Itemid=2.  
512 See previous explanation of this relationship in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
513 Semple, 2009, op. cit., pp. 81-2. 
514 To review the theoretical elements of Ripeness theory, please see chapter 1. 
515 Semple, 2009, op. cit., p. 79. 
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One Taliban source (an anomaly among those available, since most confirm 
there was never any intention to honour the deal) acknowledges that military pressure 
was vital, though likely from Special Forces raids rather than those holding the district 
itself: “when Mullah Ibrahim and Mullah Ghafoor, the two famous and key 
commanders of the Taliban were killed in the middle of 2006 by British troops, the 
Taliban lost interest in keeping the district office [in Musa Qala].”516 This seems likely 
to be a misinterpretation, since these two individuals were killed in early 2007, in the 
events surrounding the breakdown of the deal – explained in due course.517 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that it is commonplace for the names of 
renowned individuals to be copied or taken over after their deaths, in homage, or 
deception. Sometimes a name (or radio call sign) becomes synonymous with the 
particular command position – giving the impression that key individuals have never 
been killed. Mistaken identity is also common. For example, there were three Afghans 
named with variations of Abdul Ghafoor detained in Guantanamo Bay from 2002-
2006, alongside three others who gave their place of birth as Sangin or Sarawan 
Qala.518 There was also a man listed under a false name who, upon release, would turn 
out to be (or become, as a result of his experiences there) Mullah Zakir. By 2009 Zakir 
was considered one of the most renowned senior Taliban military commanders. A 
founding member of the Taliban would later say of him “we think of Zakir as Nick 
Clegg, challenging a coalition from within, but only to a certain tolerable extent."519 
                                                     
516 Primary Source PS-25, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Tribe Undeclared 
tribe. Local to Sangin? Local - Province. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin 
Accord: Undeclared. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-25. 
517 The Broad Mind, "General David Richards Could Be Back to Mediate Issues Along and across the 
Durand Line," http://broadmind.nationalinterest.in, 9th February 2007, 
http://broadmind.nationalinterest.in/2007/02/09/general-david-richards-could-be-back-to-mediate-
issues-along-and-across-the-durand-line(accessed 29th May 2015).  
518 Prisoners 352, 353, 362, in US Department of Defense, "List of Individuals Detained by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006," 2006, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf(accessed 1st June 2015). p. 9. 
Apparently linked to Sangin, prisoners 291, 334, 450. 
519 Jessica Elgot, "The Taliban's 'Nick Clegg'? Founding Member Draws Parallels with Militant Qayyum 
Zakir and Lib Dem Leader," Huffington Post UK, 10th September 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/09/10/talibans-nick-clegg-rusi-qayyum-
zakir_n_1869841.html(accessed 2nd June 2015). This source also confirms the connection between 
Zakir and Guantanamo Bay. 
The original source for the Zakir-Clegg parallel is Michael Semple et al., Taliban Perspectives on 
Reconciliation (Royal United Services Institute, 2012). 
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ISAF commanders have since been clear that the military motivation was 
predominantly based on the intense difficulties of resupplying the garrison due to its 
extreme remoteness and the pressure and risk placed upon a finite helicopter fleet.520 
The platoon based there, consisting of around 30 men, sustained casualties and they 
(and the air support to which they had access) inflicted them in return. What is not 
clear enough to satisfy the theoretical definition is whether the Hurt on both sides was 
perceived as intolerable, preventing escalation. That said, escalation was likely 
prevented by the extent to which ISAF ground forces were already committed. This 
raises the new possibility that the Hurt (for the UK at least) included the knowledge 
that further troop increases in Musa Qala would require withdrawal or extreme risk 
elsewhere in Helmand, or a further parliamentary announcement in London increasing 
the size of the deployed force. Both options may well have been intolerable to 
politicians. This falls outside the traditional definition of Ripeness theory, which 
focuses on the psychological assessments of the military commander, based 
exclusively on military-related indications of Hurt. Additions to Ripeness theory offer 
alternatives: Brigadier Butler would likely have known of the domestic political 
pressure to avoid public requests for more resources, and so could well have factored 
this in to his own conception of the requirement for the Accord in Musa Qala. It is also 
possible (though not verifiable from the sources available here) that Taliban 
commanders felt the same political pressures from their own structures, and that 
reinforcing Musa Qala came with intolerable Hurt for their own objectives. Taliban 
commanders interviewed later were clear that they always “planned to accept the deal 
and then after the foreigner and Afghan forces left the district we would attack,” 
though this does not prove conclusively that those were the motivations at the 
time.521 
                                                     
520 “With practically the entire British task force defending towns from Taliban attack, the British could 
contribute little to support the RC (South) [Regional Command] scheme of manoeuvre,” frustrating the 
higher commander at the time Major-General  Ben Freakley. See Farrell and Gordon, 2009, op. cit., p. 
10. 
521 Primary Source PS-26, between 30-39 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alizai tribe. Local to 
Sangin? Local - Province. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. 
This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-26; Primary Source PS-27, between 40-49 years old. 
Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Tribe Undeclared tribe. Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: 
Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given 
the label PS-27. 
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Two elements to the Musa Qala case study illustrate the great complexity 
involved in political activities of this type. Firstly, the mobility of those claiming to 
represent political leadership is a challenge, since they are not always present in the 
geographical area apparently covered by any arrangement. For example, after the 
Musa Qala Accord was agreed, the key Afghan “representatives were keeping a low 
profile in Lashkar Gah and could not return to Musa Qaleh empty handed. But they 
recognise[d] this would not be possible until the Governor had Karzai’s approval.”522 
Secondly, both sides’ need for approval from the highest levels for any local political 
activity, and the challenge of coordinating this at many different levels and locations. 
ISAF forces sought to resupply the garrison without a fight, while the elders who had 
signed the agreement could do little, as “without agreement from the Governor to 
their proposals for local autonomy, the shura did not have sufficient authority in the 
local community to guarantee security.”523 The elders’ proposed 14 points, covering all 
strands of district life. Despite considering them closely, Western officials felt that 
“progress was unlikely while Karzai was out of the country,” showing the weakness of 
a highly centralised system in dealing with the nuances so critical in local negotiation, 
and the implementation of any deal.524 
This push for local autonomy arrangements was more widespread in Helmand 
than appears commonly known, judging by its limited coverage in much of the source 
material. While elders’ councils frequently dealt with disputes between families and 
communities, these were rarely formal agreements,525 and no agreements had been 
made between Afghans and the Soviets in that earlier conflict.526 Late summer 2006 
saw similar requests from groups in Garmsir District and Sangin. Garmsir “was the 
                                                     
522 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 41931/06, "Afghanistan: Helmand Shuras - How Far 
Should We Go?," 25th September 2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 
0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-2. See Annex A. 
523 Ibid. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Of the nine primary sources asked about formal agreements, seven confirmed that these were never 
used [PS-1, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-10, PS-14],while  one even confirming that “it is not in our culture:” 
Primary Source PS-3, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. Local to 
Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-3. 
526 All nine of the primary sources asked confirmed that no deal had ever been made with the Soviets 
[PS-1, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-10, PS-12, PS-13, and PS-14]. A typical answer confirmed that this time 
was a united Jihad for all true Afghans: Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of 
Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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convergence of an estimated fifteen support routes across the desert, up from the 
southern border with Pakistan; intelligence showed that along these nebulous tracks 
men and materiel were trafficked northwards while key players regularly travelled 
back and forth from Quetta.”527 British officials assessed that in Garmsir 3,000 
displaced families living in the desert wanted the government and ISAF to clear the 
villages of Taliban; they would then raise their own security militias.528 In Sangin, 
elders produced a model for semi-autonomy also using 14 points, almost identical to 
those agreed in Musa Qala, and in the same week. Motivations cannot be confirmed 
for certain, but it is noteworthy that all three of the districts had central roles in 
production, processing or logistics for Helmand’s narcotics industry. With the 
additional validity in the case of historical themes, local politics, military resourcing 
pressures and the impact of narcotics, it seems insufficient to conceptualise the 
motivations for a negotiated agreement solely around a military definition of the 
Mutual Hurting Stalemate. Since the Sangin offer occurred almost simultaneously, it 
makes for a worthy comparison. 
Sangin 2006-2007 
British officials and the Afghan Provincial governor raised concerns with the 
Sangin offer.  
“Daud’s [sic] own sources tell him that more may lie behind the shura’s 
request than pure humanitarian interest. The town’s major drug traffickers want to 
reopen Sangin market, which has been severely affected by the fighting. The 
Taliban [also] have an interest in getting the drugs market working again so they 
can take their percentage. They will use Sangin as a resource hub and will therefore 
be happy to avoid fighting in the area.”529 
Nevertheless, the offer was significant and merited consideration. Officials 
reported, at that time “Karzai often extolls the need to find tribal solutions to the 
problems in the south. The shuras are just that: traditional tribal elders trying to solve 
community problems.”530 A detailed diplomatic telegram set out the risks and 
opportunities, but if it could be made to work, such local agreements offered one 
                                                     
527 Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Three Commando Brigade, Helmand, Afghanistan (Random House, 2008), p. 
127. 
528 FOI-2, 25th September 2006. 
529 FOI-1, 18th September 2006. 
530 FOI-2, 25th September 2006. 
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route to establishing a level of government presence not seen in north Helmand since 
the 1970s, and without a large-scale military operation. In 2009, Sangin elders 
recounting the history of the area recalled that the district had actually been 
administered either from Musa Qala or Gereshk, with no government presence in 
Sangin itself in their living memory prior to Karzai’s administration.531 
 As with the Musa Qala Accord, the Provincial Governor led the negotiations 
with elders.532 In a mid-September meeting, he “produced a 14 point letter reflecting 
the points agreed with the shura. Daud had sent a copy of the document to the 
President, whom the shura had already met in Kabul. Karzai had told them he would 
satisfy their wishes.”533 In return, the elders wanted “ISAF forces to move immediately 
from the District Centre to [US Forward Operating Base] Robinson. After a month if 
they were satisfied with security in Sangin, we should move to a new location 
somewhere in the desert at least 10km from any houses. If the Taleban attacked us 
there we could respond without affecting innocent Afghans.”534 The official record of 
the first meeting is shown below (my highlights and written note).  
                                                     
531 Participant observation by the author 2009-2010, confirmed in four interviews with separate 
individuals assessed to be over 60 years of age. 
532 Carlotta Gall and Abdul Waheed Wafa, "Taliban Truce in District of Afghanistan Sets Off Debate," 2nd 
December 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?pagewanted=print&_r=1&(accessed 
22nd May 2015).  Also  
533 FOI-1, 18th September 2006. 
534 Ibid. 
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Figure 17: The 14 draft points put forward in 2006 proposing local administration in 
Sangin.535 
There was a wider rationale for considering the offer, and one that remained 
valid in deliberations about the 2011 Accord: “The main additional argument in favour 
of an agreement is the need to have secure access through Sangin to deliver the 
US$127 million hydro-electric project and security for the transmission power cables 
that will be built to carry the extra power to the rest of Helmand.”536 So, at a later 
meeting on 30th October 2006 it was proposed that “the 14 point agreement would 
need amending to include reference to guaranteeing the security of the new road to 
be built to Kajaki.”537 More so than in Musa Qala, the Sangin offer – if it truly delivered 
unfettered access to the Kajaki Dam – presented the tantalising prospect of upgrading 
the electricity supply for southern Afghanistan without redeploying significant 
numbers of military forces from the more populous areas of central Helmand. 
Nonetheless, officials were aware that “set against this are two additional reasons 
against a Sangin agreement: we would not wish it to become a sanctuary and safe 
haven for drug production and smuggling. [And] there is a less acute need to relocate 
                                                     
535 Ibid. 
536 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 40720/06 (attached document), "Musa Qaleh and Sangin 
Agreements," 2nd November 2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-
14, 2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-4A. See Annex A. 
537 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 48542/06, "Afghanistan: Sangin Shura," 2nd November 
2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
allocated source reference FOI-4. See Annex A. 
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[military forces] from the District Centre than there was in Musa Qala,” since the 
district centre was less exposed.538 
Underlying the discussions about the strategic benefits, were calculations 
about trust and credibility – important components for a conflict party to believe in 
any political Way Out. Officials reported that Governor “Daud does not see the Sangin 
shura as representative of the people and he is inclined to impose delays and 
conditions.”539 In the wider provincial context there were also pragmatic reasons to 
explore the arrangement further: “the shura may not be able to deliver long term 
peace and security, but the process could buy some time for UK forces to reposition 
favourably and for the arrangements in Musa Qaleh to mature and demonstrate real 
effect.”540 In October, British forces changed over and the incoming Royal Marines 
found themselves in something of an unexpected position in Sangin, and at times in 
the dark about the political confidence-building measures which their military 
activities (and sometimes inactivity) supported. “Having put the [Royal Marines 
Commando] company in there expecting a very kinetic, high-risk period – there was 
nothing. I really don’t know why; but it was agreed between the Taliban and the 
governor and on that basis we were constrained to the District Centre.”541  
During this pause for political links to deepen, senior Taliban leaders seeking 
reinforcements would have to bring them in from outside Sangin: local elders were 
starting to tell commanders that their young men were no longer available to fight. But 
the newcomers were far more experienced and tactically smarter.542 Locals were also 
– in parts of the district at least – preparing to deliver on points 3 and 10 in their 14-
point agreement with their government; preventing those from outside Sangin causing 
disturbance. The events the followed in spring 2007 would interact with wider social 
and economic forces, including the narcotics industry, and put ISAF forces under 
pressure to spread out still further in north Helmand. 
                                                     
538 FOI-4A, 2nd November 2006. 
539 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 45506/06, "Afghanistan: Sangin Update," 16th October 
2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
allocated source reference FOI-3. See Annex A. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Southby-Tailyour, 2008, op. cit., p. 34. 
542 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., pp. 212-3. 
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The anatomy of an uprising 
Retrospective analysis by the UK Parliament confirmed that while commanders 
in London “regarded Governor Daoud, the Governor of Helmand Province, as an 
honest man, he needed to be strongly discouraged from making gestures—for 
example, the idea of a forward operating base at Sangin—that were unsustainable.”543 
British Defence Secretary John (now Lord) Reid was clear that “prior to the original 
deployment, the MoD [UK Ministry of Defence] had considered that any demands 
placed on UK Forces to move further or faster than planned should be resisted” but 
very quickly “came under pressure from Governor Daoud and President Karzai to 
provide security in a wider geographical area” than intended under the initial plan for 
Helmand.544 Other encampments of varying degrees of permanence already existed, 
some connected to the actions of (usually American) Special Operations Forces 
mentioned previously. One of these was FOB [Forward Operating Base] Fox, 
“positioned on high ground next to the Green Zone, overlooking the village of Putay, 
10 kilometres north-east of Sangin, [consisting] of two run-down Afghan compounds – 
with no space inside for a company of [up to 100] men.”545 This area would prove to be 
vital ground for the canals controlling water flow, and the heartland of the Alikozai 
political group whose interest in negotiating in 2011 was to be affected by flooding, 
and a failed community uprising against the Taliban. 
Late 2006 also saw some vital political changes in Helmand, with potentially 
large consequences for the Musa Qala Accord and the ongoing discussions in and 
around Sangin. President Karzai replaced Provincial Governor Daoud in December 
2006, with a new man, Assadullah Wafa. This had significant implications, and it is 
unclear to what extent the resulting policy changes were publicised to – or believed by 
– those elders in Sangin who sought their own agreement with their government. For 
journalists at least, Governor Wafa’s position was clear: although he would not reverse 
the controversial deal struck between British commanders and tribal elders at Musa 
                                                     
543 UK Parliament, 17th July 2011, op. cit., 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm.  Section 2, 
paragraph 47. 
544 Ibid., paragraph 46. Section 2, paragraph 46. 
545 Kemp and Hughes, 2009, op. cit., p. 218. 
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Qala, he told The Telegraph newspaper, “I will not repeat the deal elsewhere in 
Helmand."546  
The Afghan Government, and by association, NATO, suffered from a major 
legitimacy deficit in Sangin after an event in spring 2007 (date unknown), despite this 
new policy clarity over support for local political arrangements.547 For reasons that are 
not clear, this event was referred to within the ISAF system in Helmand as the Levée-
en-Masse. The expression recalls the mobilisation of the French populace in 1793 to 
reinforce the Revolutionary army. It catalysed “one of the most powerful organizing 
myths of modern politics: that compulsory, mass social mobilizations merely express, 
and give effective form to, the wishes or higher values of society and its members.”548 
The term initially meant mass conscription of citizens by government, but later came 
to include an uprising against foreigners – bound by “the more strict 19th and 20th 
century legal categorization of civilians attempting to fend off an invading force.”549 
The evolving definition of “levée” provides a useful framework for considering who 
were the civilians, government, and foreigners, in the Sangin Valley in 2007, and 
whether their motivations were voluntary or conscripted. The perceptions of ISAF and 
the Afghan Government stemming directly from this event would have significant 
detrimental consequences for legitimacy and the likelihood of a Way Out which had to 
be overcome during the Sangin Accord.  
For the Alikozai, the event was a disaster, and in 2009-10 it was simply referred 
to in the Pashto language as ‘the disaster in the Sangin Valley’ by the few locals who 
                                                     
546 The Telegraph, "Blow to British as New Helmand Governor Vetoes Local Peace Deals," 19th 
December 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1537353/Blow-to-British-as-new-
Helmand-governor-vetoes-local-peace-deals.html(accessed 23rd May 2015).  
547 The exact date is unknown and not confirmed in the available sources. The spring 2007 date comes 
from multiple anecdotal confirmations during the author’s time in Sangin 2009-10. 
548 Cambridge University Press, "Academic Catalogue," 2015, 
http://www.cambridge.org/es/academic/subjects/history/regional-history-after-1500/people-arms-
military-myth-and-national-mobilization-french-revolution(accessed 23rd May 2015).  Quote from the 
publisher’s description of Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, The People in Arms: Military Myth and 
National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
549 A useful timeline of the conceptual and legal evolutions of the term is given in Emily Crawford, 
"Levée En Masse–a Nineteenth Century Concept in a Twenty-First Century World," Sydney Law School 
Research Paper, no. 11/31 (2011), quote is from the abstract on p. 1. For a review of its multi-part 
definitions, and an interesting application of the term to the modern question of cyber-mobilisation, see 
Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée En Masse," Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006), 
definitions from pp. 79-80. 
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were prepared to talk about it (and then only after 40 or more personal meetings).550 
In this thesis I refer to it as the 2007 uprising. While the facts were hazy, people 
believed it and it is therefore influential in the psychology of the Way Out (in the 
context of trust in one’s opponent as a negotiator) and the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate, optimally associated with a recent catastrophe. What follows is a summary 
of multiple anecdotal confirmations from the author’s time in Sangin 2009-10. A 
dispute about taxation turned violent in the Upper Sangin Valley, but it also involved 
narcotics. Pro and anti-government groups often collaborated across political 
boundaries for economic gain. It is impossible to say if the tax collectors were Quetta 
Shura Taliban, or drugs barons allied with Taliban-aligned individuals. Perhaps they 
were local rivals, considered “foreigners” by the Alikozai, who use the word 
“foreigners” for anybody from outside their immediate community. The Alikozai – 
historically a pro-government group – organised a community resistance of around 
200 people, refused the demands for tax and resisted with force.551 If true, it would 
have been exceptional for a community to have confronted Taliban elements at that 
time and on this scale552 – though isolated incidents had occurred at other times.553 
Alikozai elders recounted that the District Governor, and through him, military 
forces, were asked for help. It is possible that the request was made to Special 
Operations Forces, whose counter-terrorism mission was markedly different from 
ISAF’s. The support did not come and within 48 hours some 300 Taliban-aligned 
fighters arrived from outside Helmand and inflicted swift punishment on the dissenting 
leaders, killing them, or dispersing them into exile in Kandahar, Lashkar Gah or 
                                                     
550 As of July 2010 I was aware of only three Sangin residents who had been prepared to talk to 
foreigners in reasonable detail about these events, and only to personnel with whom they had spent an 
estimated 90 hours, over 6-9 months. 
551 On community resistance see Mohammed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast 
Afghanistan (London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Development Studies Institute 
(DESTIN). Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC), 2008).  
Also Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (DTIC 
Document, 2010), also published at RAND: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1002.html 
(accessed 21st May 2015). 
552 Personal communication with CIA and RAND expert Arturo Munoz, King’s College London, 10th June 
2011. For Arturo’s biography see RAND Corporation, "Biography: Arturo Muñoz, Senior Political 
Scientist," 2015, http://www.rand.org/about/people/m/munoz_arturo.html(accessed 23rd May 2015).  
553 Farrell, forthcoming, op. cit., chapter 5, pp. 2-3 in that chapter, in the pre-publication version seen by 
the author of this thesis. Also Malkasian, 2013, op. cit., pp. 54-56. 
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abroad.554 A Helmandi official said “the Taliban again became a power in Sangin. They 
killed Haji Dastagir Khan, who was leading these people, and the others who stood 
against the Taliban left their villages, some of them came to [Sangin] District Centre, 
some of them came to Lashkar Gah and other safe places.”555 In general, these were 
older generation Alikozai, while some (generally of a younger generation) stayed 
behind and re-negotiated with the “foreigners” to retain some leadership in their 
hereditary lands. From that point, many analysts considered those local elders, judges, 
and religious leaders from the Alikozai tribe who stayed in Sangin as “Taliban,” though 
many Afghans did not see things in such stark categories. Later analysis would 
summarise this event in a way that also recognised the complexity within the label 
Taliban: “In 2007 the Alikozai (the majority tribal grouping in the Sangin Valley) rose up 
against the insurgency. But lacking sufficient support from GoA [Government of 
Afghanistan]/ISAF, they were unable to stand up to surrounding (hard-line) Alizai, and 
were forced into an accommodation with the insurgency.”556 This 2007 uprising also 
catalysed a split in political influence between different generations in Sangin. 
The term, and the organisation, “Taliban” bundled together a coalition of the 
ideological, the criminal, the coerced, and the disaffected.557 Sometimes hostility to 
government, rival Afghans, or foreigners, was deemed sufficient to indicate 
membership, inflating estimates of the size of the real organisation under the control 
of its leaders in Pakistan. Soldiers also faced much more practical problems with 
differentiation: to Western eyes all the men looked pretty much alike; on one occasion 
soldiers were sent to find a Taliban commander armed with the knowledge that he had 
black hair and a beard and no distinguishing features.558 Outsiders relied heavily on 
local tip offs, and local definitions, with all their subtle nuances – often with little 
capacity for multiple validations. Alongside efforts extend official Provincial and 
District-level state authority, there was an increasingly widespread attempt to 
                                                     
554 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
555 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. This is the only source to discuss this under formal academic 
interview, and other recollections are from participant observation 2009-10. 
556 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 17471/10, "Afghanistan/Reintegration: Signs of Progress 
in the Sangin Valley," 14th December 2010. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 
request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-14. See Annex A. 
557 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., p. 233. 
558 Ibid., p. 119. 
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establish a parallel Taliban governance structure to challenge the formal Kabul 
government, or fill a vacuum.559 Analysts referred to this as the “shadow government” 
or ‘shadow governance’, and added the prefix “shadow” to formal Afghan Government 
titles to indicate the Taliban’s alternative (for example, District Governor and Shadow 
[District or Provincial] Governor).560 The senior leadership was usually referred to as 
the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST – or simply the Quetta Shura), though other (at time 
allied) leadership shuras existed elsewhere, notably in Peshawar.561 
In the Sangin area, prior to spring 2007, shadow governance appeared to 
operate with a degree of friction between local Alikozai groups and those from outside 
the district. As in older stories of rural conservative Afghanistan recalled in chapter 
two, the key points of disagreement were taxation (including of narcotics activities), 
distribution of economic opportunity, land ownership, water access, political 
autonomy and justice. The more organised and resilient a political group, and the 
more they were able to guarantee their own security, the less influence outsiders had. 
The Quetta Shura Taliban (as distinct from local rivals who had their own voluntary 
alignment with the QST) was simply another group – like Karzai’s government – trying 
to achieve a beneficial relationship with Sangin’s Alikozai communities. 
In simple terms, shadow governance mirrored Kabul’s governance. There were 
provincial and district leaders, often brought in from outside Helmand, and they 
brought their own civil officials and security forces or made alliances with local power 
brokers to provide them (or both). The extent to which these appointees in either 
system actually controlled the land which they had been designated was constantly 
contested – in large part according to how their actions affected local decisions about 
                                                     
559 See for example Antonio Giustozzi, "Hearts, Minds, and the Barrel of a Gun: The Taliban's Shadow 
Government," Prism: a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 3, no. 2 (2012). Also C.J. Chivers, 
"In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Taliban’s Shadowy Rule," International New York Times, 6th 
February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/asia/07taliban.html(accessed 23rd May 
2015).  
560 al Sahwa, "Taliban's Shadow Government: “Community-Level” Governance," 23rd January 2010, 
http://al-sahwa.blogspot.co.uk/2010/01/talibans-shadow-government-community.html(accessed 22nd 
May 2015).  Also Stefanie Nijssen, "The Taliban’s Shadow Government in Afghanistan," Civil-Military 
Fusion Centre, (2011). 
561 Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg, The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, 
Operations, and Shadow Governance (Institute for the Study of War, 2009). Also Farrell, 2013, op. cit; 
Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (Hurst, 2009), especially 
chapters 7 and 9. 
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human security and comparative advantage. There were two significant differences 
between shadow governance and Kabul’s official structures. Firstly, the Quetta Shura 
appointed shadow governors for most provinces, reviewed their performance, and 
replaced them periodically. Critically “they established a body to receive complaints 
against their own "officials" and to act on them.562 In this, the shadow governance 
offered a much more immediate sense of accountability, albeit at the expense of any 
formal democratic mechanism. Secondly, in the Sangin area at least, the QST were at 
times prepared to allocate multiple shadow District Governors, to liaise with or govern 
defined political groupings based closely around tribe. Thus Kabul’s formal 
administrative boundaries had no impact on these areas of responsibility. There was in 
2010, for example: an Ishaqzai-friendly shadow governor for the areas south of Sangin 
town which spanned the state district boundary between Gereshk and Sangin, and; an 
Alikozai-friendly shadow governor for the Upper Sangin Valley area. The Afghan 
government had one District Governor for Sangin and another in Gereshk to cover 
these areas, with a remit to apply the same policies to all.563 While tribal approaches 
had weakness, this made shadow governance more flexible and tailored to local 











                                                     
562 This is a quote from al Sahwa, 23rd January 2010, op. cit., http://al-
sahwa.blogspot.co.uk/2010/01/talibans-shadow-government-community.html.  The source is General 
McChrystal’s 2009 ISAF Commander’s assessment, available in searchable format at ISAF, "COMISAF 
Initial Assessment (Unclassified) - Searchable Document," 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html(accessed 22nd May 2015).  For the official 
Command Historian’s review of the writing process and a copy of the report itself see Col. Matthew C. 
Brand, "General McChrystal's Strategic Assessment: Evaluating the Operating Environment in 
Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009," Air University Press, 2011, 
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/ap_brand_mcchrystals_assessment.pdf(accessed 22nd 
May 2015).  
563 This system of multiple governors was certainly confirmed in Jan-July 2010 by multiple sources during 
the author’s participant observation in Sangin. It appeared to be a response to repeated losses of 
control. 
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Figure 18: Approximate areas of perceived entitlement by the dominant tribes in 
north Helmand Province (with arrows showing typical directions of conflict).  
Other tribes and interest groups existed in these areas and contested control.564 
Image: Crown Copyright, 2013. Used with permission. 
It also allowed some deep underlying local grievances between groups to go 
unsolved, as stability could be enforced through threat, coercion, and harsh justice for 
infractions, while also offering solutions and representation that preserved local 
perceptions of geographical or social boundaries rather than brokering between them.  
Formal centralised Kabul governance was less able to do this because their structures 
and areas of responsibility were aligned to district boundaries set in the early-mid 20th 
Century.565 As explained earlier, these boundaries were designed to advantage Kabul’s 
allies, placing Karzai’s District Governors in north Helmand in a sometimes challenging 
position when seeking to promote reconciliation between rival groups, and between 
                                                     
564 Labels have been added to the base mapping by the author. 
565 As set out in chapter 2, based closely on Adamec, 1985, op. cit. 
Red = Alikozai tribe 
 
Green = Ishaqzai tribe 
 
Blue = Alizai tribe  
(With disputing sub-tribes) 
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the population and the concept of central government. In the face of these deep 
conflict drivers, security tended either to require overwhelming military dominance or 
to depend on brokering settlements that often spanned individual districts’ 
boundaries. In Sangin, for example, stability in the Alikozai lands of the upper district 
would likely require political agreements – whether to manage, or resolve, the conflict 
– with rival neighbours in Kajaki, Musa Qala and the Upper Gereshk Valley. These areas 
were all the responsibility of other District Governors and military commanders not 
resident in Sangin, and – after Sangin’s handover to the US in 2010 – also divided 
between the UK and the Americans.566 In many ways, both systems relied on co-opting 
individuals whom the local community respected. Solving a political dispute spanning 
districts and appealing to the most credible local individuals to change sides required 
both a much higher degree of credibility and greater administrative capacity from 
Kabul’s political system than was available in 2006. There were to be consequences for 
both Musa Qala and Sangin as a result. 
 
Red lines and deal breakers 
The end of the Musa Qala Accord 
The Musa Qala Accord of late 2006 accelerated wider debates about the 
policies involved. Provincial Governor Wafa’s predecessor, Daoud, had always been 
clear that any agreement must ensure “the flag of Afghanistan must continue to fly 
above the district centre; the new administration must collect taxes, guarantee the 
safety of government property, keeps roads open, and facilitate access for central 
government officials and development agencies.”567 To impose this through sheer 
military force throughout Helmand and the south was not possible with the numbers 
of troops available at that time. It is worth recalling that ISAF numbered around 15,000 
across the entire country by the time the Musa Qala Accord was agreed.568 In contrast, 
ISAF troops in Helmand alone would be close to 30,000 by the time the 2011 Sangin 
                                                     
566 To some extent this mirrored the long-standing rivalries present in the area in the 19th Century, most 
recently enflamed by the post-Soviet civil war. See chapter 2. 
567 FOI-3, 16th October 2006. 
568 “ISAF currently numbers about 9,200 troops, but is expected to increase to about 15,000” in BBC, 
"UK Troops 'to Target Terrorists'," 24th April 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4935532.stm(accessed 22nd May 2015).  
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Accord was announced, supported by a huge uplift in the number of Afghan forces: 
nationally the Afghan National Army (ANA) totalled in 46,000 in January 2007, but 
130,000 by June 2010.569 
Daoud’s actions to cement the agreement in Musa Qala were beset by 
implementation difficulties. The jirga of tribal elders had selected 50 men to provide 
security, who would be sent to Lashkar Gah for training; the elders would turn to the 
Afghan authorities and ISAF for help if further threats appeared.570 The risks associated 
with being identified publicly, and then leaving rather than be trained in Musa Qala 
itself, reduced the men available for providing security to 30 for an entire town. It also 
exposed their families to the threat of intimidation (or worse) for colluding with the 
government. This would be a problem for other outlying rural and fringe areas. The 
military priority was not to allocate forces for a potential quick reaction force to 
support Musa Qala but (from October 2006) to use the withdrawn forces to focus on 
“the Afghan Development Zone, centred on Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital.”571 The 
elders in Musa Qala also faced understandable challenges; the area had been in near-
constant conflict for decades, and for many years “the state [had been] largely absent 
in Helmand, providing little in the way of way of security, infrastructure or public 
services.”572 The interface between a traditional, local group and the formal structures 
of state were also highly problematic: those looking to establish the formal 
government, “were happy to talk with a jirga, but all expected to channel resources 
through [Afghan] government departments, which in reality were never going to set 
foot in Musa Qala [at that time].”573 This left the elders in a very weak position, unable 
to deliver the tangible benefits in the district centre required to bestow the patronage 
necessary to mobilise a minimal force to defend the district.574 
                                                     
569 See Anthony H. Cordesman, "Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take to Implement the 
ISAF Strategy," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101115_Cordesman_AfghanNationalSecurityForces_Web.pdf(accessed 
28th May 2015). Page 89. 
570 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 49851/06, "Afghanistan: Meeting with Musa Qaleh 
Elders," 9th November 2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 
2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-6. See Annex A. 
571 Southby-Tailyour, 2008, op. cit., pp. 35-6. 
572 Ware, 22nd June 2011, op. cit., http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804.  
573 Semple, 2009, op. cit., p. 85. 
574 Ibid. 
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Despite the implementation problems, especially with no ISAF or 
reconstruction expertise based in the district, the policy of helping to rebuild the 
Afghan state had both backers and opponents. UK Defence Secretary John Reid had 
stated right from the start that opponents “will want to destroy the economy and the 
legitimate trade and the government that we are helping to build up” while officials in 
November 2006 observed that “reconstruction was now beginning to take place, but 
warlords saw development as a danger to themselves. So did the Taliban.”575 
Meanwhile, January 2007 saw the new Provincial Governor Wafa in Kabul seeking 
Presidential approval for the Musa Qala Accord to be amended, adding additional 
stipulations that brought it closer to the model of governance enshrined in national-
level policies: 
1) ANSF and ISAF should be free to patrol any time anywhere without the 
permission of the elders, who should guarantee they are not fired upon. 
2) Taxes collected in Musa Qala needed to be paid to the government in Lashkar 
Gah (electricity, transport and bazaar taxes). 
3) The district chief of police should be a professional ANP officer not a locally 
appointed commander.576 
This case illustrates the considerable pressure that the Afghan Government was 
under, from an administrative and policy perspective. Wafa “had sixteen points on the 
agenda for his meeting with Karzai. Musa Qala was only one of them.”577 For the 
President, while the Accord was a high-profile issue, he was also responsible for some 
400 other districts. At the same sort of time, the capital hosted “a delegation of 100 
Musa Qala elders and Helmand notables lobbying in support of the Musa Qala deal 
and its replication elsewhere.”578 Abdul Ali Seraj, a nephew of King Amanullah (who 
ruled in the 1920s), and leader of the Coalition for National Dialogue with the Tribes of 
Afghanistan was a fervent supporter: “Musa Qala is the way to do it,” he told 
                                                     
575 FOI-6, 9th November 2006. 
576 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 243/07, "Afghanistan: Governor Wafa in Kabul," 4th 
January 2007. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 
2014, and allocated source reference FOI-7. See Annex A. 
577 Ibid. 
578 FOI-6, 9th November 2006. 
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journalists, “sixty days since the agreement, and there has not been a shot fired.”579 
President “Karzai said he thought this kind of amended agreement would be a good 
model to use in all districts. Wafa is reasonably confident the elders will agree to the 
changes: they had now enjoyed the benefits of peace for three months and will not 
want a return to fighting.”580 The Accord also had vocal and powerful opponents. 
Daoud had been the subject of an increasing swell of negative lobbying and 
rumour-mongering. Writing at that time, officials felt that “the main drivers of this 
campaign are those who have been major players in Helmand politics for many years. 
One recent rumour designed to undermine him is that he is an agent of ISI.”581 Wafa’s 
survival would inevitably require him to appear markedly different from his 
predecessor. Daoud “believed his dismissal was linked to drug smuggling interests and 
powerful warlords” while an Afghan Senator claimed he had "been talking with the 
Americans and they were completely against Daud,” and by implication, the possibility 
of local agreements like the one he had brokered in Musa Qala.582 Newspaper reports 
from the time are more direct, blaming pressure from the CIA for President Hamid 
Karzai's decision to dismiss Mohammed Daud as Governor of Helmand.583 Whatever 
the truth, there are two reasons why approaches towards local agreements within the 
ISAF coalition may have been different at that time: Firstly, the relative size (and 
potential future size) of their military deployments were radically different, suggesting 
variations in approach to the timing and relative perceived value of collaborative 
negotiated solutions. Secondly, the particular impact of the deep national trauma of 
9/11 on America, and the Taliban’s link to al-Qaeda and bin Laden. These points may 
have underpinned slightly different conceptions of the implications of a negotiated 
                                                     
579 Gall and Wafa, 2nd December 2006, op. cit., 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/02/world/asia/02afghan.html?pagewanted=print&_r=1&.  
580 FOI-7, 4th January 2007. 
581 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 49169/06, "Afghanistan: Governor Daud," 6th November 
2006. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
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582 The Telegraph, 19th December 2006, op. cit., 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1537353/Blow-to-British-as-new-Helmand-governor-
vetoes-local-peace-deals.html.  
583 Robert Fox, "CIA Is Undermining British War Effort, Say Military Chiefs," The Independent, 10th 
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local outcome at that time. A former member of the Northern Alliance summed up 
what some no-doubt feared: despite the local political and social nuances, the need to 
support Afghan Government decisions, and the differences between local and Quetta 
Shura Taliban, “the Musa Qala project has sent two messages: one, recognition for the 
enemy, and two, military defeat.”584 
The Musa Qala Accord ended in February 2007, after an ISAF missile strike 
killed a prominent Taliban commander. Each side stuck to different claims, ISAF that 
the strike was outside the agreed 5 kilometre zone, and therefore in line with the 
Accord, and the Taliban, the opposite.585 It is perhaps evidence of the significance of 
Provincial Governor Wafa’s policy shift that the breakdown of the agreement in Musa 
Qala Accord preceded the failed Alikozai ‘Levée-en-Masse’ uprising in Sangin by only a 
few weeks; (that it allegedly went unsupported by the Afghan Government, to the 
apparent surprise of locals, suggests a failure to communicate the change into fringe 
areas). 
The Alikozai offer in Sangin 
The negotiation between Provincial Governor Wafa and the Alikozai had likely 
broken down – or been consciously halted – by 6th March 2007, because ISAF launched 
Operation ACHILLES involving 5,500 troops including 1,000 Afghan forces (with a 
Sangin-specific sub-element called Operation SILVER) into precisely the territory 
controlled by the Taliban negotiating party. This came “at the request of the Afghan 
Government, to bring security to northern Helmand and to set the conditions for 
reconstruction around the Kajaki Dam.”586 Taliban attacks on contractors attempting 
to mend the dam had ended the upgrade process, in turn preventing improvements to 
electricity supply and water flow across the province.587 It is also possible that this 
operation triggered the expectation that armed Alikozai dissent would be supported, 
                                                     
584 Gall and Wafa, 2nd December 2006, op. cit., 
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2. 
586 NATO Media Operations Centre, "Progress in Sangin," NATO, 2007, 
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so decreasing the perceived risk of triggering the 2007 uprising. Most of the 5,500 
troops would have been brought in to the area specifically for that deliberate 
operation, however, and not intended to base there permanently. At the time of 
writing there is insufficient public information to clarify the order of events, and the 
motivations and perceptions of the various parties. 
It is unlikely that the 2006 offer from Sangin’s Taliban was genuine. There was 
clearly a lot to gain by convincing ISAF forces to leave the area. PRT officials assessed 
that “there is no doubt the fighting in Sangin is causing civilian casualties and damage. 
But it almost equally certain that the interests of the drug lords and Taleban are 
driving the shura’s maximalist demands. They did not respond to our suggestion of 
developing a more incremental approach.”588 This suggests that the willingness to 
develop the trust and credibility that can underpin a Way Out (in theoretical terms) 
was absent from the Taliban side. Nevertheless, an analysis based around additions to 
Ripeness theory could construct an MHS, by including the (commercial) Hurt felt by the 
restriction to narcotics trading caused by the presence of ISAF forces, the impact of 
heavy fighting, and resupply problems on both sides. There is also the prospect that 
pressure from local people constituted Hurt, through a process of political or ethical 
accountability (transmitted through local elders to either the Taliban, ISAF forces, or 
the District or Provincial Governor). This would certainly have been enhanced by the 
impact of Operation SILVER in which three UK companies supported by a US battalion 
were determined to “assault the town and once and for all clear it of enemy.”589 The 
stated objective – a peaceful district – was achieved for a time, but in the aftermath 
Sangin town “empty of enemy, was described as being ‘like a film set with the town 
totally and utterly devastated.”590 As in Sangin, so in Musa Qala too (which was 
retaken by American, British and Afghan forces in late 2007) it was imperative to start 
rebuilding the towns and their infrastructure – much of which had been destroyed 
when ISAF forces occupied them.591 It was but one of many facets that made achieving 
both military and political progress simultaneously so complex. Yet it was dialogue 
                                                     
588 FOI-1, 18th September 2006. 
589 Southby-Tailyour, 2008, op. cit., p. 247. 
590 Ibid., pp. 251-2. 
591 Matt Dupee, "A Chronology of the Musa Qala Dilemma," The Long War Journal online, 3rd December 
2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/a_chronology_of_the_1.php(accessed 4th 
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over the conditions under which major infrastructure road and irrigation 
improvements could begin – upgrades that were far beyond the capacity of local 
Taliban officials or its organisation as a whole to deliver – that would eventually lead to 
wider political progress, and then to the Sangin Accord. 
 
The reconciliation challenge 
American General and later Director of the CIA, David Petraeus, speaking in 
2014 stated categorically that “you can't kill or capture your way out of an industrial 
strength insurgency,” you also have to “persuade as many as possible of those who are 
part of the problem to become part of the solution, to give them an incentive to 
support, rather than to continue to oppose. And that was reconciliation.”592 Enacting a 
policy of this nature requires a nuanced view of the people involved in the conflict, a 
mechanism to do it that is understood and supported, and is proven to address 
underlying conflict drivers. Binary views are problematic in such political landscapes, 
yet strong differences of opinion exist about importance of the local nature of the 
conflict. Thrulelsen for example summarises effectively the views of those who favour 
local drivers: “the insurgency in southern Afghanistan [was] highly localised in nature, 
being to a large extent driven by local commanders and local area networks often 
centred on individual commanders themselves.”593 The opposing view that local 
factors were not dominant is equally strongly supported (though most writers allow 
for a range of influences).594  Alongside describing the complexity of the social 
dynamics within the population, working towards reconciliation also requires a greater 
understanding of what the other side (or sides) actually wants. “Insurgencies generally 
fall between these two extremes: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate 
                                                     
592 Academy of Achievement, "Interview: David Petraeus on Strategic Military Leadership," 13th 
September 2014, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/pet0int-1(accessed 11th June 
2015).  
593 Peter Dahl Thrulelsen, "The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: A Localized Insurgency with a Local 
Objective," Small Wars Journal vol. 21, no. 2, June (2010), p. 259. Mike Martin’s book centres on this 
analysis framework: Martin, 2014, op. cit. 
594 While “the Taliban ‘resurgence’ in Helmand over 2004–2006 was greatly aided by intertribal rivalry 
and local resistance to predatory rule” it fundamentally “conforms to the pattern previously identified 
by Giustozzi, in his earlier study of the rise of the ‘neo-Taliban’ across Afghanistan from 2002 to 2006,” 
in which the Taliban first sent in small infiltration teams from Pakistan. Farrell, 2013, op. cit., p. 849. The 
quote refers to Giustozzi, 2007, op. cit. See also Malkasian, 2013, op. cit. for a similar view. 
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power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an 
autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control.”595 It is therefore 
critical to any process of negotiation to understand in detail how an apparently 
monolithic armed opponent is constituted, or in more succinct terms, to consider who 
were the Taliban in Sangin? 
Decades before, the Soviet ground forces in Afghanistan had run in to the same 
problem, described evocatively by a 1st Lieutenant: 
“You know the word kiriz? It’s the word the Afghans use for culverts, 
originally built for irrigation purposes. This was a ‘kiriz war’. People would come 
up out of them like ghosts, day and night, with a Chinese sub-machine-gun in their 
hands … quite possibly you had been haggling with that same ‘ghost’ in the market 
a few hours before. Suddenly he wasn’t a human being for you, because he’d killed 
your best friend.”596 
By late 2007, the local political and social complexities in Sangin were further 
complicated by the fallout from the failed uprising earlier that year. With many elders 
killed, others in exile in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah (or further afield) vowed to 
return, or tried to convince ISAF to retake their lands. The leaders that stayed behind 
faced little choice but to work directly with the QST shadow government. Therefore, as 
a result of their political weakness, to maintain control over their hereditary lands 
required them to allow, or actively increase support, for the wider Helmandi 
insurgency. There was more help for those laying bombs, an expanded safe haven and 
recuperation area for commanders and high value targets, and less conflict over 
narcotics. Sangin became the testing ground for new tactics, and suffered from a 
number of suicide bombers. There was a time when the Taliban was almost exclusively 
composed of Afghans but the organisation began to attract Saudi Arabs, Chechens, 
Punjabis and Pakistanis to replace leaders killed in ISAF operations targeting their 
command and control networks.597 Local reporting from 2009 indicated that in Sangin 
these foreigners tended to be weapon specialists, particularly IED bomb makers, or 
                                                     
595 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-5. 
596 Svetlana Alexievich, Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1992), p. 111. 
597 Rayment, 2008, op. cit., p. 255. See also Farrell, 2013, op. cit., p. 857. 
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suicide bombers.598 Changes to the membership of an opposing organisation need to 
be regularly assessed, but there may be few visible distinguishing identifiers visible to 
combat personnel. Nevertheless, there is an “extremely important difference between 
insurgents who originate from villages within the same district where they fight (local 
guerrillas) and insurgents who fight outside their district-of-origin”599 because locals 
“represent key members of society the [international presence] is trying to 
stabilize.”600 A vignette from the Sangin Accord is illustrates this point well: one of the 
Afghan Government officials closely involved in it recorded that he: 
“Met with Commander [removed], who was one of the negotiating Taliban 
commanders, and he told me that when the [national] Taliban government 
collapsed, all the [local Helmand] Taliban commanders laid down their weapons 
and sat at their houses [the source context suggests they do this expecting a 
negotiation with the new power on the nature of the new political order], but later 
the foreign troops and local government of that time started arresting and killing 
the former Taliban commanders in every district, villages and house.”601 
It is likely that a degree of accommodation existed prior to the 2007 events 
between formal QST members, and Afghans fighting under the Taliban banner for local 
reasons. It is also likely that some Alikozai were involved in fighting with NATO and 
other figures connected to the central government, with whom they had personal 
rivalries or other issues. It would therefore be wrong to think of the Alikozai as a 
permanently unified political group, as universally pro-government, or to consider that 
their later alignment with ISAF’s objectives places them in a different moral category 
to others who fought throughout. But the defeat in 2007 saw accommodation shift 
into repression. It also had a significant impact on the way the shadow government 
administration was constituted. Reporting from 2008-9 confirmed that the area was 
now under political and military control by foreign (non-Sangin Alikozai) political 
appointees and their supporters, with some foreign (non-Afghan) fighters operating in 
                                                     
598 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013; Primary Source PS-13. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin 
Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
599 David Kilcullen, "Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," 2009, http://literature-
index.wikispaces.com/file/view/Kilcullen-COIN+Metrics.pdf(accessed 1st June 2015). p. 28. 
600 Ibid. Kilcullen addresses his advice primarily to military commanders, but I have replaced his term 
‘unit’ with ‘international presence’ to reflect the civilian-military team present in Sangin. 
601 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
For more on these differing expectations between Western norms and local ones, see chapters 5-7. 
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the area.602 Importantly, the Alikozai group who stayed appeared largely to be from a 
younger generation (aged from 35-50, approximately) than those who were killed or 
fled (50 years old and above).603 It is therefore possible that these events contributed 
to an internal, inter-generational Alikozai dispute, perhaps over who should lead, or 
the extent to which traditional authority and social and political standards should 
dominate. 
Since those Alikozai military, civil and judicial officials who remained in Sangin 
continued their roles within Alikozai territory as part of the shadow government, their 
legitimacy, relative to that of the Kabul government is hard to define. “In Western 
liberal tradition, a government that derives its just powers from the people and 
responds to their desires while looking out for their welfare is accepted as 
legitimate.”604 These elders retained their legitimacy by staying behind, even if they 
had to join the shadow administration. In the language of counterinsurgency doctrine, 
these “Alikozai Taliban” became the cadre, considered to form “the political core of 
the insurgency,” actively engaged in the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals.605 The 
political strength of the cadre stems from the impact of their activities on popular 
support: “the cadre assesses grievances in local areas and carries out activities to 
satisfy them. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the 
insurgency.”606 These same capacities, coupled with their high perceived legitimacy, 
explain why the same individuals were important reconciliation targets during the 
Sangin Accord negotiations.  
Destroying the state bureaucracy proved to be a common insurgent tactic. It is 
the equivalent of the Kill or Capture policy, but aiming to degrade government capacity 
and dissuade other strong candidates from participating, so that the cadre may replace 
                                                     
602 Participant observation from 2009-10 indicated that the most senior Taliban Shadow Government 
figures were brought in from outside Sangin, sometimes from neighbouring districts within Helmand, 
and at other times from different Provinces entirely. 
603 It was noticeable that elders who were in contact with authorities in the Provincial capital Lashkar 
Gah, or other areas outside north Helmand, tended to be older men while those who stayed behind in 
Sangin were reported to be younger. Both groups described the other as illegitimate during meetings, 
and both operated a Sangin Shura for decision-making about the Alikozai – one based in Lashkar Gah, 
ostensibly aligned to the government, and another based in Sangin as part of the Taliban Shadow 
Government. 
604 US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 1-114. 
605 Ibid., paragraph 1-63. 
606 Ibid., paragraph 1-64. 
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that bureaucracy and assume its functions in a counterstate.607 “A counterstate [or 
shadow government] is a competing structure set up to replace the government. It 
includes the administrative and bureaucratic trappings of political power and performs 
the normal functions of a government.”608 The man who was to become Helmand’s 
Provincial Governor in March 2008, Gulab Mangal, had survived thirteen assassination 
attempts since being trained by the Russians as one of their local commissars.609 But 
who was the counterstate? Central government presence in Sangin had been 
absolutely minimal since the Soviet times. Public service delivery was almost non-
existent. Yet varying degrees of traditional Alikozai political structures had operated in 
Sangin for centuries. Thus it is easy to see why this group of Alikozai elders felt they 
were not a counterstate, but the only legitimate “state.” As “a COIN effort cannot 
achieve lasting success without the HN [Host Nation] government achieving 
legitimacy”, these Alikozai figures in the Upper Sangin Valley became the key to 
reconciling the area using the minimum military force. Their many-layered concept of 
identity left important opportunities to sow future disagreement between local groups 
and outsiders, typically aggregated together as one “Taliban” opponent. 
Alongside an understanding of the nature of the political landscape, it is also 
important to decide where to seek a way in, at the local level or from the top, or both? 
Counterinsurgency expert Carter Malkasian suggests that to accomplish its aims in 
Afghanistan, the coalition needed “to create an acceptable bottom-up political 
structure than works within the confines of all the Afghan ethnic communities, is 
cognizant of their historical traditions and tensions to foster reconciliation and 
reintegration and workable regional relationships with the Afghan central 
government.”610 Yet alone this is insufficient, and there is a risk that local-level political 
work “cuts off the leadership” and leaves local agreements highly susceptible to 
spoilers.611 Senior Taliban, including founding members, considered that “a general 
ceasefire (closer to a larger plan for reconciliation) is preferred by the Taliban more 
                                                     
607 Ibid. 
608 Ibid., paragraph 1-32; ibid. This analytical approach is much older, and is epitomised by the classic 
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Chatto & 
Windus, 1966). 
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than local- and district-level ceasefires (reintegrating local commanders and cadres). A 
general ceasefire with Mullah Mohammad Omar’s backing would allow the Taliban to 
better deal with ‘peace spoilers’ and dissenters.”612 This view is echoed by Sir Sherard 
Cowper-Coles (later the UK’s special representative for Afghanistan), who felt “we 
were naïve in expecting reconciliation to occur on any significant scale in the absence 
of an over-arching political process leading to a new political settlement. Only later did 
we distinguish between what we later called reintegration (bringing over low-level 
fighters) and reconciliation (dealing with more senior Taliban commanders).”613 
For theorists, reconciliation is rooted in regular, effective communication that 
repairs communities and engages populations detached from central government. This 
is essential since “the collapse of social cohesion is the Taliban’s most powerful 
enabler. And their operations and methods are deliberately designed to exacerbate 
it.”614 Definitions vary, but Louis Kriesberg’s requirement is instructive, for both “a 
relatively amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in the relationship 
involving one-sided or mutual infliction of extreme injury”615 alongside a “process of 
developing a mutually conciliatory accommodation.”616 This relates to earlier 
discussions of ontological security, which in this context suggests that “security-
seeking between actors is, in part, a search for cognitive stability and routinized 
behaviour, allowing for the identity stability and the reduction of anxiety.”617 In the 
case of Afghanistan, this placed Osama bin Laden’s association with the Taliban as a 
central obstruction to a policy shift towards reconciliation and normalised interactions 
between conflict parties.  
“Routinized behaviour and this cognitive stability can be hard to find, 
particularly where geographical spaces acquire certain meanings for powerful states 
and empires,” for how could America accept dialogue with a group so closely 
                                                     
612 Ibid., p. 3. 
613 Cowper-Coles, 2011, op. cit., p. 67. 
614 Lt. Col. Christopher Kolenda, "Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level: A Rejoinder to Volney F. 
Warner and “C”," Joint Force Quarterly vol. 56, no. 1 (first quarter) (2010). 
615 Louis Kriesberg, "Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Settlement,"  (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998), p. 184. 
616 Ibid., p. 189. 
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associated with [bin Laden’s] sanctuary, before his discovery and death?618 The actions 
by the US Government to kill bin Laden show one way in which military activity can 
shift mindsets and policy towards shared outcomes, removing obstacles that block the 
goal of reconciliation. For Lederach, such actions enable “the creation of new 
perceptions on inter-group relations.”619 In Sangin, the Afghan Government would 
later appeal successfully to the same motivation for political semi-autonomy that led 
local Alikozai elders into an accommodation with the Quetta Shura. Convincing local 
people that their Afghan Government merited a more positive perception required 
new officials understood to be credible and trustworthy, past failures to reconstruct 
damaged infrastructure to be rectified, and a belief that the security guarantee so 
absent in 2007’s uprising was available. A trusted channel of communication would be 
needed, and – while all these elements developed – a targeted but decisive military 
deterrent had to show the most irreconcilable or criminal elements that, alongside a 
more positive future, consequences existed for those that sought to disrupt it. These 
approaches would form the basis of the Sangin Accord.  
Such an agreement was thought likely to have wider benefits: Stanekzai, the 
Secretary of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council and Minister for Reintegration and 
Reconciliation said “northern Helmand was the key to achieving sustained security 
throughout the province.”620 Stanekzai does not give his reasoning in the source 
document, but the UK’s official diplomatic assessment concluded that Sangin “district 
forms a strategic hinge linking the province’s population centres to potential power 
generation in Kajaki. The insurgency continues to use the less stable north as a spring 
board for attacks on the central districts and as an ingress route from the east and 
north for fighters and resources.”621 Sangin acted as a buffer for the rest of Helmand, 
and so did Forward Operating Base Inkerman within Sangin District itself. This shows 
                                                     
618 Bayly, 2014, op. cit., p. 2. 
619 John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies," Washington DC, 
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one example of the significance of local activity on a wider campaign. Created in July 
2007, it was the most isolated, and northerly outpost in the Sangin Valley effectively 
‘acting as a tethered goat’ – if the Taliban were attacking Inkerman, they wouldn’t be 
attacking the strategically important town of Sangin.622 Despite these assessments of 
its importance, there would be no clear top-level reconciliation programme in place 
and focused on the south of Afghanistan until winter 2010 when the long awaited 
reintegration and reconciliation roadshow brought the High Peace Council Chair 
(Rabbani) and Secretary to Kandahar on the 6-7th December. Here, Provincial 
Governors “were seen publicly to receive Rabbani’s blessing to take reintegration 
forward.”623 Nevertheless, prior to that time efforts proceeded at the local level. 
The years immediately preceding the Sangin Accord demonstrate the 
exceptional complexity characterising the interactions between international political 
norms and narratives with those perceived within Afghanistan. Significant differences 
also existed within the country, heavily influenced by local experiences and historical 
memory. International actors prioritised the use of elections to try and cement 
political realities into forms that could be understood, measured and supported by 
Western capacity. This approach represented considerable change for Afghanistan: 
elections were few and far between, and non-violent transitions of power were rare. 
Hamid Karzai’s path to the presidency illustrates this interplay between the different 
systems of governance, and the willingness to fuse them together in the pursuit of 
maximum legitimacy. After Bonn, President Rabbani was moved aside and supplanted 
by Karzai, pending a traditional loya jirga [Afghanistan’s traditional Grand Council] in 
2002, and Presidential elections in 2004 – fusing both the historical continuity of the 
jirga, and the change of elections.624 This complexity encompasses issues of identity, 
and the events outlined in this chapter clearly show the perils of monolithic or 
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simplified categorisation of conflict parties. This represents a core critique of the 
explanatory value of Ripeness theory for this case study. 
When in 1999 the UN sought to enforce the will of the international community 
onto the Taliban, to effect the transfer of Osama bin Laden from their custody, 
multiple conceptions of legitimacy and expectation collided. The UN decided that: 
“the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan, comply promptly with its previous resolutions and in 
particular cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists 
and their organizations, take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the 
territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for 
the preparation or organization of terrorist acts against other States or their 
citizens, and cooperate with efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.”625 
This labelling of the Taliban as a unified single bloc was understandable at the 
global level, but within the movement there were important fractures of approach, 
mindset and allegiance. 1997, for example, saw al-Qaeda-inspired Arabs fighting in the 
Taliban ranks, though some of the more extreme Arabs refused to fight against fellow 
Muslims, and rejected jihad inside Afghanistan.626 At the local level, in and around 
Sangin District, the Sangin Accord was possible precisely because so many variances 
existed between individuals and communities. The failed Levée-en-Masse uprising in 
2007 would also disperse groups, influential upon the Sangin Accord, geographically 
(through the exile of key elders), and along generational lines. Memories of this event 
will be shown to delay perceptions of a Way Out, and therefore any Ripe Moment, 
because of a hit to the perceived legitimacy of the government, and international 
forces. While analysts so readily grouped these together under a single Taliban banner, 
it was the fragmentation of that conflict party, not the monolithic indivisibility defined 
in Ripeness theory that was to be significant for the prospects of negotiated 
agreement. 
                                                     
625 United Nations, 15th October 1999, op. cit., 
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CHAPTER 6: THE SANGIN ACCORD 
Negotiating a local political agreement 
Afghan assessments of the Sangin Accord offer an important alternative 
viewpoint for validating Western analyses, exposing differences in conceptualisation, 
motivation and method. The historical narrative of these events is described in this 
chapter (explanations grounded in Ripeness theory follow in chapter seven). The first 
immediate difference is in the name. While Westerners focus exclusively on Sangin 
(the name of the town and district), Afghans sometimes call it the “Sarwan Qala 
Accord” and rarely the “Sangin Accord.” Others call it the “Alikozai accord in Sangin,” 
prioritising the traditional naming conventions and the communities involved over the 
formal political geography of the state.627 The Accord is not portrayed as Western-led 
by any sources; descriptions of the method and purpose in the primary sources is best 
summarised by an Afghan Government civilian, who described the Accord as “just an 
Afghani negotiation; the agenda of the negotiation was only how to bring security and 
construction development in the Sarwan Qala area and how to keep this trust and 
stability in future.”628 The role of the local elders is central, as brokers between 
factions in dispute: their traditional role in Afghan society. It is important to recognise 
that mediation of this type requires contact and open communication channels with all 
parties, and this is a necessary and respected function rather than a confirmed 
indication of untrustworthiness. The most nuanced explanation comes unsurprisingly 
from those involved in the Accord process. For them, “it was a security accord 
between the Alikozai Taliban and Afghan Government mediated by the Alikozai tribal 
elders in Sarwan Qala.”629 
The elders’ role in dispute resolution is considered part of the natural political 
landscape by primary sources. “In Afghanistan, especially in the south and west,”630 it 
is accepted that most of “the disputes in a district or village are solved by local 
                                                     
627 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
628 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
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councils, local ulema [Islamic religious or scholarly] councils and local tribal councils”631 
especially “land disputes, water disputes, and tribal disputes.”632 So, the Sangin Accord 
appears, from the Afghan perspective at least, to be a clear example of political 
interaction between the official state apparatus and Taliban-aligned elements, 
mediated by local community representatives. This bestows two other characteristics 
upon it within the primary sources: firstly that it is a small-scale event, and secondly 
that the very nature of its interaction with the traditional structures renders it 
informal. Indications of formality are consistent with Western norms, among educated 
Afghans at least: it “was not a formal accord where it is written on paper and both 
sides sign that paper.”633 Since the accord is perceived to have been brokered while 
engaging with tribal structures, this determines the way it is finalised. “No sides signed 
any paper at the end of the accord, because both sides agreed before to hold an 
Afghani and Pashtunwali [meaning according to Pashtun customs] negotiation. We call 
this kind of negotiation a local jirga, and in the jirga the elders don’t write their 
agreement in paper.”634 This perception of informality persists, and one source went 
as far as to assert that “it’s not in our culture to have a formal agreement.”635  
The traditional jirga system therefore remains strongly binding and heavily 
rooted in trust, between individuals and communities. Local government political 
outreach therefore depended heavily on establishing interactions with these 
individuals, since, for one of the eldest sources interviewed at least, he felt “that for 
the villagers the most important is their elders, then the government, because the 
elders decide for them and they trust their elders a lot.”636 For him, this is potentially a 
                                                     
631 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
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generational priority, asserting that while “these elders are alive, I don’t think the 
process of our negotiation will change and maybe when our sons and a new 
generation come, they will change it.”637 There is therefore some underlying 
consistency with the system of elders and local dispute mechanisms, that an official 
administration is not perceived to offer. Despite the continuity provided by the 
institutions, the personnel in government are perceived to be changing all the time, 
while the elders do not.638 This makes the ability of government (and any intervening 
force looking to support the extension of formal political control through institutions) 
to understand and identify the traditional elders a vital component of any work to 
generate a political solution, or a Way Out. In the case of the Sangin Accord, the 
government wheat seed distribution program was a key mechanism for this outreach. 
Sangin District’s Wheat Seed Distribution 
The Helmand Food Zone Program was “designed to decrease poppy production 
in the province by providing wheat seed, high value vegetable seed and fertilizer input 
packages as an alternative to growing poppy.”639 In Sangin, the distribution intended 
to increase the relative legitimacy of the government, and political understanding. By 
November 2009 – when the distribution to which this thesis refers ran in Helmand 
(there were others in different years) – Sangin residents were nevertheless 
disappointed that the international mission had not carried out reconstruction as they 
had anticipated. People often mistrusted the central government anyway: the Pashto 
word charwaki “is used synonymously for government official, tax collector, 
policeman, and bandit.”640 Despite administration challenges, the Food Zone 
Programme “brought local Taliban leaders into direct confrontation with their out-of-
area counterparts”.641 This friction occurred because farmers travelled up to 30 miles 
outside the area to pay around 700 Afghanis ($14) for 100kg of subsidised wheat seed, 
                                                     
637 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
638 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
639 USAID Afghanistan, "Hilmand Food Zone Project," 2013, 
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/255/Hilmand_Food_Zone_Project_HFZP(accessed 11th 
September 2014).  
640 Martin, 2011, op. cit., p. 5. 
641 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 95. 
  Page 182 of 334 
 
300kg of fertilizer, and some insecticide.642 They travelled back, alone or in groups, to 
small villages subjected to varying degrees of strictness by the Taliban shadow 
government. The program also brought local people together in the government-
controlled area on a scale not previously seen. Up to an estimated 500 locals grouped 
together in the centre of the town each day for close to a week, offering the first 
significant opportunity since 2006 for Afghan Government officials to canvass locals on 
their thoughts, wishes and perceptions. The impact on local political understanding 
was significant. 
While there were clear advantages for political outreach, the seed distribution 
was viewed with varying degrees of support by local sources. For some, it was a 
broadly beneficial initiative with a “positive impact on the villagers who had received 
seeds from the Afghan Government. We shouldn’t expect more from a poor 
government. The villagers understood that they have a government that thinks about 
them.”643 But there were those who were unhappy with the incomplete coverage 
offered by the program. If it is true that “those people or farmers who didn’t received 
seeds, they turned against of the government and increased their support for Taliban” 
then this would explain why an Afghan military commander felt that “we should have 
either distributed no seeds to the farmers or distributed seeds for all.“644 Trust and 
credibility were again issues: a local Alikozai elder complained that the government 
“distribution had a negative impact for the people and villagers, because villagers who 
needed the seeds didn’t get them but villagers who were rich or had contact with 
Afghan Government received seeds.”645 Against the backdrop of events in the district 
since 2001 the wheat seed distribution was an insufficient effort. A deep sceptic felt it 
“was just a government show for the people. Their hope was that people will turn to 
                                                     
642 UK Provincial Reconstruction Team, Helmand Counter Narcotics Strategy 2009/2010, Local Nationals 
Press Briefing - Press Release [Unclassified] dated 25th September 2009. 
643 Primary Source PS-15, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-15. Also PS-2: “The situation was very 
bad in those years and villagers needed food and other necessary stuff. With the giving of seeds they 
became happy.” 
644 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
645 Primary Source PS-11, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 
- Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-11. 
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the Afghan Government but people in Sangin [had seen] lots of cruelty and those 
things cannot be washed away with distributing some seeds.”646 
The Afghan Government’s wheat seed distribution generated three responses 
outside the territory controlled directly by the state. This depended on whether the 
Taliban military commanders and cadre of civilian officials in charge of a given zone 
within the Upper Sangin Valley (termed the Sangin shadow government by NATO) 
were “foreigners”, or local men from Sangin. Some allowed farmers to keep the 
materials, usually where there was a kinship or other close bond between the shadow 
officials and the population. Some applied a tax at 10%, claiming it was the Islamic 
duty zakat (though this is traditionally a 5% contribution). Others used violence and 
intimidation, punishing the farmers for engaging with the Afghan Government. 
Sometimes commanders applied one rule for their own sub-area (usually to generate 
consent) and applied a harsher rule elsewhere; others were consistent.647 Taliban 
senior leaders replaced Mullah Abdul Khaleq, their shadow governor in Sangin, on 19th 
November 2009 – he had lost control after public anger at Taliban attacks on local 
farmers.648 This fact was not publicised widely at the time, and represents an 
important data point for tracking and analysis. The local population’s tolerance for 
shadow governance, and capacity to influence appointments within it, are indicators 
for precursors to the Way Out. Within additions to Ripeness theory these factors could 
also contribute to a Mutually Hurting Stalemate, illustrating decreasing capacity or 
consent to govern. This friction allowed the District Governor to begin mapping which 
local Taliban leaders prioritised community welfare, and to use the possibility of future 
stabilisation work – in return for concessions – to challenge Taliban legitimacy in areas 
where there was no permanent military presence. However, as many local shadow 
government personnel were respected Alikozai remaining after 2007’s failed uprising, 
the Afghan Government needed a higher calibre of official to exploit this friction over 
wheat seed for higher value gains. 
                                                     
646 Primary Source PS-5, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alikozai tribe. Local 
to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-5. 
647 Participant observation by District Stabilisation Team staff between November 2009 and January 
2010. 
648 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 98, n. 23. 
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Local frictions continued into 2010, exacerbated by extreme flooding in 
February – anecdotally the worst in living memory. Local elders confirmed that “the 
2010 flooding destroyed the lives of the villagers.”649 Many were “displaced from their 
houses, and agricultural lands were destroyed.”650 Emergency supplies and basic flood 
defence materials were provided. Afghan reactions to the government-led response 
were more positive than opinions of the wheat seed distribution. One ANSF 
commander felt that “ISAF did a great job for the people, ISAF supported villagers with 
necessary stuff by helicopters and this had a positive effect on the relation of the 
people with ISAF.”651 Others recognised that “ISAF was neutral and only supported the 
local government and their programs”652 and so credited both organisations. This level 
of recognition of the distinction is rare in the primary source material: the “Afghan 
Government and ISAF helped with [flood] victim families in Sangin which had very 
positive effects on the soul of the villagers.”653    
District Governor Faisal Haq’s office was known to have communicated with 
Upper Sangin Valley leaders since 2008, including over irrigation and flood defences 
for the upper reaches of the Helmand River. Haq was a Popalzai tribesman, yet 
trumpeted himself as a central figure in the Alikozai’s 2007 uprising. President Karzai’s 
half-brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, agreed to a marriage between their families (Haq 
alleged) but the only source to comment on this suggested that while “Haji Faisal Haq 
was a very close friend of Ahmad Wali Karzai there is no news of their family relations 
in Sangin District.”654 The Taliban shadow District Governor reportedly operated from 
Haq’s old family home in the Upper Sangin Valley (a psychological tactic of the 
Taliban), and taunted him in letters read to the illiterate governor by his hunchbacked 
brother. Despite his apparent connections and kudos, Haq was a partisan governor, 
                                                     
649 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
650 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-4: “The 2010 flooding destroyed the lives of the villagers.” 
651 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
652 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
653 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
654 Primary Source PS-17. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed 2013. 
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less suited to modernising an administration. He saw government office often as a 
mechanism for safeguarding narrow tribal interests rather than promoting a wider 
reconciliation.655 
Figure 19: Sangin District Governor Faisal Haq conducts a shura (council meeting) in 
2009. The UK Provincial Reconstruction Team’s head in Sangin, Stabilisation Advisor 
Phil Weatherill, looks on. Photo credit Eros Hoagland. Used with permission.656 
Haq’s counterparts in Sangin’s rural areas were the same largely Alikozai 
military, civil, and judicial officials who had refused exile in 2007 and continued their 
roles as part of the local administration co-opted into the Taliban shadow governance 
structure. These were supplemented by “foreign” Taliban appointees (termed “Out Of 
Area” by NATO). The legitimacy deficit between older, exiled “Government” and 
respected, younger, local “Taliban” suggested a clear advantage for Taliban. But, 
assessments of legitimacy depend on frequent subjective judgements about the 
institutions, the people occupying key appointments, and whether actions taken 
confer credibility on personnel or the organisation. From a position of apparent 
advantage, the Taliban’s weak response to the natural disaster in 2010 catalysed a 
                                                     
655 This paragraph draws on participant observation during the author’s daily meetings with Faisal Haq 
between September 2009-February 2010, while serving as District Political Officer. 
656 Mr. Hoagland confirmed his permission in an email exchange on 27th November 2013 (copy available 
if required). 
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dramatic reappraisal of the shadow government’s claim to be the legitimate protectors 
of local communities. 
The spring flooding caused extensive damage, particularly in Alikozai lands 
north of Sangin town. A network of canals siphoned water from the main channel into 
irrigated farm land, and the raging torrents swept much of this infrastructure away, 
damaging homes and fields and leaving Sangin’s major communities vulnerable to 
further rainfall. Local people asked the Taliban shadow administration for help. In 
theory, the Taliban code of conduct, or Layeha, issued in May 2009, determined the 
correct response.657 In Sangin it was believed to be held only by the shadow District 
Governor and senior military commander, and not available to the people (or the 
author of this thesis), so its impact on local decisions is unclear.658 From 2009-11, local 
support for Out Of Area shadow government appointees depended increasingly on 
these outsiders waging “a guerrilla campaign in concert with a rudimentary 
population-centric strategy sensitive to local perceptions.”659 As community 
confidence and cohesion returned after the disaster in 2007, locals were prepared 
increasingly to request and then demand more moderate treatment, forcing the 
removal of two Taliban Shadow Governors for brutality in 2010.660 One exacted harsh 
punishments on farmers who accessed the wheat seed distribution. The other 
intervened in the justice system demanding that the Taliban court in Saroo (in the 
north of Sangin District) apply Sharia law, against local custom, and cut off the hand of 
a hungry man who stole bread. Importantly, more moderate governance is sanctioned 
in both the 2006 and 2009 Layeha documents. Therefore, it is likely that any changes 
in practice stemmed from greater acceptance that harsh treatment of the population 
was “a major bane to the Taliban’s political capital,” and from problems asserting 
control – likely accelerated by the effective military targeting, notably of Out Of Area 
                                                     
657 Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew C. DuPee, "Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): 
An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban," Central Asian Survey 31, 
no. 1 (2012), p. 78. 
658 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. “Even the Taliban commanders don’t have the Layeha with them. Only the 
district chief and Head of the Military Commission have the Layeha with them.” 
659 Johnson and DuPee, 2012, op. cit., p. 78. 
660 Mike Williams, "How the British Presence in Sangin Restored Trust in Government," 20th September 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/20/british-forces-in-sangin(accessed 11th 
November 2013).  
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commanders and narcotics traffickers.661 While those military forces based 
permanently in the district were heavily committed to protecting development in the 
urban centre and engaging with the population, other NATO and Afghan forces 
conducted a relentless tempo of night raids and other operations into Sangin’s rural 
areas to complement the ground-holding battlegroup’s approach. The District 
Government, approved by Provincial Governor Mangal, sent messages offering 
dialogue about the conditions under which the heavy engineering support required to 
repair the waterways and flood defences – using technical expertise to which the 
Taliban did not have access – might be provided. The near-term legitimacy calculation 
began to change, though longer memories would recall that these major irrigation 
works were the same ones that Westerners had promised, but not delivered, on more 
than one occasion since the HAVA project began in the mid-20th Century. 
From one viewpoint, government support for flooded citizens was an entirely 
unimpeachable humanitarian response to a disaster. The immediate assistance – and 
the tentative explorations of longer-term construction projects – also played into long-
standing local tensions over land and water. These issues had inflamed antagonism 
between groups; along tribal lines between Alikozai and Ishaqzai, and between 
communities of economic interest that spanned tribal categorisation – some related to 
narcotics. Self-declared Ishaqzai sources offer a view that places tribal antagonism as a 
dominant factor: “the main reason for fighting between the Alikozai and Ishaqzai tribes 
was the family of Amir Dad Mohammad Khan, the chief of Provincial NDS department 
in Helmand Province, who – with his brothers Mohammad Daud and Gul Mohammad – 
did lots of crimes against the Ishaqzai tribe in Gereshk district.”662 The position was 
more complicated than simply tribal rivalry. It incorporated struggles between 
members of the official Afghan Government administration for the right to tax 
narcotics networks of their rivals. “The problem was between Mamuk who was the 
Police of Gereshk District in the beginning of Karzai government [and also leader of the 
                                                     
661 Johnson and DuPee, 2012, op. cit., p. 81. 
662 “They selected to steal and take the money of the Ishaqzai tribe by force because they had power at 
that time.” Primary Source PS-6, between 50-59 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. This 
source is anonymised, and given the label PS-6. Also PS-8. 
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Ishaqzai in the Sangin area]663 and Mohammad Daud and his brother Mir Dad 
Mohammad Khan. Mamuk was working with Mullah Sher Mohammad Akhund [-zada, 
known as SMA], who was President Karzai’s governor in Helmand Province. Daud 
[more likely, his supporters] stopped Mamuk’s car full of opium on the way to [the 
opium trading market at] Baram Cha, and disturbed other Ishaqzai tribespeople, taxing 
those villagers who were growing opium.”664 To the south of Sangin, this rivalry played 
out in the settlements around Qal-e-Gaz “where villagers still remember the cruelties 
of Alikozai tribe” (see Figure 18 previously to situate Qal-e-Gaz).665 For some, this also 
exacerbated an extreme mistrust of government intentions towards the population. In 
the north of the district, the problems centred on the villages of Jushalay and 
Mianroday in the Upper Sangin Valley.666 They occupied vital territory for military 
defence, but also (as rediscovered by the extensive survey work of ISAF’s Military 
Stabilisation Support Teams) controlled key junctions in irrigation canal networks; 
waterways that had a definitive impact on the fertility of land south of Sangin. 
Figure 20: Villages in the Sangin Valley, with Jushalay and Mianroday circled.667 (For 
more detail on this area see Figure 21 later in this chapter). 
                                                     
663 Giustozzi, 2009, op. cit., p. 127. 
664 Primary Source PS-7, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Undeclared. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 
4th Jan 2011 - Direct. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-7. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Alternative spellings include: Mian Rod; Josh Ali. As is common in Afghanistan, other villages also had 
similar or identical names, compounding mapping and recognition problems. 
667 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Afghanistan Southern Region 
District Atlas," 2014, https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1415351065_afghanistan-southern-
region-district-atlas.pdf(accessed 4th July 2015).  
  Page 189 of 334 
 
An assessment of the longer-term historical trajectory, and the political ebb 
and flow relating to these areas, gives crucial context to the impact of a potential 
Afghan Government-ISAF politically-led intervention into the area. A Taliban fighter 
suggests that Jushalay and Mianroday were not important in the past, but that these 
two villages became important when the Taliban took control, becoming the Taliban 
centre in Sarwan Qala.668 Western commentators confirm their importance to the 
insurgency.669 The area also had political resonance within the Taliban movement 
further afield than the Sangin Valley itself:  Akhtar Mohammad Osmani [an associate of 
Osama bin Laden, and second in command of the entire Taliban movement until his 
death in 2006]670 was from Mianroday, and his madrassah [religious school] there 
remained a centre for Taliban recruitment.”671 This suggests a strong reason for the 
village remaining the centre of the Taliban in Sangin. Accordingly, that area attracted 
significant attention from ISAF targeting, particularly after the mosque there became 
the staging point for repeated suicide bombing attempts in Sangin town itself in 2009-
2010.672 
The historical record offers a more complex back story, for it appears that the 
Taliban were enlisted to right a perceived wrong that was a legacy of the mujahidin 
resistance against the Soviets. If primary sources are right, actions that appeared to 
return the area to groups aligned to the government at the expense of the Ishaqzai-
Taliban may have been inflammatory and perceived as unjust. Before the Taliban came 
to Afghanistan, these two villages were under control of Alikozai tribe in Sangin673 and 
vital for those resisting the Soviet occupation:674 “at that time the main frontline of 
                                                     
668 Primary Source PS-8, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Undeclared. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-8. Also PS-6, PS-9. 
669 Streatfeild, 2014, op. cit; West, 2014, op. cit. 
670 Reuters, "Taliban Confirm Top Commander Killed in US Strike," 27th December 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/12/27/AR2006122700330.html(accessed 5th July 2015).  
671 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. Also PS-8, PS-9. 
672 Participant observation by the author during service in Sangin (2009-10). 
673 Primary Source PS-8. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
674 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. 
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Mujahidin in Sangin was under Alikozai control.”675 The rugged terrain and convoluted 
waterways would have made an ideal defensive line, and so it is plausible that the 
Alikozai-led mujahidin made their military front there, but didn’t move back and return 
the prime agricultural land after Dr. Najibullah’s government collapsed.676 If, as 
sources allege, “the Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes are the real owners of those villages” 
and they have legal papers from decades ago, then the perceived injustice represented 
a clear local division ready for exploitation by the Taliban.677  
It appears that the Taliban did indeed position themselves as the arbitrators in 
this case. Three sources support the story that locals complained to the Taliban about 
the Alikozai encroachment, and that the Taliban investigated the case and took back 
the agricultural lands, returning them to the Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes.678 One elder 
offers more detail, asserting that the significant mujahidin commander (and Ishaqzai 
tribesman) Atta Mohammad came from Farah Province and re-took these villages by 
force in the Afghan year 1359 [approximately 1980] to effect the transfer referred to in 
other primary sources.679 The tribal division should not however be seen as a fully 
reliable indicator of allegiance, for although the Alikozai and Barakzai tribes 
traditionally support the Karzai government, there are Taliban commanders and 
fighters in both (though not as many as from the Ishaqzai and Noorzai tribes).680 The 
conflict in Sangin therefore involved individuals spanning multiple identity categories, 
of tribe, government allegiance, relative locality, and place in the licit or illicit 
economy. Disputes in north Helmand also linked to higher levels, in both tribe and 
                                                     
675 Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
676 Primary Source PS-9, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-9. 
677 Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-8, PS-9. 
678 Primary Source PS-8. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-7 (“the Taliban took control of the Jushalay and Mianroday 
and then handed over our villages to our elders at that time”) and PS-9, “Ishaqzai and Noorzai didn’t 
have the power to retake their villages from Alikozai tribe and they were quiet, until the Taliban regime 
came.” 
679 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. 
680 Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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organisation, suggesting a national and regional perspective to these extremely local 
scenarios and conflict drivers. 
 
The Sangin Accord in a wider social and political context 
Members of the Alikozai tribe had been used to a degree of patronage and 
support in the higher echelons of Afghan political society, positioning and protecting 
the interests of the local power brokers in Sangin within the wider national context. 
Chief among these were Mullah Naqib (also known as Naqibullah) from Kandahar’s 
Arghandab valley, and Daoud Mohammad Khan (DMK – also known as Amir Daoud, or 
Amir Dado) in Helmand.681 The legacy of such leaders is disputed, but there is little 
doubt that for the Alikozai in Sangin, tribal unity – already damaged by the loss of local 
elders in the spring 2007 uprising – was further weakened by the death of Mullah 
Naqib from a heart attack in late 2007. DMK’s killing in 2009 also denied them a 
political patron in Kabul (he was an MP at the time of his death, having moved to 
Parliament after service as Helmand’s intelligence chief).682 This compromised the 
tribe’s ability to hold on to their ancestral lands, though “having well-defined tribal 
boundaries seems to be an important stability factor from which the Alikozai have 
benefitted greatly.”683 Recent sources reconfirm their political significance: “Mullah 
Naqib and Amir Daud had very good connections with Afghan Government and they 
solved the problems of Alikozai people very quickly. The death of these two figures 
[had] very negative effect[-s on] the Alikozai people.”684  
                                                     
681 On DMK, see chapters 3 and 4, and Coghlan, 2009, op. cit. On Mullah Naqib, see for example Peter 
Greste, "Profile: Mullah Naqibullah," 7th December 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1697171.stm(accessed 11th July 2015).  For a general 
overview of the Alikozai’s position and history, including references to both leaders, see Tribal Analysis 
Center, 2009, op. cit., http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Alikozai%20Tribal%20Dynamics.pdf.  
682 On Naqib’s heart attack: Sarah Chayes, "A Mullah Dies, and War Comes Knocking," 18th November 
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111601204.html(accessed 11th July 2015). ; BBC, 19th March 
2009, op. cit., http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7952333.stm. DMK’s death: ibid. 
683 Tribal Analysis Center, "The Quetta Shura: A Tribal Analysis," 2009, 
http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Quetta%20Shura.pdf(accessed 11th July 2015).  
684 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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The two men were clearly powerful and ruthless (and so useful if a decline in 
visible security indicators was considered a priority). Some suffered at their hands, and 
so the specific local context had deep significance for the perceived legitimacy of these 
individuals: “Khan and his brother Daud had weapons, and power in Sangin District, 
but they didn’t disturb the local poor people, their target was only the opium 
traffickers.”685 Others considered such unreformed warlords unwelcome: 
“powerbrokers like Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Abdul Rahman Jan, Mir Wali and 
Daoud Mohammad Khan did lots of cruelty on the local villagers, and lots of them 
turned to Taliban.”686 DMK therefore offers a microcosm of the complexities involved 
for outsiders considering backing, co-opting or partnering with such characters. 
According to Elizabeth Rubin:  
“As one Western diplomat put it: ‘Amir Dado kept his own prison, 
authorized the use of serious torture, had very little respect for human life and 
made security worse.’ Yet when I [journalist Elizabeth Rubin] later met Amir Dado 
in Kabul, he pulled out a letter that an officer in the US Special Forces had written 
requesting that the Afghan Ministry of Defense install him as Helmand’s police 
chief and claiming that in his absence “the quality of security in the Helmand 
Province has dramatically declined.”687  
Mullah Naqib was the archetypal tribal politician – hedging his bets, focusing 
always on survival and then on patronage for specific interests. This is partly due to the 
Alikozai’s specific relationship with the Taliban. They were one of the least represented 
tribes, being absent “from Taliban leadership roles at nearly all levels of the Taliban 
Movement” apart from (prior to his capture in 2007) Mullah Obaidullah, who was 
considered at the time to be one Mullah Omar’s immediate deputies.688 Naqib had 
been the man to “whom the Taliban had handed control of Kandahar when they 
retreated in 2001 – although he subsequently lost it again to an American-backed 
rival,” and indeed he had handed the city to the Taliban when they first asserted 
control before 2001, as it had become clear that pragmatism would ensure his 
                                                     
685 Primary Source PS-14. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
686 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. 
687 Rubin, 22nd October 2006, op. cit., 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
688 Tribal Analysis Center, 2009, op. cit., http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Quetta%20Shura.pdf.  On Obaidullah, see Associated Press, "Taliban Leader 'Captured' in Pakistan," 
2nd March 2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/02/afghanistan.pakistan.  
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survival.689 Nevertheless, his tribe’s secure geographical position became a profound 
concern to the Taliban – perhaps echoing the threat they had faced from Masood in 
his Panjshir Valley stronghold. The “Taliban appears to have singled it [Naqib’s tribe] 
out for attacks upon its leadership in an attempt to maneuver [sic] more pliable men 
into leadership positions or to intimidate the Alikozai into accepting Taliban 
dominance.”690 Within weeks of Naqib’s death, Taliban forces exploited the resulting 
power vacuum; they first attacked, and then headquartered themselves in Naqib’s 
house for maximum psychological effect.691 This was a tactic designed to cement 
political fragmentation. President Karzai tried to counter this by intervening personally 
in the Alikozai’s succession deliberations, placing a silver turban on the boyish head of 
Kalimullah Naqibi (the tribal elder's 26-year-old son) – an event which for one senior 
Afghan (Alikozai) General at least represented "the first time ever in Afghanistan that a 
[new tribal] leader is chosen like this.”692 For one source at least, Naqibullah and DMK 
were “the leaders of Alikozai tribe in Afghanistan and they could defend their rights in 
Kabul, Kandahar or other Provinces of Afghanistan. The Alikozai will never find leaders 
like this again.”693 
This friction between the traditional and the modern leadership, and formal 
and informal governance mechanisms, was mirrored in Sangin and Helmand as 
political control shifted and was contested after the failed uprising in spring 2007. The 
tension was initially defined geographically, with some aspirants based in Sangin and 
others in Lashkar Gah or other distant urban centres. “The members of the Alikozai 
council [in Lashkar Gah] couldn’t go to Sangin because of security problems, so didn’t 
have direct contact with the people so much.”694 While “those elders who stayed with 
                                                     
689 Fergusson, 2008, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
690 Tribal Analysis Center, 2009, op. cit., http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-
TAC/Quetta%20Shura.pdf.  
691 Fergusson, 2008, op. cit., p. 41. Also Chayes, 18th November 2007, op. cit., 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111601204.html.  The 
author’s interview with American personnel with self-proclaimed personal knowledge of Naqib, in 2010, 
supported the idea that he had died of cardiac (and perhaps also liver) failure. 
692 Graeme Smith, "Karzai under Fire for His Crowning Gesture," 20th November 2007, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/karzai-under-fire-for-his-crowning-
gesture/article586000/(accessed 11th July 2015).  
693 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
694 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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the local villagers together in good and bad situations, and always helped the villagers, 
are legitimised by the villagers.”695 Sangin’s aspiring younger elders knew that action 
was required to cement their place in the hierarchy, and their interactions with 
government should be seen in this context: “Alikozai elders in Lashkar Gah, Kandahar, 
Kabul and other Provinces are maybe more powerful than us and they might be more 
important for the Afghan Government. We are important now because we made this 
accord.”696 This local political connectedness was central to the challenge to the old 
order: “The Alikozai elders from other districts and provinces couldn’t organize the 
meetings with Taliban commanders [in the Upper Sangin Valley], so without the 
Sarwan Qala elders, the Sangin Accord was not possible.”697 This intra-tribal struggle 
for political control was accelerated by the policies of the Afghan Government; “when 
Gulab Mangal came to Helmand as governor, he ordered the tribal councils in Lashkar 
Gah to stop”698 asking all the “different tribes to have their shuras in their district not 
in Lashkar Gah city.”699 This coincided with efforts to formalise district-level 
governance, and (as far as possible) to co-opt informal political power structures into 
the formal Kabul-led state administration at that level. One government insider 
expresses the rationale clearly: “Those who worked with us on that accord were all 
living in the district beside their people. There were lots of other Alikozai leaders in 
Lashkar Gah but we knew that they didn’t have as much influence.”700 
 
Making the Sangin Accord 
From 2001 onwards, the characteristics of the local Afghan Government 
evolved significantly. The earliest years after Hamid Karzai’s election as President saw 
the position of District Governor used openly to install individuals loyal to the higher-
                                                     
695 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-1. 
696 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
697 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
698 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
699 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
700 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
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level power brokers Karzai relied up on restore control in Helmand. Sangin’s early 
governors were relatives of the Alikozai strong man, DMK. Anecdotal reporting 
suggested that Provincial Governor Wafa installed an Ishaqzai rival as District Governor 
after DMK’s brother (and a former Sangin District Governor) was killed. This residual 
tribal enmity was likely part of the reason for the failure to support the Alikozai’s 
uprising in 2007.701 As the potential for political outreach increased, the key 
characteristic for a governor became their relative acceptance by non-state power 
structures, and whether they had communication channels to those power brokers 
who were not prepared to engage directly with the Kabul administration. In north 
Helmand, the picture was complex: one elder said “we have different kinds of elders’ 
councils in Sangin District, there is an Alikozai council, there is an Ishaqzai elders’ 
council, and there is [the official government] district council which mixes all tribes. All 
these councils are not formal and the negotiation or the agreements of these councils 
are not a formal agreement.”702 Trust and credibility remained key values, because 
“promises were made face to face and were not recorded.”703 Field research by Stuart 
Gordon in 2007-8 showed that in Sangin 96% of respondents expressed no confidence 
in the Afghan Government, suggesting either a failure to engage, or compete, with the 
elders councils, or an inability to deliver upon pledges made.704 
Until 2008, all governors are believed to have been from the rival Alikozai or 
Ishaqzai tribes, illustrating the importance locals placed on co-opting the formal 
government as a faction into their struggle for local control. Faisal Haq (as a Popalzai 
tribesman) broke this pattern in mid-2008, apparently having been suggested 
personally by Ahmad Wali Karzai, the President’s half-brother.705 Haq was far from the 
honest broker, however, and had both enemies and supporters in Sangin District. 
                                                     
701 Anecdotal reporting from local elders, collected during the author’s time in Sangin, 2009-10. For an 
account of the attack, see Chayes, 18th November 2007, op. cit., http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/11/16/AR2007111601204.html.  
702 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
703 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
704 Stuart Gordon, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in 
Afghanistan’s Helmand Province (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2011), 
p. 47. 
705 Anecdotal reporting from local elders, collected during the author’s time in Sangin (2009-10) suggests 
that Ahmad Karzai took Faisal Haq to meet the regional ISAF commander in Kandahar and personally 
introduced him as ‘the man who can give you the Sangin Valley.’  
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People said that one of Haq’s main opponents was Haji Bahlol. It was alleged that 
when Bahlol went to Saudi Arabia to conduct the pilgrimage to Mecca (sometime 
before 2008, but the exact date is unknown) Faisal Haq conducted a coup in Sangin 
District killing Haji Bahlol’s brother.706 Anecdotal reporting described that Faisal Haq 
shot the man in the face at point blank range, and was exiled to Iran by the 
community, where he sold vegetables in the market (the timeframe for this incident 
was never given clearly).707 His return as District Governor, backed by the President’s 
relative, was therefore likely to be contentious. Haq countered this by promoting his 
alleged central role in the 2007 uprising, so attracting a degree of prestige. Haq’s flaws 
were accentuated by the increasing requirement to run a formal administration, 
accelerated by international pressure on the Kabul administration to introduce literacy 
and other standards to raise the barrier of entry for government positions out of the 
reach of the most divisive warlords, or their proxies. One consequence of the drive to 
select Afghan Government leaders through a skills-based appointment system was 
that literate, Soviet-trained administrators were increasingly well-equipped to pass the 
tests – an educational product of the previous rentier state arrangement with 
Russia.708 Some had less legitimacy in the eyes of important parts of the population as 
a result – such as Alikozai men with mujahidin pedigree who had resisted Russian 
intervention. This perhaps explains why by June 2012 only 5-10% of District Governor 
appointments were based on these tests.709 
Mistrust in government as an institution had other historical roots. Since the 
amount of land a group owned equated closely to their political influence, the 
redrawing of the district boundaries in Helmand, enshrined in the 1964 Constitution, 
had far-reaching consequences. Four districts quickly became 13, along tribal lines in 
some rural areas. Since that Constitution also introduced voting, the district 
                                                     
706 Primary Source PS-17. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed 2013. 
707 Anecdotal reporting from local elders, collected during the author’s time in Sangin (2009-10). 
Since Haji Bahlol and DMK had at one time been allies it is possible that this incident was related to 
wider disputes between DMK and his rivals. See Courage Services, "Tribal Dynamics in Afghanistan: A 
Resource for Analysts," UK Government, April 2008, http://stabilityinstitute.com/wp-
content/uploads/AFGHAN-TRIBAL-DYNAMICS.pdf(accessed 11th July 2015). p. 61. 
708 On the higher education and training elements of rentier states see Rubin, 1992, op. cit., p. 78. 
709 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance," US Congressional 
Research Service, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf(accessed 12th January 2013). 
p.39. 
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boundaries as drawn could return the chosen candidates of the more monolithic tribal 
groupings. This could prevent minority groups from wielding much influence in local 
District councils, risking dissatisfaction. Brokering across district boundaries to address 
long standing conflict drivers, while also running a transparent, functioning 
administration, therefore required a high degree of competence, literacy, and a 
reputation for impartiality. Haq did not have these qualities, despite his powerful links 
into communities in the Upper Sangin Valley. On 1st March 2010, literate former 
Science teacher Mohammad Sharif replaced him as District Governor of Sangin – 
reportedly after a delegation from Baghran in the far north of Helmand lobbied 
President Karzai directly.710 Change had been urgently needed – both the local mayor 
and District Development Chief (both decent performers) threatened to resign should 
the governance problems have continued much longer.711 The provincial authorities 
enforced the change after “Helmand Deputy Governor Sattar led a substantial 
delegation from Lashkar Gah to Sangin on 15-17th January [2010] to review governance 
and security in the district. Sattar was frank in acknowledging the failings on the 
Afghan side, particularly of local political leadership.”712 Governor Mangal took rapid 
action, instructing “Sherriff [sic – the new District Governor, who could write simple 
English, spelt his own name “Sharif”] to build an effective administration and develop 
relations across the district – including into areas outside GIRoA [Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] control.”713 The supporting cast was extremely thin, 
and almost everything rested on the capacity of one man, the District Governor: at 
that time “only three ministries – Power and Water, Health and Education – [had] full-
time representatives in Sangin.”714 
The number of local people coming to meet Sharif in his office outside the ISAF 
base increased from five to ten Alikozai per day under Haq, to some 60-70 daily, from 
                                                     
710 Anecdotal reporting from local elders, collected during the author’s time in Sangin (2009-10). 
Details of the changeover: FOI-11: Mangal “removed the previous DG from post on 1st March 2010, 
appointing a new interim administration; effectively on probation.” 
711 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Request 0494-14 - digest, "Extract from PRT Weekly - Governance 
in Sangin District," Undated (but from 2010). Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 
request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-10. See Annex A. 
712 Ibid. 
713 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
714 Ibid. 
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all local groups.715 Previous governors had “found it very difficult to assuage villagers 
who sought audiences to air grievances – something Sharif had mastered.”716 Based on 
two years of observation by the Provincial Reconstruction Team’s forward-deployed 
District Stabilisation Team, these measurements best illustrated the District Governor’s 
potential as a credible representative. Measures like the number of combat incidents 
were less useful, since a locally driven reduction in violence (as part of conditions-
based confidence-building) was likely to attract scrutiny and reprisals from hard-line 
senior Taliban before trust and confidence, and the substance of any negotiation, 
matured enough to trigger a public switch in allegiance and activate the corresponding 
security guarantee.717 This new leader brought the office of District Governor far closer 
to the credibility conferred on Upper Sangin Valley leaders by the wider Alikozai-
dominated population. Mohammad Sharif began confidence-building dialogue, under 
the scrutiny of Provincial Governor Mangal. By early spring 2010 no member of the 
local Afghan Government had yet admitted to meeting the key Alikozai leaders, though 
some were clearly connected to them, or mistakenly dealing with lower-level proxy 
contacts. Yet one UK official with direct and deep knowledge of the case reported that, 
“on 29th May 2010, a formal offer of peace with the Upper Sangin Valley was made by 
eight of the most influential leaders and was swiftly followed by overtures from tribal 
groups in the south,” in the Upper Gereshk Valley.718  
The negotiation process 
Identifying a negotiating opportunity does not require that it be taken, or 
signify it is more valid than other policy options, including military operations. The 
opportunity that led to the Sangin Accord simply provided one policy avenue to 
“increase the country’s overall electricity supply by building a national power grid,” 
since improving the Kajaki Dam – at the top end of the Helmand Valley, to the 
                                                     
715 District Stabilisation Team staff in Sangin recorded this and other statistics throughout 2010 while 
attempting to quantify changing political legitimacy. 
716 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Unreferenced, "Sangin Deputy District Governor on North 
Helmand District Governors' Conference, GIROA-Elders Dialogue," Undated (estimated from September 
2011). Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
allocated source reference FOI-20. See Annex A. 
717 For a review of similar themes, see Kilcullen, 2009, op. cit., http://literature-
index.wikispaces.com/file/view/Kilcullen-COIN+Metrics.pdf.  
718 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 98, note 24. 
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immediate north of Sangin District – was a key element of USAID’s $5billion plan.719 
The greater priority given then, rightly, to the more populous areas in central Helmand 
and Kandahar when determining where to send military forces – including newly 
trained Afghan National Security Force units – increased the potential value of a 
political agreement at that time. Reinforcing an agreement offered the option to 
secure Sangin and the road to Kajaki with less military personnel than required by a full 
military operation in the face of unified resistance. Kabul’s Deputy Minister of energy 
and water Gulham Faruq Qarizada recognised this opportunity, saying of the conflict 
around Sangin and Kajaki, “this isn’t al-Qaeda. These are tribes that don’t like each 
other. I would sit down with these tribes and tell them you want to put another 
[electricity generation] turbine in. Everyone will get richer, there will be no battle, and 
everyone will be happier.”720 Sangin’s District Governor Mohammad Sharif, supported 
and directed by Provincial Governor Mangal, approached his political outreach against 
this strategic backdrop.  
The period from May to December 2010 focused on confidence-building and 
discussions about the substance of a possible agreement: participation in District 
Government, cessation of hostilities and free access to Kajaki, in return for irrigation 
and flood defences, security guarantees to protect against 2007-style repercussions, 
and improvements to schools and health services. Water issues continued to impact 
on local political dynamics, between the Alikozai and Ishaqzai lands to the south. As 
part of the Sangin Accord, the District Governor arbitrated water issues between these 
rivals, with help from the mirabs (Afghan stewards of the waterways selected for their 
political independence), showing intent to widen the agreement to include many tribal 
and political groups, rather than to ally with just one. The network of vital irrigation 
canals that began near the village of Jushalay in the Upper Sangin Valley, irrigating 
nearby Alikozai farmland, eventually flowed past Sangin town into the Ishaqzai-
controlled Upper Gereshk Valley. ISAF analysis suggested that this “was the single 
most important irrigation channel between Sangin and Kajaki, servicing vast areas of 
                                                     
719 Chandrasekaran, 2012, op. cit., pp. 305-6. 
720 Ibid., p. 306. 
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crops.”721 Farm yields for the marginalised Ishaqzai therefore depended directly on 
their local rivals regulating the water flow fairly. 
Figure 21: Approximate location of the significant irrigation canals and other 
offshoots of the Helmand River in the Sangin Valley (added in red by the author). 
Note the strategic location of Sangin town (marked by the broken circle) and the 
disputed village of Jushalay (unbroken circle), at the nexus of vital waterways.  
Base image: Crown Copyright, 2013. Used with permission. 
The area of irrigated land dropped considerably between 1979 and 2008, 
reducing production levels, partly because of the country’s constant state of war; 
Soviet strategy in the 1980s included the destruction of irrigation structures, farms, 
orchards and livestock.722 Many had not been renewed, especially in Ishaqzai areas, 
either due to tribal prejudice or violence against the perceived extension of a 
predatory government (which also prevented the surveying and contractor access 
necessary to begin the works). Officials were to acknowledge that “of all Helmand’s 
tribes, the Ishaqzai have historically been the one that has been most disenfranchised 
                                                     
721 Kemp and Hughes, 2009, op. cit., p. 249. 
722 Grau and Gress, 2002, op. cit., p. 313. 
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from government, having suffered particularly under Sher Mohammad Akhundzada 
when he was Provincial Governor (2001-5).”723 
Reaction against these perceived threats and inequalities triggered a constant 
rotation of Ishaqzai fighters into the Sangin Valley, seeking control of the canal nexus, 
and attempting to disrupt the Alikozai, NATO forces and the government through 
violence. “Newly arrived from Pakistan, young guerrillas would have a quick crack at 
FOB [Forward Operating Base] Delhi [the ISAF base in Gereshk], then move on north 
up the Helmand valley to fight in Sangin.”724 UK officials considered this area even 
more problematic than Sangin: “the situation in the Upper Gereshk Valley, dominated 
by the Ishaqzai tribe and a centre of opium production and processing, is arguably 
more challenging: the largely separate insurgency here is reportedly financed in part 
by a small number of widely-known Ishaqzai narcotics traffickers who live openly in 
Kandahar and Lashkar Gah.”725 One of these was Haji Lal Jan, who was later captured 
in 2012 and promptly transferred from Kabul’s maximum security prison to Kandahar 
from where he escaped, apparently after paying a bribe of $2 million.726 Anecdotal 
reporting suggested that Lal Jan owned the large house and land that British forces 
commandeered and then turned into Forward Operating Base Jackson, the main 
military camp in Sangin; a mature pomegranate grove was cut down to provide the 
Helicopter Landing Site, one of the most valuable crops after opium poppy. There may 
well have been consequences for this placement, but action to address this local issue 
was complex since Lal Jan believed to live outside Sangin. By the logic of Afghanistan, 
this would be a direct challenge to the power of narcotics traffickers in the area and 
appears to have been taken as exactly that; given the intensity of the local fighting, 
                                                     
723 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DIPTEL Lashkar Gah (Restricted), "The Successful District 
Community Council Election in Helmand's Sangin District Represents a Major Milestone of Progress," 3rd 
April 2012. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, 
and allocated source reference FOI-21. See Annex A. 
724 Sam Kiley, Desperate Glory (A&C Black, 2010), p. 25. 
725 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
726 Afghan Bios, "Who Is Who in Afghanistan? Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai," 2012, http://www.afghan-
bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&id=3179&task=view&total=23&start=11&Itemid=2(access
ed 22nd May 2015).  
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and the fact that according to NATO officials in 2010 “75% of those fighting do so 
within 5 kilometres of their home.”727 
In late autumn 2010 US and UK forces operated in Sangin together, doubling 
the NATO presence (since the incoming US Marine unit was broadly the same size as 
the departing British one) supported by additional Afghan National Security Forces. 
British Commander Lt. Col. Paul James was clear that “having a battalion of US Marine 
Corps, on top of a UK Commando battalion, is frankly decisive.”728 The Provincial and 
District Governors led a complementary nuanced political approach, building on work 
begun months and years before. In early January 2011 representatives of the Afghan 
Government, Upper Sangin Valley Taliban leaders, and the local community witnessed 
the public announcement of the Sangin Accord.729  
The terms of the agreement 
“Under the agreement, the tribal leaders vowed to expel foreign fighters, allow 
Afghan and US forces to patrol the area, contain Taliban attacks and help identify 
deadly roadside bombs. In exchange, American and Afghan leaders are supposed to 
pump more money into the area.”730 Officials recorded the potential scope of the deal 
in the diplomatic telegram titled “Afghanistan/Reintegration: Signs Of Progress In The 
Sangin Valley” dated 14th December 2010, matching the news report quoted above 
with the addition of specific details on the interaction between ISAF and those 
changing side, notably that Taliban members would provide “a complete list of all 
commanders willing to reintegrate and guarantee that they will cease fighting” while 
ISAF would “release insurgents arrested recently providing there is a guarantee by the 
                                                     
727 Mark Urban, "Duping of Mi6 Reveals Coalition Flaws," 26th November 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/11/taliban_leaders_duping_of_mi6.html(acce
ssed 12th July 2015). See also The Guardian, "US General McChrystal Approved Peace Talks with Fake 
Taliban Leader," 26th November 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/26/us-general-
mcchrystal-taliban-impostor(accessed 27th July 2010).  
728 The Australian, "Britain Stirs Clan Lords to Fight the Taliban," 14th August 2010, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/britain-stirs-clan-lords-to-fight-taliban/story-e6frg6so-
1225905055147(accessed 24th May 2012).  
729 Zainullah Stanikzai, "Ceasefire Agreed in Sangin," 2nd January 2011, 
http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/01/02/ceasefire-agreed-sangin(accessed 23rd May 2014).  
730 Dion and Hashim Shukoor Nissenbaum, "US Marines Report Peace Deal with Tribe in Afghan Hot 
Spot," 3rd January 2011, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-
world/world/article24606376.html(accessed 11th January 2013).  
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elders that they would not again take up arms” and “undertake not to harass former 
insurgents and grant them immunity from arrest for insurgency-related offences.”731 
Afghan perceptions of the terms of the deal are fairly consistent. In addition to 
allowing those “who were involved in this agreement to keep their weapons for 
defending their area and for their own security,” the priorities were the extension of 
public services like health and education in Sangin, protection for local communities 
from outside security threats [i.e. Taliban repercussions], and a promise to asphalt the 
main road from Sangin to Kajaki – a key step in the Kajaki Dam hydroelectricity project 
known as the Kajaki road for locals, and Route 611 by ISAF.732 The poor quality of this 
road (a “pot-holed, rocky track”733 in 2006) was recognised as a problem as far back as 
2005, but the issue then was finding “a road expert who knew how to do quality work 
with [unskilled] manual labour” since the rains typically washed away all but the most 
hardy of repairs each spring, and ISAF had little spare engineering capacity at that 
point.734 On the Taliban side, local sources understood that “the [Alikozai] Taliban 
offered to stop their cooperation with the Taliban in Quetta; they will show all IED 
locations; they will not attack ISAF and Afghan forces and they will not let foreign 
Taliban enter Sarwan Qala.”735 While “Afghan officials and US diplomats hailed the 
deal as a sign of how the promised carrot of reconstruction aid could lead to 
reintegration Marine officers saw in the change of heart the power of the stick.”736 
It is perhaps unsurprising for commanders to consider military actions as the 
dominant motivation for political shifts. Behind the scenes, other complementary 
social and political forces were also at work. Both elements were necessary and 
mutually supporting. Since early 2010, the District Governor challenged self-
                                                     
731 FOI-14, 14th December 2010. 
732 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
Also PS-14: the “Afghan government promised that they will take over the security of the Taliban who 
joined to the Afghan government, and will start reconstruction like making of schools, clinics, roads, 
canals.” 
733 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., p. 4. 
734 Hafvenstein, 2007, op. cit., pp. 247-8. 
735 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. PS-2: “the Alikozai elders promised that Taliban will demine the main roads.” 
PS-14: “After the accord, the Taliban will support the Afghan and international troops and will not let 
other Taliban fighters from other districts and provinces to come in Sarwan Qala.” PS-1: “they promised 
never to let the foreign Taliban to come to their area.” 
736 Chandrasekaran, 2012, op. cit., p. 283. 
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proclaimed power brokers to demonstrate their control over local fighters and IED 
networks by reducing activity, to build confidence and validate the credibility of the 
interlocutors.737 “’We have been pushing for this for 12 months’, said Colonel Paul 
James, commander of 40 Commando battlegroup, stationed in Sangin. ‘The tribes have 
responded positively. They are certainly not fighting us.’”738 In March 2010 (long 
before surge forces reached north Helmand in numbers), the BBC reported “the 
Taliban Civil Commission, the Taliban’s unofficial government in Sangin apparently 
feels it is not in the movement’s interest to attack the reinvigorated bazaar [market 
place].”739 Indeed in Sangin “violence had started to decline before Western and 
Afghan forces mounted offensives. From up to 30 Taliban attacks a day at the end of 
June, there are now fewer than half a dozen raids daily. On July 29 [2010], there were 
no attacks.”740  This picture of lengthy ground work spanning a year or more was 
countered by one official report, suggesting that higher authorities were “aware of 
contacts going back at least 5 months, but had not seen evidence they were proving 
fruitful.”741 The local view appeared more confident that these indicators were 
evidence of more constructive behaviours signalling potential for a change in political 
outlook and allegiance.  
Daoud Ahmadi, a spokesman for the Helmand governor, said several other 
factors had contributed to the political shift. “One was the replacement of government 
officials in Sangin after a 20-day consultation with tribal leaders, another was growing 
revulsion with the Taliban’s cruelty, such as the hanging in June [2010] of a seven-year-
old child accused of spying for the Western forces.”742 Alongside social and political 
avenues, combat power (including a blend of static and manoeuvre forces, partnered 
with Afghans), the impact of military operations outside Sangin, and the knowledge of 
the impending military surge northwards were likely also significant factors. It is a 
                                                     
737 Participant observation by the author during service in Sangin (2009-10). 
738 The Australian, 14th August 2010, op. cit., http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/britain-
stirs-clan-lords-to-fight-taliban/story-e6frg6so-1225905055147.  
739 Urban, 2010, op. cit., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/03/the_ingredients_making_sangin.html.  
740 The Australian, 14th August 2010, op. cit., http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/britain-
stirs-clan-lords-to-fight-taliban/story-e6frg6so-1225905055147.  
741 FOI-14, 14th December 2010. 
742 The Australian, 14th August 2010, op. cit., http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/britain-
stirs-clan-lords-to-fight-taliban/story-e6frg6so-1225905055147.  
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testament to the bravery and resolve of many Afghan and international personnel 
alike that some political common ground could be found amidst such an outwardly 
intractable and violent corner of the world. But a detailed analysis of the motivations 
behind the agreement – and especially the role of (military) Hurt and the Way Out, as 
required by Ripeness theory – is necessary before drawing stronger conclusions about 
the Accord and the factors observed in its genesis. A summary follows below, and a 
more detailed theoretical analysis is given in chapter seven. 
 
The Sangin Accord: motivations and perceptions 
The Sangin Accord could not have been made without military force, nor 
activated without the prospect of a credible security guarantee for those openly 
switching allegiance. Two other specific military strands played important supporting 
roles for the new District Governor’s political strategy. First, the overall NATO 
Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, determined key elements of the military 
approach in Sangin in the run up to the Accord, issuing guidance in March 2010 that 
“emphasised the importance of avoiding civilian casualties,”743 especially at 
checkpoints and during military road convoys. He also brought the actions of the vast 
majority of Special Forces [known in the US as Special Operations Forces, SOF] units 
under his control to reduce the chances that while one unit carried out 
counterinsurgency another carried out “a raid that might in fact upset progress” 
without coordinating over the political impact.744 Despite criticism suggesting this put 
Western military lives at risk, McChrystal himself was ironclad in his communication to 
his subordinates that “nothing has changed to limit your right or responsibility to 
defend yourself.”745 
                                                     
743 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 93. 
744 Richard A. Oppel Jr., "Tighter Rules Fail to Stem Deaths of Innocent Afghans at Checkpoints," New 
York Times, 26th March 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/asia/27afghan.html?_r=0(accessed 18th July 2015).  
745 Ibid. For criticism, see for example Thomas Harding, "'Courageous Restraint' Putting Troops Lives at 
Risk," The Telegraph, 6th July 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7874950/Courageous-restraint-putting-
troops-lives-at-risk.html(accessed 18th July 2015). This article includes a scenario from Sangin where Lt. 
Col. Paul James, commanding officer of 40 Commando Royal Marines, ruled out launching an air strike 
on 15 locals digging in an IED (improvised explosive device): "I chose not to strike them because that 
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In Sangin, the local application of McChrystal’s instructions reduced the military 
impact on the population’s daily life largely by forcing units not based in the district to 
increase communication with those who were based locally and in touch with the 
Provincial or District Governor’s political strategy before launching operations into 
Sangin. This had a significant positive impact, since as one of the most violent districts 
in Afghanistan, with significant narcotics and insurgent activity in the rural safe havens, 
it was one of the highest priority targets for specialist operations in the entire country. 
Combining this with safer interactions between military patrols and local people in the 
urban areas (especially where either or both parties included vehicles – at greater risk 
to soldiers in some cases)746 improved the trust local people had in the existing social 
structure, based on predictability and stability.747 It is important to consider that 
predictability could also relate to life in areas outside NATO control, and so an absence 
of NATO-led security did not always hinder political evolution. For example, a high and 
ever-present level of intimidation, and a reduction in disturbance, both allow a greater 
evaluation of life in contrast to Afghan Government controlled areas, with either 
potentially resulting in a desire for negotiated progress. Temporary patrols, if resulting 
in contested residential areas, could divert discussion to the conduct of the 
international forces rather than the calibre of the Taliban offer. Nevertheless, a high 
tempo of better targeted raids “against narcotic-trafficking and improvised explosive 
device laboratories impressed locals”748 and showed that “ISAF could strike, in a 
surgical manner, wherever it wanted.”749 This was a positive evolution from earlier 
times in which, despite best efforts, the impact of such activity was more problematic 
locally. One commander felt ISAF’s key “mistakes were the killing of innocent villagers 
by their airstrikes, bombing and night raids. They conducted operations or airstrikes 
with misreports from their spies or translators, without checking the reports, and killed 
                                                                                                                                                           
would have been 15 fathers of 15 sons who would almost certainly have been driven into the 
insurgents' arms. You could also not rule out who was foe or who was curious onlooker." 
746 Harding, 6th July 2010, op. cit., 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7874950/Courageous-restraint-putting-
troops-lives-at-risk.html.  
747 In theoretical terms this is a key facet of ontological security. See Giddens, 1984, op. cit., p. 50, p. 
375. 
748 Weatherill, 2011, op. cit., p. 94. 
749 Ibid. 
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innocent people.”750 Targeted raids by specialist forces and subtle ground-holding in 
tandem supported political change, when targeted effectively, and increased the 
perception that the Afghan political authorities could affect ISAF’s military conduct and 
operations – boosting the legitimacy and accountability of the Afghan Government. 
What were the central motivators for agreement? 
While local issues were undeniably the focus of the Sangin Accord, one source 
recognised the wider scope into which negotiations fitted. For him, “America [was] 
leading the fighting and the solution for making Afghanistan is also with the 
Americans. When the Americans tell both sides to fight, both sides are fighting, and 
when the Americans say to negotiate, both sides start negotiations.”751 It is possible 
that this individual followed the changing public discourse outlined earlier, and 
recognised the move towards a national reconciliation (the Afghan Peace and 
Reconciliation program, APRP, had launched in late 2010). Nevertheless, this is an 
anomaly, and most sources describe a desire to exclude foreigners from their territory, 
following a thread that ISAF and government officials had seen before, in Sangin and 
Musa Qala in 2006, and across Afghanistan. “The Taliban said that they didn’t want the 
ISAF troops to come to Sarwan Qala after the agreement, they wanted only the Afghan 
army” to provide the security guarantee they had lacked in 2007, in case of 
repercussions.752 In late 2010, this demand was dropped, leaving a core of mutually 
beneficial outcomes available for the taking. An elder captures the opportunity, noting 
that if everyone “was honest, I think the accord would [have given] a positive result. 
The Afghan Government would have control of Sarwan Qala without any fighting and 
killing, Taliban commanders with their fighters would have better lives without 
airstrikes, and Alikozai elders would have a secure area, with lots of construction.”753 
For much of 2010 communication continued, largely by hand written notes or 
telephone, facilitated by local elders endorsed as trustworthy after they brought a 
                                                     
750 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
751 Primary Source PS-13. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
752 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-4. 
753 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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letter from Taliban commanders in Sarwan Qala confirming they were authorised to 
speak for them.754 An Afghan Government official directly involved in the Accord 
negotiation quotes a senior Taliban commander involved on the other side, who said 
“our goal was only to keep the security of our areas and keep them safe from the 
cruelties of the foreigners and of the local government.”755 While this may have been a 
pervading narrative justifying conflict, Taliban representatives persisted with a 
broader, but conflicting agenda: both that foreign troops shouldn’t come to Sarwan 
Qala but also that complex canal repair works – completely beyond Afghan 
Government ministries – must be provided. Provincial Governor Mangal reacted 
strongly, “and said without ISAF, construction is impossible in Sarwan Qala.”756 This 
suggests a more complex range of factors affected the opening of negotiations than 
merely Hurt: a more nuanced view is supported by seven interviewees. They 
corroborate the fact that bargaining over a key local religious leader was also 
influential, suggesting that “when the negotiations became serious, Governor Mangal 
agreed to release Mullah [named removed]” as a confidence-building gesture.757 
Afghan Government officials were content that the request for a single prisoner 
represented a legitimate confidence-building measure. Elsewhere, political bargaining 
had included demands for large numbers of fighters and commanders to be returned: 
the “Taliban didn’t have lots of demands for the negotiation. They were not like other 
Taliban asking for the release of 20 or 50 Taliban commanders. Their only demand was 
the release of Mullah [****].”758 In this case therefore, the prisoner’s release was 
perceived to signify a shift in genuineness which in turn suggests that this was an 
important step in solidifying the Way Out: “when the negotiation became more 
                                                     
754 PS-4: “the Taliban appointed us as their representatives and with a letter they introduced us as their 
representatives for negotiation [with the Afghan government].” Also PS-15. 
See also Weatherill, 2011, op. cit. Greater detail of the communication timeline is available in Cavendish, 
2014, op. cit., https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-victory-how-isaf-infighting-
helped-doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence.  
755 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. Also PS-4. 
756 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. This echoed the similar issues surrounding the HAVA river basin works in the 
20th century, described earlier. 
757 Ibid. Confirmed by PS-8, PS-10, PS-11, PS-12, PS-13, PS-15, PS-16. 
758 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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serious, the Alikozai tribe asked Governor Mangal to release Mullah [****].”759 The 
significance of this prisoner offers strong evidence in favour of politically and culturally 
aware detention operations. Only three Afghan sources shed light on Mullah [****]’s 
capture, and there are no public records or official documents available to confirm or 
deny these assertions. The first identifies the Mullah as “an Alikozai Taliban 
commander arrested by the Afghan National Army and later handed over to the NDS 
[National Directorate of Security] office in Helmand Province,” though no timeframe is 
given.760 The second recounts that the “Afghan army arrested Mullah [***] around 4 
months before the Accord [i.e. August/September 2010].”761 The third describes that 
“just two weeks before Gulab Mangal contacted the Sarwan Qala elders, an important 
Taliban commander who was called Mullah [****] was captured by Afghan forces.”762 
A vital question cannot be answered with the sources available, which would shed 
great light on the extent to which this was orchestrated or accidental. Was the 
Mullah’s identity known before his arrest, and so planned and designed to apply 
leverage to the elders as they waivered over negotiation, was it coincidental? Are the 
estimations of timeframe, and assumptions that the events were consciously linked, 
false? 
Much depends on the Mullah’s true identity, and evidence from ISAF, which is 
not available here. The primary sources are clear that he was associated with the 
Taliban organisation, and there are limited similarities between his apparent identity 
and a man added to the United Nations sanctions list: one of the aliases given matches 
that used for the Mullah in all sources (though there are other differences).763 When 
questioned on this potential cross-over, only one source responded, and was 
unequivocal in discounting the correlation: “Mullah [****] has lived for more than 
three decades in [different place to that mentioned on the sanctions list]. The person 
                                                     
759 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
762 Primary Source PS-13. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
763 Specific references and further source details are withheld to protect the identity of the individual. 
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that you [the interviewer] mentioned is completely different.”764 What is clear is that 
the Mullah had other longer-standing characteristics that afforded him deep 
credibility, and so made him useful as a conduit for community influence. Recalling 
from chapter two that the Sayeds are believed to be the purest descendants of the 
Prophet Mohammed, “people respected Mullah [****] very much because he is from 
the Sayed Tribe, and his family is the only Sayed family in that area.”765 Local people 
“always come to his father’s shrine to pray” and this contributed to the son also 
becoming “a respected man among the villagers; he was also an important Taliban 
commander in Sarwan Qala.”766 This man’s release was reported to be the essential 
action that, for the Alikozai Taliban, “assured them that Afghan Government is honest 
for negotiation.”767 Importantly, it also boosted the elders as mediators, and indicated 
that the time for “face-to-face negotiation has started.”768 As a counter, it would also 
have shown the Sangin Alikozai Taliban’s ability to influence ISAF and the Afghan 
Government, perhaps boosting their credibility in some eyes. This shows the 
complexity of theoretical and practical analysis based so heavily on subjective 
judgements. 
Participant observation from Sangin shows that the confidence-building stage, 
between District Governor Mohammad Sharif’s first communication through proxies 
and the first formal face-to-face group meeting to consider the terms of a proposed 
agreement took at least nine months – from his appointment on 1st March 2010 until 
mid-December 2010.769 Throughout this time, proxy communication through the 
                                                     
764 Primary Source PS-17. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed 2013. 
765 Primary Source PS-16. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed. 
766 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-13: “Mullah [***] was very religious man and had lots 
of people as supporters.”  
767 Primary Source PS-16. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed. Also PS-3: from then, the “Taliban commanders believed that Afghan government really 
wanted peace and negotiation.” 
768 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also from the same source: “When Mullah [****] was released then the 
elders also found lots credit with the Taliban commanders.” 
769 Participant observation from the author’s time in Sangin 2009-10, confirmed by conversations with 
other personnel during and after the events. See also Weatherill, 2011, op. cit. and Cavendish, 2014, op. 
cit., https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-victory-how-isaf-infighting-helped-
doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence.  
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mediating elders and – eventually – direct conversations via telephone, were the only 
method to build a personal rapport. Trust and legitimacy depended on demonstrating 
the District Governor’s impact on the military and stabilisation actions taken by 
international and Afghan Government personnel. Underpinning this delicate web of 
relationship-building were invaluable longer-standing social and political links. This 
endorsed the immense value shown in the case study of understanding interpersonal 
obligations, loyalties and bonds – and having the access and credibility to request their 
application to conflict resolution. One key elder sums this up: “the main factor was 
that we [the elders and the Alikozai Taliban] knew each other from a long time before 
and that was the reason that they didn’t reject us.”770 In the case of the Sangin Accord, 
these ties ran very deeply, and included links to the most senior members of the 
Taliban organisation based in Pakistan: “those Taliban commanders in Sarwan Qala 
who agreed to make an accord had direct contact with Quetta Shura.”771  
Closer to home, in Sangin District, family ties drove the shape of the Sangin 
Accord, both leading up to and after the deal. “There was a relative of Mullah [**** - 
the prisoner released as part of the Accord, as outlined above] who was called 
[****].772 He was involved in the negotiation with the Afghan Government; in fact he 
was one of the encouragers of the elders in that negotiation.”773 Following the Accord, 
its implementation involved pledges to increase representation in the ANSF, providing 
they remained on hand to provide security in the local area. This again highlighted the 
importance of securing support from the influential local characters: “one of Mullah 
[****]’s brother, who is called Mullah [****] was commander of the local police in the 
area. He was with the Taliban before but later joined the Afghan Local Police.”774 The 
Mullah’s membership of the Sayed tribe was powerful, since as “this tribe is much 
                                                     
770 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
771 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
772 Confirmed by participant observation to be an Alikozai Taliban commander, and the key intermediary 
for the Afghan District Governor. 
773 Primary Source PS-17. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed 2013. 
774 Ibid. 
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respected among every tribe and nationality”775 the local “people obeyed him, and 
whatever [****] said, people accepted that as a message from their religious man.”776 
The importance of co-option or reconciliation with religious figures is therefore a key 
lesson from this case study. 
The Accord itself entered a new stage on 13th December 2010, when a 
delegation of some 20 elders and Taliban representatives met the Sangin District 
Governor in the town.777 An official report records that these people, “representing 
the entire valley from the District Centre up to the Kajaki Dam, had reached a tentative 
agreement with the Government of Afghanistan.”778 A second meeting two days later 
advanced the discussion into specifics, though international officials anticipated that 
“the 15 December shura would continue well beyond that date as the detail of the 
agreement was hammered out.”779 The eventual deal was announced at a public 
meeting on 4th January 2011, where “tribal elders presented the Afghan Government 
and coalition leaders a document signed by seven Taliban commanders who agreed to 
follow the direction of the elders. In exchange, the elders reiterated that Afghan forces 
should lead searches of area compounds, that all patrols in the area are partnered and 
requested commitments to short-term and long-term reconstruction and development 
projects.”780 Implementing the Accord would be tricky and there would be significant 
challenges involved with controlling perceptions of adherence to the terms of the 
Accord, and trust in the implementing partners. Officials were mindful of this 
complexity, noting that “negotiations elsewhere have involved a demand that 
ISAF/ANSF stay out – this should not be part of any agreement. Equally, if ISAF/ANSF 
                                                     
775 Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
776 Primary Source PS-9. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
777 Participant observation, confirmed by District Stabilisation Team notes seen and contributed to by 
the author. 
778 FOI-14, 14th December 2010. 
779 Ibid. 
780 ISAF Joint Command, 2011, op. cit., http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-coalition-
leaders-broker-peace-deal-in-sangin.html. It is interesting that this request was made, since it was 
already official ISAF policy: see ISAF, ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Partnering Directive 
29th August 2009. It is possible that the volume of Western troops surging into that area raised 
additional concerns from elders – Cavendish quotes the ISAF Regional Commander who reported that 
Special Operations Forces were “out wreaking havoc in the boon docks” in late 2010. Cavendish, 2014, 
op. cit., https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/snatching-defeat-from-victory-how-isaf-infighting-
helped-doom-sangin-to-its-ongoing-violence.  
  Page 213 of 334 
 
are attacked, or take military action in the valley, it should not be seen as voiding any 
agreement.”781 The extent to which these sorts of expectations were agreed and 
communicated widely, or imposed or assumed, affects the resilience of an agreement, 
and elements of a Ripe Moment. For Taliban members not aware of the precursors to 
the deal, “it was very shocking news and I am sure it was also a shocking news for all 
the Taliban commanders and fighters in Helmand Province.”782  The Sangin Accord 
resonated sufficiently to merit a statement by the Taliban movement’s spokesman 
Qārī’ Yūsef Aḥmadī. He said “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan refutes these baseless 
claims of the enemy. Those media outlets which have published the report or are 
publishing it now, commit violation of [the] journalistic code. [The enemy] resorts to 
disseminating some fatuous and unbelievable reports every day and week, so our 
astute people and the Mujahidin should not allow the enemy to succeed in these 
schemes.”783 If this indicated that the Sangin Accord created some desirable political 
impact, that sentiment was echoed by the Provincial Government. In follow up 
meetings with international officials, Helmand’s Governor Mangal reportedly saw “the 
Sangin Accord as a model for wider outreach efforts across the province – particularly 
his nascent attempts to negotiate with the Ishaqzai tribe in the UGV [Upper Gereshk 
Valley] and the Alizai who dominate Kajaki.”784 This impact on wider policy suggests 
that the case study is significant enough within the recent campaign to merit further 
analysis of the negotiating process underpinning the Sangin Accord, using Ripeness 
theory as an explanatory tool. 
                                                     
781 FOI-14, 14th December 2010. 
782 Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
783 Jihadology.net, "New Statement from Qārī’ Yūsef Aḥmadī, the Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan: Regarding the Rumors of Ceasefire in Sangin District," 5th January 2011, , 
http://jihadology.net/2011/01/05/new-statement-from-qari-yusef-a%E1%B8%A5madi-the-spokesman-
of-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-regarding-the-rumors-of-ceasefire-in-sangin-district/(accessed 
29th July 2015).  
784 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. Mangal had conducted three meetings with the Ishaqzai since 1 January, 
“warning them that they too should negotiate a similar agreement, or risk being left behind”: Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, eGram 648/11, "Sangin - Latest Developments," 12th January 2011. 
Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
allocated source reference FOI-15. See Annex A. 
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CHAPTER 7: EXPLAINING THE SANGIN ACCORD 
This chapter assesses the detailed history of the Sangin Accord, set out for the 
first time in this thesis, for evidence of Ripeness theory’s explanatory capacity. It 
begins by reviewing the impact of the older history described in earlier chapters upon 
the constituent elements of a Ripe Moment: an MHS and a Way Out, perceived by all 
conflict parties simultaneously (shown on the diagram repeated below).  
Figure 22: The key elements of a Ripe Moment (circled) labelled for explanation.785 
This analysis draws out areas of conceptual difficulty with the way Ripeness 
theory considers the boundaries between conflict parties, and the rationality that is 
assumed to drive their decisions and perceptions about negotiation. This discussion 
illustrates the implications of culture on the ability to identify the intent of negotiators 
(and therefore the genuine motivations central to the Way Out); the potential for 
individual or group trauma to alter both historical memory and rationality, for specific 
conflict parties. The explanatory value of Zartman’s theory is then shown, for more 
recent events and the perceptions directly relating to the Sangin Accord, as set out in 
chapters four, five and six. Observations upon the MHS, Way Out and Ripe Moment 
are given. The implications for scholarship and further research are summarised in the 
concluding chapter. 
 
                                                     
785 The diagram is a repetition of that shown in Figure 8 in chapter 1.  
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The relationship between history and Ripeness theory 
Questioning rationality 
Ripeness theory relies on a model of rationality and decision-making 
unaffected by the specific impact of history and local cultural factors the conflict 
parties. In this Zartman perpetuates “negotiation theorists’ dismissal of the effect of 
culture” which “springs from the assumption that there is a single, universal paradigm 
of negotiation” underpinned by instrumental assumptions of rationality.786 Zartman’s 
theory focuses directly on the moment that negotiations begin, but does not make any 
effort to describe the conditions that indicate dialogue has evolved into negotiation, 
nor to outline the level of formality that defines that threshold between other types of 
verbal exchange and negotiation. As will be shown later in this chapter, the history of 
the Sangin Accord suggests that this requires review, since the debate over when 
negotiations become formal – and by implication, genuine – in central to analysis of 
the presence (or not) of a Ripe Moment in the case study. The assessment is clouded 
by differences between local Afghan practices and Western norms about the 
boundaries between communication and negotiation, and also how an MHS or a Way 
Out is perceived by each party.787 Since Ripeness theory lacks any recognition that 
cultural or historical factors may mean the different conflict parties do not share the 
same perception or understanding about when genuine negotiations for conflict 
resolution are underway, the theory compels analysts to conclude that the cause is the 
absence of the a Ripe Moment. This makes Ripeness problematic for explaining the 
Sangin Accord, where addressing those same local factors had significant implications 
for the timing and substance of the agreement, but also on the local people’s decision 
to engage in formal negotiations.  
To apply Ripeness theory literally to the case study therefore requires us to 
exclude the impact of longer-term historical legacies including: disputes over land and 
water access stretching back over 200 years, including with Iran; frequent attempts by 
                                                     
786 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent 
World (US institute of Peace Press, 1997), pp. 215-6. 
787 Winston Churchill perceived differences between British and Afghan actions and beliefs as 
“irrefutable evidence of the barbaric nature of Britain’s adversaries and, concomitantly, the impossibility 
of sustaining a rational negotiation with them.” David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines 
on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 181. 
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foreigners to control the Helmand region through partisan relationships with specific 
tribal groups, including the three Afghan Wars with Britain; poorly implemented 
irrigation projects with significant impact on power relations and human security, 
notably the HAVA program in the Helmand Valley, and; military interventions 
(particularly by the Soviets) accompanied by social and political reform agendas that 
challenged locally-understood mechanisms and lifestyles. It is impossible to suggest 
that these events were experienced in the same way by others, or that there was 
negligible impact upon local assessments of negotiating with a centralising Afghan 
administration promising reconstruction projects, and backed by foreign military 
forces. Indeed Zartman himself acknowledges that “frequently conflict involves the 
resurgence of latent feelings or dormant grievances,” but then immediately excludes 
the impact of these from his theoretical model.788 Since grievance typically arrives 
from perceptions of inequality, the historical memory of these events and their 
outcomes must be significant – but also different from their opponents’ – for those 
who favour reopening conflict.789  
These challenges to the universal applicability of rationality highlight the 
challenge facing theorists and practitioners alike to determine whether or not 
common models and approaches can be applied successfully to multiple case studies. 
This debate extends back at least as far as British Imperial scholarship. Bethell is one 
who suggests that the issues facing the territory that we now know as southern 
Afghanistan had been seen before. He wrote that “there is scarcely an incident in the 
story of our Indian Frontier that has not its parallel in the ‘Debateable Land’ which lay 
between England and Scotland in years gone by.”790 Bayly, in his study of diplomatic 
perceptions of Afghanistan, makes the important point that “geographic spaces have 
often been analysed through a structuralist-functionalist lens, which has, in some 
cases, encouraged ahistorical understandings.”791 General Jonathan Shaw levels the 
same accusation at the modern campaign, citing “the locals’ disbelief at our ahistorical 
                                                     
788 Chapter 11, “Negotiations and pre-negotiations in ethnic conflict: The beginning, the middle, and the 
ends” in Zartman, 2007, op. cit., quote on p. 174. 
789 Berdal and Wennmann, 2013, op. cit; Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, Rethinking the 
Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005); 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, op. cit. 
790 L. A. Bethell, Tales from the Outposts: Tales of the Border, Vol. 3 (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons Ltd., 1936), p. 2. 
791 Bayly, 2014, op. cit., p. 1. 
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efforts in the country.”792 The importance of historical context, and the impact of 
memories of past events on rationality, is a conclusion that can be applied here to 
regions within states, such as those – including Sangin – that fall within my earlier 
definition of fringe areas. 
Ahistorical approaches have been applied to the mechanics of state building. If 
the hallmarks of a functioning state are “understood in terms of their shortcomings 
vis-à-vis their European contemporaries,” then policies that promote local variations, 
informed by specific cultures, societies or history, would not be considered valid.793 
Our own history contains warnings for those who would seek to export mirror images 
of strategies, or state functions, and apply them everywhere. Anecdotally, the British 
experience in Malaya was a common reference point during strategy discussions about 
counterinsurgency in Helmand between 2009-10, yet a major difference between that 
campaign and recent events in Afghanistan reduces the significance of imported 
lessons, since in Malaya High Commissioner Templer “wielded complete control of 
every aspect of civilian and military life,” while in Helmand every effort was made to 
operate in support of the Host Nation administration.794 For Sir John Malcolm, the 
Governor of Bombay (1826-1830), the “greatest error in India appears to have been a 
desire to establish systems founded on general principles. I have been led, by what I 
have seen, to apprehend as much danger from political as well as religious zealots.”795 
The polar opposite view, however, places enormous information collection and 
analysis requirements on those seeking to understand progress towards peace. If, as 
David Kilcullen has written “the imperative is to understand each environment, in real 
time, in detail, in its own terms, in ways that would be understood by the locals - and 
not by analogy with some other conflict, some earlier war, or some universal template 
                                                     
792 Jonathan Shaw, "The Battle over Sangin Should Teach the West Some Vital Military Lessons," 24th 
December 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/24/battle-sangin-military-
lessons-local-realities-afghanistan(accessed 5th January 2016).  
793 Marsden, 2012, op. cit., p. 35. 
794 Bishop, 2007, op. cit., p, 25; ibid. See Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (Faber & Faber, 1977), part 2 on 
Malaya. Also Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations (Faber, 1972), chapter 3 on Civil-Relations; Michael 
Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the Modern World 1945-65 (Oxford: Macmillan, 
2013), chapter 6; John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat 
Soup with a Knife (University of Chicago Press, 2002), section 2. 
795 Cited in Robert Johnson, "Transitions: Britain's Decolonization of India and Pakistan," in At the End of 
Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and 
Withdrawal, ed. Robert Johnson and Tim Clack, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 88. 
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or standardized rule set” then an enormous cultural, social and historical record must 
be accessible, updated, and created through repeated detailed interactions with local 
people at all levels, and at all points in a conflict.796 This would require a degree of 
access and capacity rarely available in fringe areas. Rory Stewart is somewhere in the 
middle, concluding that “local and regional factors tend to be a far more important 
determinant of success than the interveners themselves.”797 Determining whether or 
not local people interact rationally with imported political, military and other 
organisations, and the norms and mindsets that accompany them, is vital for assessing 
the explanatory value of Ripeness theory. 
Two approaches to assessing rationality offer important evidence here. The 
first says that rationality exists, but that unexpected actions are the consequences of 
failing to understand the influences driving a rational choice. The second suggests that 
traumatic events damage memory and rationality. On failures to recognise rationality, 
Walter and Snyder conclude that analysts commonly “ignore the calculus of those who 
face the consequences,” glossing over the fact that “fear causes citizens to act on ideas 
or claims they believe are more likely to be false than true” – for them “this is not 
irrational, but a rational response to the huge costs of being wrong.”798 This argument 
is persuasive in the Sangin case, since it is arguably impossible for outsiders to 
accurately assess the perceptions (and so their impact on a Way Out or MHS) that 
derive from poverty, near-constant war, the absence of protection from central 
authorities and the need to respond flexibly to changes in community political and 
ideological emphasis in order to survive. Equally, it would be extremely difficult for 
local Afghans to understand the pressures upon international actors, including the 
impact of domestic political pressure upon decisions that played out in Sangin 
District.799 Interactions between these different versions of rationality have parallels in 
                                                     
796 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 2. 
797 Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, Can Intervention Work? (WW Norton & Company, 2011), back cover. 
Complexity expressed in Christopher D. Kolenda, The Counterinsurgency Challenge: A Parable of 
Leadership and Decision Making in Modern Conflict (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2012), 
especially Scenario 4, pp. 79-114. 
798 Barbara F. Walter and Jack L. Snyder, Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), pp. 293-4. 
799 For the implications of different strategic views and awareness between operational conflict zones 
and capitals, see chapters 11 and 12 in Christopher Elliot, High Command: British Military Leadership in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London: Hurst, 2015). 
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history, and also extended to policy choices. There were also differences in the way 
power and influence were understood, especially in rural areas, that affected 
perceptions of relative strength and of Hurt. “European political ideas elevated the 
exclusive control of territory as a constituent element of sovereignty.”800 Local Afghan 
communities on the other hand expected “multiple tributary relationships as a 
fundamental part of the political order” meaning that aspirants to political control 
should also, “focus on the visible bestowal of honour, visitation, and expressions of 
mutual, albeit hierarchical, obligation” rather than near-exclusively on land and its 
control.801 Especially for leaders, these variations had significant implications for 
establishing the mutual trust and understanding required to generate a Way Out. They 
are also significant for analysts looking to assess accurately whether each conflict 
party’s own actions had the intended impact on the opposition’s perceptions required 
for both an MHS and a Ripe Moment.802  
The impact of traumatic events on international relations theory, and 
explanations of political negotiations, is a developing field. While it is commonly 
known that extreme experiences damage individuals, how trauma affects communities 
in conflict areas and the rationality of their individual and collective decision-making is 
little studied. Memory plays an essential role for “making sense of the past while 
developing an outlook for times to come” while importantly “trauma may affect 
memory by providing experiences of existential crises that require an intensified 
engagement with past and future.”803 It is hard not to conclude that the experiences of 
Helmand’s population, and memories of them, were traumatic: individuals involved in 
the Sangin Accord had direct experience of the Soviet occupation, the civil war, the rise 
of the Taliban, and the international intervention. Research suggests that trauma 
                                                     
800 Marsden, 2012, op. cit., p. 28. 
801 Ibid. 
802 On the specifics of Pashtun leadership motivations and approaches to negotiation, see Fredrik Barth, 
Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (Athlone Press London, 1965). 
803 Hannes Hansen-Magnusson, "Memory, Trauma and Changing International Norms: The German 
Green Party's Struggle with Violence and Its Concern for Humanity," in Memory and Trauma in 
International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, (New York: 
Routledge, 2013). 
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affects ontological security, affecting perceptions of the self, relative to others.804 
International actors had also experienced traumatic events, especially the attacks of 
11th September 2001: Becker shows how such trauma affects foreign policy.805 If 
memories of those histories – not universally shared with other conflict parties in the 
case study – caused different conceptions of rationality that were then judged 
irrational, or prompted genuinely irrational responses triggered by psychological 
trauma, then actors’ ability to perceive a Ripe Moment would also be damaged. This 
shakes the rational foundation for Ripeness theory. 
Challenging the simple categorisation of conflict parties 
It is likely that collective trauma, combined with the legacies of history upon 
perceptions of internationally-backed efforts to establish a centralised and reforming 
government, affecting local willingness to declare support openly for one side or the 
other. As a result, in the case of the Sangin Accord, defining the conflict parties is a 
central challenge, questioning the value of Ripeness theory as an explanatory tool. 
While Zartman’s original theory tends to consider just two conflict parties with a 
unitary nature (i.e. with no constituent parts), the case study suggests far greater 
complexity, both from a longer historical perspective but also for events surrounding 
the Sangin Accord. This is supported by practical research on evolving Ripeness theory, 
by Coleman and others, portraying “the transition to and maintenance of constructive 
engagement as a complex psychosocial process for individuals and groups” involving a 
“multitude of stakeholder experiences, decisions, and actions” that ultimately result in 
a shift in thinking.806 Stedman has also criticised the unitary nature of Ripeness, 
questioning the ability to “perceive or calculate the gains and losses of combat, 
negotiation, and surrender in terms of the government or insurgency as a whole.”807 
                                                     
804 Alexandria Innes and Brent Steele, "Memory, Trauma and Ontological Security," in Memory and 
Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, 
(New York: Routledge, 2013). 
805 Douglas Becker, "Memory and Trauma as Elements of Identity in Foreign Policymaking," in Memory 
and Trauma in International Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates, ed. Erica Resende and Dovile 
Budryte, (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
806 Coleman et al., 2008, op. cit., p. 54.  
See also pp. 55-58 for a detailed list of 17 methods and 111 actions setting conditions for change. 
807 Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 
(L. Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 26. 
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Defining the boundaries of the conflict parties in the case of the Sangin Accord 
is problematic, since it is not clear whether all of the parties engaged in military 
conflict were formal parties to the agreement. The theory is also immature when 
considering multi-faceted conflict parties, as is the case for the Taliban. It had local and 
wider-ranging elements, and formal and informal affiliations and identities, aligned to 
varying degrees within an unclear and at times fluid organisational structure. Primary 
sources confirm this complex blend of family, tribe, identity and motivation. Some 
Alikozai Taliban who were unhappy with the Sangin Accord “were not [in a] position to 
resist [the] deal publicly, because their families were still there in the middle of the 
tribe,”808 risking social repercussions. The tribal unity and strength of the Alikozai at 
that time is also reported as a reason why “it was pretty difficult for the Taliban to 
cancel and destroy the agreement.”809 For the American commander with 
responsibility for Sangin at the time of the Accord, General Richard Mills, “this was 
primarily an Afghan brokered agreement arrived at in close consultation with local 
coalition forces,” allowing “for security conditions around Sangin similar to those 
already in place in other parts of the province.”810 This suggests that one approach 
would be to consider the principal conflict parties for analysis as the Afghan 
Government and the Taliban, defined by the local level only. In this case, there would 
be many exogenous parties influencing these two actors, including: the Afghan 
provincial and national levels of government; higher levels with the Taliban political 
organisation; exiled political leaders based outside Sangin, and other parties affected 
by the results of any negotiation – for example, narcotics traders with interests in the 
territory covered by the Sangin Accord. It would also be necessary to define the 
(potentially different) relationship between UK and US elements acting in support of 
the Afghan Government – or to consider all international forces aligned into one 
coalition, alongside the Afghan Government, and therefore to consider them to hold a 
shared perception.  
                                                     
808 Primary Source PS-29, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Ishaqzai tribe. 
Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-29. 
809 Primary Source PS-30, between Undeclared years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Tribe Undeclared 
tribe. Local to Sangin? Local - District. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin 
Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-30. 
810 ISAF Joint Command, 2011, op. cit., http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-coalition-
leaders-broker-peace-deal-in-sangin.html.  
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Aligning Ripeness theory to the realities of the case study is therefore highly 
complex: the unitary nature of conflict parties is also shown to be insufficient. This 
manifests itself through great difficulty in determining exactly whose actions are 
significant, especially for developing the Way Out. Sources also highlight the 
understandable reluctance in all conflict parties to commit publicly to any sort of 
political reconciliation process. Taliban and their intermediaries were equally 
concerned about publicity – it was reported locally at the time that the Taliban’s 
Quetta Shura had a list of those suspected of working with the government or the 
international presence and exacted extreme punishments on them periodically, 
including gruesome murder; Malim Yaqoob, described by multiple sources as the 
leader of the 2007 uprising had been reportedly tied behind a car on a long rope and 
dragged until dead.811 Counter to the typical response, which given the threat was not 
to talk about one’s own actions, one source openly claimed to be “the first elder who 
accepted [Provincial Governor] Mangal’s offer to make the Taliban commanders agree 
to negotiations. I met Governor Mangal secretly in his office in Lashkar Gah.”812 The 
source recalls that “for more than two weeks the Taliban didn’t give us a positive 
answer; they seemed to agree with negotiations [with the elders] but didn’t tell us 
openly that they agreed to negotiate with Afghan Government.”813 At this point, 
Afghan Government officials “asked us [the intermediary elders] to bring a letter from 
the Taliban saying that they were ready for peace negotiations.”814 This eventually led 
to both sides agreeing to sit together in person, as “face to face [interaction] has more 
effect then talking over mobile and walkie-talkie.”815 This unveiling of the various 
groups did create friction, and some elders left, while others who were not involved 
complained that “the important Alikozai elders in Sangin who are the decision makers 
were not informed or were not invited by the Afghan Government.”816 One went as far 
                                                     
811 Participant observation based on multiples sources of anecdotal reporting from the author’s time in 
Sangin (2009-10). 
812 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
813 Ibid. 
814 Ibid. 
815 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
816 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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as to suggest that “the Afghan Government involved or invited some unknown Alikozai 
elders from Sarwan Qala.”817 
It is likely, but unproven in the primary source material, that the split in opinion 
and influence between difference groups stemmed in part from Mangal’s instruction 
to communities to return their political negotiations to the districts rather than hold 
them in Lashkar Gah.818 This boosted younger aspiring leaders and isolated those 
(often of older generations) who were not prepared to travel into the more rural 
areas, or (on the other side) engage with Kabul’s representatives or their 
intermediaries in ISAF-patrolled towns.819 This variety of groups, vying for leadership 
within those mediating and in the Alikozai Taliban, goes some way to explaining the 
wide variation in explanations of the main motivations for the negotiating parties, and 
perceptions of their trustworthiness. This again suggests that further research into 
multipolar negotiation and the sub-division of conflict parties is important. As such, no 
sources openly acknowledged a desire for formal agreement, though all who 
commented described the political interactions as more complicated than simply 
direct relationships between two conflict parties. Elders were considered 
intermediaries, and respected as trusted individuals: “those elders who were 
mediating between the Taliban and Afghan Government were very important and 
influential figures in the area. I trusted the elders and I believed that they would never 
play a game with the government.”820 The most succinct explanation comes from a 
single source with no clear affiliation: the negotiation was not a formal negotiation, 
and not written on paper. The Alikozai elders acted as representatives of the Alikozai 
Taliban.821 The official Afghan Government leadership was also reticent to make too 
much of these overtures. “We didn’t want to make it formally. Governor Mangal [said] 
                                                     
817 Ibid. 
818 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. “Gulab Mangal asked the different tribes to have their local shuras inside of 
their district not in Lashkar Gah city. Now all the members of the Alikozai shura are from Sangin District 
and they are living in Sangin District.” 
819  “Gulab Mangal asked the different tribes to have their local shuras inside of their district not in 
Lashkar Gah city. Now all the members of the Alikozai shura are from Sangin District and they are living 
in Sangin District.” 
820 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
821 Primary Source PS-14. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
  Page 224 of 334 
 
we are not dealing with another country; it’s a deal between the local government and 
some unhappy brothers inside our Province.”822 A final important implication from the 
case study derives from the extent to which the conflict parties were in fact perceived 
as enemies and the question (unresolvable here) of whether this alters Zartman’s 
theoretical model or not: for a second Afghan source, “we were mediating between 
two sides that were fighting, but we cannot say any side was our opponents.”823 
 
Implications for the Mutually Hurting Stalemate 
Determining whether an MHS exists requires close observation, but far more 
data is available relating to international military casualties than among Afghan 
Government and Taliban forces. It is only directly applicable to Ripeness theory if 
international forces are considered to be one of the conflict parties moving towards 
negotiation (contradicting General Mills’ assessment, above, that this was an Afghan 
negotiation); or if we aggregate international efforts and the Afghan Government into 
one conflict party. Recalling chapter one, the definitive characteristic of an MHS is the 
inability to bear the costs of further escalation strongly implied but not conclusively 
defined within the theory as military casualties or loss of equipment. Since data on 
military casualties is the most readily available, and reporting confirms that Taliban 
and other parties to conflict went to extreme lengths to inflict damage on both 
international and Afghan forces, it is assessed here.  
A tactical switch from conventional attacks towards Improved Explosive 
Devices heralded some terrible ingenuity from the Taliban, who went to extraordinary 
lengths to exploit local communities. For example, on 7th July 2007, men paid a young 
boy to push a cart into a bakers’, before triggering a bomb with a phone.824 IEDs 
caused increasing casualties, especially stark in the early years: of the 21 men who lost 
their lives in Helmand in 2006 there was only one instance of death by IED and one by 
                                                     
822 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
823 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
824 Kemp and Hughes, 2009, op. cit., p. 250-1. 
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suicide bomber; in 2008 the insurgents carried out 3276 bombs attacks.825 Helmand, 
and Sangin in particular, were focal points for violence: for example, in February 2009, 
39 per cent of everything [in terms of violent incidents] that happened throughout the 
whole of Afghanistan happened in Helmand, while in late 2008 “66% of the command 
wire [IED] devices in Afghanistan [located or activated] were to be found within 500m 
of the patrol base in Wishtan,” which guarded the eastern approach to Sangin.826 
These vignettes do suggest local Hurt originating in Sangin but they offer just a 
snapshot. A more comprehensive review, set within the wider campaign, follows. 
Figure 23: Number of Afghanistan UK Military and Civilian casualties 7 October 2001 
to 31 December 2014.827 
                                                     
825 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., pp. 93-4. 
826 Southby-Tailyour, 2010, op. cit., p. 40, p. 171.  
827 UK Government, "Official Statistics Op Herrick Casualty and Fatality Tables: 2014," H.M. Government, 
2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/op-herrick-casualty-and-fatality-tables-released-in-
2014(accessed 12th December 2015).  
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2009 and 2010 were the most costly for British personnel, showing that the 
times leading up to and around the Sangin Accord were the most hurtful for the UK, 
when considered across the whole area of operations – or as a national contingent. 
This raises the level of analysis above the local, however, but gives context to Sangin-
specific data and demonstrates the intensity of conflict there. There were 3,403 
coalition fatalities across the rest of Afghanistan, from 2001-2015.828 When assessed 
by year and by province (2001-11), Helmand is by far the most deadly, with 33% of the 
fatalities nationally across that timeframe (921 of 2761), similar in magnitude to the 
next three most deadly provinces combined (Kabul, Kunar, and Kandahar).829 Over the 
14 years of conflict, the UK suffered the following levels of annual fatalities: 2001-5; 0, 
3, 0, 1, 1 (5 years, total 5); 2006-8; 39, 42, 51 (3 years, total 132); 2009-10; 108, 103 (2 
years, total 211); 2001-12; 46, 44 (3 years, total 90); 2013-15; 9, 6, 2 (3 years, total 17), 
clearly showing the heightened totals in 2009-10.830 Of the 180 months covered by 
those records, the most deadly six months (3% of the timespan) – which as set out 
later in this section were all in 2009 and 2010 – accounted for 15% of the fatalities. 
Statistics for Sangin District specifically are hard to corroborate, partly because not all 
fatalities are recorded with the same location terminology: the terms North Helmand, 
Helmand Province, Sangin District, and Sangin, are all in use.831 Official statistics on UK 






                                                     
828 iCasualties.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Deaths by Year, in Afghanistan," 2015, 
http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx(accessed 12th December 2015).  
829 iCasualties.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Deaths by Province, in Afghanistan," 2015, 
http://icasualties.org/oef/ByProvince.aspx(accessed 12th December 2015).  
830 iCasualties.org, 2015, op. cit., http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx.  
831 On US fatalities see for example The Washington Post, "Faces of the Fallen," 2015, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/national/fallen/(accessed 20th December 2015). The search term 
“North Helmand” returns 400 results, “Sangin District” 70, and “Sangin” 3. 
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Figure 24: Number of Afghanistan UK Military and Civilian fatalities 7 October 2001 
to 31 December 2014.832 
Media reporting, speaking of the forces centred in Sangin, confirmed that in 
March 2010 “half of all UK casualties occur in this one area of operations, with about 
one tenth of Britain's forces in Afghanistan deployed in it.”833 An exact analysis is 
complicated by the fact that the military battlegroup responsible for Sangin at times 
controlled forces in neighbouring Kajaki District, and so there can be reporting 
confusion between Sangin town, Sangin District, and the area of operations allocated 
to the battlegroup based in Sangin. Confirming the number of Afghans killed and 
wounded – both Taliban and ANSF – is even more problematic, and the direct 
comparisons required for assessing an MHS are significantly weakened by almost an 
complete lack of clarity over places, years and dates. A detailed study by academics at 
Brown University suggests that there were some 40,470 ANSF (23,470 killed, 17,000 
                                                     
832 UK Government, 2015, op. cit., https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/op-herrick-casualty-and-
fatality-tables-released-in-2014.  
833 Urban, 2010, op. cit., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/03/the_ingredients_making_sangin.html.  
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wounded), and 50,000 Taliban and other militant casualties (35,000 killed, 15,000 
wounded), from 2001-2014.834 
Verifiable data for Taliban and other casualties in Sangin is not available, so this 
analysis relies on perceptions from the primary sources. Only once source uses 
language that correlates closely to the term Hurt, so central to Zartman’s theory. One 
elder had “seen lots of disputes in Sangin District in which both sides killed each other 
a lot, and at the end, the pain of violence motivated them to negotiate.”835 Others 
refer to tiredness, aligning with additions to Ripeness theory that offer the 
“opportunity for improvement, but from a tiring rather than a painful deadlock.”836 
One source asserts “that the Alikozai Taliban became tired of fighting and airstrikes; 
Afghan forces and ISAF forces also became tired of fighting and local villagers in 
Sarwan Qala were dreaming of peace and no fighting at their area.”837 Another 
interview highlights an inability to escalate, suggesting a close parallel with the 
conditions required for part of the Mutual Hurting Stalemate: “both sides were tired of 
fighting without any result because both sides didn’t have that much power to go 
forward.”838 Sadly, this recollection is not dated, and therefore cannot be correlated 
with ISAF sources to test the presence of an MHS. These sources offer the most 
evidence available to test the applicability of Zartman’s original theory, and alongside 
the wider trends, support the premise that military-focused Hurt in Helmand and 
Sangin was significant within the wider campaign. Across the whole country, the 
deadliest months (in order) were: June, July and August 2010, followed by August, July 
and October 2009. Hurt for the international force was therefore highest just after the 
time of the May 2010 letter just before the Sangin Accord.839 Core Ripeness theory 
                                                     
834 Neta C. Crawford, "War-Related Death, Injury, and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001-
2014," 2015, 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War%20Related%20Casualties%20A
fghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%202001-2014%20FIN%20%288%29.pdf(accessed 20th December 2015). 
p. 18. 
835 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
836 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
837 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
838 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
839 iCasualties.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Deaths by Month, in Afghanistan," 2015, 
http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByMonth.aspx(accessed 12th December 2015).  
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would suggest that – from the data available – this is the most likely time for Hurt to 
trigger negotiations, but without comparable Afghan-focused data is not possible to 
confirm the presence of an MHS at that time. 
Other Afghan interviewees state that [US-led] escalation was itself a motivating 
factor for agreement. The local element of the ISAF push northwards in summer 2010 
was named Operation SANGIN SUNRISE. A local elder felt that “the plan for military 
action in Sarwan Qala affected the negotiation significantly – the Taliban thought to 
make a fake agreement with the Afghan Government to prevent the operation.”840 
Another explained that the declared intent to bring a large US-UK-Afghan force into 
the rural areas further up the Sangin Valley ensured that “the Alikozai Taliban in 
Sarwan Qala feared defeat.”841 This was likely informed by events that took place in 
spring 2010 further south in Helmand, as “when we [the Afghan Government] 
launched [military] operations in Marjah and Garmsir, lots of Taliban were killed and 
those who survived escaped from the district. Then they realized that they cannot 
defend against our operations [in Sangin].”842 This was Operation MOSHTARAK, a 
larger push to consolidate control in the more populous areas of central Helmand.843 
These operations displaced fighters, including to Sangin; local people reported to the 
District Stabilisation Team in February 2010 that over 70 fighters from Marjah had 
arrived, and they conducted a complex, sustained, night-time attack on multiple ISAF 
locations just days later.844 If perceptions from later in 2010 are prioritised, then (if all 
                                                     
840 Primary Source PS-15. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
841 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-15. 
842 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
843 Ian Drury, "British Troops Launch Major Taliban Assault in Insurgents' Heartland," The Daily Mail, 5th 
February 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1248583/British-troops-launch-major-Taliban-
assault-insurgents-heartland.html(accessed 19th July 2015). ; Theo Farrell, "Appraising Moshtarak: The 
Campaign in Nad-E-Ali District, Helmand," RUSI Briefing Note, June 2010, 
www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Appraising_Moshtarak.pdf.  
844 Participant observation by the author while in Sangin, February 2010 (date illegible in my notebooks). 
In addition to other local reports, a numerate and educated Afghan government official screeched to a 
halt in his car and begged a District Stabilisation Team foot patrol not to go further into the town, urging 
us to warn ISAF that 70 armed Taliban from Marjah were moving through the area and attacks would 
occur that night. This proved to be accurate.  
An official report assessed that “following the removal of significant Taliban strongholds in Marjah and 
Mad Ali district in Operation MOSHTARAK, Sangin District represents essentially the last significant safe 
haven for the Taliban insurgency in the province and provides a key Taliban supply route. There are 
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international and Afghan Government forces are considered one coalition, and 
compared to local Taliban) this capacity to bear the costs of renewed military effort 
and to escalate would disprove the presence of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate and 
suggest that the Sangin Accord was – for those sources – a conflict management 
exercise, lacking the genuine intent to resolve the conflict. If constructed in spring 
2010 between UK and Afghan forces together in one conflict party, in relation to the 
Alikozai Taliban as another, then an MHS looks more likely from the case study. 
Policy decisions, rooted in ISAF-wide doctrine, may have directly accentuated 
conditions for a stalemate, assisting in analysis of the MHS (applying additions to 
Ripeness theory that allow an MHS to be constructed from the aggregate of a range of 
military and non-military factors). The decision (in line with doctrine to focus on the 
populous areas) to consolidate and prioritise central Helmand resulted in “economy of 
force operations in Musa Qala and Sangin,”845 bringing both towards the definition of 
fringe areas set out at the start of this thesis. While credible data for Afghan forces is 
not readily available, the state of the Afghan National Police in Sangin in 2010 suggests 
and that an assessment of resource levels plays an important part in constructing an 
MHS.846 In March 2010 – just before the written offer of peace arrived, and as the 
District Governors changed over – officials reported that “just 76 Afghan National 
Police are in place against a tashkiel [officially allocated total] of 202, though 33 are 
expected over the next few weeks from the interim Helmand Police Training Centre 
(50 others have been in Shah Kariz and the remaining 41 are unaccounted for).”847 
Those allocated to the Shah Kariz militia worked for Musa Qala’s allegedly reintegrated 
Taliban District Governor, Mullah Salaam.848 An ISAF official with knowledge of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
signs that Op MOSHTARAK has displaced some insurgents to the area” (quote from FOI-10, Undated 
(but from 2010). 
845 Southby-Tailyour, 2010, op. cit., p. 264. 
846 Low resource levels have been cited as a key reason for failure to achieve the required political 
outcome in Iraq. This is explained in the context of counterinsurgency theory, rather than negotiation 
theory, in Warren Chin, Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq (DTIC 
Document, 2008), pp. 132-3; Warren Chin, "Colonial Warfare in a Post‐Colonial State: British Military 
Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan," Defence Studies vol. 10, no. 01-02 (2010), p. 242. 
847 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
848 Local assessments on Mullah Salaam’s significance vary. “It was a big loss for Taliban.” Primary 
Source PS-28, between 40-49 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Barakzai  tribe. Local to Sangin? 
Local - District. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-28.  
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background reported that “when we disarmed them in 2010 there were 35 of them – 
given that a fair few were killed in the final battle, others would have fled the district 
and others would have been on R&R I suspect total numbers were probably around 
80.”849 While unconfirmed, that source thought the use of Sangin’s ANP allocation was 
“a combination of pragmatism to get some forces to Shah Kariz [after one of the rare 
publicised reintegration events in Helmand in nearby Musa Qala] and 
personal financial interests of the two respective District Governors.”850 With ANP 
salaries worth around $150/month, if true, these 165 unfilled posts would have been 
worth some $300,000 per year to whoever drew the salaries. It is likely that the 
absence of those policemen increased the perceptions of Hurt felt by those aligned 
with the Afghan Government. This suggests that resource distribution is an important 
area for study in the context of Ripeness.851 
Chapters five and six show how important improvements in government 
capacity were for establishing the conditions for the Sangin Accord. The application of 
additions to Ripeness theory to the case study introduces a more useful theoretical 
explanation by linking military activity more directly to the political goals of 
counterinsurgency than Zartman’s original theory allows. Stathis Kalyvas’s argument is 
powerful: 
Insurgency can best be understood as a process of competitive state 
building rather than simply an instance of collective action or social organization. 
State building is the insurgent’s central goal and renders organized and sustained 
                                                                                                                                                           
“He was a big commander in the [Soviet] jihad” but was a junior commander in the Taliban with only 
about 20 fighters.” Primary Source PS-26. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin 
Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 2013.  
When “Mullah Salaam joined the Afghan government it was not a big loss for Taliban, because Taliban 
can create 100 other Mullah Salaam in one day and didn’t cause us much trouble” Primary Source PS-34, 
between 40-49 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Alizai tribe. Local to Sangin? Local - Province. Self-
identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. This source is anonymised, 
and given the label PS-34. 
849 ISAF official, background conversation 22nd May 2012. 
850 Ibid. 
851 The role of private contractors in compensating for resource shortfalls is an important extension for 
this line of analysis, shown eloquently in James Dunsby, "The Changing Role of Contractors in Security 
Transitions in Southern Afghanistan," in At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and 
Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, ed. Timothy Clack and Robert Johnson, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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rebellion of the kind that takes place in civil wars fundamentally distinct from 
phenomena such as banditry, mafias, or social movements.852 
The capacity of governments now becomes a factor that can be incorporated 
into the Mutually Hurting Stalemate, since – as shown earlier – strengthening the 
Afghan state was a declared goal of the international campaign. The additional 
flexibility in additions to Ripeness theory also allows relative calculations about 
capacity between rival actors, each claiming the right to govern, to be included within 
a wider group of factors contributing to both the Way Out and the MHS.  
In early 2010, the official Afghan Government presence in Sangin consisted of: 
a District Governor (with 4 house staff), a Mayor (no staff), a National Directorate of 
Security officer (and less than 10 officers), a Chief of Police (with 30 active, present 
policemen from a maximum establishment of around 202) and an Army commander 
with some 400 active, present soldiers and officers (from a maximum establishment of 
some 700). Ten local elders advised the District Governor, and from their number 
came a development and construction project manager, and a former teacher to 
address education. Health care was provided through the Health Ministry by the 
Bangladeshi Non-governmental organisation, BRAC.853 In Sangin District, this was one 
clinic running sporadically in the town centre.854 There are three methods in which this 
data can be factored in to MHS calculations. Firstly, the difference between public 
aspirations (or expectations) of government, and the reality, constitute Hurt by 
affecting public engagement with official institutions. This can be manifested both as 
an unwillingness to work for those organisations, to access the services, or to support 
their aims as a negotiating party. Second, international expectations about Afghan 
Government capacity may, if disappointed, affect willingness to support them, or 
increase the attractiveness of more immediate service delivery mechanisms that side-
line official organisations. Thirdly, adverse calculations about the capacity of Afghan 
Government-administered areas, relative to that offered by Taliban (shadow) 
                                                     
852 Kalyvas, 2006, op. cit., p. 218. 
853 BRAC, "Annual Report: Afghanistan 2014," 2014, 
http://www.brac.net/sites/default/files/ar2014/BRAC%20Afghanistan%20AR%202014.pdf(accessed 
20th December 2015).  
854 Data on the structure and number of Afghan government officials in this paragraph comes from 
Participant Observation from 2009-10 confirmed multiple interviews and visits during the author’s time 
in Sangin. 
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governance, cause Hurt where mission success ultimately relates to an eventual 
handover of control to an Afghan Government perceived as legitimate in Afghanistan 
and by overseas observers. 
This same method applies to international capacity. While UK military doctrine 
was clear that to reach a political accommodation “all protagonists must eventually 
understand one another’s objectives and aspirations, and that they will have to make 
accommodations,” the capacity to do has been questioned.855 Anthony King assessed 
(based on research largely from 2008-9), that “officers tend to be more comfortable 
with military action than with considering the political consequences of their 
actions.”856 Diplomatic efforts also faced challenges of comprehension, and soon after 
arriving in 2006 there had been a view among some officials that Sangin should be 
handed over to the ANP and ANA to control because of the complex nature of the 
tribal system.857 What is clear from Afghan sources is that in later years, around the 
Accord, the reputation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team for project delivery 
played a positive role in creating shared positive horizons. Four interviewees describe 
how “the good job of PRT in Marjah, Garmsir and other districts really encouraged the 
elders and Taliban in Sarwan Qala to get ready for making an accord.”858 One goes 
further suggesting that “the only reason that Alikozai elders in Sarwan Qala area 
worked to make this accord happen was to bring PRT construction projects to Sarwan 
Qala.”859 Elsewhere a surge in military activity tended to be followed by a surge in 
reconstruction effort. Having watched this occur across Helmand, Sangin’s Alikozai 
may have first “decided to have construction and development projects without any 
                                                     
855 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 4-10. 
856 King, 2010, op. cit., p. 324. 
857 Rayment, 2008, op. cit., pp. 173-4,. 
858 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-2: “the PRT actions on building and constructing affected to the 
negotiation and making the accord.”  
ISAF General Richard Mills echoed this point after the Sangin Accord, saying “I believe many of the 
Afghans in Sangin look to successful areas such as Nawa and Lashkar Gah and they want that same 
progress in their district. They want schools, medical clinics, and the freedom to move about without 
fear of the insurgency.” ISAF Joint Command, 2011, op. cit., http://www.rs.nato.int/article/isaf-
releases/afghan-coalition-leaders-broker-peace-deal-in-sangin.html.  
859 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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[military] operations.”860 From a theoretical standpoint (but only in an MHS 
constructed using additions to Ripeness theory), it appears possible to consider 
reconstruction elements as part of a Mutually Enhancing Opportunity (in which local 
needs were met while also progressing the Kajaki Dam electricity project important for 
the ISAF campaign objectives), and as a cause of Hurt for the Taliban administration – 
as local communities were demanding construction projects of a scale and complexity 
that only ISAF could deliver. This technical shortcoming undermined local perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the Taliban administration relative to the ISAF-backed Kabul 
authorities. But there were other factors also affecting trust legitimacy calculations, 
notably historical legacies, money and narcotics. 
Additions to Ripeness enable a third element, illustrated by primary sources, 
shedding light on a more complex picture about where the impetus to negotiate 
originates, and in what form. The case study suggests that the pressure to negotiate 
was generated by local communities and applied to their elders. This falls outside the 
boundaries of Zartman’s core theory, in which military leaders are typically the agents 
of perception that matter most. For one government official, the discussions with 
elders that led to the Sangin Accord were primarily “for preventing civilian casualties 
during the [military] operations in Sangin, and for bringing development projects to 
the Sarwan Qala area for the benefit of local villagers.”861 The elders’ mediation role 
extended in both directions since “the local elders’ pressure [also] made the Taliban 
commanders agree to negotiate with Afghan Government.”862 For additions to 
Ripeness theory, this sort of pressure exerts Hurt, potentially offsetting any disparity in 
objective military advantage. Evidence suggests that this was related to wider efforts 
to use all possible means to increase the Alikozai hold on territory in Sangin, and to 
expel foreign elements from the area. Previously, Alikozai elements let “foreign Taliban 
come to Sarwan Qala and fight against the Afghan Government and foreign troops”863 
but by 2010, with local Taliban control slipping, one suggested motivation for the 
                                                     
860 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
861 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
862 Primary Source PS-3. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
863 Ibid. 
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Accord is that “foreign Taliban in Sarwan Qala and Pakistani Taliban planned to attack 
the Alikozai Taliban in Sarwan Qala and disarm them, so they joined the Afghan 
Government and got the support of Afghan Government and ISAF.”864 If true, this 
offers the perspective that ISAF had no direct role in the Hurt calculation underpinning 
the decision to negotiate the Accord. Instead it appears to come from Taliban based 
outside Helmand and across Afghanistan’s borders, is felt by locals, and is transmitted 
to their representatives who seek a protective agreement with their government and 
international forces. One source states directly that a major factor was “the pressure 
of the local villagers on [local Alikozai] Taliban to negotiate.”865 In this scenario, the 
Accord would be classified as a conflict management negotiation triggered by power 
perceptions between the Alikozai and other Afghan groups, rather than a genuine 
conflict resolution negotiation related to a Ripe Moment.  Within that, the relationship 
between the Afghan Government (and its Western backers), and the Alikozai, was as 
providers of positive psychological horizons based on protection and public service 
provision. According to theory, this would be more akin to a Mutually Enhancing 
Opportunity, since the Accord also offered the Afghan Government and ISAF the 
chance to achieve campaign objectives – such as access to the Kajaki Dam project, 
flood defence improvements, and other actions designed to foster the legitimacy and 
capacity of the Host Nation government. 
 
Implications for the Way Out 
Chapter one explains that the Way Out has little theoretical definition beyond a 
shared perception that both sides are prepared to look for one with genuine intent. 
Events outlined in chapters two, three and four, show that there were long historical 
trends suggesting that both outsiders and a government based in Kabul might not be 
trustworthy negotiating partners. At the local level, there were also reasons why locals 
lacked confidence in the intentions of their government. Taliban commander [name 
removed] said “really we became tired of the cruelties of the local government and 
foreign troops at that time, and then we decided again to take weapons and stand 
                                                     
864 Ibid. 
865 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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against [them].”866 This suggests that some in Sangin “were not ideologically Taliban 
commanders.”867 British officials had drawn much the same conclusion, assessing in 
January 2011 that the “Alikozai were not natural Taliban sympathisers. Large numbers 
had sided with the insurgency as a reaction to criminal behaviour perpetrated or 
allowed by previous provincial and/or district administrations.”868 Government 
resources had also allegedly been misappropriated by officials, and abused for 
commercial gain – including narcotics production: “Sangin District has lots of land 
belonging to Afghan Government, but those who had power in that area used those 
lands for growing poppy.”869  
Opium was woven tightly into the economic fabric of the insurgency, and – 
given the problems outlined earlier with the irrigation and river systems required for 
sustainable licit crop production – remained one of the few dependable crops, 
regardless of political leanings.870 Opium connected local events to globally significant 
trends: in 2011 the United Nations assessed that Afghanistan was the centre of global 
heroin manufacture871 accounting for up to 85% of production.872 Helmand Province 
was at the core of the global trade in Afghan opiates, with Sangin a significant site for 
poppy growth and processing.873 It is therefore impossible to disconnect political and 
military events from the opium trade. As early as 2007 the threat of poppy eradication 
by government forces existed – and this may have been a factor in the Musa Qala and 
agreement, and the so-called Levée-en-Masse in the Sangin Valley that same year – 
                                                     
866 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
867 Ibid. 
868 FOI-15, 12th January 2011. 
869 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
This allocation of land relates to the order of the district within the official classification under the 
constitution, outlined in chapter 2. 
870 For the relationship with the Taliban, see Gretchen Peters, "How Opium Profits the Taliban," United 
States Institute of Peace, 2009, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf(accessed 20th December 
2015).  
871 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment," 
UNODC, 2011, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/Global_Afghan_Opium_Trade_2011-web.pdf(accessed 20th December 2015). p. 5. 
872 Ibid., p. 143. 
873 Ibid., p. 142. 
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and altered perceptions of the government and ISAF.874 This relationship is reflected in 
primary sources relating to the Sangin Accord, with four accounts suggesting when 
combined that motivation for the Accord was partly driven by community pressure on 
the elders to protect their opium interests, and sanctioned by at least one Taliban 
official near the top of the entire organisation.875 Poppy was an important source of 
financing for the insurgency, but it also had a significant impact on the governance 
structures the international coalition aimed to engage with and bolster, and in turn the 
likelihood of the Way Out emerging. As Nick Kay, the UK regional co-ordinator for 
southern Afghanistan stated in 2006: 
“Significant elements of the provincial leadership and institutions are so 
enmeshed with criminal and insurgent interests that it is difficult to draw 
distinctions between legal and criminal structures – a particular challenging 
situation in the context of a counterinsurgency where perceptions of the state’s 
responsiveness and legitimacy are critical to the extension of its moral and political 
authority”876 
The picture was not so clear-cut when also considering the impact on local 
communities. Successful policies to reduce opium production were fundamentally 
bound up with the delivery of improvements to other areas of public service, since 
“illicit drug crop cultivation supported an improvement in the welfare of parts of the 
rural population in Afghanistan,” allowing “those in the desert areas of south and 
southwest Afghanistan to acquire land and assets that they would not have realised if 
opium poppy were not illegal.”877 
                                                     
874 On Helmand’s eradication activity in 2007 see for example Ahto Lobjakas, "Afghanistan: 
Multipronged Drug-Eradication Effort Set for Helmand," Radio Free Europe, 30th January 2007, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1074381.html(accessed 20th December 2015).  
875 On protection of poppy crops under the Accord, see Primary Source PS-30. Self-identified role: 
Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
And Primary Source PS-27. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
On senior leadership approval for the deal, following community pressure, see Primary Source PS-18, 
between 30-39 years old. Ethnicity and tribe: Pashtun, Tribe Undeclared tribe. Local to Sangin? 
Undeclared. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-18.  
Also Primary Source PS-28. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th 
Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
876 David Slinn and Michael Ryder, quoted in Farrell and Gordon, 2009, op. cit., p. 668. 
877 Alex Marshall, Grasping the Links in the Chain: Understanding the Unintended Consequences of 
International Counter-Narcotics Measures for the EU (EU Community Research Development 
Information Service (CORDIS): University of Glasgow, 2015). 
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A Way Out included visible evidence of government commitment to operate in 
an area. Expanding the government presence to counter the shadow government 
often meant acquiring local buildings and converting them into public facilities. But 
repercussions were a constant fear for those involved in such transactions. A case from 
Zabul is typical. Offered the colossal sum of $50,000 for a building the owner said 
“even if you offer me double that I’ll not do it because the Taliban will kill my 
children.”878 In Sangin in 2010, after an apparently legitimate transaction validated by 
the local authorities, construction began on a new military outpost. Like wildfire, a 
rumour spread that the buildings had collapsed a hidden library, destroying 1,000 
Qur’ans. A large agitated mob surrounded the District Governor’s building and 
widespread armed repercussions were considered imminent. A quickly organised 
delegation of elders, mullahs and officials disproved the story, but similar incidents 
elsewhere had led to open conflict and loss of life.879 This presented a severe challenge 
to the international community: to direct funding through the Afghan Government, or 
enter into direct contracts for reconstruction projects? The UK’s Department for 
International Development channelled more than 70 percent of its funding through 
the Afghan Government, at least until 2009.880 Coalition-wide, the quantities were 
enormous, with both positive and negative impacts on government reputation. For 
example, the US Army’s Commander’s Emergency Relief Fund (CERP), a source of 
financing for reconstruction and development programs to be spent discretionally by 
commanding officers in the field, increased from zero in 2003 to 1.2 billion dollars in 
2010.881 This approach was codified in the US Army’s Commander’s Guide to Money as 
                                                     
878 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., p. 106. 
879 This incident occurred during the author’s service in Sangin, 2009-10, and is recounted here as 
participant observation. In 2010 in Garmsir “rumors [sic] spread that American servicemen had 
desecrated a Koran and defiled local women in a nearby village. Taliban provocateurs on the scene 
whipped up a crowd and goaded it to violence, local officials said.” Dexter Filkins, "Deadly Protest in 
Afghanistan Highlights Tensions," 12th January 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?_r=0(accessed 25th July 2015).  Also 
Malkasian, 2013, op. cit., pp. 166-173. 
880 John Bennett, Country Programme Evaluation: Afghanistan, Ev969 (London: Department for 
International Development, 2009), p. ix. 
881 Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship 
between Aid and Security in Afghanistan," Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, 
MA, (2012), p. 13. 
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a Weapons System Handbook.882 Questions around capacity, and the source and use of 
funding, created perceptions that could be classed as Hurt for the official 
administration as it attempted to extend the public services required to generate the 
trust and legitimacy necessary to show that the formal government was a suitable 
partner for a political Way Out, or Mutually Enhancing Opportunity. 
The question of trustworthiness peppers the primary source material, 
especially in relation to the prisoner release condition that appears to coincide (as well 
as the evidence allows) with the opening of formal negotiations. The legacy of the 
unsupported 2007 uprising in the Sangin Valley remained potent. This lack of trust was 
a major hurdle that any accommodation building would need to address, since for one 
elder “from that time most of the Alikozai elders promised never to help the Afghan 
Government again.”883 There are sources to suggest that all sides displayed – at times 
– both genuineness, and alternatively no honest intent, to negotiate for conflict 
resolution. At least five sources are unequivocal that the sole “aim of negotiation for 
the Alikozai Taliban was to release Mullah [****], and nothing more.”884 An Afghan 
Government official with direct access to the Accord shared this fear, initially at least, 
for he “was afraid a bit that it might be the Taliban’s project to release their 
commander and then break the negotiation.”885 Another government official also 
expressed a clear temporary conflict management motivation for the Accord, recalling 
that “the Accord was a good chance for the Afghan Government to insert itself inside 
Sarwan Qala” since “before it was very difficult for Afghan forces to enter [that 
area].”886 One source suggests a joint collaborative aim, which for Zartman would be 
the shared and positive psychological state associated with a Mutually Enhancing 
                                                     
882 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) 
Handbook (US Army, April 2009). There is no equivalent counterinsurgency manual relating to longer 
term development planning or spending using military budgets. 
883 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
884 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. Also PS-15: “the main demands of the Taliban for doing negotiation was releasing of that man.” 
PS-13: “on Taliban side the main aim and propose was only releasing of Mullah [****].” PS-9: “It was a 
tactic of Alikozai Taliban for releasing a religious and important commander of Taliban from the 
government [name given in the original source].” PS-7: “All the negotiations and accords were planned 
by the Taliban only for releasing Mullah [****].” 
885 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
886 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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Opportunity. For just one man, “the aim of the Alikozai elders and the Afghan 
Government was to reduce the pain of violence, and the opportunity for both sides to 
get something better by working together.”887 
One Taliban source suggests mixed motivations, assessing that “the negotiation 
was a game [by] the Alikozai Taliban to release Mullah [****], though I accept that the 
Taliban also lost some parts of Sarwan Qala. That gave us disadvantages.”888 Two other 
sources offer joint motivations for the Sangin Accord, though these suggest shared 
negative reasons for the negotiation, indicating no genuineness on either side, and so 
a complete absence of Ripeness. An elder felt that “overall it was a game from both 
sides, the Taliban for releasing Mullah [****] and the Afghan Government for finding a 
safe way for entering Sarwan Qala. Both sides misused the Alikozai elders.”889 For an 
Afghan Government military commander, both sides had a secret plan: the Taliban 
negotiated to stall or cancel the impending ISAF military operation, while the 
government sought to take the Sangin Valley without a fight.”890 The legitimacy of the 
elders acting as mediators is frequently cited as a reason for the perceived credibility 
of the Accord, in this case suggesting that respected intermediaries had a direct impact 
on individual assessments of the presence (or not) of a Way Out. Two sources offer 
negative assessments. The first outlines well-intentioned foreign forces misled by local 
contacts: “British troops were trying to find a solution to end the war in Sangin District 
but the elders who were advising them were not good people.”891 The second cites the 
disparity in intelligence and capacity between local intermediaries and the 
personalities in the local Taliban administration, recording that “because the 
negotiation was not done with clean hearts, the Taliban had a secret aim. Those elders 
who were the mediators between Taliban commanders and the Afghan Government 
were very simple people and they couldn’t analyze the aim of Taliban” – an outcome 
                                                     
887 Primary Source PS-13. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. ibid. 
888 Primary Source PS-8. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
889 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
890 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
891 Ibid. 
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accentuated by the fact that “the Afghan Government [were] not negotiating with the 
Taliban face to face” for the majority of the time.892 
Saunders defines “pre-negotiations” as “the parts of the negotiating process 
that take place before around-the-table negotiation begins.”893 Afghan conflict 
“includes regular contact with enemy leaders (via telephone, letter or face-to-face),” 
often because of kinship and other ties.894 “Most conflicts end when one group 
switches sides or agrees to surrender” and Afghan conflict parties expect direct 
communication on these subjects.895 “Thus, the mere fact that our local partners are in 
dialog [sic] with the enemy is not an indicator, in and of itself, of disloyalty to the 
government.”896 This is challenging for some Westernised organisations, which 
typically handle such communications centrally, considering the opening or cessation 
of dialogue as significant indicators, perhaps of relative strength or perceived 
legitimacy. The generation of the Sangin Accord therefore attempted to boost the 
Afghan Government’s credibility, as the first step towards being a legitimate partner in 
a Way Out. For one source, this was helped considerably by long-standing ties: “we 
knew from the beginning that this project will happen, because the Taliban 
commanders that we spoke with were all from our area and we knew each other from 
many years ago. The Alikozai Taliban commanders respected us.”897 
Afghan Government officials went to significant lengths to validate the 
credibility of those they were dealing with. Both sides had a mixed record of 
manipulation, honesty, and switching allegiance, and individual interlocutors did at 
times exaggerate their political importance (the most famous of which was a 
greengrocer from Pakistan who convinced the intelligence services that he was the 
Taliban’s deputy leader interested in peace talks).898 According to one source, during 
                                                     
892 Ibid. 
893 Saunders, 1985, op. cit., pp. 252-3. 




897 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
898 Urban, 26th November 2010, op. cit., 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/markurban/2010/11/taliban_leaders_duping_of_mi6.html. This 
event could be used to ridicule one service, but “as Bill Harris a senior American official who had until 
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the Sangin Accord “there was one main group [of] five or six elders who were the 
Afghan Government’s main contacts to talk with the Taliban, but besides that the 
Afghan Government appointed many other different elders separately to follow this 
case and to investigate all the reports that the main group brought from the Taliban 
[and confirm whether it] was true or wrong information.”899 This involved up to five 
different groups of elders, totalling perhaps twenty individuals.900 All the groups were 
working secretly and each group didn’t know that others were also working on the 
same project – just one week before of the accord, [Afghan Government official – 
name redacted] brought us together to work as one.901 The due diligence appeared to 
worth it as “fortunately when these five groups brought information from the Taliban 
side, all the information from these five groups was the same,” showing that – despite 
a lack of leader-related data for the May 2010 timeframe – the genuine intentions of 
the Alikozai Taliban were both demonstrated and recognised in the months 
immediately preceding the January 2011 Accord.902 
 
Identifying the Ripe Moment 
Accurate, regularly validated insight into the mindset of conflict parties is 
essential for identifying a Ripe Moment. This case study would benefit from more data, 
covering the conflict parties’ psychological perceptions over a greater timespan. 
Ripeness theory is particularly focused on perceptions held by leaders, and that is an 
area of deficiency in the source material. Nevertheless, the absence of an intended 
military escalation, high casualty statistics (relative to the rest of the conflict), a recent 
catastrophe (the spring floods), and echoes of a previous disaster (the 2007 uprising) 
suggest the closest correlation with a Ripe Moment at the point that the Alikozai 
                                                                                                                                                           
recently been working in Kandahar pithily told The Times “something this stupid generally requires 
teamwork” (quote from the same source). 
899 Primary Source PS-16. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, 
interviewed. 
PS-4 recalled two or three groups of elders. PS-5 suggests three to four groups. PS-1 claimed 5 groups. 
900 PS-2 reported that “they didn’t know that there were 20 elders from their area working on the same 
project.” 
901 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
902 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
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Taliban letter arrived in May 2010. This assessment would be significantly 
strengthened by evidence that Afghan Government sources were in direct contact 
with the Alikozai Taliban prior to that letter reaching the Afghan District Governor, as 
this would lend credence to the idea that a Way Out had already been formed, but this 
is not available.903 Without that, it is not possible to rule out that the letter was a 
unilateral tactic. That letter might also have been the first step in attempting to form a 
Way Out, a test of credibility, or a secondary channel while the true [in a theoretical 
sense] Way Out was in fact constructed between the Sangin Alikozai and some other 
interlocutor. It is also possible that the weaknesses in the explanatory value of 
Ripeness theory shown here are partly weaknesses with this Western dataset.  It 
remains possible that an entirely Afghan process (and therefore dialogue) for conflict 
resolution was underway, and that data about a much richer Afghan political process 
remains uncollected.904 
The Afghan sources available here offer widely differing evidence about the 
point at which negotiations began, and differentiate poorly between communication, 
bargaining, and negotiation. The strength of the analysis is weakened considerably by 
the fact that none of the self-declared Taliban sources chose to comment on the 
timing question. Nevertheless, three Afghan sources with unclear alignment, or linked 
to the government, consider the negotiations to have started around spring 2010: one 
stated that “when our primary negotiation started there was no news of American 
troops coming to our district,”905 another that “when the beginning of the negotiation 
started, it was not clear that British troops would be leaving”906  and a third that “the 
beginning of the negotiations were months before the leaving of British.”907 These 
place the opening of negotiations approximately in spring 2010 or earlier. Accuracy is 
                                                     
903  Perceptions were partly informed by the 2007 uprising, reporting that “the elders went back to their 
districts, and after a week they called me on my mobile worried that we don’t leave them alone after 
the operation like [Provincial Governor] Wafa did.” Ibid.  
904 This relates to important research on variety of routes to stabilisation and peace, some of which do 
not require (or are not helped by) the actions of external actors. See chapters on indigenous and 
autonomous stabilisation in Christian Dennys, Military Intervention, Stabilisation and Peace: The Search 
for Stability (New York: Routledge, 2014).  
905 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
906 Primary Source PS-11. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
907 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
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difficult since rumours of the handover surfaced in January 2010, it was enacted in 
September, and the build-up of American Marines in Sangin would have been visible – 
to those with access to Sangin town – over the summer.908  
Phil Weatherill suggests that the Taliban’s use of a signed letter bestowed 
formality on the offer, but also implies that this was unilaterally offered, rather than 
negotiated. For Zartman, this would place it outside the Ripe Moment, but potentially 
in the formation of the Way Out. The offer would not itself illustrate the presence of a 
theoretical Way Out unless both parties considered that letter sufficient evidence that 
a genuine shared outcome aimed at conflict resolution was intended. This cannot be 
verified from the sources available here. That said, one of the key Afghan sources 
directly involved in the Accord shares the perception that the use of letters indicated a 
shift in sincerity:  “I felt that the negotiated solution to end the conflict in Sarwan Qala 
area was possible when the elders brought a letter from the Taliban.”909 It is also 
possible that the May 2010 letter was not widely known about in Sangin. Official 
reporting lends some weight to the argument for March 2010 correlating most closely 
with a Ripe Moment, highlighting features of a painful stalemate. That same month, 
diplomats assessed that “substantial change is unlikely, or a major reduction in 
casualty levels, without significant investment on security in the district from both ISAF 
and ANSF.”910 Using the data presented in this chapter, Ripeness theory would 
therefore indicate that if formal negotiations opened around that time, they conform 
to a reasonable degree with Zartman’s core theoretical requirements. Referring to 
Figure 10 (power and legitimacy conditions under which insurgents and regimes would 
consider entering into negotiations), and analysis of the same moment in May 2010 
using additions to Ripeness theory suggests two possible scenarios are credible. First, a 
mutual boost to legitimacy through negotiation, with a constant power dynamic (8A 
and 2B), perhaps because of the intersection between government stabilisation offers 
and military coercion, Alikozai needs after the flooding, and a desire to reduce military 
                                                     
908 Initial rumours: Starkey and Harding, 9th January 2010, op. cit., 
http://www.commondreams.org/news/2010/01/09/british-troops-set-hand-frontline-afghanistan-role-
us. Handover: Pannell. 
909 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
910 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
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pressure. The second explanation would be an increase in Afghan Government power 
and legitimacy at the direct expense of the Alikozai Taliban (1A and 1B). 
Other local sources considered that the negotiation process began roughly 2-4 
months before the Accord was announced in January 2011, correlating with public 
knowledge of the coalition intent to conduct joint US-UK military operations in Sangin 
in autumn 2010: “the secret negotiation started around three or four months before 
the accord happened”911 and “started when the [Afghan] Government planned to 
launch an operation in Sangin District.”912 Under the core theory this does not 
constitute a Ripe Moment. A stalemate might exist, but the impending military 
operation is a clear indication of escalation and so any temporary stalemate does not 
meet the definition of an MHS, as the pain of escalation is tolerable for at least one 
conflict party. For Zartman this would also rule out genuine intentions by that party, 
and place any negotiations opened at this point into the category of conflict 
management, in which temporary advantages are sought. One of the most well placed 
government sources with direct knowledge of the process links both moments:  
“our first conversation started around 7 or 8 months before [i.e. May or 
June 2010], and our serious conversations regarding making a deal started around 
three months before the accord day [i.e. October 2010]. Around three months 
before the accord day [4th January 2011] we understood that Taliban in Sarwan Qala 
were ready for peace.”913  
Another central Afghan Government source shares the view that more formal 
negotiations began much later than the spring letter, saying that “until three or two 
and half months before the accord, I didn’t believe that this accord would be done.”914 
A local elder also felt that “when the Taliban confirmed in a letter the will to negotiate 
with the Afghan Government, then we felt that this negotiation is possible. I don’t 
know the exact date but it was the last month of 2010” [i.e. December].915 Was a 
                                                     
911 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-2: “The talks started few months before the accord.” 
912 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
913 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
914 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
915 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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community meeting an essential indicator of the Way Out? That does not appear to 
have happened until December 2010, some seven months after a written offer was 
received. Assessments of the significance of silence, and indicators signposting 
transition from informal communication to formal negotiation need further testing 
against local practice, as “in Afghanistan, warfare is normally accompanied by direct 
messaging” occurring “partly because people across all factions of the insurgency and 
the government side are related to each other, have common district or tribal ties and 
know each other well, because many families have members on both sides.”916 
Importantly, assuming that sources favouring a late 2010 timeframe were also aware 
of the May 2010 letter, this would suggest the presence of factors in the interim 
period that qualified the earlier intentions into more formal, genuine overtures. 
Improvements to policy also offer evidence that could form part of calculations 
about the timing of a Ripe Moment. President Karzai made a brief appearance at the 
December 2010 reconciliation event in Kandahar “to express his personal support, and 
underscore that reintegration was a national priority” with the event serving “as a 
launch pad for the Governors of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Helmand and Nimroz to 
begin reintegration work in earnest.”917 At provincial level, sources suggest that the 
initiative was viewed with some scepticism, including by government officials. The 
“Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program was not a successful project in Helmand 
Province. We haven’t heard that a known Taliban commander came and joined this 
process;”918 it was “only a show and only spending money in a wrong way.”919 Officials 
suggested that “reintegration – in its formal structured sense – does not fit with 
current reality in the USV [Upper Sangin Valley], where communities still want to fight, 
                                                     
916 Kilcullen, 2009, op. cit., http://literature-index.wikispaces.com/file/view/Kilcullen-COIN+Metrics.pdf. 
p. 9. 
917 FOI-13, 9th December 2010. 
918 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-5. For a detailed analysis of the program’s difficulties, 
notably that “many shortcomings stem from the fact that the programs were shaped by the post-Bonn 
political context” (in which the Taliban were excluded from political discussions), see Deedee Derksen, 
"The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan," United States Institute of Peace, 2015, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/20/the-politics-of-disarmament-and-rearmament-in-
afghanistan(accessed 3rd December 2015). quote from p. 3. 
919 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
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even if it is to repel out of area fighters.”920 However, the wholesale co-option of 
communities remained a powerful solution, and so the Afghan Government continued 
with negotiations.  
Co-option hinged on achieving influence with vital community leaders since “in 
Afghanistan, especially in rural areas, actors who combine formal office with the 
legitimate political authority gained through local [sometimes, but not always, tribal] 
structures achieve higher levels of political centrality and therefore power, than those 
who have merely been appointed to public offices: political power is associated less 
with state apparatus and more with consent.”921 As a former Science teacher, who had 
taught the fathers of many fighters, DG Sharif brought both personal and 
organisational credibility that was fundamental to creating a Ripe Moment. Sharif’s 
legitimacy aligned strongly with one contact vital to the Sangin Accord: “Commander 
[name removed] was a teacher before he joined the Taliban and he had very open 
mind. There was not too much difference between his ideas and the Afghan 
Government’s ideas.”922 Within key members of the Afghan Government, the 
perception was that “the Taliban commanders who negotiated with us were not 
destroying Afghanistan; they only took up weapons to secure their areas.”923 
Local perceptions did not always align with the belief held within parts of ISAF 
that “while large-scale tribal settlements can offer big advances, the local impact on 
the insurgency and communities of taking mid-level commanders directly out of the 
fight should not be underestimated.”924 This type of targeting played a part in evolving 
the character of the Taliban movement. A Sangin elder described the impact of 
removing many of the original, likely older, members of the organisation: “In the 
beginning the Taliban had very good behavior towards people, solved the problems of 
                                                     
920 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. ibid. 
921 Personal communication with anthropologist and Afghanistan specialist Donald Bray, 11th July 2013. 
Donald is researching Socio-Political Organization in Contemporary Southern Afghanistan: 
Understanding Political Dynamics amongst the Helmandi Pashtun. See Cambridge University, 
"Biography: Donald Bray," 2015, http://www.polis.cam.ac.uk/Staff_and_Students/donald-bray(accessed 
11th May 2015).  
922 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
923 Ibid. 
924 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 4177/11, "Afghanistan/Helmand: Reintegration - Progress 
and Challenges," 7th March 2011. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-
14, 2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-17. See Annex A. 
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the villagers, and brought very good security. That was the reason why lots of villagers 
in north Helmand supported them. But now a different type of people joins the Taliban 
and they kill innocent people, disturb villagers and force them to pay taxes.”925 This 
change came at the same time as improvements to the Kabul administration’s 
presence outside the capital. For one source, “one of the reasons that locals stopped 
supporting the Taliban [in Sangin] and turned to the local government is because the 
local government became much better and found legitimacy among the people.”926  
These changes to legitimacy enabled an Accord “based on trust and honesty” 
underpinned by improving local confidence: “when villagers and Taliban commanders 
saw the [reconstruction] developments, their trust become more concrete.”927 
Alongside capacity, improvements in the trajectory of trust perceived by both sides 
were catalysed by effective discussions about side-issues. In this case, Afghan efforts 
to build the relationships that led to the Sangin Accord focused initially on renovating 
the shrine at Garm Ab, in the north of the District, believed to heal the body and wash 
away sin.928 Talks turned only to security and reconciliation and eventually to a formal 
Accord months later, when credibility and confidence allowed.929 This is the clearest 
evidence offered in the sources suggesting progress towards a Way Out. These 
conditions established an environment in which the power of the local elders to vouch 
for the government and then to mediate was strengthened, as first “the governor 
trusted the elders, then we trusted the commanders of the Taliban.”930 Afghan 
Government representatives then met “many times with different groups of the 
Alikozai in Sangin District” and the offer to open negotiations was made, accompanied 
by the request to release Mullah [****] outlined earlier, to confirm government 
                                                     
925 Primary Source PS-6. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared, interviewed 
2013. ibid. 
926 Ibid. 
927 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
928 Confirmed by three sources, ibid. Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of 
Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. Primary Source PS-7. Self-identified role: 
Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
929 Another example of such constructive dialogue was  the Taliban’s changing “approach to education 
and health [which] also demonstrated a degree of revision and pragmatism in synch – to an extent – 
with international priorities and those of the Afghan government” and represented “relatively neutral 
issues that could be built into the process, perhaps even as confidence-building measures.” Semple et 
al., 2012, op. cit., p. 10, p. 14. 
930 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
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genuineness.931 These events shifted perceptions, resulting in the vital moment where 
the parties decided to meet and negotiate about the substance of the Accord, 
indicated “when they [the Alikozai Taliban] showed a blue signal” [note: in Pashto the 
same word means blue and green].932 Under additions to Ripeness theory, the same 
progress could be counted as changes in the relative Hurt calculation, in legitimacy, 
and evidence of shared positive horizons. This correlates closely to the legitimacy 
conditions advanced by Druckman and Green under which a Ripe Moment exists – as 
set out in Figure 10 in chapter one, cell 1A – where the insurgents’ legitimacy and 
power is decreasing relative to the regime – indicating that additions to Ripeness 
theory can offer useful explanatory value in this case. There are also flaws with the 
capacity of Zartman’s theory to explain this local negotiated agreement; an 
assessment of these theoretical strengths and weaknesses, and some 
recommendations for policy makers, are set out in the final chapter.  
                                                     
931 Primary Source PS-2. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th 
Jan 2011 - Direct, interviewed 2013. 
932 Ibid. Also PS-15: “the main purpose of the Taliban for that accord was releasing of a Taliban 
commander who was called [name confirmed as the same in the original source]. PS-12: “the demand of 
the Taliban for the start of negotiation with Afghan government was the release of [name confirmed as 
the same in original source], who is the son of a respected religious man.” PS-5: “The first issue of the 
negotiation was the releasing of [name confirmed as the same], who was released by Governor 
Mangal.” Also PS-8, PS-9, PS-10, PS-11, PS-13, PS-16. 
Personal communication with Mike Martin, referenced elsewhere for his work on Helmand, confirmed 
that the word “shin” (or dialectic variants) in Pashto means both green and blue, hence the use of “blue 
signal” here, meaning the same as “green light” in English. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
The Sangin Accord: impact and legacy 
Six days after the public announcement of the Sangin Accord, the ISAF 
Commander US General David Petraeus visited Helmand to assess the agreement first 
hand. The official report of the visit records his comment, that “the peace accord 
represented a positive development. We should be cautious in our assessment and in 
moving forward, but should do everything possible to build on it.”933 Provincial 
Governor Mangal was “hopeful that the accord would prove durable, but sometimes in 
Afghanistan things [only] start well.”934 The international coalition now faced a 
conundrum: how to implement the agreed provisions effectively, and ensure that the 
Accord ultimately strengthened the Afghan Government’s bond with its people, in 
preparation for eventual withdrawal. Counterinsurgency doctrine captures this 
pressure: 
“Putting the host nation government in the forefront of any political and 
economic successes may necessitate having to play down the role of the coalition. 
However, balance is required since maintaining the acceptability of the coalition to 
the population is also important.”935 
Provincial Governor Mangal took a close co-ordinating role after the Accord, in 
the months ahead persuading “successive ISAF commanders to draw back from full 
combat operations in the USV [Upper Sangin Valley].”936 This was not a rejection of the 
importance of military power; on this he was consistently “emphatic, stating that 
military pressure on the leaders of the insurgency was critical to the success of the 
reintegration programme – which was to be financed largely by the Japanese 
Government.”937 Rather, the Governor was prepared to trade off the immediate 
military advantages (and progress on the Kajaki road and other construction projects), 
“believing that a negotiated communal settlement represents the best chance of 
                                                     
933 FOI-15, 12th January 2011. See also Heidi Vogt, "Petraeus Says Taliban Influence on Decline," 10th 
January 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/10/petraeus-says-taliban-weaker-
afghan-south/(accessed 6th January 2016).  
934 FOI-15, 12th January 2011. 
935 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 7-5. 
936 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
937 FOI-13, 9th December 2010. 
  Page 251 of 334 
 
sustained success” for the longer-term.938 One important reason for the delay was to 
allow the elders and leaders to undertake necessary communication with their 
communities, and other actors further afield.  Importantly, this involved Sangin’s 
representatives travelling to Pakistan to inform the Taliban’s senior leadership, who 
“didn’t have any information about the negotiation” until it was made public on 4th 
January 2011.939 Since this delegation was still underway 19 days later, according to 
official records, it demonstrates the importance of political control over military 
actions to provide the necessary patience for information and allegiances to cascade 
from the direct signatories to an agreement to others now bound by it. Records 
reported on 23rd January that “two key Taliban commanders were currently in 
Pakistan, and had told the Quetta Shura of their intent to cooperate with [the Afghan 
Government].”940 It is unclear from the sources who decided the Accord would be 
made public. The opportunity had enormous publicity value, but also brought great 
risk: according to one of the most credible primary sources, “Mullah Omar ordered the 
Quetta Shura to kill all those elders who were involved in the Accord, and also to kill 
the Taliban who were involved in the agreement.”941 
Physical intimidation, including murder, was a particular tactic of the Taliban, 
and they let it be known that there was a list of people marked for assassination. 2006 
saw 177 victims who had been deliberately singled out for the challenge their 
existence posed, including aid workers, doctors, teachers and journalists.942 One of 
Sangin’s few medical professionals, Dr. Esamodin, had also been assassinated in 2010 
for openly running a government-backed medical clinic.943 According to a primary 
source, on 4th January “the Afghan Government publicly announced all the elders who 
were involved in the negotiation. Some of the elders didn’t want their names made 
                                                     
938 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
939 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. 
940 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 1286/11, "Sangin Peace Accord," 23rd January 2011. 
Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd October 2014, and 
allocated source reference FOI-16. See Annex A. 
941 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. Also PS-8. 
942 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., pp. 130-1. 
943 Participant Observation for the author’s time in Sangin, 2009-2010. There were related rumours that 
Esamodin (who identified himself as a dentist) had misdiagnosed a young patient who died, and his 
death was partly a repercussion for malpractice. 
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public as government supporters; they became unhappy and left the meeting.”944 
Accounts vary on the number of elders associated with the Sangin Accord who were 
targeted, but between two and four seem to have been killed quickly – one the day 
before the public announcement,945 others within days, and at most, one or two weeks 
later.946 One source adds further tribal detail, suggesting “the elders who were killed 
were Taliban from the Ishaqzai tribe,” long-standing rivals of the Alikozai.947 If this is 
true, other explanations than the obvious are plausible, including that the Alikozai 
sought to prevent the expansion of the Accord’s provisions to other groupings. Either 
way, especially given recent memories of the 2007 uprising, it is unsurprising that 
there seems to have been some rapid re-assessments of personal appetites to be in 
the area: for one source, most of those elders who were involved in the negotiation 
were soon not living in Sarwan Qala948 while at the same time the Afghan Government 
“struggled to persuade civil servants to deploy to Sangin, citing staff concerns about 
security and safety.”949 This failure to deliver personal security severely hampered 
efforts to bolster Afghan capacity and the delivery of improved public services: one of 
the key clauses of the Accord.  
Delivering on the terms of the Accord 
Implementing the Accord required effective delivery in fields including 
reconstruction, governance, political reconciliation and security. Early interactions 
were cagey, with all sides appearing to seek further evidence of the others’ sincerity. 
The official assessment sums this up: “developing local infrastructure and providing for 
basic development needs will be an important confidence-building measure, but will 
need to be set in the context of security gains made under the accord.”950 At the heart 
                                                     
944 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-16. 
945 FOI-15, 12th January 2011. 
946 Afghan sources vary: PS-2: “four of the Alikozai elders who were involved in the Sarwan Qala accord 
were killed by the Taliban.” PS-12: “two or three of those elders were killed.” PS-29 reports the “murder 
and beheading of two elders from the Alikozai tribe who were key figures of this deal with foreign 
forces.” PS-30 describes two deaths: the “Taliban killed them, cutting their throats and beheading 
them.” 
947 Primary Source PS-30. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 
2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
948 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
949 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
950 FOI-15, 12th January 2011. 
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of this tense atmosphere was the need for unchallenged access to key sites, to 
undertake the promised reconstruction. While the international military forces could 
have gone where they wanted, and defeated any level of likely resistance, this would 
have undermined the shared intent behind the agreement, and so they paused: “a 
critical test of the Accord will ensue as we await evidence of secure access to assess 
the priority needs identified by the Shura and to monitor project implementation.”951 
The situation was severely complicated by the variety of identities in play, and the 
challenges for security personnel in distinguishing between local people – some of 
whom may not have heard of the Accord – and spoiling elements from further afield. 
Officials reported that “Quetta, working in cahoots with interested narco-barons and 
numerous other spoilers, makes no secret of its intent to destroy the peace 
process.”952 
At the time of the Sangin Accord, the state apparatus for handling wholesale 
shifts in allegiance of sections of the population (as opposed to individuals or small 
bands of fighters) was not in place. In December, Provincial Reconstruction Team 
reporting acknowledged this, noting that “Helmand did not have formal reintegration 
structures on the scale required for a community.”953 Nevertheless, Mangal pushed 
ahead. Officials felt that: 
“High-profile political processes would have greater impact than individual 
cases on public perceptions of security and prospects for sustained peace. While 
lack of national guidance can cause uncertainty, progress is being made by 
developing local solutions.”954 
On 27th February Governor Mangal “convened the Helmand Peace Council for 
the second time” but it was not until “the next day [that] reintegration support teams 
from five Districts came to Lashkar Gah to meet the newly appointed [Afghan] 
Provincial Reintegration Support Team.”955 Back in Sangin, early March saw a major 
advancement, with 15 Ishaqzai elders coming forward, “of whom six would liaise with 
                                                     
951 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 4206/11, "Afghanistan/Helmand: Sangin Peace 
Agreement," 8th March 2011. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 
2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-18. See Annex A. 
952 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. It is also reported that “what resistance there was appears to have been 
mounted by out-of-area fighters” in FOI-16, 23rd January 2011. 
953 FOI-14, 14th December 2010. 
954 FOI-17, 7th March 2011. 
955 Ibid. 
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[District Governor] Sharif on a day-to-day basis – from a community hitherto extremely 
reluctant to engage.”956 This was the first indication that the agreement might be 
expanded to include other groupings alongside the Alikozai; essential if the Accord was 
not to be inflammatory. 
Efforts to formalise governance were intimately linked to maturing security 
mechanisms, but there was a long way to go from the early kernels of the Accord. A 
shura on 3rd March 2011 appears to be a central event. First, it convened a shura 
representing Upper Sangin Valley Alikozai tribes, “marking an important stage in 
consolidating the January Sangin peace accord.”957 However, the shura only covered 
three of Sangin’s five administrative zones; Mangal’s commitment to form similar 
groups from communities in other zones was vital, as was his determination that these 
should eventually merge to form an interim administrative body.958 The security 
challenge was also significant; officials noted that managing “expectations in a 
populace still smarting from failure to support their anti-Quetta uprising in 2007 will 
prove difficult.”959 Effective counterinsurgency also required that, as far as possible, 
Afghan forces – or local community initiatives – should not be replaced by 
international forces, which would eventually leave. Governor Mangal was clear to 
Sangin’s communities that “long-term security is an Afghan responsibility that starts at 
local level,” describing at the 3rd March 2011 shura a trajectory that would see 
community defence initiatives stand up while ANSF capacity was increased over 
time.960 Scepticism over community security supported by outsiders ran deep, based 
on the legacy of history, including into Helmand’s political classes: MPs “thought 
communities in Musa Qaleh, Sangin and Now Zad had tried it, but it had been 
                                                     
956 FOI-18, 8th March 2011. 
957 Ibid. 
958 Ibid. 
959 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
960 FOI-18, 8th March 2011. On the realities of partnered ANSF development, see Oliver Lewis and 
Andrew Britton, "'Gripping and Touching' the Afghan National Security Forces," in At the End of Military 
Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, 
ed. Timothy Clack and Robert Johnson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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sabotaged by the internationals.”961 This same mistrust played a central role in 
affecting perceptions of the Accord’s duration.  
Assessing the durability of the Accord 
Whether the Sangin Accord lasted for any meaningful length of time affects the 
usefulness of the case study for future theoretical comparative studies greatly. 
Accounts of its duration vary considerably, from two to over 12 months. The Accord 
appears to have evolved over time through three ill-defined phases: the first of around 
two months, during which some early signatories left the process or were killed; then a 
renewal after six months, partly triggered by Taliban re-negotiation with the Alikozai; 
and a third phase involving attempts (by both the government and the Alikozai 
themselves) to extend the Accord to other groups and areas. Coverage from Afghan 
primary source material and public Western analysis ends in April 2012, preventing a 
credible assessment of the Accord’s end date – or confirmation of its survival. 
Six sources place the end of the Accord just one or two months after the 
agreement, with one considering it little more than a “symbolic accord, because after 
few months it was broken.”962 The two-month estimate coincides closely with 
Governor Mangal’s community shura in Sangin on 3rd March 2011, suggesting that this 
visit may have been to place fresh impetus behind a flagging agreement. Events had 
also affected perceptions held by military commanders, including the US Marine Corps 
officer in command of international forces in Sangin. He expressed his reservations in 
March 2011, saying that “while some are still optimistic that the agreement is in place, 
others, including me, are much more suspect about whether there actually is an 
agreement or if they are capable of upholding an agreement.”963 Two sources place 
the blame on all parties, stating: “both sides were not honest in their promises, I think 
half of those commanders rejoined with the Taliban. The development projects were 
going on for the few first months after the accord; then later those projects also 
                                                     
961 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 35298/07, "Afghanistan: Meeting with Helmand MPs, 23 
August," 26th August 2007. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 2nd 
October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-8. See Annex A. 
962 Primary Source PS-14. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-10: it “was not continued even for two or three months.”  
963 Associated Press, "Tribal Peace Deal in Afghanistan on Shaky Ground," 2nd March 2011, 
http://www.dawn.com/news/610079/tribal-peace-deal-in-afghanistan-on-shaky-ground(accessed 5th 
January 2016).  
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stopped.”964 Three sources felt that Taliban actions destroyed the Accord, lending 
weight to the accusation that they struck the agreement purely to secure the release 
of Mullah [****].965 Attacks on key community elders, including beheadings, played a 
role in this reassessment with one Taliban source confirming that renewed efforts to 
establish relations with the Alikozai were needed after the murders.966 For one source, 
the departure of some Taliban from the process triggered improved engagement with 
the Afghan Government: “after two months when the Taliban commanders who were 
involved in the accord returned back to Taliban, most of the villagers improved their 
support to Afghan Government.“967 For another, the Taliban withdrew specifically 
because the Afghan Government did not stand by their reconstruction promises.968  
Wallensteen’s research – if valid in this case study – suggests that progress on 
military co-operation would have been definitive for the duration of the Accord, 
concluding from a review of 144 civil war agreements that “less costly concessions by 
government of military integration and autonomy increase the duration of peace 
agreements, while political power-sharing provisions have a negative though 
insignificant impact on duration.”969 By June 2011, implementation issues dominated 
perceptions. The PRT reported that while the accord still held, “USV commanders 
expressed concerns with what they described as slow progress following the 1 January 
peace accord. Their main gripes are what they see as a lack of project delivery, ISAF’s 
unwillingness to work more closely with [them], detainee issues, and battle 
damage.”970 These points seem to have some merit, with the same report assessing 
that “governance in Sangin has progressed dramatically in the last half year, but 
delivery on stabilisation and development has lagged behind and cooperation between 
                                                     
964 Primary Source PS-12. Self-identified role: Government - Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-11: “These promises were given from both sides but 
unfortunately after around one and half months, all the promises were broken.”   
965 PS-13: “The Taliban broke the accord and broke their promises.” PS-28: “after two months the deal 
was cancelled and again the Taliban stood against the Afghan government and Americans.” Also PS-10. 
966 Primary Source PS-29. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th 
Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
967 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
968 Primary Source PS-14. Self-identified role: Other. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Post 4th Jan 2011 - 
Indirect, interviewed 2013. 
969 Derouen et al., 2009, op. cit., p. 367. 
970 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 1st January appears to be the date the Accord was privately agreed, with 4th 
January being the public announcement. 
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ISAF and USV commanders is in its infancy.”971 Diplomatic reporting highlights one 
instance where a mixture of factors had generated an impasse that could – with 
further corroboration – constitute an MHS under additions to Ripeness theory. 
Analysis from June 2011 concluded that “all sides find themselves in somewhat of a 
stalemate: ISAF doubting the value of the agreement given the recent rise in kinetic 
activity; the local commanders given the apparent lack of dividend for turning away 
from Quetta.”972  
Judged over the longer-term, the Accord generated visible progress in material 
areas that both improved the lives of local people, and met campaign objectives for 
the international presence. One source cites improved recruitment into the security 
forces, recalling that “after the accord lots of the villagers joined the ANA and 
Police.”973 Others prioritise the improved transport and public services, while just one 
describes the outcome of the Accord in terms that reflect Zartman’s Mutually 
Enhancing Opportunity, required to deliver stable longer-term horizons: 
“We have an asphalt road from Sangin to Kajaki; Taliban Commanders 
who were involved in the agreement are not receiving airstrikes anymore; and 
government troops do not come under attack from the Taliban in Sarwan Qala. I 
think this agreement and accord is for the benefits of all three groups who tried 
their best to make this agreement happen.”974 
Only one source corroborates that the Accord lasted for at least 12 months. An 
Afghan source with direct knowledge of the agreement recounted that “after one year 
of our accord with Taliban, I mean in January 2012, ISAF came to Governor Mangal and 
said that due to this accord or deal having been very successful we want to celebrate 
its first anniversary.”975 The same source reports that Mangal declined the offer. Given 
the repercussions for those involved when it was announced, this seems wise. A few 
months later, Sangin held its first elections since the Accord. Elections were a key 
objective for the international community, recognised as a significant sign of progress 
                                                     
971 Ibid. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Primary Source PS-10. Self-identified role: Government - Military. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 
4th Jan 2011 - Indirect, interviewed 2013. Also PS-1. 
974 Primary Source PS-5. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. Also PS-4. 
975 Primary Source PS-1. Self-identified role: Government Civilian. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Direct, 
from pre-4th Jan 2011, interviewed 2013. 
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and also a validation that security conditions had reached appropriate levels. The data 
below illustrates just how fragile the concept of democratic elections and public 
engagement with them really was in rural Afghanistan at that time:  
“The Sangin election shows the value of local political settlements. The 
agreement reached in January 2011 paved the way by enabling security to improve 
across much of the district. There appears to be a cumulative effect too, the 
numbers of voters steadily increasing from the first in 2008 (Nad Ali – 105) to the 
seventh in 2012 (Sangin – 1,995).”976  
Alongside the electoral success, the Accord stirred up the complex local 
political situation. While Mangal saw “the Sangin Accord as a model for wider outreach 
efforts across the province,”977 it required deft handling from Afghan officials. The 
turbulence was felt within the Alikozai tribe itself (recalling the dispute between 
generations for tribal leadership),978 and with rivals in the region – notably the Alizai 
from neighbouring Musa Qala.979 Alikozai sources were clear that any extension of the 
Accord should not alter the balance of power in Sangin, saying of the Alizai: “they 
should only live in Sangin District as villagers and residents not as [a] decision-making 
tribe.”980 Despite the exceptional complexity in managing these political nuances, 
officials recorded Governor “Mangal’s belief that it [the Sangin Accord] could become 
the gold standard for communal reconciliation in Helmand and elsewhere.”981 
 
Implications for scholarship 
The importance of history for theory iteration 
The central role played by historical influences in the Sangin Accord case study 
demonstrates that Governor Mangal’s stated intent to replicate that negotiated 
agreement more widely required Afghan officials to interpret expertly the relationship 
                                                     
976 FOI-21, 3rd April 2012. 
977 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
978 PS-12: “Alikozai elders in Sangin who were not informed of the making of that accord became 
opposed to the Alikozai elders from Sarwan Qala who did the negotiation without their permission of 
Alikozai elders in Sangin. Still there are tensions between these two groups.” 
979 Primary Source PS-4. Self-identified role: Elder. Awareness of Sangin Accord: Pre 4th Jan 2011 - 
Direct, interviewed 2013. The “Alizai tribe has lots of population in north of Helmand Province and they 
are trying to take control of Sangin District then they can own all the north of Helmand Province.” 
980 Ibid. 
981 FOI-19, 20th June 2011. 
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between history and the contemporary political and social context in which they 
operated.982 In the Sangin case, an understanding of ancient antecedents gave 
important context to the more recent grievances, perceptions of legitimacy, tolerance 
to Hurt, and persuasiveness of negotiating opportunities in play immediately prior to 
the Sangin Accord. 
A longer-term reading of the history sets out the extremely long-standing 
lineage of many influences that, if excluded, would undermine the credibility of a 
historical narrative about the Sangin case study. Since, as shown in chapters six and 
seven, these factors affect the presence of a Way Out, MHS and Ripe Moment to 
varying degrees, a recent history alone would be of restricted value as a basis for 
iterations to Ripeness theory. This places renewed importance upon historical 
scholarship to provide a foundation for later theoretical work focused on conflict 
zones. Chapter two outlined the impact of history passed through the generations on 
perceptions of influential social and political boundaries, and upon modern attempts 
to (re-)define areas of state responsibility or administration in Helmand Province. 
Geographical features, notably the Helmand River, influenced patterns of movement 
and affected engagement with urban centres including political capitals. This early 
history of the Afghans showed that the resistance to centralising authority experienced 
in recent times had long-standing roots, especially in rural or fringe areas – exemplified 
by the fractious interaction between the state and the region of Zamindawar in north 
Helmand over taxation, and also the Alikozai tribe’s experience of military conscription 
in the 19th Century. In the early decades of the Afghan state, few visible signs of local 
benefit from interactions with the formal administration – and the variable application 
of coercive or collaborative community control policies – heightened desire for 
autonomy, or resistance. These trends, beginning in the country’s early history 
remained influential upon the perceptions held by communities involved in the Sangin 
Accord. 
                                                     
982 The contemporary Afghan Government would need to overcome the failures of the Soviet era 
government, hamstrung by the fact that “whenever it did attempt to expand its influence in the 
countryside, imported naïve and often arrogant party workers from the cities, whose presence was 
often temporary, and who only alienated the local inhabitants from the central regime.” Alex Marshall, 
"Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and 
State Reconstruction," Small Wars and insurgencies vol. 18, no. 1 (2007), p. 71. 
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Chapters three and four show how important the preservation and later 
analysis of records relating to major reforms, and infrastructure projects, can be for 
understanding future conflict drivers. Attempts to operate in Helmand would be 
heavily undermined without a clear understanding the impact of the mid-20th Century 
Helmand Valley Authority irrigation projects upon water and land politics of the region 
(also crossing into neighbouring countries, like Iran). In turn, the implementation of 
such projects – and the consequences for local populations – is remembered by later 
generations, and features in contemporary legitimacy assessments that in turn affect 
support for central authority backed by foreign funds and personnel. The use of opium 
production as a valuable domestic source of revenue, diluting the power of foreign 
financial subsidy, and funding rival visions of government continued themes seen in 
the Soviet era. This demonstrates the importance of economic research, including illicit 
trade as well as the capacity for legal domestic productivity, for those explaining 
motivations to negotiate. 
The case study shows that historical research also plays an essential role in 
capturing the trajectory of perceptions over time, including identities, the strength of 
religious belief, and trust in local groups and governance mechanisms relative to those 
espoused by Afghans from further afield, and foreigners. This helps counter the 
weaknesses inherent in any analysis relying on snapshots in time, for both policy and 
theory generation. Similarly, a longer-term review of the history of Helmand warns 
against single label categorisations – such as Taliban – especially in fringe areas. Where 
state law and order provisions are unlikely to sufficiently protect those holding 
absolute positions, the value of social and political hedging incentivises the adoption of 
multiple identities and allegiances as a survival mechanism, as shown by multiple 
generations of people involved in the Sangin Accord. 
The events immediately prior to the Sangin Accord set out in chapters five and 
six show that approaches to generate negotiated agreement continue in the context of 
these longer-term historical drivers, and also influenced by distinctly recent 
approaches to governance, state-building, and the use of military force. Governor 
Mangal’s appointment of Mohammad Sharif as District Governor in Sangin illustrates 
the link between this nuanced understanding of historical context and political 
legitimacy. However, it also suggests that general characteristics of quality (such as 
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literacy) are significant, as important foundations for the added ability to discern which 
factors seen in the local context matter. Many of the indicators that suggested that 
District Governor was increasingly competent could be considered widely applicable: 
he was literate; consistent; financially transparent and even-handed; characteristics 
that would be respected across the world. Importantly, Sharif’s approach combined a 
variety of political mechanisms. These – as earlier references to Kilcullen suggest – 
maximised the efficacy of political action by prioritising the way in which it would be 
assessed and viewed by locals, whose views were in turn partially informed by recent 
experience and the historical record. The Afghan Government’s use of shuras and 
relationships with key elders, alongside elections and other state functions, shows how 
vital this portfolio of new and long-standing approaches was for finding the common 
ground between Western-backed organisations and locally-understood groups that led 
to the Sangin Accord. Official reporting from 2006 also identified and grappled with 
these implications. Engagement with the Afghan shuras ran in some ways “counter to 
policy agreed by the government and international partners” because: 
The model of governance enshrined in the constitution does not give a role 
to local shuras, which are unelected and accountable only to themselves. But shuras 
of tribal elders have a long history in Afghanistan and probably have more 
legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Afghans than the formal sub-national bodies.983 
The focus on understanding local perceptions of legitimacy as a central 
underpinning of success in Afghanistan gives further credence to the importance of 
understanding the historical record in conflict areas (as well as any outside observer, 
or direct participant can). The pragmatic option was “to use these shuras to help 
deliver government priorities for security and development, but without ceding too 
much autonomy.”984 Such hedging may have been prudent, as part of early steps 
towards building the opportunity to bring key individuals or communities into formal 
government structures through reintegration or reconciliation. It may also have had 
counter-productive side effects. The complex web of identities employed by the 
Alikozai and many others suggests that such mixed approaches may have created 
norms of interaction that did not encourage open declarations of support from local 
people. Especially after the announcement of the withdrawal of international forces, 
                                                     
983 FOI-2, 25th September 2006. 
984 Ibid. 
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political hedging strategies may have undermined the likelihood of a public ceasefire 
or peace agreement – or any other polarised, absolute position – since “the very way 
in which the power struggle is handled in preparation for independence [or in this 
case, transition of security control] is important in establishing the future rules through 
which power will be used and passed among the parties thereafter.”985  
While security and factors such as economics, infrastructure delivery, and land 
and water access were influential, the link between historical factors and the 
perceived legitimacy required to deliver the political objectives central to campaign 
success pervades the Sangin case study. The engagement between local people and 
armed groups over their desired outcomes from violent action was also significant.986 
The most powerful evidence to support the value of nuanced historical knowledge 
remains that political strategy on all sides prioritised the co-option of influential 
people into power structures aligned to nation-wide government or Taliban 
organisations, playing heavily on the relationship between dominant historical 
narratives and contemporary perceptions of legitimacy to achieve local political 
support.987 The Sangin Accord case study therefore highlights the importance of 
factors that fall outside the core definitions of Ripeness theory, with significant 
implications for the use of Zartman’s theory to inform actions in ongoing conflicts, and 
areas in which the theory could be developed. 
Challenges for using Ripeness theory in operational practice 
Theorists continue to seek explanations for negotiated settlements, and 
conflicts taking place within state borders (rather than between nations) remain 
important cases because there are so few successful political resolutions: “between 
1940 and 1990, 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, 
whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions.”988 This reduction is 
                                                     
985 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 13. 
986 See for example Sophie Haspeslagh, Workshop Report: Local Civil Society Engagement of Non-State 
Armed Groups (London, 1st November 2013). 
987 Derksen, 2015, op. cit., http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/20/the-politics-of-disarmament-
and-rearmament-in-afghanistan. pp. 29-34 illustrates the direct link between the historical record and 
the relative success of government policy in the Sangin area, such as disarmament and political 
reintegration. 
988 Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization vol. 51, 
no. 3 (1997), p. 335. 
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explained by the greater significance of loss of legitimacy for parties in internal 
conflict: 
“Often a military stalemate and a rough kind of equality emerge. In an 
interstate war, this might provide the basis for some sort of negotiated settlement. 
However, in an internal war, the government abandons its legitimacy if it openly 
negotiates with the rebels. The commitment of the rebels makes them equally 
unwilling the struggle, which has become their life.”989 
Nilsson demonstrates an important point, that a partial peace – excluding 
certain conflict parties – is possible without affecting the signatories’ commitment to 
peace, though the permanence of that peace will depend on effective law and order, 
or security measures addressing the actions of excluded groups.990 This is clearly less 
applicable when the single major opponent is excluded, as can happen if labelled as 
terrorists, for example. Actors focussed on practical political work in the field have also 
considered the validity of Zartman’s work. The United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission was set up in 2005. Its report on Enhancing mediation and its support 
activities in 2009 observed that some have taken Zartman’s theory to mean that “the 
international community should wait for a “hurting stalemate” to develop before 
offering mediation; but this turned out to be costly for all concerned, since 
opportunities for early resolution were lost and a stalemate sometimes led, instead, to 
intractability.”991 The same Commission has also reported on Peacebuilding in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict.992 Both documents focus on the impact that the 
conduct of signatories to agreements, mediators and other supporting actors have 
upon the sustainability of an agreement after conflict has ended. These studies raise 
two challenges for Ripeness theory, suggesting developments to the theory would be 
beneficial. These points are also echoed in the Sangin Accord case study. First, that 
policymakers focus considerably on the outcome of negotiations, requiring theory to 
                                                     
989 Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," The American 
Political Science Review vol. 89, no. 3 (1995), p. 683. 
990 Desirée Nilsson, "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements," Journal of 
Peace Research vol. 45, no. 4 (2008), p. 479. 
991 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and Its 
Support Activities," 8th April 2009, 
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SGReport_EnhancingMediation_S2009189%2
8english%29.pdf(accessed 17th October 2012). Pages 5-6 refer. 
992 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Armed Conflict," www.un.org (2009). 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/s2009304.pdf (accessed 11th June 2012). 
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address this to be truly useful in real-time scenarios. Secondly, that the historical 
legacy of failing to implement the terms of a negotiated agreement affects future 
attitudes towards negotiation, upon which a future Way Out – and therefore, a future 
Ripe Moment – would depend. 
Areas for developing Ripeness theory 
As shown in chapter seven, Ripeness theory’s original formulation aligns with 
thinking rooted in rational cost-benefit analysis, by placing the use of coercive force at 
the very heart of strategies to control populations’ behaviour.993 This stems from a 
Cold War political context, where the risk of nuclear confrontation meant 
(Superpower) parties acting to bring about negotiation in other conflicts were unlikely 
to also be direct overt participants in those conflicts.994 Zartman expresses this 
approach clearly, suggesting that “once one side has provided arms or political 
support, the only way to bring a conflict to management, let alone resolution, may well 
be to provide enough countervailing support to bring about stalemate and 
negotiation.”995 This allowed Ripeness theory to combine rational approaches to cost-
benefit assessments with clearly defined conflict parties. Chapter seven shows both 
foundations to be insufficient in the Sangin Accord case highlighting seven areas for 
theory development, following below.  
Points one to three of the suggested areas for further research relate to the 
definition of conflict parties, and difficulties with the Way Out and the Mutually 
Hurting Stalemate in the core theory. The first requirement is improved definition of 
conflict parties in local and fringe areas, where political and identity hedging strategies 
complicate clear categorisation. The second area for consideration is a subset of the 
first: Ripeness theory does not adequately cover scenarios in which one or more actors 
offers political and military support to another conflict party with the lead 
responsibility for negotiation (in this case, the Afghan Government), while also being 
                                                     
993 For his clearest summary see Zartman, 2001, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Also Richard Shultz, "Breaking the Will 
of the Enemy During the Vietnam War: The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of 
Counterinsurgency Warfare," Journal of Peace Research vol. 15, no. 2 (1978). 
994 An excellent review of the processes and mindsets is found in Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, 
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999). 
995 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 16. 
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active participants in the conflict themselves (in this case, the UK and US).996 This 
absence has a serious impact on the analyst’s ability to apply Ripeness theory to 
explain the case study. The third area relates to the relationship between military 
conduct constituting an MHS, and the likelihood of a Way Out. Ripeness theory implies 
there is no interaction between the desire and intent for a political Way Out – and the 
actions that construct it – with perceptions of the factors that establish an MHS. This is 
problematic, for example, the conduct of one party’s military forces may affect the 
perceptions held by their own side’s negotiators about the prospects for successful 
negotiation. Conflict parties might also act to effect an MHS but in doing so, use 
conflict strategies that reduce an opponents’ willingness to consider them genuine 
partners in a shared Way Out. Breaking an agreement for tactical military gain would 
be an example. The impact of individual or collective trauma (likely in violent conflict) 
upon either rational action or perception is also not considered in Zartman’s writings, 
and affects the rationality underpinning all the theoretical points above. 
Points four to six relate to constructing or recognising a Ripe Moment in 
conflicts where reconstruction activity and political legitimacy are important policy 
objectives for one or more conflict parties. The fourth raises problems for explaining 
conflict involving parties that cannot afford military defeat for reputational reasons, 
and have either the capacity for significant escalation and/or a rationale to invite Hurt. 
Thus, if a superpower (or an international organisation, such as NATO in this case) is 
intent on preserving the deterrent value of its military at all costs, a “crisis of tactics 
will produce escalation”997 and national liberation movements have “nothing to lose 
by fighting and nothing to do but fight” then both parties face catastrophic 
consequences from accepting (and being seen to accept) that force has brought them 
to the negotiating table – in such cases a Ripe Moment is near-impossible.998 Additions 
to Ripeness theory do offer some explanatory prospects, allowing Hurt triggered by 
                                                     
996 Third-party intervention is discussed in Marieke Kleiboer, "Ripeness of Conflict: A Fruitful Notion?," 
Journal of Peace Research, (1994). However, it refers to mediation rather than direct participation. 
997 Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 17. 
998 Zartman, 1989, op. cit., p. 14. Zartman calls these blockers to the psychology of negotiation Resistant 
Reactions (see Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 12.). A superb exploration of these concepts can be found in 
Eric Hoffer, "The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements," (evelynbrooks.com: 
HarperCollins e-books, 1951). http://evelynbrooks.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/The_True_Believer_-_Eric_Hoffer.pdf (accessed 2nd January 2016). Sections 
on Factors promoting self-sacrifice, Fanatics (XIII) and The Fanatics (XVI) are most pertinent. 
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other mechanisms to compensate for the military element. The case study shows this 
using reconstruction requirements and legitimacy shortfalls. Further developments are 
suggested, however.  
The fifth area applies when political legitimacy and state-building infrastructure 
objectives are at the heart of definitions of success. New analytical approaches are 
possible:  
a) the relative balance between the conflict parties relating to these factors 
can construct an MHS, even when resistant mindsets prevent acceptance of 
a military-driven MHS (this perception can be heightened if, as the Sangin 
Accord illustrates, pressure from local people is acknowledged);  
b) parties might move directly to the shared positive horizons described in a 
Mutually Enhancing Opportunity: 
“If an MEO could be theoretically developed and practically exploited as 
the other entry door to negotiation; most people engaged in the study and practice 
of negotiation would be pleased to see the MHS demoted to only one of two 
necessary (even if not sufficient) conditions for the initiation of negotiations.”999  
This would meet one of the key criticisms of the theory that it relies exclusively 
on negative psychology: in the Sangin case, the Taliban sought the same 
improvements as the Afghan Government and international forces, following pressure 
from locals, and so the chance to play a role in the improvements could form an MEO. 
However, Taliban reliance on the government and ISAF to deliver technically complex 
reconstruction projects would contribute strongly to a non-military MHS. This raises 
the possibility that a surge in non-military improvements could be constructed as 
either a coercive or a positive motivation to negotiate, under additions to Ripeness 
theory.  
The sixth area relates to the relationship between military action and 
legitimacy. The requirements of local communities for public services and other 
provisions, beyond simply armed resistance to the foreign invader, obliges groups with 
resistant mindsets to evolve and accept some of the responsibilities of a state – if they 
wish to retain legitimacy. This is illustrated by the expansion of Sangin’s Taliban 
                                                     
999 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 245. 
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shadow governance beyond purely fighting, to include a Civil Commission to respond 
to community wishes in agriculture, education, and representation.1000 The local 
characteristics of the case study add significant degrees of complexity to the 
explanatory process, posing challenges for modelling and representing conflicts and 
applying Zartman’s theory to them – particularly for practitioners seeking to foster 
political legitimacy. An effective analysis requires: an understanding of the trajectory 
over time of perceptions held by a range of conflict parties (each typically 
multifaceted); events at the local level pertaining to the components of a Ripe 
Moment to be placed within a wider geographical and historical context; locally-held 
legitimacy assessments to evolve in the context of relationships between groups and 
individuals, both horizontally and vertically.1001 Similarly, the need for international 
forces to foster a government perceived as legitimate and capable to hold power after 
their departure promotes the importance of a theoretical framework that incorporates 
political legitimacy and relates it to military action.  
Additions to Ripeness theory offer far greater potential for this than the core 
theory, though further work is needed to draw definitive theoretical conclusions. The 
case study, and scholarship triggered by Zartman’s theory, show that explanations 
allowing iterative progress towards Ripeness are the most persuasive and more 
useful.1002 The Sangin Accord case study also exposes a seventh weakness in the 
explanatory value of Ripeness theory; that previous perceived failures to stick to an 
agreement fundamentally undermine rationality about future negotiating 
opportunities, as occurred for the Alikozai in Sangin in 2007. The suggested evolutions 
above are driven by the essential importance of the effective implementation of the 
terms of the agreement and of those that protect the negotiated agreement for policy 
                                                     
1000 There are some parallels here with Pruitt’s analysis considering the psychology of “a polity rather 
than looking only at leader level.” Pruitt, 2005, op. cit., p. 22. 
1001 These might include the interaction between the vertical legitimacy of the Afghan government and 
supporting international elements; and the horizontal legitimacy between groups at the same level, 
within both conflict and stabilisation parties and the population. This draws upon Ohlson, 2008, op. cit. 
1002 This draws upon the type of “dynamical” approach that theorists use to extend Zartman’s theory. 
Dynamical “is defined as a set of interconnected elements (such as different beliefs, feelings and 
behaviours) that change and evolve together over time” in an evolving system. This adds the 
perspective that intractability could be caused by a self-reinforcing system, as positive feedback loops 
mean that “each element of the conflict activates and reinforces other elements” such that “the system 
resists changes.” Coleman et al., 2008, op. cit., pp. 31-32. 
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makers. Alongside these theoretical challenges, the Sangin Accord does raise some 
considerations for future policy and practice. 
 
Implications for policy and practice 
The Sangin Accord case study highlights six considerations for practitioners and 
policy makers considering approaches to negotiated agreement. These relate to: (1) 
how individuals and organisations understand the role negotiation plays in conflict 
strategy; (2) the importance of policy on communication, and the capacity to do so 
effectively; (3) placing the local level of analysis within in a wider context; (4) defining 
actions to promote legitimacy; (5) actively promoting transitions of policy, mindset, 
and action; (6) acknowledging that implementation matters as much for political 
stability as the agreement itself. 
Understanding the role negotiation plays in conflict strategy 
It is essential to understand how negotiations are perceived by individuals and 
organisations in live conflict situations who are engaged in actions focused on political 
outcomes. The conceptualisation underpinning international activity (or sub-elements 
of it) is only addressed once in the primary source material relating to the Sangin 
Accord. In March 2010, UK officials recorded that: 
“We have long said that reintegration and reconciliation can only be 
achieved from a position of strength – a position we do not yet have in Sangin. 
And, as ever, the key challenge ahead will lie in finding sufficient trained and 
enduring Afghan National Security Forces to sustain any improvements in security 
[author’s note – and territorial gains] over the longer term.”1003 
If this was official policy (and it is not possible to confirm this from one source) 
it has profound implications for the approach taken to the Alikozai Taliban’s letter 
appearing to offer political progress received on 29th March of that same year. It would 
suggest that the opportunity was not viewed as something that could be progressed, 
and – if the requirement for a position of strength was paramount – that Ripeness 
theory was not considered influential upon policymakers. If the theory had been 
influential, this apparent stalemate would have indicated to policy actors that a 
                                                     
1003 FOI-11, 22nd March 2010. 
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possible negotiating opportunity existed. As suggested in chapter seven, March 2010 
was the point at which the conflict was nearest to a Ripe Moment (especially when 
considered by additions to Ripeness theory), then according to Zartman there would 
be consequences for future political efforts, since “failure to seize the moment often 
hastens its passing, as parties lose faith in the possibility of a negotiated way out or 
regain hope in the possibility of unilateral escalation.”1004 If there was knowledge of 
the impending start of the latest phase of the US military surge in March 2010, then 
this quote would be consistent with the case study. 
The Sangin Accord history suggests that definitions of success should move 
beyond the domination or destruction of an opponent if a campaign is to be assessed 
by longer-term political stability, where social cohesion is best assured by 
reconciliation through negotiated settlement. Some approaches may be counter-
productive to longer-term social objectives if they generate new grievances (or 
exacerbate old ones) that the post-transition government cannot manage effectively. 
Economic issues (including those associated with stabilisation projects) may affect the 
co-option of groups as “greed-based conflicts seek the continuation of war as an 
avenue to self-enrichment.”1005 Individuals and organisations must determine whether 
their policy is based on: negotiating opportunities arising only from the success or 
failure of other conflict strategies, or; that negotiation as a practice (including its 
precursors, confidence-building communication or dialogue) has an evolutionary 
impact on conflict. If the former, debate focuses on the triggers that signify the time is 
right for dialogue. In the latter case – though it is essential to control formal bargaining 
– tight restrictions on communication (even exchanges of views) may inhibit progress. 
The importance of policy on communication and the capacity to do so 
Practitioners should consider the distinction between a formal negotiating 
process, and communication that fosters social ties and sets the conditions for the will 
to improve the reach of any agreement.  This needs to be reflected in policy, to ensure 
that officials are given permission to communicate widely enough to generate the 
                                                     
1004 Zartman, 2001, op. cit., p. 13. 
1005 Cynthia Arnson, "The Political Economy of War," in Rethinking the Economics of War: The 
Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed, ed. Cynthia J Arnson and I William Zartman, (Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 2005), p. 11. 
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political and historical understanding required to underpin any negotiation, even if the 
formal negotiation itself is controlled more tightly. For theory, the Sangin Accord 
suggests that the very act of dialogue, or offer of it, established a political equilibrium 
(which could under additions to Ripeness count as part of an MHS), since the 
opposition’s power advantage depended on isolating Sangin’s community through 
intimidation.  
US, and UK counterinsurgency doctrine sets high expectations for the Political 
Advisor here, requiring them to shape, meaning “influence and inform the 
perceptions, allegiances, attitudes, actions, and behaviours of all principal participants 
in the Area of Operation, and in the regional, international and domestic audiences as 
well.”1006 The greater the mandate to communicate outside the formal bargaining 
process, the greater the chance of developing a strong political strategy resting on a 
shared vision that meets local and international objectives, containing credible 
elements that can be sustained after international forces depart. This depth of 
understanding is vital to enable strategies that alter perception and motivation, as “it 
is through an approach which seeks to unify essentially voluntary efforts that political 
primacy is achieved.”1007 These principles guided stabilisation staff working in Sangin 
on the implementation phase of the Sangin Accord in 2011; they were urged to “help 
build momentum by facilitating government engagement, build deeper understanding 
of community demands, and develop plans for possible stabilisation activities. Avoid 
over-promising, and counter-productive consequences.”1008 
Placing the local level of analysis within in a wider context 
Analysis techniques that place artificial boundaries around political and social 
questions risk skewing the conclusions and misdirecting the resulting policy 
                                                     
1006 The definition of “shape” is from British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 4-10. Allocation of the 
shaping task to the Political Advisor is found in US Army, 2006, op. cit., paragraph A-16. It also states 
that “this position is not suitable for intelligence professionals. They can help, but their task is to 
understand the environment. The political advisor’s job is to help shape the environment.”  
US doctrine refers to this role as the Political Advisor, and suggests it is likely to be a military individual. 
The UK used Political Officer (POLO), a civilian post, perhaps to avoid confusion with the UK’s Policy 
Advisors (POLADs) deployed into military headquarters staffs to work for military commanders, largely 
on defence policy issues. 
1007 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 3-5. 
1008 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, eGram 1287/11 (attached document), "Sangin - Options for Civil 
Support," 23rd January 2011. Published under UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 request 0494-14, 
2nd October 2014, and allocated source reference FOI-16A. See Annex A. 
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recommendations and activities. So, despite the distinct focus on the local level of 
analysis in this thesis, the case study and the historical review show that the Sangin 
Accord must be considered – and can only be understood properly – within longer 
historical and wider geographic contexts. Afghanistan’s neighbours have a close 
interest in events in the south of the country, notably Iran and Pakistan. Anatol Lieven 
summarises Pakistan’s strategic considerations in a representative fashion: to prevent 
Indian encirclement, “Pakistan must have a friendly government ruling in Kabul or, 
failing that, at least friendly forces controlling the Pathan areas of Afghanistan 
adjacent to the Pakistani border.”1009 This places the fate of southern Afghanistan 
firmly within the content of India-Pakistan relations, and most recently also the focus 
of the so-called Islamic State grouping based across Syria and Iraq.1010 
Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi considers Iranian interests in Helmand, 
and Sangin, to be an importance influence on the political events leading up to the 
Sangin Accord. As shown in chapter two, the function of the Kajaki Dam north of 
Sangin had a direct impact on the flow of the Helmand River, which in turn affects the 
viability of the farmland across the border in Iran’s turbulent Sistan Province. 
According to Giustozzi’s own assessment of his Taliban source material, this interest 
led to political engagement in Helmand including with the former Provincial Governor 
Sher Mohammed Akhundzada. After “actively pursuing at least some Taliban networks 
in Helmand until 2005” he negotiated a new deal with Taliban elements in 2006: 
Taliban sources indicated an Iranian role in forging the deal, at least indirectly, with 
“both Zakir and Sher Mohammed’s men were being offered financial and other 
incentives to keep the pressure on Kajaki dam high, to prevent its completion.”1011 
From a purely military perspective, an international military surge into Helmand could 
be perceived as a little too close to the Iranian border, and this appears to have been 
                                                     
1009 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (PublicAffairs, 2011), p. 408. 
1010 See for example Dawood Azami, "Why Taliban Special Forces Are Fighting Islamic State," 18th 
December 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-35123748(accessed 3rd January 2016).  
1011 Pressure on Kajaki Dam confirmed in Primary Source PS-35, between 30-39 years old. Ethnicity and 
tribe: Pashtun, Alizai tribe. Local to Sangin? Local - Province. Self-identified role: Taliban - Military. 
Awareness of Sangin Accord: Undeclared. This source is anonymised, and given the label PS-35. 
Antonio Giustozzi quotations from personal email communication with the author, Giustozzi also notes 
that “it is worth noting that this [the Zakir-Sher Mohammad link] is an odd relationship in a sense; Sher 
Mohammed maintains close relations with President Karzai and would happily be re-appointed back as 
Helmand governor. Zakir is among the Taliban leader one of those most bitterly opposed to any 
negotiations. 
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one facet of the Iranian mindset. During the 2006 operation to take the new electricity 
turbine to Kajaki, locals apparently demanded “the right to search the convoy to verify 
that it did not contain a new ‘secret weapon’ designed to menace Iran.”1012 In personal 
communication with the author, Giustozzi prioritised the human security rationale 
above the potential military encirclement, concluding that “it's the water flow to Iran's 
dry eastern regions that has the Iranians seriously concerned.”1013 In this, Tehran’s 
concerns echoes those from previous centuries virtually unchanged. Attempts to bring 
Sangin’s conflict parties to a negotiated agreement played out within this wider 
regional context; one where many local and international actors sought to bring 
individuals perceived locally as legitimate into their own organisations, and conflict 
resolution strategies. 
Defining actions to promote legitimacy 
The reconstruction actions of the international presence in Afghanistan, 
dominated by English speakers, were influenced by Western liberal norms which 
focused on organising elections, the creation of a market economy, and the promotion 
of human rights and the rule of law. A major critique of this agenda is that it is 
“characterised by programmes, practices and actions implemented from the top-down 
in areas that are not necessarily defined as priorities by local populations or that 
respond to the root causes of armed conflicts.”1014 Perceptions of legitimacy were also 
affected by the relative success or failure of interactions between international 
diplomatic norms and local norms about when “to negotiate an issue, as opposed to 
adjudicate[ing], arbitrat[ing], or ignor[ing] it,”as well as the “proper pace or 
appropriate timing for certain bargaining behaviors [sic], [what is] considered a 
reciprocal obligation, what constitutes a fair and just outcome, [and how] the prospect 
of future renegotiation [should] be handled.”1015 Individuals and organisations should 
consider closely how an understanding of local history and social norms affect the 
                                                     
1012 Bishop, 2009, op. cit., p. 288. 
1013 Personal email communication between the author and Antonio Giustozzi, 15th May 2014. 
1014 Fernando  Cavalcante, "The Influence of the Liberal Peace Framework on the United Nations 
Approach to Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau," RCCS Annual Review, 2014, 
https://rccsar.revues.org/564(accessed 2nd January 2016). Paragraph 3.  
1015 Michael Fowler quoted in Severine Autesserre, "Constructing Peace: Collective Understandings of 
Peace, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding," 2011, 
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/critique_add/art_sa.pdf(accessed 14th May 
2014). p. 4. 
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anticipated negotiating process, since the Sangin Accord shows that this correlates 
closely with the legitimacy required to underpin a Way Out, and strengthens policies 
focused on the co-option of individuals and communities into formal government 
structures. 
Afghanistan held Presidential elections in 2004 and 2009, Parliamentary (and 
some Provincial Council) elections in 2005 and 2010, and elections for District Councils 
throughout this period, when security and local political conditions allowed. In some 
populous, more secure areas there was therefore an election of some sort in most 
years since 2004.1016 In Sangin, the “first ever District Community Council election was 
held on the 28 March [2011] with a respectable 62 percent turnout of the 3,206 
registered voters. Although this appears modest compared to Sangin’s estimated 
population of 60,000, the number of potential voters was restricted to elders from 
each mosque in the district.”1017 The Ishaqzai tribe were relatively under represented 
after the assassination of their leading representative on the council on 4th January.1018 
Nevertheless, officials in 2011 hailed the election as “a major milestone of progress. 
There was a higher number of voters than in any previous local election in Helmand” 
and it included the election of one woman onto the council (by male-only voting), Bibi 
Hazara, a well-known former mujahedeen fighter.1019 This, and the wider case study, 
reinforces that legitimacy was at the heart of community decisions about political 
allegiance, and individual legitimacy directly affected engagement with organisations 
such as the offices of the Afghan Government, or the Taliban shadow government. 
Elections and political appointments, typically considered central to political progress, 
struggled to deliver sufficient visible changes to quality of life in Afghanistan, especially 
at the local level, suggesting that they alone did not trigger sufficient actions to boost 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population.1020 Improvements to legitimacy were 
supported over time by transitions in policy, mindset, and evidence of trust and 
                                                     
1016 Election data taken from the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan and other sources, 
presented and analysed at National Democratic Institute, "Afghanistan Election Data," National 
Democratic Institute, 2015, http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/front(accessed 4th September 2012).  
1017 FOI-21, 3rd April 2012. 
1018 Ibid. 
1019 Ibid. 
1020 The importance of legitimacy is supported by Chin:  highly resourced effort is irrelevant unless the 
“Afghan central government is able to implement reform and establish a meaningful presence on the 
ground that affects the day-to-day lives of the people in a positive way.” Chin, 2007, op. cit., p. 221. 
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implementing capacity in both the Afghan Government and international presence, 
relative to the Taliban shadow government. 
Actively promote transitions of policy, mindset, and action 
Practitioners seeking negotiated agreement and applying Ripeness should 
consider dynamic transitions as normal, and actively track and promote evolutions to 
policy, mindset and action that match the theory’s progression from coercion towards 
positive shared horizons – as set out earlier. That said coercive force applied carefully 
should remain a vital tool in the political arsenal to promote trust and legitimacy, 
particularly when protecting the precursors to an agreement (and those involved), or 
the success of the implementation that follows. Ben Connable’s extensive research 
proves one such use for applied force in the context of ending an insurgency: 
eliminating sanctuaries that give active support remains central, when seeking a 
solution within defined geographical boundaries.1021 Transitions in military approach 
therefore underpin negotiating progress; say from Kill or Capture, to coercion and 
deterrence, to provision of security guarantees for opponents susceptible to co-option, 
or to partnered capacity building, power-sharing or integration. These mirror the 
evolution in mindset Ripeness theory anticipates, from zero-sum coercion to Mutually 
Enticing Opportunity, and require military organisations – and those that comment on 
their achievements – to consider a shared outcome as a success. Transitions in policy 
may also be important, in some cases linked to shifts in mindset. Attitudes to political 
reconciliation are informative here. In 2008, Fergusson wrote that “the ultimate legacy 
will be a government in Afghanistan in x years’ time, with Taliban representation. The 
Americans, with their emotional ties to the abuse of 9/11, are absolutely, vehemently 
opposed to that. But then they said the same thing in Iraq.”1022 This policy changed as 
time passed, catalysed by the death of Osama bin Laden. 
The case study sheds light on an area for further research: the superpower 
mindset within Ripeness theory, especially when opposing other resistant mindsets, 
such as fundamentalism. Acceptance of the impact of Hurt is so problematic that this 
may be a case requiring an explanation under additions to Ripeness theory. Steele 
                                                     
1021 Libicki and Connable, 2010, op. cit., pp. 34-35. See also Chin, 2010, op. cit., p. 241. 
1022 Fergusson, 2008, op. cit., p. 288. 
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draws interesting parallels between the end of the recent US-led campaign and 
Russian efforts in the 20th Century: “As with the Americans and NATO, the main 
motivation for the Soviet withdrawal was war-weariness, but it was dressed up in 
public, just as it is being dressed up in the West today.”1023 British generals’ 
unwavering view that the Taliban, at least at the tactical level, were losing, were also 
prevalent within the American military elite: in summer 2011 both General Petraeus 
and General John Allen registered official disagreements after “CIA analysts had 
assessed the state of the war, district by district, and reached the conclusion that is 
was stalemated” – while President Obama also considered (publicly at least) that the 
withdrawal was beginning from a position of strength.1024 
Shifts in mindset and policy may also be conscious and deliberate, as well as 
unconscious, or the result of external factors. Determining negotiating points is an 
essential focus for this, as the ideal approach is to ensure negotiators have the 
capacity and backing to take actions that the other side(s) perceives to be concessions – 
it is not essential that you do. This matters, because for Zartman “if parties that 
perceive themselves to be of equal power and the negotiators share a cooperative 
motivational orientation, the more effectively they are likely to function,” compared to 
competitive approaches.1025 “By giving a sense of equality to the weaker” they will be 
“less impelled to seek compensating advantages in other, more disruptive ways.”1026 
These types of strategies require careful explanation and handling, as there is a risk 
that audiences recognise negotiated outcomes differently. The domestic narrative is 
especially important, and complex.1027 Despite this focus on evolution within 
negotiating scenarios, consistency, informed by institutional memory, is also essential. 
What you (and your organisation) promised and what is delivered are linked directly to 
the perceptions of legitimacy required simply to secure access to truly credible 
representatives within, or representing, other conflict parties. As US Marine Corps 
                                                     
1023 Jonathan Steele, "A Tale of Two Retreats: Afghan Transition in Historical Perspective," Central Asian 
Survey 32, no. 3 (2013), p. 306. 
1024 Ibid., p. 311. 
1025 Zartman, 2002, op. cit., p. 18. 
1026 Ibid., p. 289.  
1027 See for example Mark Beautement, "We’re Winning Sir, We Just Don’t Believe It Yet: Public 
Perception and Modern Military Operations," in Comparative Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in 
Conflict Zones (RUSI Occasional Paper), ed. Michael J. Williams and Kate Clouston, (2006). 
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General Larry Nicholson said so appositely, “you can surge troops and equipment, but 
you can’t surge trust. That has to be earned.”1028 
Implementation matters as much for political stability as the agreement 
itself 
While Ripeness theory concentrates on the conditions present at the opening 
of negotiations, getting the politics around negotiated agreements right includes at 
least four stages: (1) outreach focused on pre-negotiations and credibility building to 
prepare for negotiation; (2) striking an agreement, usually formally; (3) communicating 
the pledges, and implementing the provisions of the deal; (4) managing the 
consequences, and evolving it when required. If outreach evolves into a negotiation, 
and then implementation, theorists have some lessons for the structure and scope of 
an agreement. Retaining a record of promises either perceived or made by individuals, 
and organisations, is an excellent way of tracking legitimacy risks during all four stages 
mentioned above. Different cultures accord varying respect to positions of authority, 
or the conduct of the individual – regardless of their office. This focus on legitimacy 
gained from effective implementation also applies after agreements have been made, 
especially over military provisions. Hoddie and Hartzell showed that “peace proved 
durable in seven of the eight cases in which post-civil war states with agreements 
requiring military measures fully implemented this aspect.”1029 Establishing sunset 
clauses, or expiry dates, to specific proposals or whole agreements can also apply 
pressure. “The Dayton peace talks ended well because [US negotiator Richard] 
Holbrooke gave the Bosnian Muslims an ultimatum: If you don’t sign the agreement in 
one hour, we close the talks down for good.”1030 They also offer re-negotiation 
opportunities that head off violent responses to changing power relationships. “Some 
of the most stable civil war settlements were preceded by a rapid succession of 
                                                     
1028 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "In Afghanistan’s Garmser District, Praise for a US Official’s Tireless Work," 
Washington Post, 14th August 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-
afghanistans-garmser-district-praise-for-a-us-officials-tireless-
work/2011/07/29/gIQA2Cc0DJ_story.html(accessed 2nd September 2011).  
The General commended Dr. Carter Malkasian, the Provincial Reconstruction Team’s District Political 
Officer for Garmser in Helmand. 
1029 Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003, op. cit., p. 313. 
1030 Stephen Sestanovich, "What Would Richard Holbrooke Do?," 9th December 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/what-would-richard-holbrooke-do-
100879_Page2.html(accessed 15th February 2014).  
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agreements. For example, there were seven agreements in El Salvador and 14 in 
Guatemala within a very short period.”1031  
The control and oversight of negotiation – especially during transition from an 
international presence to a supported government – remains a critical area for study 
and training, as doctrine is clear:  
“Where the host nation government is functioning it is essential that 
intervening headquarters work effectively with the agencies of the host nation in 
order to develop and implement politically acceptable and culturally appropriate 
settlement. The host nation should be encouraged to take ‘ownership’ of such 
settlements as part of the process of winning the consent of the people. The 
planning of transitions should reflect this.”1032  
This implies a counter-argument, that where the host government is not 
working, settlements may be best avoided, unless there is a temporary conflict 
management imperative – or unless the settlement improves governance, perhaps 
through the wholesale co-option of respected and capable opponents. Practitioners 
should not underestimate the amount of time required to see visible change after the 
communication or negotiation processes begin. It has been shown for example that 
mediation may take typically 8-12 months to moderate conflict significantly, and may 
increase conflict in the short term.1033 While the Sangin Accord cannot be compared 
directly, as mediation was not in play, it is interesting that this correlates closely with 
ten months between the March 2010 letter and the announcement of the Accord in 
January 2011.1034  
 
Final thoughts  
This thesis began by asking whether the Sangin Accord case study suggested 
Ripeness theory and its additions had explanatory value for that, or other local 
negotiated agreements. Zartman’s theory was applied to the local level of analysis for 
                                                     
1031 Derouen et al., 2009, op. cit., p. 371. 
1032 British Army, 2009, op. cit., paragraph 7-5.. 
1033 Schrodt et al., 2003, op. cit., http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/papers.dir/Schrodt.etal.ISA03.pdf.  
1034 The Times reported in August 2010 that “officials have spent more than a year in delicate 
negotiation with tribal groups in and around the town,” which would mean that the communication 
began at least 15 months before the Sangin Accord was made public. Tom Coghlan, "Tribal Uprising 
against Taleban Could Take Hundreds of Insurgents out of the Conflict," 13th August 2010, (accessed 
20th August 2010).  See Annex D. 
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the first time, seeking to explain the Accord while also setting out the first detailed 
public historical review of the case study. This final chapter has considered the 
implications for developing theory, and also for policy and practice in other “fringe 
areas” of low population containing lower military force levels – typically removed 
from centralised authority – in which military resource levels, doctrine, campaign 
planning or other factors result in no permanent, definitive military dominance, and no 
imminent prospect of one without a change in either the overall number of military 
forces available, or to another factor that currently restricts reinforcement.  
This thesis has shown that additions to Ripeness theory offer a far more 
effective explanatory model for the Sangin case than Zartman’s core theory, but that 
the data required for comprehensive judgements about Ripeness far exceed those 
available for this thesis. Particularly important is data spanning a significant timeline, 
to allow the trajectory of perceptions to be assessed. Data covering actors outside the 
local area is essential (for example, in this case, elders who fled Sangin after the 2007 
uprising), since many key players and conflict drivers are affected by the actions or 
perceptions of those away from the area of interest itself. Access to senior leadership 
on all sides is also important, if challenging. In Sangin, a range of non-military factors 
fall outside the scope of Zartman’s core Ripeness theory, but their presence – or 
absence – is important for the policy objectives of the campaign. These same factors 
are also seen to apply coercive motivation in the historical case study, such as the 
capacity of officials, the budget and skills to deliver services and advanced 
infrastructure, and trust. Most powerfully, they demonstrate shortfalls in governance 
capacity or delivery, thereby altering the relative legitimacy calculus between the 
Afghan Government and the Taliban shadow government. This same legitimacy is 
fundamentally linked to the success criteria for international actors seeking to 
withdraw leaving a lasting, effective formal government in place. Druckman and 
Green’s work on the relative power and legitimacy conditions under which insurgents 
and regimes would consider entering into negotiations (see chapter one) proved to be 
effective as explanatory tool. Some non-military factors (or their absence) – despite 
being coercive motivators for opponents and constituting part of an aggregated 
Mutual Hurting Stalemate – also have positive impacts on the population, such as 
improvements to flood defences or public service delivery. Some form the basis of 
confidence-building communication and dialogue allowing the groundwork for formal 
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negotiation to be laid (subject to policy approval), where a basic level of security 
existed for key officials, facilities, reconstruction projects, and government institutions. 
In Sangin, the most powerful of these were the seed distribution and the renovation of 
the revered site at Garm Ab, which established political links and dialogue that turned 
only to security and reconciliation months later, when confidence and mutual 
perceptions of legitimacy allowed.  
Populations who do not feel secure (as those in fringe areas may not), or have 
reason to doubt the credibility of their interlocutors, may pursue multiple strategies, 
for entirely rational reasons. In such circumstances, confidence-building measures 
must be specific and verifiable without requiring a public change of allegiance, as this 
draws reprisals before a political shift is likely. At a particular point in any negotiation, 
especially during transition, this capacity to corroborate the legitimacy of 
interlocutors, and of their offers, may not be available, which risks manipulation. The 
allocation of responsibility for politics according to District administrative boundaries 
risks diluting capacity to resolve multi-faceted social grievances – many of which span 
a wider area, or operate to older social conceptions of community boundaries. This 
“hedging of one’s bets, in identity, location, profession is a powerful warning to 
anyone operating with policies or data collection and categorisation mechanisms that 
do not allow this plurality.”1035 This adds another level of complexity for real-world 
scenarios, and increases dependence on local expertise. Nevertheless, bold 
practitioners should forge ahead with early communication, as if Ripeness theory is 
correct, acting to bring about a Way Out can transform motivations: a sense of 
Ripeness (that arrives later) may turn initial communication or negotiations for side 
effects (such as in the Garm Ab case) into negotiations to resolve conflict.1036  
The effectiveness and wisdom of using reconstruction spending to influence 
political outcomes remains hotly disputed.1037 The Sangin case study shows that public 
                                                     
1035 Mark Beautement, "Review: Fragments of the Afghan Frontier," e-International Relations, 16th May 
2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/16/review-fragments-of-the-afghan-frontier/(accessed 16th May 
2012).  
1036 Zartman, 2000, op. cit., p. 227. 
1037 A key study here is Gordon, 2011, op. cit. Gordon finds that aid spending in itself will not translate 
into winning hearts and minds. Rather, it must first be pushed through local governance mechanisms to 
produce legitimacy. See also Seth G. Jones, "Testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting: 
Stabilization from the Bottom Up," RAND, 2010, 
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service delivery – especially when implemented through local governance mechanisms 
staffed by individuals considered legitimate by local people – can help establish 
humanitarian or reconstruction rationales for a foreign military presence. This provides 
evidence that central government cares about local needs, and can generate the 
confidence-building dialogue and improvements to legitimacy required to achieve 
political progress.1038 It also offers a collaborative counter to those exhibiting partisan 
or destructive behaviours (including narcotics producers), challenging the models of 
governance offered by competing factions. Despite the significant focus upon non-
military factors in this analysis, it is essential to recall that an effective military strategy 
underpins all political progress. Military forces based in the area of interest must be 
able to show credible force protection for themselves and the government they 
support, with minimum disruption to everyday life for local people. The Sangin case 
also shows that a security guarantee is also one of the key desires motivating 
wholesale changes in community-wide political alignment. Surge capacity, or effective 
plans to mobilise local security provisions, may be required to consolidate the extra 
responsibilities gained through successful negotiation – this has significant impacts for 
policy, planning and resourcing. Targeted strikes, from specialist units usually based 
elsewhere, can be extremely valuable. If co-ordinated and focused properly, they 
appear part of the same political campaign as local actions, sending direct coercive 
messages without disrupting local life and boosting the legitimacy of the local official 
seen to control them.   
The success or failure of these approaches is critically linked to the history of 
the area, the relationships between the conflict actors, and local perceptions of them. 
The past gives context to grievance, explaining who may lose and gain – and how they 
may resist – if military intervention crystallises power relations at a particular point for 
local groups (and therefore also determining land holdings, economic advantage or 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2010/RAND_CT340.pdf(accessed 7th June 2013).  Or Justin 
Gorkowski, "A Penny for Your Thoughts, a Nickel for Your Heart: Buying Popular Support for 
Counterinsurgency," Center for Complex Operations, 2010, 
http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/case-
studies/6_tn_penny_for_thoughts_teacher_edition.pdf(accessed 14th July 2011). For a study assessing 
whether development aid affects conflict Ripeness, see Podszun, 2011, op. cit. 
1038 For more on questions surrounding the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building 
model onto societies such as Afghanistan, and the importance of recognizing more traditional sources of 
legitimacy and a hybridity of political order, see Lucy Morgan Edwards, "State-Building in Afghanistan: A 
Case Showing the Limits?," International Review of the Red Cross vol. 92, no. 880 (2010). 
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access to public services). Officials in 2011 noted the same challenge Ahmad Shah 
Masood faced decades before: that “if members of the tribes perceive favouritism in 
the distribution of government services or security operations, they will work to 
undermine the position of the favoured tribe.”1039 An understanding of the trajectory 
therefore matters most for ensuring a negotiated agreement is constructive for wider 
strategy, and analysis based on snapshots should be avoided. It is a peculiar threat to 
large organisations, that people can consider all actions as deliberate, and based on 
perfect institutional memory. “You’ve been coming here for 200 years,” said Sangin 
elders in 2010, of the British – “how can you not remember who everyone is?”1040  
Extensive analysis by the RAND Corporation, Victory Has A Thousand Fathers – 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, supports the premise advanced here that the 
significance of local conflict drivers, including the relationships between history and 
legitimacy, means that those engaged in policy and practice should not seek universal 
solutions to resolve conflict scenarios. RAND concluded that in the 30 most recently 
resolved counterinsurgencies there were 20 distinct approaches involved in successful 
outcomes.1041 This level of data, and requirement for historical understanding, raises 
great challenges for Ripeness theory as an explanatory tool – particularly for 
comparative studies, where the nature of the conflict parties and the underlying 
drivers may be extremely difficult to prove and categorise to academic standards. 
Nevertheless, the Sangin Accord case offers a body of historical data for future work, 
and raises areas of interest for Ripeness theorists. It highlights the importance of 
history (both received and remembered), and traumatic experiences, on memory, 
perception and rationality; vital factors for Ripeness theory. Further data on the 
following areas would be valuable: defining conflict parties, and the formation of a 
Ripe Moment, in multipolar conflicts; political and identity hedging strategies as part 
of defining conflict parties and constructing a Way Out; the interaction between 
conduct creating an MHS, and its impact also on the Way Out; and the importance of 
implementing promises before and after the agreement, to align military and other 
                                                     
1039 FOI-20, Undated (estimated from September 2011). 
1040 Heard repeatedly by the author during participant observation In Sangin between 2009-10. 
1041 Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers - Sources of Success in 
Counterinsurgency (RAND, 2010). 
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activities with post-agreement objectives based around political stability and 
legitimacy.  
One of the most pertinent areas for future scenarios considers interactions 
between the psychology of superpowers and others with resistant or fanatical 
mindsets, and reduced prospects for perceiving Ripeness. Here, the case of renowned 
American diplomat Richard Holbrooke is poignant. In 2015, his wife (who wrote up all 
of his private notes over many decades), said “Richard, the greatest optimist I ever 
knew, did not think a military solution to a decades-old conflict was possible. He was 
convinced that eventually President Obama would have to turn to him to negotiate a 
regional end to the Afghan war. Tragically, his heart gave out before that could 
happen. Reconciliation, the policy now in play, was his goal.”1042 
The final conclusion both for theory and practice reiterates older wisdom. It is 
extremely complex to take negotiation from its beginning, through a genuine 
agreement (where Ripeness theory ends) and into post-agreement implementation – 
usually including the transition of security responsibility and withdrawal of foreign 
forces – that underpins lasting political stability built on legitimacy. Post-agreement 
stability relies on functioning relationships between local political and military officials. 
As the foreign presence steps back, will the local political representative be able to 
lead reconciliation, harnessing a range of military and civil resources both within their 
area, and from higher authorities?1043 The co-opting of communities wholesale may 
require a proven security guarantee, independent from international forces. The 
alignment of interests is undoubtedly helped by clear aspirations for territorial control 
and a degree of semi-autonomy. This thesis has made much of tribal labels, and I 
would counsel against any single-identity categorisation. Yet, in the Sangin case, the 
ancient historical ties to definable territory dominated by one group (the Alikozai here 
– though that need not be tribally-determined in future) offers a strong overlap 
between Western and local conceptualisations of power and interest, focused on 
                                                     
1042 Kati Marton, "Richard Holbrooke’s Diary of His Diplomacy," 28th April 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/opinion/richard-holbrookes-diary-of-his-
diplomacy.html?smid=fb-share&_r=3(accessed 1st January 2016).  
1043 On challenges for post-transition understanding, see Anthony King, "Political Analysis and 
Understanding in Afghanistan: Beyond Transition," in At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, 
Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, ed. Timothy Clack and 
Robert Johnson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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physical geography. There are “many paths up the mountain,” and so it is not wise to 
assert universal theories specifying how or when negotiations should be used.1044 
However, the Sangin Accord highlights six points to consider in future. 
(1) Generating and sustaining the option for agreement (and then seeing local 
benefits) requires significant time – often longer than military and development 
strategies.  
(2) Communication that aligns understanding and interests is essential for 
negotiated agreement; this exploratory work need not wait for a military 
advantage.  
(3) Local conflict drivers, relationships and implementation are critical for successful 
strategy, especially if local solutions do not cascade from top-level engagement.  
(4) Negotiation should be about conflict resolution; but unequal or temporary 
agreements to manage conflict remain policy options – though these approaches 
will undermine future attempts at genuine reconciliation. 
(5) Partisan approaches to conflict and relationship-building may inhibit wider 
stability, where a patchwork of polarising agreements cannot be aggregated. 
(6) It is vital to understand the local historical trajectory, in a wider context, as 
historical factors affect legitimacy directly – and therefore the creation and 
longer-term survival of a political agreement. 
These are intensely detailed and complex issues, and understanding them 
socially, politically and linguistically requires an enormous amount of effort. It is 
therefore beholden upon policy-makers to consider very carefully before undertaking 
a negotiation, especially at the local level. Even if an opportunity exists to strike a deal, 
not taking it remains a legitimate choice. If reconciliation through negotiation is 
sought, however, political work focused on long-term stability should support 
arbitration and stabilization by creating agreements that can be aggregated together. 
Developing relationships with narrow sections of a society may breed segregation and 
inflammatory advantage between communities that are supposed to reconcile with 
                                                     
1044 Nathan Springer, "Many Paths up the Mountain: Population-Centric Coin in Afghanistan," Small 
Wars Journal, (2010). 
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themselves, threatening stability1045 before and after international political, 
development, and military actors transition control and depart.1046
                                                     
1045 Giustozzi concludes that without this wider approach “there is little evidence that local deal-making 
may favour the emergence of wider peace agreements,” in Antonio Giustozzi, "Local and Tactical 
Political Accommodation: Afghanistan," in At the End of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and 
Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, ed. Timothy Clack and Robert Johnson, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 375. 
1046 This final paragraph was first printed in Beautement, 2014, op. cit., p. 353. Slight corrections have 
been made in this later version, resulting in minor variations from citation in the published volume. 
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REFERENCE ANNEXES 
ANNEX A: Details of the new primary sources 
PRIMARY SOURCE DATABASE 
Descriptors for each category 
Primary Source 
Code 
Gender Age Range Ethnicity Tribe Local Person? Self-identified Position Principal relationship to 
Sangin Accord 






















Local – Sangin 
District 
Local – Province 
Not Local – Afghan 
Not Local – Not 
Afghan 
Undeclared 
Government – Military 
Government – Civilian 
Taliban – Military 




Other, or Undeclared 
Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
Post 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
Undeclared 
 
Primary Source Database 
PS-1 Male 30-39 Pashtun Noorzai Not Local Government – Civilian Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
PS-2 Male 50-59 Pashtun Alizai Local – Province Government – Civilian Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
PS-3 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Local – District Elder Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-4 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Local – District Elder Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
PS-5 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Local – District Elder Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
PS-6 Male 50-59 Pashtun Ishaqzai Local – District Elder Undeclared 
PS-7 Male Undeclared Pashtun Ishaqzai Undeclared Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Direct 
PS-8 Male Undeclared Pashtun Ishaqzai Undeclared Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-9 Male Undeclared Pashtun Ishaqzai Local – District Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-10 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Undeclared Government – Military Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-11 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Local – District Elder Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-12 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Undeclared Government – Civilian Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-13 Male Undeclared Pashtun Alikozai Local – District Elder Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-14 Male 30-39 Pashtun Undeclared Not Local Other Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
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PS-15 Male Undeclared Pashtun Ishaqzai Local – District Elder Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-16 Male Undeclared Not Known Undeclared Undeclared Other Undeclared 
PS-17 Male Undeclared Not Known Undeclared Undeclared Other Undeclared 
PS-18 Male 30-39 Pashtun Undeclared Undeclared Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-19 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-20 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-21 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-22 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-23 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-24 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-25 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-26 Male 30-39 Pashtun Alizai Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-27 Male 40-49 Pashtun Undeclared Local – District Elder Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-28 Male 40-49 Pashtun Barakzai Local – District Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-29 Male Undeclared Pashtun Ishaqzai Local – District Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-30 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – District Taliban – Military Pre 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-31 Male 30-39 Pashtun Sayed Local – District Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-32 Male 30-39 Pashtun Popalzai Not Local Taliban – Military Post 4th Jan 2011 – Indirect 
PS-33 Male Undeclared Pashtun Undeclared Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-34 Male 40-49 Pashtun Alizai Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
PS-35 Male 30-39 Pashtun Alizai Local – Province Taliban – Military Undeclared 
Figure A-1: Details of primary sources showing self-identified attributes deemed to be low risk. 
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Annex B: Documents released under Freedom of Information 
This table sets out the details of the diplomatic telegrams and reporting 
released by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, under Freedom of 




FOI-1 18th September 
2006 
Afghanistan: the Sangin Shura. 
FOI-2 25th September 
2006 
Afghanistan: Helmand shuras - how far should we go? 
FOI-3 16th October 2006 Afghanistan: Sangin Update. 
FOI-4 2nd November 2006 Afghanistan: Sangin Shura. 
FOI-4A 2nd November 2006 Musa Qaleh and Sangin Agreements. 
FOI-5 6th November 2006 Afghanistan: Governor Daud. 
FOI-6 9th November 2006 Afghanistan: Meeting with Musa Qaleh elders. 
FOI-7 4th January 2007 Afghanistan: Governor Wafa in Kabul. 
FOI-8 26th August 2007 Afghanistan: Meeting with Helmand MPs, 23 August. 
FOI-9 March 2009 Extract from Rule of Law and Development in Regional 
Command (South) – The Way Forward. 
FOI-10 Undated (but from 
2010) 
Extract from PRT Weekly - Governance in Sangin 
District. 
FOI-11 22nd March 2010 Afghanistan/Helmand: Making Progress In Sangin. 
FOI-12 3rd August 2010 Sangin Update: CIVCAS allegations. 
FOI-13 9th December 2010 Afghanistan/Reintegration: Is the Ball Now Rolling in 
Helmand? 
FOI-14 14th December 2010 Afghanistan/Reintegration: Signs Of Progress In The 
Sangin Valley. 
FOI-15 12th January 2011 Sangin - Latest Developments. 
FOI-16 23rd January 2011 Sangin Peace Accord. 
FOI-16A 23rd January 2011 Sangin - Options For Civil Support. 
FOI-17 7th March 2011 Afghanistan/Helmand: Reintegration - Progress and 
Challenges. 
FOI-18 8th March 2011 Afghanistan/Helmand: Sangin Peace Agreement 
FOI-19 20th June 2011 Afghanistan/Helmand: Sangin Peace Accord Six 
Months On. 
FOI-20 Undated (estimated 
September 2011) 
Sangin Deputy District Governor on north Helmand 
District Governors' conference, GIRoA-elders dialogue 
FOI-21 3rd April 2012 The successful District Community Council election in 
Helmand's Sangin District represents a major 
milestone of progress. 
Figure B-1: UK Government documents released under the Freedom of 
Information Act (2000).
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Annex C: Pashtun tribal structures 
Figure C-1: ISAF’s own taxonomy of Pashtun tribal structure.1047  
                                                     
1047 ISAF Regional Command (South), "The Tribes of Southern Afghanistan," http://hansdevreij.com/, 2010, (accessed 20th June 2015).  The date for this analysis is not clear, but 
the (apparently Dutch) source indicates this data came from his personal archive. The Dutch led Regional Command (South) from 1st November 2008 – 1st November 2009. 
Overview 
 
This is a representation of the Pashtun 
tribal structure.  
 
The first distinction is between the two 
most numerous groups, the Durrani 
Federation (roughly south-western) and 
the Ghilzai (south-eastern). 
 
Within the Durrani Federation, the Zirak 
branch is historically the more favoured 
and prestigious, and the Kings of 
Afghanistan have come from these tribes. 
 
The Panjpai (literally, five fingers) is 
perceived to be the lesser branch, and 
central authority tends to exclude these. It 
is little surprise that the Taliban have heavy 
support within these tribes. 
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Annex D: The Times trails the possibility of an Accord in Sangin, August 2010 
Figure D-1: The Times headline in August 2010, five months before the Sangin Accord was announced.1048  
                                                     
1048 Coghlan, 13th August 2010, op. cit., 
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Annex E: Afghanistan’s ethnicities by region 
Figure E-1: Afghanistan’s ethnicities by region.1049
                                                     
1049 Map produced by the US Congressional Research Service, and published in Zachary Laub, "US Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounders: The Taliban in Afghanistan," 4th July 
2014, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551#(accessed 12th February 2015).  
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